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The Sales Law Review Group was appointed in November 2008 by the then Tánaiste 
and Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment, Mary Coughlan T.D. with the 
following terms of reference: 
 To review the general sales law provisions of the Sale of Goods Acts 1893 and 
1980 and to make recommendations for a scheme of legislation capable of 
providing a statutory sales law framework appropriate to modern-day 
conditions and needs. 
 
 To examine the provisions of the proposed EU Directive on consumer 
contractual rights in the light of existing Irish consumer law and assess its 
implications for Irish consumer rights and law, to contribute to the 
development of the Irish response to the proposed Directive, and to consider 
and make recommendations as to how the Directive and Irish contract and 
sales law may best be integrated. 
 
 To consider and make recommendations on other matters related to Irish sales 
law and the common law and statutory framework of that law, including 
dispute resolution mechanisms in Ireland.   
 
In accordance with these terms of reference, the Review Group published a position 
paper on the proposed Consumer Rights Directive in June 2009.1    
 
This is the Group’s final report and deals with the other elements of our terms of 
reference as well as with matters relating to the implementation of the Consumer 
Rights Directive, the text of which has recently been agreed and which is expected to 
come into force in October 2011.  We have decided, however, not to deal with the 
issue of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in this Report.  Since the Review 
Group’s establishment, these mechanisms have been the subject of a report, including 
a draft Mediation and Conciliation Bill, from the Law Reform Commission in 2010,2 
and of a consultation paper from the European Commission in 2011.3  We saw no 
advantage in duplicating the work undertaken by the Law Reform Commission in 
particular, or in adding further to what is already a lengthy Report.   
 
                                                 
1 Position Paper on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on Consumer Rights, http://www.djei.ie/publications/commerce/2009/slrgcrdpositionpaper.pdf  
2 Law Reform Commission.  2010.  Report on Alternative Dispute Resolution: Conciliation and 
Mediation (LRC 98-2010).   
3 European Commission.  2010.  Consultation Paper on the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
as a Means to Resolve Disputes Relating to Commercial Practices and Transactions in the EU.   
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It was envisaged on the establishment of the Review Group that our work would be 
finished by mid-2010. In accordance with this time frame, we had substantially 
completed our deliberations and finalised our conclusions and recommendations by 
the third quarter of 2010. In view of the uncertainty then surrounding the provisions 
of the proposed Consumer Rights Directive, and the major implications of those 
provisions for Irish sale of goods law, the Chairman of the Review Group wrote in 
September 2010 to the then Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Innovation, Batt 
O’Keefe, T.D., indicating the Group’s preference to defer submission of its report 
until the final shape of the proposed Directive had been clarified. The Minister agreed 
that the proposed deferral was a sensible course given the major direct implications of 
the Directive for core provisions of Irish consumer sales law and the significant 
indirect implications for Irish commercial sales law. At the time, it was thought that 
clarification of the contents of the proposed Directive would be forthcoming by the 
end of 2010. In the event, though a general approach to the Directive was approved at 
Council in early 2011, further discussions on the proposal had then to take place with 
the European Parliament and these did not reach a conclusion until late June. The 
proposed Directive is expected to be formally adopted by the Competitiveness 
Council in September and to come into force in October, following which Member 
States will have two years in which to implement it.  Though we regret the delay in 
submitting our report, knowledge of the final provisions of the Consumer Rights 
Directive was of considerable benefit to the Group in putting the final touches to our 
conclusions and recommendations in a number of key areas.    
 
(Signed)4 
                                           Robert Clark (Chairman) 
Tony Burke                                                                                       Judy Dunne  
Caterina Gardiner                                                                             Roderick Maguire 
Sean Murphy                                                                                    Kevin O’Higgins 
Nathan Reilly                                                                                    Fidelma White        
 
 
                                                 
4 Richard Nesbitt S.C. participated in the work of the Group to mid-2009 and contributed to the 
Position Paper on the proposed Consumer Rights Directive, but was unable to participate thereafter. 
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SUMMARY 
CHAPTER ONE  SALES LAW SINCE 1893 
The Sale of Goods 1893 and the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980  
1. The Sale of Goods Act 1893 has been the cornerstone of Irish sales law for over a 
century. Its durability is due to two principal factors.  First, many of its provisions 
take the form of default rules. As originally enacted, the Act also gave contracting 
parties a free hand to waive or alter the terms that it inserted into contracts of sale. 
Though, following an amendment made by the 1980 Act, these terms cannot now be 
altered in the case of consumer sales and can be altered only where shown to be ‘fair 
and reasonable’ in commercial sales, the legislation still affords a substantial degree 
of latitude to the parties to commercial contracts. Secondly, in providing that, unless 
inconsistent with the statutory provisions, the rules of the common law continue to 
apply to contracts of sale, the 1893 Act left ample space for the evolution of sales law 
in line with the general development of the common law relating to obligations.    
 
2. The first amendment of the 1893 Act had to await the passing of the Sale of Goods 
and Supply of Services Act 1980, an enactment whose main purpose was to 
strengthen the protections available to consumers. Though the 1980 Act was a 
progressive piece of legislation in a number of respects, it took the form of additions 
and amendments to the 1893 Act rather than its repeal and replacement.  In order to 
understand the statutory rules governing contracts of sale, therefore, it is necessary to 
read the original Act of 1893, the sections substituted in the 1893 Act by the 1980 
Act, the textual and non-textual amendments to the 1893 Act made by the 1980 Act 
and other enactments, as well as the new provisions of the 1980 Act – a state of affairs 
not in keeping with the principles of better regulation. The focus of the 1980 Act on 
enhancing the protections available to consumers also left much of the parent Act 
untouched; in all, fifty three of the 1893 Act’s sixty two sections were unaffected by 
the amendments effected by the 1980 Act.   
 
European Union Consumer Legislation and its Impact  
3.  From the mid-1980s, the dynamic for change in Irish consumer legislation came 
from the European Union which adopted a number of Directives in the area of 
consumer contract law, notably Directive 1999/44/EC on Consumer Sales and 
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Guarantees. Though the Directive overlapped substantially with the consumer sales 
provisions of the 1893 and 1980 Acts, it was transposed into Irish law as a stand-alone 
statutory instrument, resulting in a confusing and, in some respects, contradictory 
legislative framework. While several examples of the discrepancies between the 
domestic and EU enactments can be cited, the sharpest difference between the two 
regimes lies in the remedies available to the consumer for goods not in conformity, 
with the contract.   
 
Other Developments  
4. In recent decades, innovations in information and communications technologies, in 
particular the emergence of digital services, have presented challenges for the Sale of 
Goods Acts of a kind that could not have been envisaged in 1893 or even in 1980.  
These centre on the appropriate basis for the classification and regulation of contracts 
for the supply of software and digital content, often supplied in immaterial form over 
the Internet.   
 
The Need for Reform 
5. The time for a thorough revision of the 1893 and 1980 Acts and the related 
secondary legislation is now long overdue. There is a need to distinguish between 
legislative provisions that no longer serve a necessary or useful purpose in modern 
conditions and those that that remain relevant but require modification.  There is a 
need also to integrate the provisions of domestic and EU legislation in a more 
coherent and accessible way than has been done to date, and to achieve a workable 
balance between the partly common, partly separate requirements of the provisions 
governing consumer and commercial contracts of sale while maintaining, as far as 
possible, a unified sales law regime.    
 
CHAPTER TWO SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893 INTERPRETATION AND 
SCOPE  
The Definition of Goods 
6. The definitions in the 1893 Act, particularly that of ‘goods’, govern the scope of the 
legislation. The wording of the definition of ‘goods’- ‘all chattels personal other than 
things in action and money’ – is archaic and obscure. Though similar in substance, the 
core of the definition in the EU Directive on Consumer Sales and Guarantees - the 
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specification that goods are tangible and moveable – is clearer and less dated than that 
in the 1893 Act and should be the basis of the definition in future legislation.   
 
The Classification of Contracts for the Supply of Software 
7. Considerable uncertainty surrounds the law on the classification of contracts for the 
supply of software and digital content.  Though there is no Irish authority in the 
matter, UK case law suggests that, if software is to be treated as goods, it must be 
contained on a tangible medium. Where software or other digital content is 
downloaded from the Internet or transferred to the end user by e-mail, no such 
tangible medium is involved.  This leads to the unsatisfactory situation that the law 
applicable to a certain transaction will depend on whether software has been delivered 
on a physical medium such as a disk or a CD (in which case it could be classified as a 
sale of goods) or whether it has been downloaded online (in which case it could be 
categorised as a supply of services, or as a contract sui generis to which the statutory 
rules do not apply). The classification of a transaction as ‘goods’ or ‘services’ is 
significant because the duties and liabilities of the seller of goods and the supplier of 
services are different; the rules governing the exclusion of the implied statutory terms 
also differ between the two types of contract.     
 
8.  It is plainly unsatisfactory that the legal rights and remedies enjoyed by the 
purchasers of software of similar content vary with the medium on which the software 
is supplied.  The most straightforward way of addressing the divergent legal treatment 
of software supplied via different media would be to regard all forms of software as 
goods for the purposes of sale of goods legislation. We gave full consideration to a 
possible legislative amendment along these lines but concluded, for a number of 
reasons, that it was not a change we could recommend in present circumstances. 
Though we are not in a position to propose an overall solution to the legal 
classification of software and digital content, we have sought where possible in our 
recommendations to minimise the differences in the legal treatment of contracts of 
sale and contracts for the supply of services. These changes will serve to reduce the 
anomalies that currently exist where software is supplied through different media. 
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The Classification of Electricity, Gas and Water  
9. There is no clear-cut answer to the question as to whether electricity, gas and water 
should be defined as ‘goods’ for the purposes of sale of goods legislation.  The 1893 
Act offers no specific guidance on the issue, while Sale of Goods and Supply of 
Services Act 1980 treats electricity as the supply of a service. The EU Directive on 
Consumer Sales and Guarantees expressly excludes electricity from the definition of 
‘consumer goods’ and includes gas and water only where sold in a limited volume or 
set quantity such as bottled water or cylinders of gas. We think that, other than where 
sold in this way, the arguments for defining these utilities as services is, on balance, 
more persuasive. 
 
Categories of Goods in the 1893 Act  
10. The 1893 Act contains two classifications of goods, namely ‘existing’ and ‘future’ 
goods, and ‘specific’ and ‘unascertained’ goods.  ‘Existing goods’ are those ‘owned 
or possessed by the seller’ while ‘future goods’ refer to those ‘to be manufactured or 
acquired by the seller after the making of the contract of sale.’ ‘Specific goods’ are 
defined by the Act as ‘goods identified and agreed upon at the time a contract of sale 
is made’, for example, a particular car with a specified registration number. Though 
the Act does not define ‘unascertained goods’, these comprise goods not identified 
and agreed upon at the time the contract is made. This two-fold categorisation is not a 
model of clarity, particularly in regard to the overlap between the respective binary 
categories.  While we have some sympathy with the view that it amounts to a case of 
statutory over-classification, we have decided on balance against recommending 
substantial change to either of the Act’s classifications of goods. A number of minor 
changes are recommended however in order to bring greater clarity to these 
categorisations.  
 
CHAPTER THREE  SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893 FORMATION OF THE 
CONTRACT  
The Contract of Sale  
11. The definition of contract of sale in the recently agreed Directive on Consumer 
Rights includes ‘any contract having as its object both goods and services’ and, in 
thus treating mixed-purpose contracts as contracts of sale, is at odds with the approach 
of the common law to the distinction between a sale of goods and a supply of 
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services. While the definition in the Directive will have to be implemented in the case 
of consumer contracts of sale, there is no requirement to apply it to commercial sales 
contracts. Though we are in favour as far as possible of having common rules for 
consumer and commercial transactions, we do not consider, on balance, that the 
definition of commercial contracts of sale should include mixed-purpose contracts.    
 
Capacity to Buy and Sell: the Necessaries Rule 
12. Where necessary goods (as distinct from services) have been sold and delivered to 
a minor or a person incompetent to contract by virtue of mental incapacity or 
drunkenness, section 2 of the 1893 Act requires that he pay a reasonable price for 
them. ‘Necessaries’ as the Act terms them, are not limited to essentials such as food, 
clothing or medicine but can include other items as long as they are not purely 
ornamental.  In its 2006 Report on Vulnerable Adults and the Law, the Law Reform 
Commission proposed an amended necessaries rule whereby an adult who lacked 
capacity to contract would be obliged to pay the supplier a reasonable sum for 
necessaries supplied at his or her request. It also recommended a new definition of 
‘necessaries’ that would include services as well as goods supplied under non-sale 
contracts. We are in agreement with the Commission’s reformulation of the 
necessaries rule and recommend that a similar provision should be included in future 
legislation on the sale and supply of goods and the supply of services.  
 
Formalities of the Contract  
13. Section 4 of the 1893 Act, which has its origin in the Statute of Frauds 1695, 
provides that a contract of sale for the value of €12.70 or more is not enforceable in 
the absence of a note or memorandum in writing unless the buyer has accepted and 
received part of the goods or given something in earnest for payment. Reform of this 
provision is long overdue, and the sole matter for decision is whether it should be 
repealed as has been done in most jurisdictions or substantially recast and updated as 
has been done in the United States. While a large increase in the monetary threshold 
and a widening of the bases for enforceability would address some of the concerns 
raised by the present rule, we do not consider that there is a convincing case for the 
retention of even a modified provision of this kind.   
 11
Perished Goods  
14. Section 6 of the 1893 Act deals with the situation where, at the time the contract is 
made, specific goods have perished without the knowledge of the seller, while section 
7 deals with the situation where such goods perish after the making of the contract but 
before the property in them has transferred to the buyer.  The Act does not define 
‘perish’ and, while the term might suggest that it denotes the actual destruction of 
goods, case law has held goods to have perished where they have ceased to exist in a 
commercial sense. Future legislation should include a definition of the term to this 
effect. As it is unclear whether section 55 of the 1893 Act (which permits the parties 
to negative or vary any right, duty or liability that arises under a contract of sale by 
implication of law) applies to section 6, future legislation should clarify that parties to 
a commercial contract, though not a consumer contract, can vary the application of 
the section.   
 
The Price  
15. Section 8 of the 1893 Act provides that, where the price in a contract of sale is not 
fixed by the contract or in some other way prescribed by the section, the buyer must 
pay a reasonable price. Section 9 provides that, where there is an agreement to sell the 
goods on the terms that the price is to be fixed by the valuation of a third party and 
this party cannot or does not make the valuation, the agreement is avoided. It would 
be preferable to stipulate that the buyer should pay a reasonable price for the goods in 
this event, and future legislation should provide accordingly.   
 
Auction Sales  
16. Section 58 of the 1893 Act codifies certain common law rules governing aspects 
of auction sales. There is merit in our view in also incorporating in statute the case 
law rulings that a notification that a sale by auction is not subject to a reserve price 
constitutes a collateral contract on the part of the auctioneer to sell the goods to the 
highest bidder. Future legislation should accordingly provide, first, that, in a sale by 
auction without reserve, a lot cannot be withdrawn from the sale by the owner or 
auctioneer after the auctioneer has called for bids unless no bid is made within a 
reasonable period of time. Secondly, where goods are stated to be sold at auction 
‘without reserve’, that statement shall be binding upon the auctioneer once bidding 
commences. An agreement between bidders to form a ‘ring’ - that is, to refrain from 
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bidding in competition with each other in order to depress the price - is not illegal at 
common law. While we considered the  introduction of specific criminal law 
provisions to regulate this practice, we concluded that it appears to be adequately 
covered by the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001. There is merit, 
however, in introducing statutory provisions dealing with the rights of the seller of 
goods in such a case to avoid the contract and with the joint and several liability of the 
parties to a non-bidding agreement to make good to the seller any loss he has 
sustained.    
 
17. The courts in Ireland and in the United Kingdom have yet to rule on whether 
auctions conducted by means of online platforms come within the scope of section 58 
of the 1893 Act on auction sales. In our view, the central issue is not whether online 
auctions are auctions within the meaning of the Act, but rather what type of 
provisions, including those in section 58, would serve a useful purpose in regulating 
this type of transaction.  We consider that some of the existing provisions – in 
particular those restricting the right of sellers to bid or to employ others to bid – 
should apply to online auctions.  The application of other elements of section 58 to 
online auctions is less straightforward and should be assessed following consultation 
with industry and consumer interests. 
 
Contract Formation and Sale of Goods Legislation  
18. Though the Sale of Goods Acts contain no general provisions on contract 
formation, we gave some consideration as to whether future legislation should include 
rules on key aspects of contract formation such as offer and acceptance, the ‘battle of 
the forms’, and parol evidence along the lines of the provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods or the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference. As such a reform would involve a fundamental change in the structure of 
sale of goods legislation of a kind unsuited to the Irish legal system, it is not one that 
we can recommend.     
 
CHAPTER FOUR  CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES  
The Implication of Terms by Statute  
19. Though the rights that buyers enjoy by virtue of the implied quality and other 
terms in the Sale of Goods Acts are rights conferred by statute, breaches of their 
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provisions do not involve a breach of the Acts per se. As the terms are inserted into 
the contract between seller and buyer, their breach takes the form of a breach of the 
contract between the parties. It has been suggested that this approach injects an 
additional layer of complexity into the law and that the imposition of statutory 
requirements on a seller vis-à-vis goods sold, independent of an underlying agreement 
between the parties, would provide a simpler and sounder basis for consumer rights. 
We are not persuaded that placing such duties on a seller other than through the 
implication of terms into the contract is a change worth pursuing. In our view, 
similarly, the presumption of conformity with the contract approach employed in the 
Directive on Consumer Sales and Guarantees affords a less satisfactory basis for 
consumer rights than the implied terms approach adopted in the Sale of Goods Acts, 
and the latter should be retained in future legislation.  
 
Conditions and Warranties 
20. The 1893 Act divides contract terms into conditions, breach of which may give 
rise to a right to treat the contract as repudiated, and warranties, breach of which may 
give rise to a claim for damages but not to a right to reject the goods and treat the 
contract as repudiated. Most of the terms implied into contracts of sale by the Act 
have the status of conditions. The common law distinction between conditions and 
warranties that was incorporated in the 1893 Act related to contract terms at the time 
the contract was made and, as such, did not require regard to be had to the actual 
effects of any subsequent breach. The decision in 1962 of the English Court of Appeal 
in Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha signalled a major 
change in twentieth century judicial thinking in holding that the main obligations 
under a contract could be neither a condition nor a warranty, but belong instead to a 
separate category of innominate terms, the applicable remedy for breach of which 
would depend on the nature and effect of the breach. In our view, the abolition of the 
distinction between conditions and warranties and its replacement by the category of 
innominate term would be ill-advised on grounds of both policy and practice. The 
condition/warranty dichotomy recognises that some contract terms are more important 
than others and should attract more potent remedies. Classifying all terms as 
innominate, the remedies for which would depend on the nature and effects of a 
breach, would create commercial uncertainty and, in all likelihood, lead to more 
litigation. Though the present statutory rules governing termination rights under the 
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Sale of Goods Act should broadly be maintained, future legislation should include a 
provision restricting the right of buyers in non-consumer sales to reject goods for 
slight breach of the implied terms.  
 
Sale by Description  
21. Section 13 of the 1893 Act provides that, in the case of a contract for the sale of 
goods by description, there is an implied condition that the goods shall correspond 
with the description. In the view of some commentators, section 13, as it has come to 
be interpreted by the courts, merely states as an implied term an obligation that is 
central to the contract as an express term, namely to deliver the agreed goods under 
the contract. Other than labelling the obligation as a condition, the section, on this 
view, does nothing that is not also done by section 27 of the 1893 Act in stipulating 
that it is the duty of the seller to deliver the goods in accordance with the terms of the 
contract. While we have some sympathy with this view, we cannot go as far as to 
recommend that future legislation should dispense with a provision on 
correspondence with description. Section 13 provides the parties with a convenient 
reminder of a key contractual obligation and should be retained.   
 
Implied Undertakings as to Quality or Fitness  
22. The seller’s obligations as to the quality of goods are at the heart of the law of 
sale.  Section 14 of the 1893 Act, as amended by the 1980 Act, provides that goods 
are of ‘merchantable quality’ if they are as fit for the purpose or purposes for which 
goods of that kind are commonly bought and as durable as it is reasonable to expect 
having regard to any description applied to them, the price (if relevant) and all the 
other circumstances.  The term ‘merchantable quality’ is, in our view, outdated and 
unsuited to modern day legislation. On balance, we think that ‘satisfactory quality’, 
the wording used in the UK Sale of Goods Act since 1994, is preferable to the 
‘acceptable quality’ wording used in Australian and New Zealand legislation or any of 
the other possible options.  
 
23. When it comes to the substance of the statutory rules on the quality of goods, the 
principal alternative to the present section 14 is the provision that has applied in UK 
legislation since 1994, and is broadly similar to that in consumer legislation in 
Australia and New Zealand.  This states that goods are of satisfactory quality if they 
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meet the standard that a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory taking account 
of any description of the goods, the price (if relevant) and all the other relevant 
circumstances.  Though there is no great difference of substance between this 
formulation and that in the 1980 Act, the adoption of the definition used in the UK, 
Australian and New Zealand statutes would give us the benefit of being able to draw 
on the greater volume of case law from these jurisdictions. An indicative list of the 
following specific aspects of quality should apply alongside the general definition in 
appropriate cases: fitness for all the purposes for which goods of the kind in question 
are commonly supplied; appearance and finish; freedom from minor defects; safety; 
and durability.   
 
Sale by Sample 
24. The provisions on sale by sample at section 15 of the 1893 should be amended in 
future legislation to provide expressly for sale by model. It is common in consumer 
transactions for prospective buyers to be shown a model or specimen of the goods 
rather than a sample, and a provision along these lines is also required by the 
Directive on Consumer Sales and Guarantees.   
 
Implied Warranty for Spare Parts and Servicing  
25. Section 12 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 provides that 
there is an implied warranty that spare parts and an adequate after-sale service will be 
made available by the seller in such circumstances and for such period as are stated in 
an offer, description or advertisement by the seller on behalf of the manufacturer or 
on his own behalf. We gave some consideration to the adoption of a provision that 
would afford a stronger entitlement to an after-sale service and the availability of 
spare parts, but concluded that this would not be a practical proposition. Though 
Section 12 has had a limited impact in practice, it can still serve a purpose in 
enhancing the rights of buyers and should be retained in future legislation.   
 
Implied Condition on Sale of Motor Vehicles  
26. Section 13 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 inserts into 
contracts for the sale of motor vehicles a condition that the vehicle be free from 
defects that would render it a danger to the public, including persons travelling in the 
vehicle.  The section further provides that a person using the vehicle with the consent 
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of the buyer, who suffers loss as a result of breach of the implied condition, may 
maintain an action for damages against the seller as if that person were the buyer. 
Though the case for statutory provisions of this kind may not be as strong as in the 
past due to developments such as compulsory vehicle testing, their retention remains 
justified in our view.  
 
CHAPTER FIVE  EXCLUSION OF IMPLIED TERMS AND CONDITIONS  
27. As originally enacted, section 55 of the 1893 Act provided that any right, duty or 
liability arising under a contract of sale by implication of law could be negatived or 
varied by agreement between the parties, by the course of dealing between them, or 
by usage of a kind binding both parties to the contract. The widespread resort by 
sellers to exemption clauses – that is, contractual provisions which oust or qualify the 
express or implied terms of the contract – came to be seen as a significant problem, 
particularly in standard form consumer contracts. In response, the courts sought to 
curb the use of exemption clauses by means of the doctrine of fundamental breach, 
and held that such clauses could not protect against liability where there had been a 
‘fundamental breach’ of the contract. While the doctrine was expressed as a corollary 
of the rules of contract construction in some cases, in others it appeared to have the 
status of an independent rule of law. Though judicial repudiation of this approach in 
Ireland must await a Supreme Court decision, a number of High Court cases have 
cited with approval the contrary UK case law to the effect that application of 
exclusion clauses to breaches of contract is always dependent on the construction of 
the contract.  As many of the cases in which fundamental breach was applied were 
sales contracts, argued before the statutory reforms of exemption clauses were in 
place, we think that the ‘fundamental breach as a rule of law’ approach has outlived 
its usefulness. The rule should accordingly be abrogated in the new legislation 
recommended to replace the 1893 and 1980 Acts.  
 
28. Following its amendment by the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980, 
section 55 provides that any contract term exempting the implied statutory terms 
applicable to contracts of sale is void where the buyer ‘deals as consumer’ and, with 
the exception of the implied terms as to title which cannot be excluded in any 
circumstances, is enforceable only where shown to be fair and reasonable in 
commercial contracts of sale. Exemption clauses in consumer contracts are also 
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subject to regulation under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1995 
and the Consumer Sales and Guarantees Regulations 2003. The broad approach to the 
regulation of exemption clauses in contracts of sale at section 55 of the 1893 Act 
remains valid in its essentials, namely that such clauses should be prohibited in 
consumer contracts and subject to a test of fairness in business contracts. The present 
situation under which exemption clauses in consumer contracts are regulated in 
different ways under different enactments, however, is manifestly unsatisfactory. In 
our view, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations are the most 
appropriate vehicle for the regulation of exclusion clauses in consumer contracts. 
Such clauses should be deemed to be automatically unfair under the Regulations 
rather than being assessable by reference to the criteria governing fairness. 
 
‘Deals as Consumer’ 
29. The ‘deals as consumer’ formulation used to govern the application of the rules on 
exemption clauses at section 55 of the 1893 Act and other provisions of the 1893 and 
1980 Acts is not fit for purpose and should be repealed.  The definition of ‘consumer’ 
for the purposes of the application of exemption clauses and other provisions in future 
legislation should refer to a natural person acting for purposes unrelated to his or her 
business.   
 
CHAPTER SIX  TRANSFER OF PROPERTY AS BETWEEN SELLER AND 
BUYER 
30. The rules regulating the transfer of property in contracts of sale are set out in 
sections 16-20 of the 1893 Act. The pre-eminence accorded the transfer of property 
by the Act has been the subject of critical comment, and it has been suggested that the 
US Uniform Commercial Code which makes the transfer of possession, rather than 
property, the pivotal event for determining the rights and obligations of the parties 
would offer a more coherent and practical foundation for a modern sales law regime. 
In the absence of evidence that the existing provisions are a cause of substantial 
practical difficulty or of any appreciable demand for change from business or 
consumer interests, fundamental reform of this element of the Sale of Goods Acts is 
not a practical proposition at the present time in our opinion. Though the UCC model 
has undoubted merits, it would be wrong, moreover, to assume that it would resolve 
all of the problems that have arisen in this area of the law.     
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The Passing of Property in Unascertained Goods 
31. Section 16 of the 1893 Act lays down the fundamental and mandatory rule that 
property cannot pass until goods are ascertained. Case law on the section has 
highlighted the vulnerable position of pre-paying buyers of goods in bulk in that, as 
the goods remain unascertained, the buyers acquire no proprietary rights over them 
while they remain part of the larger bulk. If the seller becomes insolvent, a buyer in 
this position can only claim repayment of the price as an unsecured creditor. The issue 
was addressed in the UK by the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995 which 
provides that, where there is a contract for the sale of a specified quantity of 
unascertained goods forming part of an identified bulk, a buyer who has paid for some 
or all of the contract goods obtains an undivided share in the bulk and becomes a 
tenant in common of the whole. The Act has provided a model for legislative change 
in a number of other common law jurisdictions. Its provisions are balanced and 
workable, and in our opinion should be adopted in future Irish legislation. 
 
Consumer Buyers and Insolvent Sellers 
32. Insolvencies are a not uncommon occurrence in the retail sector and, though most 
do not lead to losses for consumers, serious detriment can occur where consumers 
have paid for goods in advance of delivery. In this situation, the goods will normally 
be unascertained, and the pre-paying buyer will have no proprietary right over them as 
a result. His payment will be used, together with the insolvent seller’s other assets, to 
pay the creditors, and he will rank as an unsecured creditor behind the preferred and 
secured creditors when it comes to the distribution of the assets. In British Columbia, 
by contrast, the Sale of Goods Act 1996 gives pre-paying buyers a mandatory, non-
possessory lien over the seller’s goods.  The lien is for the amount the buyer has paid 
towards the purchase price of the goods and is against all goods in possession of the 
seller that correspond with the contract description, and the property in which has not 
passed to another buyer.  Though the mandatory lien approach has merits, it is not one 
that we can recommend. A similar result could be achieved more simply by giving 
consumer buyers preferential status, like employees as regards unpaid wages, in 
insolvencies. The matters at issue are, for a number of reasons, more appropriately 
considered in the context of the overall rules governing insolvencies than in that of the 
rules on the passing of property in contracts of sale. 
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Reservation of Right of Disposal  
33. Section 19 of the 1893 Act permits the seller of goods to include a term in the 
contract of sale that property in the goods will not pass to the buyer until certain 
conditions are fulfilled.  The most common such term is a clause stipulating that the 
seller retains title to the goods supplied to the buyer until they have been paid for. 
Retention of title clauses have given rise to challenges in the courts and been the 
subject of reforms of the law regulating security interests in personal property in some 
countries and, in others, including Ireland, and the UK, of calls and proposals for 
reform. Experience in other jurisdictions suggests that it is preferable to address these 
issues in the broader context of personal property security reform rather than in the 
narrower context of sale of goods legislation. While we are not unsympathetic to a 
broader programme of reform along these lines, a recommendation to this effect is 
outside our terms of reference.   
 
The Passing of Risk 
34. Section 20 of the 1893 Act provides that, unless otherwise agreed between the 
parties,  risk passes with property. The recently agreed EU Directive on Consumer 
Rights will require a change to the effect that risk passes with delivery where the 
trader dispatches the goods to the consumer, and it would be anomalous and 
confusing to have a different rule for other consumer sales contracts. Though the 
matter is less clear-cut in the case of commercial transactions, we think, on balance, 
that a default provision linking risk with delivery rather than with the passing of 
property would also be a more appropriate rule for commercial contracts of sale.   
 
CHAPTER SEVEN  TRANSFER OF TITLE  
The Nemo Dat Rule and its Exceptions 
35. Section 21 of the 1893 Act restates the fundamental rule of property law that no 
one can transfer a better title than he himself has - nemo dat quod non habet – thereby 
protecting security of ownership. Over a long period of time, a number of common 
law and statutory exceptions to the rule have been developed in order to protect bona 
fide purchasers and thereby encourage commercial activity by reinforcing the security 
of sale transactions. Sections 21-23 & 25 of the 1893 Act contain seven separate 
exceptions to the nemo dat rule. Further exceptions can be found in the Factors Act 
1889 and the Consumer Credit Act 1995, amongst others.  
 20
36. The main general criticism levelled at these sections of the 1893 Act is that the 
exceptions to the nemo dat rule are over-complicated, lack an underlying and unifying 
rationale, and overlap in ways that are inconsistent and incoherent.  These criticisms 
have led to suggestions that the rule and its exceptions should be repealed and 
replaced by a single more coherent principle. While the current Irish rules on conflict 
of title seek to strike a balance between original owners and innocent third-party 
purchasers, other jurisdictions such as France and Germany take what appears to be 
the more straightforward approach of favouring the innocent third-party purchaser 
over the original owner. In our view, the replacement of the existing statutory 
provisions in this way would not offer an appropriate or balanced basis for reform. An 
alternative reform option focuses on the all-or-nothing nature of the current rules on 
conflict of title, and proposes  that the loss which occurs when an innocent owner and 
an innocent bona fide purchaser are left in a conflict of title should be apportioned 
between them. While we are sympathetic to the aims of this approach, it would be 
impractical and complicated to implement, particularly where a string of transactions 
was involved. Though we do not recommend the replacement of the existing statutory 
provisions by an alternative general framework, a number of specific amendments are 
recommended to sections 22-23 and 25-26 of the Act, including the repeal of the 
market overt exception at section 22.   
 
CHAPTER EIGHT DELIVERY OF THE GOODS  
Modalities of Delivery 
37. The rules regulating the time, place and other aspects of the delivery of goods at 
sections 29 and 32-33 of the 1893 Act are relatively straightforward and have given 
rise to little or no significant case law. The recently agreed Directive on Consumer 
Rights will contain a default rule applicable to all consumer contracts of sale requiring 
the trader to deliver the goods by transferring physical possession or control of them 
to the consumer without undue delay, but not later than thirty days, from the 
conclusion of the contract. This will require the amendment, in the case of consumer 
contracts of sale, of the rule at section 29(2) of the 1893 Act requiring delivery within 
a reasonable time where the contract requires the goods to be sent to the buyer. There 
will also be a need in this event to amend the rule at section 32(1) of the Act which 
provides that delivery of the goods to a carrier, whether named by the buyer or not, 
for the purpose of transmission to the buyer is, prima facie, deemed to be a delivery of 
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goods to the buyer. Though our preference is for common rules to apply to consumer 
and commercial contracts as far as possible, we do not favour the application of a 
thirty-day default delivery rule to commercial contracts. A specific provision of this 
kind, even one of a presumptive character, is unsuited to the diversity of 
circumstances and requirements found among delivery arrangements in commercial 
contracts. The issues regarding the retention or replacement of the provision at section 
32(1) that delivery of the goods to a carrier for the purpose of transmission to the 
buyer is prima facie deemed to be a delivery of goods to the buyer are also less clear-
cut in the case of commercial contracts of sale. We consider, on balance, that the 
existing rule remains appropriate to commercial sales contracts and should be 
retained.   
 
Delivery of the Wrong Quantity  
38. Section 30(1) of the 1893 Act provides that, where the seller delivers a lesser 
quantity of goods than that contracted for, the buyer may either reject the delivery or 
accept and pay for it at the contract rate. Section 30(2) provides that, where the seller 
delivers a greater quantity than that contracted for, the buyer may either accept the 
contract quantity and reject the rest, reject the whole delivery, or accept the whole 
delivery and pay for it at the contract rate. It can reasonably be argued that the buyer’s 
right to reject the goods, regardless of the extent of the shortfall or excess, is 
disproportionate. In response to concern of this kind, the UK Sale of Goods Act was 
amended in 1994 to provide that the right to reject for delivery of a wrong quantity 
would not apply in commercial contracts of sale where the excess or shortfall was so 
slight that it would be unreasonable to reject the whole of the goods. This amendment 
is sensible and balanced in our view and should be adopted in future Irish legislation.  
 
Mixed Delivery and Partial Rejection 
39. Section 30(3) of the 1893 Act provides that, where the seller delivers the contract 
goods mixed with goods of a different description, the buyer may either accept the 
goods which match the contract description and reject the rest, or reject the whole 
delivery.  This provision constitutes the sole exception to the bar on partial rejection 
of defective goods in non-severable contracts which derives from section 11(3) of the 
Act. We are not persuaded by the rationale for either the Act’s broad prohibition of a 
right of partial rejection, or the single exception to it for goods of mixed description. 
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Future legislation should accordingly replace the limited right of partial rejection for 
goods of mixed description at section 30(3) with a general right of partial rejection for 
goods not in conformity with the contract. There should be an exception to this right 
in respect of what are termed commercial units, that is goods whose division would 
materially impair the value of the goods or the character of the unit, for example a 
multi-volume set of encyclopaedias. 
 
CHAPTER NINE  EXAMINATION, ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION OF 
THE GOODS 
Acceptance    
40. As the buyer’s acceptance of the goods annuls his right to reject them, the 
provisions on acceptance at sections 34 and 35 of the 1893 Act are pivotal to the 
remedies available to the buyer for goods not in conformity with the contract.  Section 
35 provides that acceptance is deemed to occur when: (i) the buyer intimates to the 
seller that he has accepted the goods; (ii) the buyer does any act in relation to the 
goods that is inconsistent with the ownership of the seller; and (iii), without good and 
sufficient reason, the buyer retains the goods without intimating to the seller that he 
has rejected them. A number of changes are recommended to the first two heads of 
acceptance to clarify and rebalance them. The 1980 Act substituted the ‘without good 
and sufficient reason’ test in the third and most important head of acceptance in 
section 35 for the original provision in the 1893 Act that the buyer was deemed to 
have accepted the goods ‘when after the lapse of a reasonable time’ he retained them 
without intimating rejection. This amendment was prompted by concerns arising from 
UK case law that the original provision had been interpreted in ways that were not in 
the interests of consumers. The main problem with the present wording of this head of 
acceptance, however, is that it is couched in such general terms that it offers little or 
no guidance to buyers and sellers as to when acceptance occurs and the right of 
rejection is lost.  Insofar as this provision can be interpreted, moreover, as providing a 
long-term right to reject, we would have serious reservations about it. Though 
superficially attractive in principle, such a right would give rise to major issues and 
difficulties in practice.  
 
41. In our deliberations on this question, we have had the benefit of the detailed 
review of consumer remedies for faulty goods undertaken by the English and Scottish 
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Law Commissions in 2008-09. After considering a range of options, the Commissions 
recommended that the normal period for the exercise of the right to reject should be 
thirty days. A standard period of this duration would be easy to publicise, understand 
and apply, and would afford sufficient time in most cases for the buyer to examine the 
goods and test them in use. Though a thirty day period would be appropriate in most 
cases, it was necessary to make allowance for circumstances in which a longer or 
shorter rejection period was justified. It should be open accordingly: (i) to the seller to 
argue that the right to reject should be exercised in less than thirty days where the 
goods are of a kind that would be expected to perish within a shorter time, and (ii) to 
the consumer to argue that the right to reject should be exercisable for a period longer 
than thirty days where it is reasonably foreseeable by both parties that a longer period 
would be necessary to inspect the goods. 42. In our view, the recommendations of the 
Law Commissions for a normal thirty day rejection period, with provision for a 
shorter or longer period in specified circumstances, would bring a substantially 
greater degree of clarity and certainty to the operation of the remedies regime. Though 
the Law Commissions’ recommendations were put forward in the context of a review 
of consumer remedies, we consider that, if applied as default rules, they could 
function no less advantageously in the context of commercial contracts of sale. This 
would also have the merit of maintaining broadly common rules for consumer and 
commercial sales. This recommendation should be reviewed, however, if evidence 
emerges that the proposed rule is unsuited to certain types of commercial contract. 
 
Remedies under Domestic and EU Legislation  
43. Under the European Communities (Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer 
Goods and Associated Guarantees) Regulations 2003, repair or replacement are the 
first-tier remedies for goods not in conformity with the contract. The second-tier 
remedies of price reduction or rescission of the contract can be invoked only where 
the consumer is not entitled to the first-tier remedies, or where the seller cannot 
provide these remedies within a reasonable time or without significance 
inconvenience to the consumer. By contrast, the remedial scheme under the Sale of 
Goods Acts gives primacy to the right to reject the goods and repudiate the contract. 
The co-existence of parallel remedies arising by virtue of differing regimes, of 
domestic and EU origin, is one of the main issues in need of reform. Their integration 
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is essential and should take the form of a provision for the following three remedies of 
first resort to be exercised at the choice of the consumer:  
 termination of the contract and full refund of the price within a normal thirty-
day period or, in specified circumstances, a longer or shorter period; 
 replacement of the goods; 
 repair of the goods.  
Where the consumer opts in the first instance for repair or replacement, he would be 
entitled to proceed to the remedies of termination and full refund or price reduction 
where: 
 The seller has not completed the repair or replacement within a reasonable 
time or without significant inconvenience to the consumer; or 
 The lack of conformity of the goods has not been remedied by the first repair 
or first replacement. 
 
44. A number of other recommendations are made regarding the remedies for 
consumer contracts of sale, including the removal of any restriction on the right of 
termination and refund for so-called minor defects.  The remedial framework 
proposed here would apply only to consumer contracts of sale.  In the case of 
commercial contracts of sale, the right to reject and the related rules on examination 
and acceptance recommended above would operate in tandem with the ‘cure’ 
provision for commercial contracts of sale recommended in the context of the 
amendment of section 53 of the 1893 Act.  
 
CHAPTER TEN  RIGHTS OF UNPAID SELLER AGAINST THE GOODS 
45. The duty of the buyer under the contract of sale is to accept and pay for the goods 
in accordance with the contract of sale. Where the buyer defaults on this obligation, 
sections 38-39 and 41-48 of the 1893 Act afford the unpaid seller a number of real 
remedies against the buyer’s default - a lien on the goods, a right to stop the goods in 
transit, and a right to re-sell the goods.   
 
46. A lien is a right to retain possession of the goods until the price has been paid or 
tendered in full. Section 41 of the 1893 Act provides that the unpaid seller who is in 
possession of the goods is entitled to retain possession of them until payment or 
tender of the price where: (i) the goods have been sold without any stipulation as to 
credit; (ii) the goods have been sold on credit but the term of credit has expired; (iii) 
the buyer has become insolvent.  Recourse to the lien has declined greatly since the 
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inclusion of the remedy in the 1893 Act. As there is no entitlement to the remedy 
where goods are sold with a stipulation as to credit, the prevalence of credit terms in 
present-day contracts of sale means that the lien is no longer an option for the unpaid 
seller in many cases. The seller’s need for protection from the risk of non-payment 
has also been met in other ways, most notably through recourse to retention of title 
clauses. Though the relevance of the lien has declined, it has not entirely disappeared 
from commercial practice, and the remedy should accordingly be retained in future 
legislation.   
 
47. Section 44 sets out the right of the unpaid seller who has parted with the 
possession of goods to stop them in transit, that is to resume and retain possession of 
them until payment or tender of the price. Three conditions must be met before the 
right can be exercised.  First, the seller must be unpaid; second, the buyer must be 
insolvent; and, third, the goods must be in transit.  The case for the retention of the 
right of stoppage  is weaker in our view than that for the unpaid seller’s lien.  Rapid 
transit has made the right of stoppage both less usable and less useful, while the 
development of the system of payments against documents and, more particularly, of 
payment by bankers’ commercial credits, have greatly reduced the need for a right to 
stop goods in transit. While the Group favours the repeal of the right of stoppage in 
transit, this recommendation should be reviewed if evidence is forthcoming that the 
right retains some utility.  
 
48. In practice, the right of lien is often exercised as a preliminary to resale. The 
circumstances in which the seller can resell the goods and the effect of resale on both 
the passing of title to a second buyer and the contract of sale with the first buyer are 
the subject of section 48 of the 1893 Act.  Sections 48(3) and (4) which deal with the 
seller’s right of resale have been the subject of considerable critical comment.  These 
criticisms centre, first, on the confusion apparent in the provisions between the power 
of resale and the right of resale and, secondly, on their divergence from modern 
contract theory, particularly in respect of termination for breach. We share the view 
that section 48 needs to be redrawn and make a number of recommendation aimed at 
clarifying the circumstances in which the seller’s right of resale applies and the effects 
of such resale on the property in the goods.     
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CHAPTER 11 ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT  
Remedies of the Seller: Action for the Price   
49. Section 49 of the 1893 Act provides the seller with an action for the price of the 
goods where (i) the property in the goods has passed to the buyer and payment is not 
made in accordance with the contract, and (ii) the price is payable ‘on a day certain’ 
irrespective of delivery although property has not passed and the goods have not been 
appropriated to the contract. There are a number of areas of doubt and uncertainty 
around section 49, stemming in large part from the fact that the transfer of property is 
the critical event for the seller’s action for the price. The US Uniform Commercial 
Code opts in contrast for acceptance by the buyer as the most important factor in 
triggering the seller’s right to an action for the price. The Canadian Uniform Sale of 
Goods Committee, however, favoured delivery as the controlling event.  While the 
Group considers that acceptance will include delivery in virtually every instance, it 
may be the case that the complex process of drafting a stand alone section on this 
point renders section 9.11 of the draft 1982 Canadian Uniform Sale of Goods Act a 
more practicable solution.  Future legislation should accordingly replace section 49 of 
the 1893 Act with a provision linking an action for the price to delivery that is 
modelled on section 9.11 of the Canadian Act.   
 
Remedies of the Seller: Damages for Non-Acceptance 
50. Section 50 of the 1893 Act provides the seller with a right to damages in cases 
where the buyer wrongfully refuses to accept and pay for the goods, and includes 
rules on the applicable measure of damages. Case law reveals a number of difficulties 
in relation to its provisions, including uncertainty regarding what is meant by an 
‘available market’ for the purposes of assessing damages. While the case for 
fundamental reform of the section is not compelling, some adjustments to the existing 
rules are recommended for adoption in future legislation.   
 
Remedies of the Buyer: Specific Performance  
51. Though section 52 of the 1893 Act affords the court discretion to award specific 
performance following upon breach of a contact for specific or ascertained goods, 
Irish courts have proved very reluctant to exercise this discretion in favour of a 
disappointed buyer. The increasing awareness by courts of the need to recognise and 
vindicate the buyer’s ‘performance interest’ should, in our view, lead the judiciary to 
 27
recognise that specific performance of a contract affords an alternative to engaging in 
a difficult or arbitrary process of assessing damages. While the Group favours the 
retention of specific performance as a discretionary remedy rather than a remedy of 
first resort, or one based on entitlement, we consider that an adjustment based on the 
template in section 2-716 of the Uniform Commercial Code should be made to section 
52 in order to ‘liberalise’ its provisions.  We also favour the deletion of the words 
‘specific or ascertained goods’ from the first sentence of section 52 in order to 
broaden the scope of the provision.     
 
Remedies of the Buyer: Cure 
52. Section 53(2), as introduced by the 1980 Act, gives a consumer buyer the right to 
request the seller either to remedy a breach or to replace goods not in conformity with 
the contract.  While some commentators are sceptical of the value of a cure provision 
in the commercial context, we think that there should be a general statutory right to 
repair or replacement for buyers. Article 46 of the United Nations Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods contains an appropriate legislative model for a cure 
regime for non-conforming goods in commercial contracts, and future legislation 
should include a provision along similar lines.   
 
Remedies of the Buyer: The Measure of Damages for Breach of Warranty 
53. Section 53(4) of the 1980 Act provides that the measure of damages for breach of 
warranty is the estimated loss directly and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course 
of events from the breach. Section 53(5) provides that, in the case of breach of 
warranty, such loss is prima facie the difference between the value of the goods at the 
time of delivery to the buyer and the value they would have had if they had answered 
to the warranty. Recent English case law, however, has upheld the general position in 
relation to the award of damages that it is for the plaintiff to prove a loss and, in 
ignoring the benefits of a provision such as Section 53, has left the law of damages in 
the UK Sale of Goods Act in an incoherent and unpredictable state.  Though the 
judgment in question does not represent Irish law, we think it desirable to provide 
greater clarity in the way in which Irish statute law estimates damages in respect of 
non-conforming goods. Section 53(5) should be amended accordingly in order to meet 
the market value standard where commercial practice and the expectations of the 
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parties, viewed as at the date of breach, so require. This can be done by deleting the 
reference to ‘prima facie’ in the subsection.   
 
CHAPTER 12  MISREPRESENTATION 
54.  The provisions at sections 43-46 of the 1980 Act deal with a number of aspects of 
the law relating to misrepresentation, specifically the remedies of rescission and 
damages and the exclusion of liability. While the English Misrepresentation Act of 
1967 on which the provisions in the 1980 Act are based applies to contracts generally, 
the scope of the Irish legislative provisions is limited to contracts for the sale of 
goods, hire-purchase and consumer hire agreements, and contracts for the supply of 
services. Though the matter is outside our terms of reference, serious consideration 
should be given to the introduction of statutory provisions of general application on 
misrepresentation. Future legislation should extend the misrepresentation provisions 
to commercial hire agreements and clarify their application to consumer hire 
agreements. 
 
55. Section 44 of the 1980 Act was enacted in order to remove certain bars to 
rescission for innocent misrepresentation.  Its provisions remain necessary in our view 
and should be retained in their existing form. Future legislation, however, should lay 
down clearer and more balanced rules on the circumstances in which rescission 
should be available for misrepresentation. There is merit in our view in the rules at 
section 7 of the New Zealand Contractual Remedies Act 1979, and we would favour 
the incorporation of provisions along similar lines into Irish law.    
 
56. Section 45(1) of the 1980 Act reversed the historical pre Hedley Byrne common 
law rule that, as innocent misrepresentation was not actionable in tort, damages were 
unavailable as a remedy.  This was balanced, however, by the discretion afforded the 
courts by section 45(2) to award damages in lieu of the remedy of rescission 
previously available at common law for all forms of misrepresentation. The main 
issues raised by section 45 relate to the measure of damages available for the cause of 
action under subsection (1).  The language of the subsection appears to point to the 
measure in the tort of deceit, an interpretation which, though upheld by the English 
courts, has been criticised for being excessively punitive in permitting the plaintiff to 
recover all losses flowing directly from the misrepresentation.  These criticisms are 
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valid in our view in respect of innocent and negligent misrepresentation, and it would 
be preferable to apply the contract measure of damages in these cases. In the case of 
fraudulent misrepresentation, however, the applicable measure should remain 
damages in the tort of deceit, including for unforeseen loss and damage. 
 
57. Section 46 of the 1980 Act provides that contract terms excluding or restricting 
liability, or the availability of any remedy, for misrepresentation shall not be 
enforceable unless shown to be fair and reasonable. Future legislation should 
incorporate the common law prohibition on the exclusion of liability for fraudulent 
misrepresentation. Contract terms that exclude or limit liability for other forms of 
misrepresentation should be permissible where shown to be ‘fair and reasonable’. 
  
CHAPTER THIRTEEN  PRODUCT GUARANTEES, UNSOLICITED 
GOODS, DIRECTORY ENTRIES, AND REGULATIONS  
Product Guarantees  
58. Product guarantees are regulated by sections 15-19 of the Sale of Goods and 
Supply of Services Act 1980 and by Regulation 9 of the European Communities 
(Certain Aspect of Consumer Guarantees and Regulations) 2003. Both sets of 
provisions are broadly similar in their focus on the enforceability of guarantees and 
the provision of information about them, an approach that we support. A single set of  
rules governing product guarantees should replace the present dual regimes and, as 
the rules in the 1980 Act are clearer and more detailed than those in the Directive, 
these should provide the basis for future statutory provisions.  
 
Unsolicited Goods and Services  
59. Section 47 of the 1980 Act provides that, subject to specified conditions, the 
recipient of unsolicited goods can treat them as an unconditional gift. The supply of 
unsolicited goods and services is also regulated at EU level by Directive 97/7/EC on 
Distance Selling and Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices. The 
Distance Selling Directive exempts the consumer from any duty to provide of any 
consideration in cases of unsolicited supply. It has been suggested that the conditions 
applying to the retention of unsolicited goods under section 47 may constitute a form 
of consideration, and these conditions should be repealed in future legislation to 
remove any doubt on the issue. Issues of compatibility with EU law aside, we see no 
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good reason why restrictive conditions should attach to the retention of goods sent to 
persons without their consent.   
 
Business Directory Entries  
60. Sections 48 and 49 of the 1980 Act on business directory entries were introduced 
to regulate demands for payment for entries in business directories where the business 
had not knowingly consented to such an entry or, in some cases, where the directory 
did not exist. The sections lay down procedural requirements governing orders, and 
consent to  charges, for entries in such directories. The evidence of continued abuses 
involving business directories shows the need for the retention of provisions along the 
lines of those at sections 48 and 49. As these provisions predate modern 
communication technologies and business practices, there is a need to update them to 
take appropriate account of these  technologies and practices and the requirements of 
e-commerce legislation.    
 
Ministerial Orders 
61. Sections 51-54 of the 1980 Act deal with the powers of the Minister for 
Enterprise, Trade and Innovation to make orders in respect of a range of matters 
relating to contracts. In the thirty years in which these sections have been in force, 
however, no such order has been made. Regulations could usefully be introduced in 
two areas in our view: the use of small print in consumer contracts, and the issue of 
receipts in consumer transactions. The substance and detail of such regulations should 
be decided following consultations with consumer and business interests.   
 
CHAPTER FOURTEEN  NON-SALE CONTRACTS FOR THE SUPPLY OF 
GOODS AND CONTRACTS FOR THE SUPPLY OF SERVICES 
Non-Sale Contracts for the Supply of Goods  
62. There are a range of transactions that fall outside the definition of a contract of 
sale either because there is no transfer of property or only an option for such a transfer 
(contracts of hire, hire-purchase agreements); no consideration (gift) or no money 
consideration (barter or exchange); or no goods (contracts for services, or work and 
materials contracts in which the goods element is incidental). A number of gaps and 
areas of uncertainty exist in the present statutory regulation of these transactions, such 
as the absence of any implied statutory undertakings as to goods supplied under 
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commercial hire-purchase and hire agreements. The implied undertakings that apply 
to goods supplied under different types of transaction, moreover, are spread across a 
number of separate statutes - the Sale of Goods Acts 1893 and 1980 for contracts of 
sale, the Sale of Good and Supply of Services Act 1980 for work and materials 
contracts, the Consumer Credit Act 1995 for consumer hire-purchase and hire 
agreements, and the Trading Stamps Act 1980 for goods supplied in exchange for 
trading stamps. As these provisions are similar in their purpose and substance, their 
consolidation would advance regulatory simplification and make the law clearer and 
more accessible for both businesses and consumers. The policy approach that should 
underline such consolidation is straightforward. Other than where adjustments are 
required by virtue of the nature of the contract, the implied conditions and warranties 
governing goods supplied under different kinds of transaction should be identical in 
substance and form. As well as making the law less complex, this would minimise the 
practical effects of differences in the classification of contracts.  
 
A Separate Consumer Contract Rights Act  
63. The consolidation of different legislative provisions raises the question of whether 
there is merit in having a separate statute for the core provisions applicable to 
consumer contracts. The New Zealand Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, for example, 
deals essentially with the implied quality and other terms applicable to contracts for 
the supply of goods and services and with the remedies available to consumers for 
breaches of these implied terms. Provisions relating to non-core aspects of consumer 
sales – transfer of property, transfer of title, the rights of unpaid seller against the 
goods etc – continue to be dealt with, together with all of the provisions applicable to 
commercial contracts of sale, in the Sale of Goods Act 1908. Though we favour the 
retention of a common legal basis for consumer and commercial contracts of sale, this 
would not preclude, nor be inconsistent with, the introduction of a separate statute 
governing the main aspects of consumer contract rights. We think that there would be 
considerable benefit to both consumers and businesses in bringing together in an 
accessible way the main statutory provisions applicable to consumer contract rights. A 
separate Consumer Contract Rights Act should accordingly be enacted that would 
incorporate the core statutory provisions applicable to consumer contracts, including 
the provisions of the recently agreed Consumer Rights Directive and of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive.  
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Contracts for the Supply of Services  
64. Part IV of the 1980 Act, comprising sections 39-42, constituted the main 
innovation of the Act in that, almost a century after legislation of general application 
was first enacted to regulate the quality of goods, it introduced statutory standards 
governing the quality of services. Though this Part of the Act was intended to be of 
general application, a number of restriction were placed in relation to certain services 
provided by State bodies. Part IV of the Act has also been given a somewhat 
restrictive interpretation in case law. A broadly-based definition of ‘services’, 
modelled on the definition at section 2 of the Consumer Protection Act 2007, should 
be included in future legislation, and the existing restrictions should be repealed.    
 
65. The implied undertakings in section 39 of the 1980 Act are expressly said to be 
terms of the contract. The corresponding undertakings in contracts of sale, however, 
are classified by the 1893 and 1980 Acts as either conditions or warranties. Though 
the status of the implied terms under section 39 does not appear to have created 
significant practical difficulties to date, the logic of treating the implied undertakings 
for the two types of contract differently can be questioned. The implied terms which 
apply to services contracts under the 1980 Act relate to quite fundamental aspects of 
the performance of the contract and, for this and other reasons, we favour, on balance, 
giving the implied statutory undertakings as to services the status of conditions in 
future legislation.    
 
66. The requirement under section 39 that the supplier should supply the service with 
due skill, care and diligence is a negligence or fault-based standard.  Though the 
service provided may fail to achieve the desired result or even be defective, the 
supplier will be liable only if he has failed to exercised the due level of skill and care. 
This contrasts with the strict liability or result-based standards applicable to the 
implied undertakings as to goods under the 1893 and 1980 Acts.  Though we are not 
in favour of the introduction of an inflexible result-based standard for services 
contracts, we think that there is scope for a measured reform of the purely fault-based 
standard under the 1980 Act. Future legislation should accordingly include a 
provision to apply to both consumer and commercial contracts for services that: 
     A service, and any product resulting from it, will: 
          (i) be reasonably fit for any particular purpose, and  
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          (ii) be of such a nature and quality that it can reasonably be expected to achieve  
          any particular result,  
     that the recipient makes known to the supplier as the particular purpose for which  
     the service is required or the result that he desires to achieve.  
 
67. Section 40 provides that the implied undertakings as to the quality of services can 
be negatived or varied by express or implied terms of the contract. Where the 
recipient of the contract deals as consumer, however, it must be shown that the 
exclusion clause is (i) fair and reasonable by reference to the criteria in the Schedule 
to the Act and (ii) has been specifically brought to the attention of the consumer.  In 
the case of contracts of sale, by contrast, any contract term exempting any or all of the 
implied undertakings regarding correspondence with description, quality and fitness 
for purpose, and correspondence with sample under sections 13-15 of the Act is void 
where the buyer deals as consumer and, in any other case, is not enforceable unless 
shown to be fair and reasonable. It is now time in our view to put exemption clauses 
pertaining to the implied terms in services contracts on the same footing as those for 
sales contracts, namely that they should be void in consumer contracts and 
enforceable in commercial contracts where shown to be fair and reasonable. As the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations are the most appropriate vehicle for 
the regulation of exemption clauses, clauses of this kind in consumer contracts for the 
supply of services should be deemed automatically unfair under the Regulations.   
 
CHAPTER FIFTEEN  THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 
69. The United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods [CISG] 
comprises a set of uniform substantive rules for the regulation of contracts of sale 
involving parties with a place of business in states that have ratified the Convention 
(Contracting States).  In its 1992 Report on the Convention, the Law Reform 
Commission examined a wide range of considerations relevant to Ireland’s ratification 
of the CISG and concluded that, on balance, it would be desirable for Ireland to 
become a party to it. In our view, the case for Ireland’s accession to the Convention 
is, if anything, stronger now than when the Law Reform Commission reported in 
1992. At that time, thirty-four states had ratified the Convention compared with 
seventy-six states now, including most of the world’s main trading economies and all 
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European Union Member States other than Ireland, the United Kingdom, Portugal and 
Malta. As accession to the Convention will require appropriate legislative provisions, 
the opportunity presented by the need for new sale of goods legislation to give effect 
to our other recommendations should be availed of for this purpose. The UN 
Convention permits Contracting States to make declarations limiting the application 
of specific provisions of the Convention in respect of that State. The Law Reform 
Commission were against the exercise of any of these derogations on the general 
ground that such derogations lessened the impact of the Convention and for reasons 
specific to the individual opt-outs. We agree with the Commission’s view that Ireland 
should not avail of any of derogations permissible under the Convention and note the 






















CHAPTER ONE SALES LAW SINCE 1893  
1.1. The Sale of Goods Act 1893 has been the cornerstone of Irish sales law for over a  
century. Enacted during the reign of Queen Victoria when electricity, the telephone 
and the motor car were still in their infancy, it has remained in force with most of its 
provisions unchanged through the successive commercial and technological changes 
of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries – the growth of mass production, the  
development of new consumer goods and markets, the rise of the mass media and 
modern advertising and marketing, and the emergence of advanced information and 
communication technologies. As the account of its history in other common law 
jurisdictions at Annex IV shows, the Act’s durability is not unique to Ireland.  Of the 
countries which have based their sales law on the 1893 Act – the United States, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Hong Kong and Singapore – only the United 
States has subsequently put its law on a different foundation with the adoption of the 
Uniform Commercial Code in 1952. Despite a succession of legislative reforms in the 
United Kingdom and the repeal of the 1893 Act, many of the Act’s provisions have 
been retained unchanged in the legislation that has replaced it.   
 
1.2. This Chapter sets out the background to the enactment of the 1893 Act and 
outlines its key features. It notes the virtual absence of legislative change in Ireland 
during the first three quarters of the twentieth century, and describes the series of 
legislative changes in the United Kingdom from the mid-1950s to the late 1970s that 
greatly influenced subsequent Irish reforms. In Ireland, as in the UK, the impetus for 
change came increasingly from the pressure to adapt the 1893 Act to reflect the 
growing importance of consumer sales, an impetus that led eventually to the 
enactment of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980. Though the 1980 
Act was an innovative piece of legislation in a number of respects, it took the form of 
additions and amendments to the 1893 Act rather than its repeal and replacement.  Its 
primary focus on enhancing the protections available to consumers also left much of 
the parent Act untouched; in all, fifty three of the 1893 Act’s sixty two sections were 
unaffected by the amendments effected by the 1980 Act. From the mid-1980s, the 
dynamic for change in Irish consumer legislation came from the European Union 
which adopted a number of Directives in the area of consumer contract law, most 
notably Directive 1999/44/EC on Consumer Sales and Guarantees.  Though this 
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Directive overlapped substantially with the consumer sales provisions of the 1893 and 
1980 Acts, it was transposed into Irish law as a stand-alone statutory instrument, 
resulting in a confusing and, in some respects, conflicting legislative framework.  In 
seeking to explain why the 1893 Act has remained largely unchanged for so long, this 
account will underline that the time for a thorough revision of the 1893 and 1980 Acts 
and the related secondary legislation is now long overdue.   
 
The Sale of Goods Act 1893 
1.3. The Sale of Goods Act 1893 was one of several statutes drafted by Sir 
MacKenzie Chalmers as part of a movement for the codification of core elements of 
commercial law that got underway in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.5  Its 
long title describes it an ‘Act for codifying the law relating to the Sale of Goods’, a 
summary that accurately describes its objectives and explains its limits.  As the Law 
Commission for England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission observed:6 
   What Chalmers sought to do was to prepare a statement in statutory form of the  
   principles of law derived from decided cases.  For this reason, the Sale of Goods  
   Act does not provide an answer to every question which it could be imagined might  
   arise in a dispute concerning the sale of goods.  If a point had been decided, it might  
   well be found stated in the Act.  But many points of potential dispute had not then  
   (and still have not) been decided and the Act did not attempt to answer them in  
   advance. This means that the Sale of Goods Act is far from being a complete code,  
   as the Uniform Commercial Code of the U.S.A. sets out to be.   
 
1.4. The case law codified by the Act inevitably reflected the commercial conditions 
and practices of its era. It made no reference to consumer sales as the notion of the 
consumer as a distinct category of buyer in need of special protection was still some 
decades distant.  The type of commercial cases that underlay the Act’s provisions 
were also very much of their time.  As Bridge has observed,7 this case law:  
   does not deal with massive shipments or supertankers or with the sale of complex  
   manufactured machinery.  It is heavily concentrated in the area of relatively small- 
   scale transactions involving raw materials soon to be used in the manufacturing  
   process. There is little evidence of dealings in futures. The cases are therefore  
   replete with references to bags of waste silk, quantities of worsted coatings, pockets  
   of hops, Manila hemp, scarlet cuttings, oil extracted from grain, long-staple Salem  
   cotton and the like. Less often, they deal with relatively unsophisticated  
                                                 
5  Other notable examples include the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 and the Marine Insurance Act 1906, 
both of which remain on the statute book in Ireland and the UK. 
6 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  1987.  Sale and Supply of Goods (Law 
Com. No. 160, Scot. Law Com. No. 104), para. 1.5. 
7 Bridge, M.G. ‘The evolution of modern sales law’, (1991) L.M.C.L.G. 53.     
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   manufactured objects such as hosting ropes, carriage poles, and copper sheathing for  
   a ship.    
 
1.5. The durability of legislation so firmly rooted in the conditions prevailing at its 
inception is due to two principal factors.  First, the Act’s provisions are for the most 
part optional and not mandatory.  Many are expressly formulated as default rules.  
Section 55 of the Act as originally adopted gave contracting parties a free hand to 
waive or alter its implied statutory terms:   
    Where any right, duty or liability would arise under a contract of sale by  
     implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by express agreement or by the  
     course of  dealing between the parties, or by usage, if the usage be such as to bind  
     both parties to the contract.   
 
Though the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 amended this section to 
provide that the terms implied by the Act cannot be altered in the case of consumer 
sales and can be altered only where shown to be ‘fair and reasonable’ in commercial 
sales, the latter provision still affords a substantial degree of latitude to the parties to 
business-to-business contracts. Second, section 61(2) of the 1893 Act left ample space 
for the evolution of sales law in line with the general development of the common law 
relating to obligations: 
   The rules of the common law, including the law merchant, save in so far as they are  
   inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, and in particular the rules  
   relating to the law of principal and agent and the effect of fraud, misrepresentation,  
   duress or coercion, mistake or other invalidating cause, shall continue to apply to  
   contracts for the sale of goods.    
 
As Bridge has noted, this section has proved its value in enabling courts to avoid 
inflexibility in the Act and, more broadly, in helping to prevent the divergence of 
sales law from an evolving general law.8   
 
1.6. One further factor merits mention in any consideration of the 1893 Act, namely 
the nature and quality of its drafting. Goode has observed that:9 
    Compared with modern legislation, the Sale of Goods Act is delightfully easy to  
    read. Perusal of any section conveys at once the basic idea the draftsman is trying  
    to implant. The tortuousness of recent statutes is avoided, and the impression is  
    given of limpid clarity.   
 
                                                 
8 Bridge, M.  2009.  The Sale of Goods (2nd ed.)  (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 7.  
9 Goode, R. & McKendrick. E. 2010. Goode on Commercial Law (4th ed.) (London: Penguin), p. 210.  
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He adds, however, that the Act’s simplicity is deceptive, a verdict that will be borne 
out at a number of points in this Report.  Other assessments of the 1893 Act are less 
positive. In Atiyah’s view,10 the Act ‘has not proved one of the more successful pieces 
of codification undertaken by Parliament towards the end of the nineteenth century’, 
though he acknowledges that this may largely be due to a change in the type of sale of 
goods cases coming before the courts as consumer sales assumed increased 
importance over the course of the twentieth century.  
 
Developments 1893-1980 
1.7. The three-quarters of a century that followed the adoption of the 1893 Act saw 
little legislative change in sales law in Ireland and limited change in the United 
Kingdom. The pressure for change in Ireland may have been lessened by the fact that, 
over the first half of the twentieth century, the patterns of trade and manufacture here 
remained consonant with the conditions underlying the Act’s provisions. In Britain 
and beyond, the Act’s inbuilt flexibility permitted parties engaged in, for example, 
large-scale international commodity trading to devise appropriate contractual 
arrangements without impediment from its provisions, often using standard contract 
forms prepared by trade associations. Forms of contract, such as c.i.f (cost, insurance 
and freight),11 which are nowhere mentioned in the Act, became an established feature 
of international trade over this period.     
 
1.8. The first Irish legislative development of relevance to the 1893 Act occurred with 
the enactment of the Hire Purchase Act 1946.  Though commercial contracts 
providing for a bailment of goods coupled with an option to buy after the payment of 
all instalments of the price had been common for some time, this type of arrangement 
became a feature of consumer contracts for motor cars and other consumer goods 
from the 1920s.  The 1946 Act, which drew heavily on the UK Hire-Purchase Act 
1938, can claim therefore to be the first piece of post-Independence Irish consumer 
legislation.12 While its main focus was on protecting hirers from unfair terms, it also 
                                                 
10 Atiyah, P.S. et al.  2010.  The Sale of Goods  (12th ed) (Harlow: Pearson), p. 6.  
11 Commercial contracts where the sum contracted for covers the price of the goods, their insurance 
during transit, and the cost of freight. 
12 Like the UK Act, the Bill in its original form was limited to goods whose hire-purchase price did not 
exceed £100.  The then Minister for Industry for Commerce, Seán Lemass, stated in introducing the 
Bill to Dáil Éireann that it was ‘assumed that persons in a position to acquire goods of a value in excess 
of £100 should be able to look after their own interests’  (Dáil Debates. Vol. 100, 1 May 1946 Hire 
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provided for the application to goods supplied under hire-purchase agreements of 
implied undertakings as to title and quality and fitness for purpose similar to those at 
sections 12 and 14 of the 1893 Act. These implied terms were incorporated in updated 
and augmented form in the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 and were 
later incorporated, along with the other provisions regulating hire-purchase 
agreements, in the Consumer Credit Act 1995.      
 
1.9. In the United Kingdom, the Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act 1954 
repealed section 4(1) of the 1893 Act, the main effect of which had been to render 
unwritten contracts of sale to the value of £10 or more unenforceable unless specified 
conditions were met. As discussed in Chapter 3, this provision remains in force in 
Ireland, and its repeal is long overdue. If the amendment effected in the UK in 1954 
addressed an archaic provision with its origin in the seventeenth century Statute of 
Frauds, a development towards the end of the same decade was a harbinger of future 
trends. The Molony Committee on Consumer Protection established by the British 
Government in 1959 was the first official inquiry dedicated to issues of consumer 
policy and welfare. Its establishment was symptomatic of a new-found emphasis on 
consumer issues in advanced economies.  Though the main focus of the Molony 
inquiry was on matters other than consumer rights under sale and related contracts, its 
report published in 1962 made a number of recommendations for changes to the 1893 
Act.13  These included the prohibition of clauses excluding or varying the terms as to 
title, correspondence with description, quality and fitness for purpose implied by 
sections 12-14 of the 1893 Act.   
 
1.10. Exemption clauses of this kind were emerging as a key issue in the conflict 
between the old emphasis on freedom of contract and the new insistence on the need 
to protect  consumers by reason of their position as the weaker party in dealings with 
business.14 The newly established Law Commission for England and Wales and the 
                                                                                                                                            
Purchase Bill Second Stage: cols. 2250-2251). This restriction was deleted at Committee Stage, 
however, partly in response to concerns expressed about the position of farmers purchasing tractors and 
farm machinery by hire- purchase.   
13 Final Report of the Committee on Consumer Protection.  1962.  (London: HMSO).  Cmd. 1781: 
paragraphs 414-478.   
14 The Molony Committee concluded that the most serious limitation of the sale of goods legislation 
was ‘the ease and frequency with which vendors and manufacturers of goods exclude the operation of 
the statutory conditions and warranties by provisions in guarantee cards or other contractual 
documents’, ibid: para. 426. 
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Scottish Law Commission reported jointly on the issue in 1969 and recommended that 
contracting out of the terms implied by sections 12-15 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 
should be prohibited in consumer sales.15 While the Commissions were agreed that 
protection against contracting out should not be limited to private purchasers, they 
were divided as to the extent of the protection that should be provided for business 
buyers.  The report also recommended a number of changes to sections 13-14 of the 
1893 Act, including clarification that the sale of goods exposed for self-selection by 
the buyer, as had become increasingly common in supermarkets and department 
stores, came within the scope of the Act’s provisions on sale by description, and the 
inclusion of a definition of ‘merchantable quality’ in the Act.       
 
1.11. The piecemeal reform of the 1893 Act continued meanwhile in England and 
Wales when the Misrepresentation Act 196716 repealed the stipulation at section 
11(1)(c) of the 1893 Act that, in the case of a contract for the sale of specific goods, 
the buyer lost the right of rejection when the property in the goods had passed to him.  
This had represented a significant curtailment of the right to reject goods not in 
conformity with the contract, and the effect of the amendment was that this right was 
henceforth governed in all cases by the rules on the acceptance of goods at sections 
34-35 of the 1893 Act. Section 22(2) of the  Act which provided that the provisions of 
section 22 on sales in market overt were not to affect the law relating to the sale of 
horses was repealed by the UK Criminal Law Act 1967, and section 24 which 
provided that property in stolen goods disposed of in market overt revested in the 
owner on conviction of the offender was repealed by the UK Theft Act 1968.  Further 
changes of greater significance followed in the UK with the enactment of the Supply 
of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973.  The Act addressed the issue of exemption 
clauses by providing that any clause in a consumer sales contract which exempted the 
implied terms of the 1893 Act on title, correspondence with description and sample, 
and quality and fitness for purpose would be void.  In the case of business-to-business 
contracts, clauses exempting the implied terms as to description, quality, and sample 
would be unenforceable unless shown to be ‘fair and reasonable’, while exemption of 
                                                 
15 Law Commission for England and Wales and Scottish Law Commission.  1969.  Exemption 
Clauses in Contracts – First Report.  (Law Commission Report No. 24, Scottish Law Commission 
Report No. 12. HC 403).  A second report on the subject was published in 1975. Law Commission for 
England and Wales and of Scottish Law Commission.  1975.  Exemption Clauses: Second Report.  
(Law Commission Report No. 69, Scottish Law Commission Report no. 39 HC 605).   
16 A separate Misrepresentation Act was enacted in Northern Ireland in 1967.   
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the implied term as to title would be void. The 1973 Act also set out five criteria to be 
taken into account in determining whether a term was fair and reasonable. In addition, 
it made a number of amendments to sections 12-14 of the 1893, the most significant 
of which brought goods sold on a self-service basis within the ambit of section 13 on 
sale by description. The 1973 Act’s provisions on exclusion clauses were broadly 
retained in the more comprehensive regulation of these clauses effected by the UK’s 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. A more systematic reform of UK sale of goods 
legislation occurred with the enactment of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.  This repealed 
the 1893 Act and replaced it with a statute which incorporated the amendments made 
in 1967 and 1973 and introduced some additional changes. These changes centred on 
the implied conditions and warranties at Sections 11-15, including the addition of a 
definition of ‘merchantable quality’, and the provisions on examination and 
acceptance at sections 34-35. Much of the 1893 Act survived intact however so that, 
as Bridge has observed, the 1979 Act ‘represents the old 1893 Act encrusted with 
some ten or so statutory alterations ranging from 1954’.17     
 
1.12. The first step towards a modern consumer protection regime in Ireland was 
taken with the establishment of the National Prices Commission in 1971. The new 
body proceeded to commission of a number of reports on consumer policy and 
protection, the most important being a comparative report on consumer protection law 
undertaken by an English legal academic, Michael Whincup, that was published in 
1973.18 The Whincup report contained a large number of recommendations, including 
proposals for significant changes to the Sale of Goods Act 1893. In November 1973, a 
National Consumer Advisory Council was established, and the new body assumed the 
consumer protection function previously exercised by the National Prices 
Commission.19 Its terms of reference included the provision of advice to the Minister 
for Industry and Commerce on ‘the introduction of legislation which the Council feels 
is needed to assure consumers’ interests’. In December 1974, the Council made a 
submission to the Minister on a wide range of proposals for new or amended 
                                                 
17 Bridge. M.  ‘Do we need a new Sale of Goods Act?’ in Lowrey & Mistelis (eds).  2006. Commercial 
Law: Perspectives and Practice (London: Butterworths), para. 2.2.   
18 National Prices Commission.  1973.  Occasional Paper No. 9. Consumer Protection Law in 
America, Canada and Europe (Dublin: Stationery Office).   
19 Dáil Debates.  Vol. 316, 13 November 1979, col. 399: Written Answers – National Consumer 
Advisory Council.   
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legislative provisions, including proposals for the reform of the Sale of Goods Act 
1893, broadly in line with those in the Whincup Report.20 
 
1.13. The years following the submission of the Council’s proposals saw the 
introduction of a number of pieces of consumer protection legislation, commencing 
with the Consumer Information Act 1978 which modernised the law relating to false 
and misleading advertising and consumer information, and established the office of 
Director of Consumer Affairs.21  More pertinently for the purposes of the present 
account, the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act was enacted in 1980 following 
a lengthy parliamentary gestation.  The legislation was first introduced in the form of 
a Consumer Protection Bill circulated by the Fine Gael-Labour Government in May 
1977 shortly before it left office. In November 1978, the Bill was reintroduced with 
some modifications as the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Bill by the Fianna 
Fail Government and finally became law in May 1980.    
 
1.14. The Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Bill 1978 was presented as a 
consumer protection measure and the influence of the National Council Advisory 
Council and Whincup recommendations on its provisions was fully acknowledged.22  
In large part, the Act followed the reforms previously enacted in the United Kingdom 
in respect of exclusion clauses and the criteria to be taken into account in assessing 
whether such clauses were ‘fair and reasonable’; the amendments of the implied terms 
on title, correspondence with description and sample; the inclusion of a definition of 
merchantable quality; the conditions governing the right to reject specific goods; the 
amendment of the provisions on the examination of goods; and the inclusion of 
statutory rules governing misrepresentation. The Act differed from its UK 
counterpart, however, in a number of significant respects. First, the detailed 
provisions on manufacturers’ and suppliers’ guarantees at sections 16-19 of the Act 
                                                 
20 National Consumer Advisory Council.  December 1974.  Submission to the Minister for Industry 
and Commerce on Proposals for Legislation to Assure the Consumers’ Interests (Dublin: 
Stationery Office).   
21 In addition to the Consumer Information Act and the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 
1980, the period also saw the enactment of the Pyramid Selling Act 1980 and the Trading Stamps Act 
1980.    
22 Introducing the Bill’s second stage reading, the then Minister for State at the Department of Industry, 
Commerce and Energy, Máire Geoghegan Quinn, described it as a ‘major move to ensure certain basic 
rights for the consumer in buying goods and services’.  She further stated that the National Consumer 
Advisory Council and Whincup Reports were ‘major factors leading … to the measure now before us.’  
Dáil Debates.  Vol. 309, 16 November 1978: cols. 1100-1101.   
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had no counterpart in Westminster legislation and broke new ground in departing 
from the doctrine of privity of contract. Secondly, the Act’s provisions on the supply 
of services, including implied undertakings as to quality of services, preceded the 
adoption of broadly similar provisions in the UK in the Supply of Goods and Services 
Act 1982.  Thirdly, the Act’s provisions on cure in consumer sales gave consumers 
the additional remedies of repair or replacement where the right of rejection had been 
lost, and revived that right where the seller failed either to provide these remedies or 
to do so within a reasonable time. Fourthly, the Bill as introduced had followed the 
1893 Act and UK Act of 1979 in providing at section 35 that the buyer was deemed to 
have lost the right to reject goods not in conformity with the contract when, ‘after the 
lapse of a reasonable time’, he retained the goods without intimating rejection to the 
seller. A Government amendment to the section at Committee stage recast it, 
however, to provide that the buyer was deemed to have accepted the goods when he 
retained them ‘without good and sufficient reason’ without intimating rejection.  This 
change was made in response to the decision of the English courts in Lee v. York 
Coach and Marine Ltd
23 in which the buyer of a faulty car who had spent six months 
in an unsuccessful attempt to have it repaired by the seller was held to have accepted 
the vehicle.24  Though the wording at section 35 of the 1980 Act has yet to be 
interpreted by the courts, it is generally taken to be more expansive than the 
equivalent provision under UK legislation.25 The fact that the new wording of the 
section diverges from the equivalent provision in the Sales of Goods Act 1979 means, 
of course, that UK case law cannot be drawn upon in the case of this provision. 
Fifthly, the 1980 Act included novel provisions that conferred specific protections in 
respect of spare parts and after-sales service, unsafe motor vehicles, and purchases 
made through finance houses.26 The combined effect of these elements of the 1980 
                                                 
23 1977 RTR 35.   
24 Dáil Debates.  Vol. 316, 14 November 1979: Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Bill: Committee 
Stage, col. 1646.   
25 Law Commission for England and Wales and Scottish Law Commission.  1978.  Consumer 
Remedies: A Consultation Paper, p.59.  
26 Section 12 provides that there is an implied warranty that spare parts and an adequate after-sale 
service will be made available in such circumstances as are stated in an offer, description or 
advertisement by the seller, on a manufacturer’s behalf or on his own behalf, for such period as is so 
stated or, if no period is stated, for a reasonable period.  Section 13 provides, among other things, that 
in every contract for the sale of a motor vehicle, except where the buyer is a motor dealer, there is an 
implied condition that, at the time of delivery, the vehicle is free from any defect which would render it 
a danger to the public, including passengers.  In a departure from the privity rule, the section also 
provides that a person using the vehicle with the consent of the buyer who suffers loss as a result of a 
breach of its implied terms may sue the seller as if he were the buyer.  Section 14 provides for joint and 
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Act led the European Commission to refer subsequently to the ‘pioneering, exemplary 
character’ of Irish consumer sales law.27     
 
1.15.  If the substance of the 1980 Act was progressive in many ways, the form of the 
Act had less to commend it.  The Act did not repeal and replace the 1893 Act as had 
been done by the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 but, in addition to the sizeable number 
of new sections and Parts in the 1980 Act itself, opted to substitute a number of 
sections of the 1893 Act. The result was that, in order to understand the statutory rules 
governing sales contracts, it became, and remains necessary, to read the original Act 
of 1893, the sections substituted in the 1893 Act by the 1980 Act, the textual and non-
textual amendments to the 1893 Act made by the 1980 Act and other enactments, as 
well as the new provisions of the 1980 Act.  The reasons for proceeding in this way 
are not clear, but the outcome was neither in keeping with the principles of better 
regulation nor one conducive to the accessibility and understanding of the law, 
particularly as the text of the 1893 Act is not readily available to businesses or 
consumers.28 Matters were improved somewhat with the publication in 2003 by the 
Attorney General’s Office of a restatement of the 1893 Act and Part II of the 1980 
Act,29 but the form taken by the legislation still falls far short of what is desirable.      
 
European Union Developments 1980-2010 
1.16. If the legislation of the United Kingdom parliament and the decisions of the 
English courts exercised a major influence on Irish sales and consumer law over the 
first eight decades of the last century, the locus of influence shifted to the European 
                                                                                                                                            
several liability between sellers and finance houses for goods bought by a finance house under a 
repayment agreement with a consumer.   
27 Cited in White, F.  The EC Directive on Certain Aspects of Consumer Sales and Associated 
Guarantees: one step forward, two steps back?’, (2000) CLP (3) 1.  The European Commission’s 1993 
Green Paper on Guarantees for Consumer Goods and After-Sales Services referred to the provisions of 
the 1980 Act on commercial guarantees as one of the ‘two most forward-looking national texts in this 
domain’ and also commended the Act’s provisions on after-sale service. Commission of the European 
Communities.  1993.  Green Paper on Guarantees for Consumer Goods and After-Sales Services.  
[Com (93) 509],  pp. 80 & 96.  
28 The Bill that formed the basis of the 1980 Act was prepared well before the enactment of the UK 
1979 Act.  It is probable that it followed the model of the UK’s Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 
1973 which substituted new sections for Sections 12-14 of the 1893 Act.   
29 Available at http://www.attorneygeneral.ie/slru/Restatement_Sale_of_Goods_Acts_1893_and_Part II 
_of_1980.pdf.   A restatement is an administrative codification that incorporates all of the amendments 
made to an Act after its enactment.   
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Community thereafter.30 From the mid-1980s on, a series of consumer protection 
Directives exerted an increasing influence on Irish law.31 The origins of EU activity in 
the area of consumer protection can be traced to the Preliminary Programme for 
Consumer Protection and Information Policy published in 1975.32 While the 
Programme identified consumer protection as an element of the Common Market as it 
was then known and enumerated a number of basic consumer rights,33 specific actions 
to enhance consumer rights were hampered by the absence of a legal basis in the 
European Treaty. This gap was addressed in Article 95 of the Treaty adopted 
following the entry into force of the Single European Act in 1987.34  A further change 
made as a result of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 saw the inclusion in Article 153 of 
                                                 
30  Mc Dermott, P.A..  2003.  ‘The Europeanisation of Contract Law’ in Lucey, M.C. &  Keville, C. 
(eds), Irish Perspectives on EC Law (Dublin: Round Hall), pp. 173-95.    
31 Directive 84/450/EEC on Misleading Advertising implemented in Ireland by the European 
Communities (Misleading Advertising) Regulations 1988 (S.I. No. 134 of 1988); Directive 
85/374/EEC on Liability for Defective Products implemented by the Liability for Defective Products 
Act 1991 and the European Communities (Liability for Defective Products) Regulations 2000 (S.I. No. 
401 of 2000); Directive 85/577/EEC on Contracts Negotiated Away from Business Premises 
implemented by the European Communities (Cancellation of Contracts Negotiated Away from 
Business Premises) Regulations 1989 (S.I. No. 224 of 1989); Directives 87/102/EEC and 90/88/EEC 
on consumer credit implemented by the Consumer Credit Act 1995; Directive 90/314/EEC on Package 
Travel, Holidays and Tours implemented by the Package Holidays and Travel Trade Act 1995; 
Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts implemented by the European 
Communities (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) Regulations 1995 and 2000 (S.I. No. 27 of 1995 
and S.I. No. 307 of 2000);  Directive 94/47/EC on Timeshare Contracts implemented by the European 
Communities (Contracts for Time Sharing of Immovable Property – Protection of Purchasers) 
Regulations 1997 (S.I. No. 204 of 1997) and European Communities (Contracts for Time Sharing of 
Immovable Property – Protection for Purchasers) (Amendment) Regulations 2000 (S.I. 144 of 2000); 
Directive 97/7/EC on Distance Contracts implemented by the European Communities (Protection of 
Consumers in Respect of Contracts Made by Means of Distance Communications) Regulations (S.I. 
No. 207 of 2001); Directive 98/6/EC on product pricing implemented by the European Communities 
(Requirements to Indicate Product Prices ) Regulations 2002 (S.I. No. 639 of 2002);  Directive 
98/27/EC on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers’ Interests implemented by the European 
Communities (Protection of Consumers’ Collective Interests) Regulations 2001 (S.I. No. 449 of 2001); 
Directive 1999/44/EEC on Certain Aspects of Consumer Sales and Associated Guarantees 
implemented by the European Communities  (Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and 
Associated Guarantees ) Regulations 2003 (S.I. No. 11 of 2003); Directive 2000/31/EC on Electronic 
Commerce implemented by the Electronic Commerce Act 2000 and the European Communities 
(Directive 2000/31/EC) Regulations 2003 (S.I. No. of 68 of 2003); Directive 2002/65/EC on the 
Distance Marketing of Financial Products implemented by the European Communities (Distance 
Marketing of Financial Services) Regulations 2004 (S.I. No 853 of 2004); Directive 2005/29/EC on 
Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices implemented by the Consumer Protection Act 
2007; Directive 2008/48/EC on Consumer Credit implemented by the European Communities 
(Consumer Credit Agreement) Regulations 2010 (S.I. no 281 of 2010); and Directive 2008/122/EC on 
Time Share, yet to be transposed. 
32 European Economic Community.  1975.  Preliminary Programme for a Consumer Protection 
and Information Policy. (1975 OJ C92/1).    
33 The protection of health and safety; the protection of economic interests; redress; information and 
education; and representation.  
34 This now forms Article 115(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU] and 
provides that ‘the Commission in its proposals envisaged in para. 1 [dealing with the approximation of 
laws directly affecting the establishment or functioning of the Single Market] concerning health, safety, 
environmental protection and consumer protection, will take as a base a high level of protection’.   
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the Treaty of an explicit reference to consumer protection as a policy objective of the 
European Union.35  
 
1.17. Some European Community consumer legislation, such as the Directives on 
Doorstep and Distance Selling, dealt with matters not previously covered by  Irish 
domestic legislation and presented no significant difficulties of implementation or 
integration. Other Directives encroached more directly on domestic legislation. 
Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts sought, among other 
things, to protect consumers ‘against the abuse of power by the seller or supplier, in 
particular against one-sided standard contracts and the exclusion of essential rights in 
contracts.’36  The guidelines set out in the Directive to assist in the assessment of the 
good faith element of the Directive’s test of unfairness overlapped substantially with 
the criteria outlined in the Schedule of the 1980 Act for the purpose of determining 
whether a contract term exempting the implied statutory undertakings under the 1893 
and 1980 Acts is fair and reasonable.37   
 
1.18. The co-existence of the relevant provisions of the 1980 Act and the Regulations 
that give effect to Directive 93/13/EEC effectively means that there are two sets of 
unfair terms rules in Irish law. The provisions of the 1980 Act are broader in scope in 
that they cover business as well as consumer contracts, but the range of contracts they 
encompass is far narrower, being confined to terms which exclude the implied 
                                                 
35 This now forms Article 169(1) of the TFEU and states: ‘In order to promote the interests of 
consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer protection, the Union shall contribute to protecting 
the health, safety and economic interests of consumers, as well as to promoting their right to 
information, education, and to organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests.’ 
36 Council Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, Recital 9.   
37 The Schedule to the 1980 Act states, among other things, that, in determining if a term is fair and 
reasonable, regard is to be had in particular to any of the following which appear to be relevant:  (a) the 
strength of the bargaining position of the parties relative to each other, taking into account (among 
other things) alternative means by which the customers’ requirements could have been met;  (b) 
whether the customer received an inducement to agree to the term, or in accepting it had an opportunity 
of entering into a similar contract with other persons, but without having to accept a similar term; (c) 
whether the customer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the existence and extent of the term 
(having regard, among other things, to any custom of the trade and any previous course of dealing 
between the parties); (d) where the term excludes or restricts any relevant liability if some condition is 
not complied with, whether it was reasonable at the time of the contract to expect that compliance with 
that condition would be practicable; and (e) whether any goods involved were manufactured, processed 
or adapted to the special order of the customer. Recital 15 of the Directive sets out four guidelines as 
follows to which ‘particular regard shall be had’ in making an assessment of good faith: the strength of 
the bargaining position of the parties; whether the consumer had an inducement to agree to the term; 
whether the goods or services were sold or supplied to the special order of the consumer, and; the 
extent to which the seller or supplier has dealt fairly and equitably with the consumer whose legitimate 
interests he has to take into account.   
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statutory undertakings as to the quality of goods and services, and the title to goods 
and their correspondence with description and sample. Though the scope of Directive 
93/13/EEC is limited to consumer contracts, it has a much wider scope of application 
in that it covers the non-core terms of all non-individually negotiated consumer 
contracts. As has been noted, the co-existence of these overlapping rules is ‘a source 
of great complexity and not a little confusion’.38  
 
1.19. The adoption of Directive 1999/44/EC on Certain Aspects of the Sale of 
Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees led to a more substantial encroachment 
of EU legislation into the sphere of domestic sale of goods legislation.  The core 
provisions of the Directive are as follows:  
 The seller of consumer goods must deliver goods that are in conformity with 
the contract in respect of compliance with description, fitness for a particular 
purpose made known by the consumer, fitness for the purposes for which 
goods of the same type are normally used, and that show the quality and 
performance which are normal in goods of the same types and which the 
consumer can reasonably expect given the nature of the goods.   
 Where the seller has delivered goods which do not conform with the contract, 
the consumer may, in the first instance, require the seller to repair or replace 
them.  
 Where the consumer is entitled neither to repair or replacement, or where 
either  remedy has not been completed within a reasonable time or without 
significance inconvenience to the consumer, the consumer may require an 
appropriate reduction of price, or if the lack of conformity is not minor, have 
the contract rescinded. 
 The seller is liable for lack of conformity of goods for a period of two years 
from their delivery.   
 Unless proved otherwise, any lack of conformity which becomes apparent 
within six months of delivery is presumed to have existed at the time of 
delivery unless the presumption is incompatible with the nature of the goods 
or the lack of conformity.  
 
The Directive further provides that commercial guarantees are legally binding under 
the conditions laid down in the guarantee statement and the associated advertising, 
and lays down information requirements to be met by such guarantees.   
 
1.20. As this summary indicates, the Directive’s scope is narrower than the Sale of 
Goods Acts by virtue, first, of its restriction to consumer sales and, second, of its 
focus on the standards of quality and fitness for purpose of goods and the remedies for 
                                                 
38 Clark, R.  2008. Contract Law in Ireland (6th ed.) (Dublin: Thomson Round Hall): 260.   
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goods not in conformity with these standards. Though the Directive is silent on 
significant aspects of consumer sales such as title, risk, and the modalities of delivery, 
the matters with which it does deal are those that are of most concern to consumers 
and the cause of most disputes with sellers. When compared with the corresponding 
provisions in domestic legislation, the Directive gives additional protections in certain 
areas such as the reversal of the burden of proof where a lack of conformity becomes 
apparent within six months of delivery. In other areas, however, it offers a lower level 
of protection, in particular its relegation of the right to reject faulty goods to the status 
of a remedy of second resort and its two-year liability period for faulty goods 
compared with the six-year limit for contractual claims under Irish law.39 The 
Directive’s remedial scheme thus reflects the emphasis of civil law legal systems on 
the specific performance of legal rights and obligations rather than the common law 
emphasis on the right of the buyer to redress for breach of the contract through 
rejection of the goods and/or damages.   
 
1.21. Disparities in the level of protection between the Directive and national 
legislation, however, did not lessen the rights of Irish or other European consumers 
because of the Directive’s minimum harmonisation character.40  The Regulations 
which give effect to the Directive in Ireland expressly state that their provisions are 
‘in addition to, and not in substitution for, any other enactment relating to the sale of 
goods’ and further provide that where, the level of consumer protection afforded by a 
particular provision of any other enactment is greater than that afforded by the 
Regulations, or vice versa, the consumer can invoke the provision affording the higher 
level of protection to the exclusion of the other provision.41   
                                                 
39 The pros and cons of the two consumer protection regimes were summarised as follows by White:  
‘For the Irish shopper shopping in Ireland, the Directive brings some useful features.  The inclusion of 
installation in the conformity requirements, the reversal of the burden of proof where the lack of 
conformity becomes apparent within six months after delivery; liability for associated advertising 
under guarantees, and the right of access to guarantee information are welcome improvements.  
Against this, the predominance of the right to reject as a remedy; the longer limitation period; the more 
detailed guarantee provisions; and the provisions on after-sale services under Irish law cannot be 
matched by the Directive.’ White, F. ‘The EC Directive on Certain Aspects of Consumer Sales and 
Associated Guarantees: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?’, op. cit., p.16. See also Bird, T.C. 
‘Directive 99/44/EC on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees: its 
impact on existing Irish sale of goods law’. (2000) E.R.P.L. 279.   
40 Article 8(2) of the Directive states that Member States ‘may adopt or maintain in force more 
stringent provisions, compatible with the Treaty in the field covered by this Directive, to ensure a 
higher level of consumer protection.’ 
41 European Communities (Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated 
Guarantees) Regulations 2003 (S.I. No. 11 of 2003), Regulation 3.   
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1.22. The implementation of the Directive through free-standing Regulations, 
however, further aggravated the complexity and lack of coherence of Irish sales law. 
With very limited exceptions, the Regulations transposed the Directive more or less 
verbatim.  While the provisions of Regulation 2 of the Regulations on conformity 
with the contract are superficially similar to the provisions of  sections 13-15 of the 
Sale of Goods Acts on sale by description, implied undertakings as to quality or 
fitness, and sale by sample, there are significant differences, minor and not so minor, 
between the two. Regulation 5(2), for example, provides that goods are presumed to 
be in conformity with the contract if they meet the requirements set out in the 
Regulation; recital 8 of the Directive makes it clear that this presumption is 
rebuttable.42 Goods which are in accordance with Regulation 5(2), consequently, may 
not be in conformity with the contract; conversely, there may be no lack of 
conformity even where goods are not in compliance with the requirements of the 
Regulation.  The equivalent provisions in the 1893 Act, by contrast, are requirements 
which must be met in consumer sales. Similarly, while Regulation 5(2)(a) of the 
Directive stipulates that goods should comply with the description given ‘by the 
seller’, section 13(1) of the 1893 Act provides that, where goods are sold by 
description, the goods must comply with that description, and not just the description 
given by the seller. According to Regulation 5(2)(c) of the Regulations, the fitness for 
purpose of goods is assessable by reference to the purposes for which similar goods 
are ‘normally used’. Under section 14(3) of the Act, however, goods are required to 
be fit for the purpose or purposes for which goods of that kind are ‘commonly 
bought’.  Goods commonly bought for a non-normal use could comply with the Act, 
therefore, while breaching the Regulations. 
 
1.23. While further examples of the discrepancies between the domestic and EU 
enactments can be cited,43 the starkest difference between the two regimes lies in the 
remedies available to the consumer for goods not in conformity with the contract.  To 
simplify somewhat, the remedial scheme under the Sale of Goods Act 1893 for 
breaches of its implied quality and other conditions puts the right to reject the goods 
                                                 
42 ‘Whereas, in order to facilitate the application of the principle of conformity with the contract, it is 
useful to introduce a rebuttable presumption of conformity with the contract covering the most 
common situation’, Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain 
aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees, recital 8.   
43 For a detailed account, see White, ‘The EC Directive on Certain Aspects of Consumer Sales and 
Associated Guarantees: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?’, op. cit., pp. 6-13.    
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first and, where this has been lost through acceptance of the goods, offers a second-
tier remedy of repair or replacement, with a restoration of the right to reject where the 
seller fails to provide the second-tier remedy within a reasonable time. The remedial 
scheme under the Regulations that implement the Directive, by contrast, prioritises 
the repair or replacement of goods not in conformity with the contract, and provides 
for termination of the contract only where the consumer is not entitled to these 
remedies or where the seller cannot perform them within a reasonable time or without 
significance inconvenience to the consumer. Each of these remedial schemes is 
complex in itself.44 Having two parallel schemes compounds the complexity and 
confusion.  Similar criticisms have been made in the United Kingdom where, despite 
a different method of transposition, the end result has been broadly similar.45  As the 
UK’s Davidson Review on the Implementation of EU legislation observed:46  
   Although it is the case and is widely accepted that the law which was in place  
   before the Directive was implemented is partly to blame for this complexity, there is  
   still evidence that the way it was implemented has added to the confusion in an  
   already complex area.   
 
1.24. Irish sale of goods law was difficult to follow prior to the implementation of the 
Directive because, among other reasons, of the unsatisfactory way in which the 1980 
Act amended and augmented the Act of 1893. The approach taken to the transposition 
of Directive 1999/44/EC aggravated this complexity. As Walley pointed out prior to 
the  transposition:47  
   Clarity is imperative in the law governing a consumer transaction.  It sets a marker  
   to the consumer, the retailer and the manufacturer on the relative standard required  
   of products. It also aims at facilitating dispute resolution in an extra-judicial setting,  
   most commonly the shop counter… Transposition of the Directive through statutory  
   instrument will result in two overlapping systems with a different interpretation of  
   defect, different scheme of remedies, different rules on liability and burden of proof.      
   The resultant confusion would not alone nullify the minor improvements in the  
   consumer’s position brought about by this Directive, but would seriously impede  
                                                 
44 For a discussion of the problems with the Directive’s remedial framework, see Twigg-Flesner, C. & 
Bradgate, R. ‘The EC Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated 
Goods – All Talk and No Do?’, (2000) Web JCLI (2) 1 at 15. 
45 The Directive was implemented in the UK by the Sale of Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations 
2002 [S.I. 2002/345].  The Directive’s provisions on conformity with the contract were not directly 
transposed as these were considered to be covered adequately by the corresponding provisions of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979.  The Regulations inserted a new Part 5a into the 1979 Act setting out the new 
consumer remedies required by the Directive.   
46 Davidson Review.  Implementation of EU Legislation: Final Report.  2006.  (London: HMSO), p. 
40 & pp. 38-42.   
47 Walley, A.  ‘The Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated 
Guarantees – Implications for Irish Consumer Sales Law’.  (2000) I.L.T. 32-33.   
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   the protective capacity of existing Irish law.  
 
Nothing has occurred in the period since the implementation of the Directive to  
invalidate or lessen this  criticism.   
 
1.25. Directive 1999/44/EC on Consumer Sales and Guarantees will now remain in 
force following the failure to reach agreement on the inclusion of revised provisions 
on consumer sales in the proposed Consumer Rights Directive. This will provide an 
opportunity to put in place a clearer, more coherent, and unified set of provisions on 
consumer sales. The specific ways in which this should be done are discussed in 
subsequent parts of this Report, in particular Chapters 2, 4, 8 and 9.    
 
1.26. Though EU legislation has mainly affected consumer sales law, Directive 
2000/35/EC on Combating Late Payment in Commercial Transactions extended the 
influence of European law to business-to-business transactions. In particular, Article 
4(1) of the Directive requires member states to provide, in conformity with applicable 
national provisions designated by private international law, that the seller retains title 
to goods until they are fully paid for if a retention of title clause has been expressly 
agreed between the buyer and seller before the delivery of the goods.  Article 3(3) of 
the Directive requires member states to provide that an agreement on the date of 
payment or the consequences of late payment which is not line with the Directive’s 
provisions on interest in case of late payment will either be unenforceable or will give 
rise to a claim to damages if it is grossly unfair to the creditor.  Indicative criteria for 
determining whether an agreement is grossly unfair to the creditor are set out in the 
Directive and member states are required to ensure that adequate and effective means 
exist to prevent the continued use of such grossly unfair terms.  While the regulation 
of unfair terms in commercial transactions was well established in many Member 
States prior to the Directive, provisions of this kind were more novel in the Irish 
context. The Directive was given effect by European Communities (Late Payment in 
Commercial Transactions) Regulations 2002.48  It has recently been replaced by 
                                                 
48 S.I. No. 388 of 2002.  The Regulations do not directly transpose Article 4(1) on retention of title 
clauses, presumably on the ground that Irish law already made adequate provision for such clauses. 
Regulation 6 of the Regulations provides that a supplier who considers that the payment terms in a 
contract are grossly unfair by reference to the Regulations may apply to the Circuit Order or an 
arbitrator for an order to this effect.   
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Directive 2011/7/EU on Combating Late Payment in Commercial Transactions which 
member states are required to transpose by March 2013.  The provisions of this 
Directive on retention of title clauses and grossly unfair payment terms are broadly 
similar to those of its precursor.   
 
Other Developments 1980-2010 
1.27. It would be misleading to suggest that the European Union was the sole source 
of change in sales law in the closing decades of the twentieth century and the first 
decade of the twenty-first.  The growth of international trade in the decades after 
World War Two led to initiatives to bring greater uniformity to the regulation of 
international contracts of sale between businesses. While these efforts made limited 
progress at first, they achieved fruition in 1980 with the signature of United Nations 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods [CISG], commonly known as the 
Vienna Convention. The Convention was drawn up by experts on contract law from a 
number of different countries and represents an amalgam of civil law and common 
law approaches. It came into force in 1988 on receiving the requisite number of 
ratifications. To date, seventy six states, which between them account for the 
preponderant share of world trade, have ratified the Convention, including the US, 
China, Japan, and Germany. The only EU member states now outside the Convention 
are Ireland, the UK, Portugal and Malta.     
 
1.28. The Vienna Convention constitutes a unified international sales law that deals 
with all of the main issues dealt with domestically by the Sales of Goods Acts – 
delivery, conformity with the contract, the passing of risk, and remedies for breach of 
contract by seller or buyer.  Unlike Irish sale of goods legislation, it also contains 
detailed rules on the formation of the contract. Unless its terms are excluded by the 
express terms of a contract, the Convention’s provisions are deemed to be 
incorporated in, and to supersede, domestic laws regulating contracts of sale between 
parties from different contracting states. This allows businesses engaged in 
international trade to avoid choice of law issues in favour of the greater certainty 
offered by common substantive rules.  Though it applies on a default basis, the 
Convention has exerted an increasing influence on sales law in areas outside its scope. 
Its provisions were influential, for example, in the formulation of aspects of the EU 
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Directive on Consumer Sales and Guarantees.49 The issue of Ireland’s accession to the 
Convention is discussed in Chapter 15 of this Report.     
 
1.29. In the United Kingdom, further significant changes were made to the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 by a series of enactments passed in 1994 and 1995.  The Sale and 
Supply of Goods Act 1994 replaced the century-old standard of ‘merchantable 
quality’ with a new criterion of ‘satisfactory quality’.50 The Act also set out a non-
exhaustive list of aspects of the quality of goods – fitness for all the purposes for 
which goods of the kind in question are commonly supplied, appearance and finish, 
freedom from minor defects, safety, and durability. Its other provisions included a 
stipulation that the right to reject would not apply in non-consumer cases where the 
breach was so slight that rejection would be unreasonable, and the introduction of a  
right of partial rejection in cases where a breach by the seller affected some but not all 
of the goods.  The Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1994 repealed the market overt 
rule originally at section 22 of the 1893 Act whereby the buyer of goods sold in an 
open or public market according to market usage acquired a good title provided he 
bought them in good faith and without notice of the seller’s title defect.  Finally, the 
Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995 addressed the consequences of the rule in the 
1979 Act that property in goods could not pass until the goods had been ascertained 
for the sale of unascertained goods forming part of an identified bulk.51 The effect of 
this rule had been that, where an unidentified and unascertained part of a identified 
and ascertained bulk was sold, no property could pass until the specific part had been 
physically severed from, or otherwise separately identified from, the remainder of the 
bulk. The 1995 Act dealt with the issue by providing that a pre-paying buyer in such 
cases is recognised as having a proprietary interest in the goods in the form of an 
undivided share in the bulk and becomes a tenant in common with the other owners. 
Though Irish sale of goods law remains similar to that in the UK in many respects, 
there are now significant divergences in key areas such as the quality standards for 
goods and the rules on acceptance. Given the paucity of Irish case law on the Sale of 
                                                 
49 See Twigg-Flesner and Bradgate, ‘The EC Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer 
Goods and Associated Goods – All Talk and No Do?’, (2000) Web JCLI (2), op.cit., pp. 8-9.   
50 For a discussion see Howells, G.  ‘The Modernization of Sales Law?: The Sale and Supply of Goods 
Act 1994’. (1995) L.M.C.L.Q. 191.    
51 For a detailed discussion, see Law Commission for England and Wales.  1993.  Sale of Goods 
Forming Part of a Bulk (Report No. 215).   
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Goods Acts, it is regrettable that the more extensive UK case law can no longer be 
drawn upon in these areas.52     
 
1.30. Innovations in information and communications technologies, in particular the 
emergence of digital services, often supplied in immaterial form over the Internet, 
have presented challenges for the Sale of Goods Acts of a kind that could not have 
been envisaged in 1893 or even in 1980.  These centre on the question of whether 
software and digital content can be classified as goods for the purposes of the Acts. 
The limited case law suggests that, in order to qualify as goods, software must be 
contained on a tangible medium. Where software or other digital content is 
downloaded from the Internet or transferred to the end-user by e-mail, there is no such 
tangible medium and these products cannot be regarded as goods for the purposes of 
sale of goods legislation. This leads to the plainly unsatisfactory situation that the law 
applicable to a transaction depends on whether the software or other content has been 
delivered on a physical medium such as a disk or CD (in which case it can be 
classified as a sale of goods and will come within the scope of the implied quality and 
other terms of the 1893 Act) or whether it has been delivered online (in which case it 
might be categorised as a supply of services or as a sui generis contract).  This issue, 
and other matters relating to electronic contracts, are considered further in Chapter 2. 
 
1.31. The foregoing account of the background to, and evolution of, the Sale of Goods 
Acts 1893 and 1980 highlights a number of themes that will recur in later Chapters.  
These include the need to distinguish between the provisions of the Acts that no 
longer serve a necessary or useful purpose in modern conditions and those that that 
remain relevant but require modification; the need to integrate the provisions of 
domestic and EU legislation in a more coherent and accessible way than has been 
done to date; and the necessity to achieve a workable balance between the partly 
common, partly separate requirements of the provisions governing consumer and 




                                                 
52 The UK case law on the ‘satisfactory quality’ standard and its relation to the case law on the 
‘merchantable quality’ standard are discussed at paras. 4.39-4.40 below.   
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CHAPTER TWO  SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893: 
INTERPRETATION OF TERMS AND SCOPE, SECTION 62  
 
2.1. Like present-day United Kingdom legislation, but unlike post-Independence Irish 
statutes, the interpretation, or definitions, section of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 is 
located at the end of the Act.53  As the definitions govern the scope of the legislation, 
we will, in keeping with the structure of domestic legislation, commence our survey 
of the 1893 Act with them.  Most of the issues raised by the interpretation provisions 
centre on the definition, and classification, of goods. We will look first at this 
definition and at what it does, and does not, encompass, including the question of its 
application to software and digital content, a matter most definitely not within the 
contemplation of the Act’s framers. We will then look at the Act’s classification of 
goods as existing/future and specific/unascertained.   
 
The Definition of ‘Goods’ 
2.2. Section 62 defines ‘goods’ as follows: 
   ‘goods’ include all chattels personal other than things in action and money54 … The  
   term includes emblements, industrial growing crops, and things attached to or  
   forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the  
   contract of sale.  
The first part of the definition sets out the essential characteristics of goods; the 
second part, which we discuss briefly later, deals with the interface between goods 
and land. The term ‘chattels personal’ is made up of two sub-categories – ‘things in 
possession’ and ‘things in action’ - the second of which is expressly excluded from 
the scope of the definition of ‘goods’.  Things in possession include:55 
    all things which are at once tangible, movable and visible, and of which possession  
    can be taken, for example, animals, household articles, money, jewel, corn,  
    garments, and everything else that can properly be put in motion and transferred  
    from place to place.   
Things in action comprise ‘shares and other securities, debts, bills of exchange and 
other negotiable instruments, bills of lading, insurance policies, patents, copyrights 
and trade marks56 and other incorporeal property’.57 Though money is a thing in 
                                                 
53 At section 62.  Only the commencement provision which was repealed by the Statute Law Revision 
Act 1908, and the short title come after it.   
54 The first sentence of the definition also states that in Scotland ‘goods’ include ‘all corporeal 
moveables except money’.   
55 Halsbury, Laws of England (4th ed), vol. 35, para. 1205.   
56 Though goods may clearly incorporate these intellectual property rights.   
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possession, it is excluded from the Act’s definition of goods.  Where coins or bank 
notes are bought and sold for qualities other than their face value as legal tender, 
however, these qualities may bring them within the definition of goods for the 
purposes of the Act.58  
 
2.3. Before discussing matters to do with the substance of the definition, it is 
necessary to consider its form. The language in which the definition is couched is 
likely to strike today’s readers of the Act, particularly those without a legal 
background, as archaic and obscure. As stated previously, one of the overall aims of 
our recommendations is to integrate as far as possible EU and domestic sales law. The 
Regulations which give effect to the EU Consumer Sales and Guarantees Directive 
reproduce its definition of ‘consumer goods’ verbatim at Regulation 2(1) as follows:59 
‘consumer goods’ means any tangible, moveable item, other than -  
(a) goods sold by way of execution or otherwise by authority of law; 
(b) water or gas where it is not put up for sale in a limited volume or set  
quantity, and  
(c) electricity.  
The core of this definition – the specification that goods are tangible and moveable – 
is similar to that under the Sale of Goods Act, but the terminology is clearer and less 
dated than that in the 1893 Act.60 There is no difficulty in applying the definition to 
non-consumer goods as matters outside the scope of EU legislation are within the 
legislative discretion of member states. As the Directive is a minimum harmonisation 
measure, member states are also free to extend the definition provided that its 
substance is given effect in national legislation.   
 
2.4. Recommendation  
We recommend that the definition of ‘consumer goods’ in Directive 1999/44/EC 
as ‘any tangible moveable item’ should be the basis of the general definition of 
‘goods’ in future legislation. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
57 Guest A.G. et al. 2006. Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (7th ed.) (London: Sweet & Maxwell), para. 1-
080.     
58 Ibid., para 1-084.  Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para 2.20.   
59 European Communities (Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated 
Guarantees) Regulations 2003 (S.I.  No. 11 of 2003).   
60 Bradgate, R. & Twigg-Flesner, C.  2003.  Blackstone’s Guide to Consumer Sales and Associated 
Guarantees (Oxford: Oxford University Press), paras. 2.2.1.3. & 2.3.1.5.   
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2.5. We look next at a number of issues that have arisen under the existing definition 
of goods, beginning with the question of the classification of contracts for the supply 
of software.   
 
Is A Contract for the Supply of Software a Sale of Goods? 
2.6. Considerable uncertainty surrounds the existing law on the classification of 
contracts for the supply of software and digital content.61 While there is no Irish 
authority in the matter, the UK Court of Appeal in St. Alban’s City and District 
Council v. International Computers Ltd.
62
 addressed the question of whether, in the 
absence of any express term, a contract for the supply of software was subject to any 
implied term as to quality or fitness for purpose. Sir Iain Glidewell expressed the view 
obiter that, where software was supplied on a computer disk, that physical medium 
was within the definition of goods for the purpose of the sale of goods legislation, 
while the computer program itself ‘being instructions or commands telling the 
computer hardware what to do’ was not.63 Accordingly, when a defective program is 
encoded and sold or hired on a disk, the seller or hirer of the disk will be in breach of 
the implied terms as to quality and fitness in the Sale of Goods Act. In this case, an 
employee of the defendant went to the plaintiff’s premises and installed the program 
directly into the plaintiff’s computer system.  In Sir Iain Glidewell’s view, there was 
no transfer of goods and there could consequently be no statutory implication of terms 
as to quality or fitness for purpose. He was of the opinion however that, in the absence 
of an express term, such a contract would be subject to an implied term under general 
contract law that the program would be reasonably fit for purpose.  
 
 
                                                 
61 The term ‘software’ is used in the broad sense to include not only computer programs, operating 
system software and application software, but also other digital content such as video, music and games 
either recorded on disk or downloaded online. 
62 [1996] All ER 481. 
63 ibid. at 493.  In London Borough of Southwark v IBM (UK) Ltd [2011] EWHC 549 (TCC), Akenhead 
J. stated obiter that, in principle, software could be goods.  He based this view on the fact that a CD is a 
physical object and is hence goods.  The fact that a CD is impressed with electrons to add functions to 
it simply gives it a particular attribute and, just as a CD containing music is goods for the purpose of 
the Act and is required to be of satisfactory quality, a CD containing software is no different in this 
respect.  Unlike the St Alban’s judgment which distinguished between the software program and the 
disc carrying the program, the judgment in this case appeared not to think it necessary to distinguish or 
separate the two.  Akenhead J’s statement appears to be limited, however, to cases where software is 
contained on a physical medium such as a CD and to have no application to cases where software is 
downloaded from the Internet or supplied by e-mail or some other non-tangible medium.         
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Delivery of Software Online  
2.7. A clear implication of the St. Alban’s decision is that, if software is to be treated 
as goods, it must be contained on a tangible medium. Where software or other digital 
content is downloaded from the Internet or transferred to the end user by e-mail, no 
such tangible medium is involved. Programs delivered in this way cannot therefore be 
classified as ‘goods’ under existing sale of goods legislation. This leads to the clearly 
unsatisfactory situation that the law applicable to a certain transaction will depend on 
whether software has been delivered on a physical medium such as a disk or a CD (in 
which case it could be classified as a sale of goods) or whether it has been 
downloaded online (in which case it could be categorised as a supply of services, or as 
a contract sui generis to which the statutory rules do not apply). 
 
2.8. In Beta Computers (Europe) Ltd. v. Adobe Systems (Europe) Ltd,64 a Scottish 
case which dealt with the question of the effectiveness of a ‘shrink-wrap’ licence,65 
Lord Penrose considered obiter the question of whether software should be 
considered to be goods and observed:66  
This reasoning [that software is goods] appears to me to be unattractive, at 
least in the context with which this case is concerned.  It appears to emphasise 
the role of the physical medium and to relate the transaction in the medium to 
sale or hire of goods.  It would have the somewhat odd result that the 
dominant characteristic of the complex product, in terms of value or the 
significant interest of the parties, would be subordinated to the medium by 
which it was transmitted to the user in analysing the true nature and effect of 
the contract. 
 
He went on to state that the supply of proprietary software for a price was a single 
contract sui generis, though it contained elements of contracts such as sales of goods 
and the grant of a licence.  This decision is widely regarded as being commercially 
inconvenient and it has not been followed since.   
 
2.9. The Regulations which give effect to the EU Consumer Sales and Guarantees 
Directive address a number of important aspects of sales law including provisions 
relating to the quality of goods supplied under consumer sales contracts, remedies for 
                                                 
64 [1996] FSR 367.  See also Kingsway Hall Hotel Ltd v Red Sky IT [2010] EWHC 965 (TCC).   
65  A ‘shrink-wrap’ licence refers to software supplied in a box covered with shrink-wrap film and on 
which the terms of the licence are readable on the box under the shrink wrap or on a sticky seal.  Once 
the consumer opens the package, he is deemed to have accepted the contract terms.   
66 1996 [FSR] 367 at 376. 
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non-conforming goods and guarantees. As noted above, the Directive and the 
implementing Regulations define goods ‘as any tangible moveable item’ and do not 
apply to services.  The same loophole applies therefore as under the Sale of Goods 
Act when it comes to protecting consumers in regard to non-conforming software or 
digital content which is downloaded online.   
 
Is a contract for the supply of software/digital content a supply of services? 
2.10  Contracts for the supply of software tend to be very diverse and deciding when a 
contract is a service is often not straightforward.   If software is not supplied on a 
physical medium, it will not be classified as a sale of goods for the purposes of the 
1893 Act. However, even if software is supplied on a physical medium and can 
therefore be classified as goods, it may still be the case that it is not properly a sale of 
goods but rather a contract for work and materials (or more generally, services) rather 
than for goods.  What is relevant here is the distinction between a contract for services 
which also involves goods and one that is simply for the sale of goods.67 
 
Why is the Distinction Significant? 
2.11. The classification of a transaction as either goods or ‘work and materials’ 
(services) is significant because the duties and liabilities of the seller of goods and the 
supplier of a service are different. Liability for goods under the Sale of Goods Act 
1893 is strict, so that the seller is liable for defects even in the absence of negligence. 
In contrast, liability for the supply of services, under Part IV of the Sale of Goods and 
Supply of Services Act 1980, is fault-based. The supplier’s duty is to supply the 
service with due skill, care and diligence and where materials are used there is an 
implied term that they will be sound and reasonably fit for the purpose for which they 
are required.68  In addition, where the buyer is dealing as a consumer, any attempt to 
limit or exclude the implied statutory terms is void under section 55 of the 1893 Act, 
whereas under Part IV of the 1980 Act, a reasonable limitation or exclusion of the 
statutory implied terms is permitted where the purchaser of the service deals as a 
consumer.69  The classification of a contract as either a contract for the sale of goods 
                                                 
67 It is also possible that there may be held to be two separate contracts: one of sale and one for the 
supply of services.  See further White, F.  2003. Commercial Law (Dublin: Thomson Round Hall), p. 
202, and Bridge,  The Sale of Goods, op. cit.,  para. 2.57.  
68 S.39 Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980. 
69 S.40 Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980. 
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or a contract for work and materials is also relevant in the context of the formalities 
required under Section 4 of the 1893 Act.  Section 4(1) of the Act which derives from 
the Statute of Frauds (Ireland) 1695 provides that a contract for the sale of goods for 
the value of €12.70 or more is not enforceable in the absence of some note or 
memorandum in writing unless the buyer has accepted and received part of the goods 
or given something in earnest or payment.70 Whether this stipulation has any real 
effect, however, once the contract is commenced is doubtful. There is no such 
requirement in relation to contracts for the supply of services.   
 
2.12. The goods/services distinction is now well established at common law and two 
approaches have emerged when it comes to distinguishing between the different types 
of contract.  In Lee v. Griffin,71 it was held that the supply of dentures by a dentist was 
a supply of goods as, despite the employment of skilled services, the end result of the 
contract consisted in the production of goods. The essential test was whether anything 
that could be the subject matter of a sale had come into existence.72 In Robinson v. 
Graves,73 a contract was made with an artist for a portrait to be painted.  The court 
held that it was a contract for the services of the artist, rather than one for the sale of 
goods. It was necessary in its view to look for the dominant element in the contract.  
If this was the end product, then it would be a contract for the sale of goods.  But if 
the substance of the contract was that skill and labour had to be exercised for the 
production of the article and it was only ancillary to this that some materials would 
pass to the customer in tandem with the exercise of skill, it would be a contract for the 
supply of services. This has become known as the ‘substance of the contract’ 
approach.  Benjamin is critical of this judgement on the ground that it overlooks the 
fact that what passes to the client is not the materials but the finished picture, of which 
both the work and the materials are components. Lee v. Griffin and Robinson v. 
Graves cannot be reconciled accordingly, and the reasoning in each case could have 
                                                 
70 As discussed in Chapter 3, section 4 of the 1893 was repealed in the U.K. by the Law Reform 
(Enforcement of Contracts) Act 1954 and, as a consequence, the issue has ceased to be of importance 
in that jurisdiction. 
71 (1861) 1 B&S 272. 
72 ‘If the contract be such that, when carried out, it would result in the sale of a chattel, the party cannot 
sue for work and labour; but if the result of the contract is that the party has done work and labour that 
ends in nothing that can become the subject of sale, the party cannot sue for goods sold and delivered’, 
ibid. at 278.   
73 [1935] 1 KB 579. 
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been applied to the facts of the other.74  The tests laid down in these cases have also 
been criticised on the basis that their application leads to uncertainty and 
unpredictability.75 As a result, determining where a contract for the supply of software 
fits into the goods/services distinction can be difficult.  The circumstances in which a 
transaction will be classified as a sale of goods or a supply of services will be decided 
in the context of the facts of the particular case.    
 
Customised Software v. Off-the-Shelf Software  
2.13. A distinction is sometimes drawn between a transaction for the supply of 
bespoke software made to the order of the customer and contracts involving 
standardised ‘off-the-shelf’ products.  According to the ‘substance of the contract 
test’, one must look for the dominant element in the contract, namely whether this is 
the end product or the skill and expertise of the person providing the services. Using 
this test, the supply of customised or bespoke software could well be categorised as a 
supply of services rather than a sale of goods.  On the other hand, the provision of 
standardised, or ‘off-the-shelf’ software supplied on a physical medium would be 
classified as the sale of goods. 
 
2.14. In the Australian case of Toby Construction Ltd. v. Computer Bar (Sales) Pty 
Ltd.,76 a contract for a computer system comprising computer hardware, a financial 
software package and a word processing package was held to be a sale of goods 
because there was a substantial hardware component.  Rogers J dismissed the 
argument that the contract involved a supply of services:77 
Whilst representing the fruits of much research work, [the software] was in 
current jargon, off the shelf, in a sense, mass produced.  There can be no 
comparison with a one-off painting.  Rather is the comparison with a mass 
produced print of a painting. 
 
The court suggested accordingly that mass production was a relevant factor in 
determining whether there was a sale of goods.  However, the judgment failed to 
                                                 
74 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 1-047 fn. 1.  
75 Ní Shúilleabháin, “Formalities of Contracting: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Requirements that 
Contracts be Evidenced in Writing”, (2005) D.U.L.J 113 at 117. Ní Shúilleabháin suggests that 
Robinson v. Graves can be explained by a desire to do justice on the merits of the case and to exclude 
the application of the Statute of Frauds where its application would have barred a legitimate claim. 
76 (1983) 2 NSWLR 48. 
77 ibid. p. 51. 
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address the question of the classification of a contract for the supply of software 
alone. 
 
2.15. While the argument for treating digital content as a contract for the supply of 
services is strongest in the case of customised software, this assumption will not 
necessarily apply in every instance. One situation where a contrary view might be 
taken is that of the ‘turn-key’ contract.  This type of agreement involves the complete 
installation of a system which is then simply handed over to the party to whom it is 
being supplied.  As such, it is a contract purely concerned with results.  It might more 
properly be regarded as a sale of goods rather than a supply of services even where it 
involves the supply of customised software.78 
 
Distinction between Licences and Sales 
2.16. In most transactions for the transfer of software, a licence will normally be 
involved and the person to whom the software is supplied will take it subject to 
copyright. It has been argued accordingly by some commentators that software cannot 
be goods within the meaning of sale of goods legislation because of the intellectual 
property rights involved and that, as a consequence, transactions involving software 
do not fall to be considered under this legislation.79 Other commentators disagree with 
this view and argue that it is necessary to distinguish between the intellectual property 
transaction (the licensing agreement) and the goods transaction (the sale) and that the 
existence of intellectual property rights over a computer program does not necessarily 
preclude the supply of software from being treated as a sale.80   
 
2.17. It has been suggested that the analogy of books, CDs and DVDs in physical 
form is relevant in this context. Though all are sold subject to copyright, the resultant 
restrictions are not seen as preventing transactions involving the transfer of such items 
from being sales. Others contend, however, that copyright restrictions have a different 
impact in the case of software than in the case of books or other products.  The basic 
purpose for which a book or DVD is bought can be fulfilled without any need for the 
                                                 
78 See further Rowland and MacDonald (2005). Information Technology Law (3rd ed.) (London: 
Cavendish Publishing), p.153. 
79 For example, see Horovitz, “Computer Software as a Good Under the Uniform Commercial Code: 
Taking a Byte out of the Intangibility Myth”, (1985) B.U.L. Rev 129; Niranjan, ‘A Software Transfer 
Agreement and its Implications for Contract, Sale of Goods and Taxation’, (2009) J.B.L. 799. 
80 Green and Saidov, ‘Software as Goods’, (2007) J.B.L. 161. 
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purchaser to consider intellectual property rights. On the other hand, the use of 
software will entail copying it onto hardware, and in general intellectual property 
rights have a greater impact on the enjoyment of software.81  Nevertheless, as Green 
and Saidov point out, an individual who buys a software package will generally do so 
in order to acquire its use value.  The fact that the corresponding intellectual property 
rights over it are restricted will make no difference to the utility which that person 
derives from the transaction, and the issue of the restriction of intellectual property 
rights is unlikely to occur to the majority of purchasers.  Purchasers who buy software 
to benefit from its use value should not be distinguished consequently from those who 
buy conventional goods with a similar purpose in mind.82   
 
2.18. It can be argued, however, that in some instances the intellectual property rights 
so dominate the transaction as to prevent the supply of software from being regarded 
as a sale of goods. According to section 2(1) of the 1893 Act, a contract for the sale of 
goods is ‘…a contract by which the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property in 
the goods to the buyer for a money consideration called the price.’ The property in the 
goods refers to ownership.  In the case of a software licence, the person to whom the 
goods are supplied will take them subject to the restrictions of copyright in the 
licence.  The question may arise consequently as to whether those restrictions are such 
as to prevent the transferee from obtaining property in the goods. For example, some 
licensing agreements may require the return of the software in case a software user 
violates the agreement.  Some agreements require periodic fees instead of a once-off 
fee.  In some cases, the duration of the use of software may be limited and it may be 
supplied under an agreement that it will be returned when the program licence 
terminates.  In cases such as these, the agreement may not come within the remit of 
sale of goods legislation.  According to Green and Saidov:83 
    The important point is that whether or not the existence of IP rights has an effect on      
    the characterisation of the software transaction as sales is a matter of a particular  
    case.  A non-exhaustive list of relevant considerations includes such factors as  
    whether the duration of using software is indefinite, whether payment is to be made  
    once or periodically, and whether the licence can be revoked. 
                                                 
81 See further Rowland and Macdonald, op. cit., fn.18, p.145.  See also Green and Saidov, ibid. 
82 Green and Saidov, ibid., fn.20, p.176 
83 ibid. p.177. 
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These issues were among those considered recently by the English High Court in 
London Borough of Southwark v IBM UK Ltd.
84 The Council brought a claim for 
damages of £2.5m. against IBM on the ground that third-party software supplied by 
the company was not fit for purpose or of satisfactory quality. The court dismissed the 
claim and held, among other things, that the agreement between the parties was not a 
contract of sale within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.  In order for there 
to be a contract of sale under the Act there had to be a transfer of property in the 
goods and, as the parties had agreed that title to the software remained with the third 
party who had developed it, there was no such contract in this case. This conclusion 
was reinforced by the fact that the contract provided that all forms and copies of the 
software had to be destroyed on termination of the contract.    
 
Exemption Clauses 
2.19. Producers of software may be exposed to a greater degree of risk than producers 
of conventional goods.  Unlike most manufactured products, where defects will 
typically be introduced at the production stage and affect only a portion of the 
products in question, in the case of software, if one copy is defective, it is likely that 
all copies will suffer from the same defects. The losses resulting from software faults, 
consequently, can be extensive and mainly economic in nature.  The extent of claims  
may be hard to quantify in such cases and, as a result, difficult to insure against.  For 
these reasons, it has been standard practice to seek to exclude and limit liability for 
some forms of loss in the terms of the end-user licence agreement (EULA) supplied 
with software. 
 
2.20. In order to be effective, clauses that seek to exclude or limit liability must be 
incorporated into the contract, must be appropriately worded to cover the breach 
which has occurred and must be effective under applicable legislation. One practice 
which has developed is the supply of software subject to a ‘shrink-wrap’ licence. As 
noted earlier, the terms of the licence are printed clearly on a sticky seal, or are 
readable on the box which is covered with shrink-wrap film.  Once the purchaser 
opens the packaging, they are deemed to have accepted the terms.  Under UK law, 
several questions concerning the enforceability of such licences have been raised – 
                                                 
84 [2011] EWHC 599 (TCC).   
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principally whether the terms have been validly incorporated into the contract - and 
their legal position remains unclear.85  Increasingly common is the use of ‘click-wrap’ 
licences which require a higher level of affirmative action on the part of the user.  
Here, the purchaser must click an ‘I accept’ icon in relation to the EULA terms before 
being permitted to download or install software.  It seems more likely that such terms 
would be taken to have been incorporated into the contract.86 
 
2.21. Assuming such terms to have been incorporated, their validity would also have 
to be considered under the relevant legislation.  Under the 1893 Act, the terms implied 
into contracts of sale by sections 12-15 of the Act can never be excluded where the 
buyer deals as a consumer.  In non-consumer contracts, clauses seeking to exclude the 
implied terms will, with the exception of the implied terms as to title, not be 
enforceable unless shown to be fair and reasonable.87 In the case of contracts for the 
supply of services, section 40 of the 1980 Act provides that the quality terms implied 
by section 39 may be excluded except where the recipient of the service deals as a 
consumer in which case it must be shown that the exclusion clause is fair and 
reasonable and has been specifically brought to the recipient’s attention. 
 
2.22. The enforceability of clauses excluding the implied terms in contracts for the 
supply of computer software will therefore depend on the classification of the contract 
as a sale of goods or supply of a service.  In consumer contracts, these clauses would 
also fall to be considered under the European Communities (Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts) Regulations 1995. The Regulations which give effect to the 
Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts88 are applicable to goods and 
services alike and apply consequently whether software is sold as a tangible or 
intangible product.  A term included in a standard form contract is generally regarded 
as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance 
in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract to the detriment of the 
                                                 
85 In Beta Computers v. Adobe Systems[1996] FSR 387, the Scottish court upheld the validity of a 
shrink-wrap licence, emphasising the rights of the customer to return the software should the licence 
prove unsatisfactory. However, the validity of shrink-wrap licences has since been repeatedly 
questioned by academic commentators.  See for example, Johnson, ‘All Wrapped up? A Review of the 
Enforceability of Shrink-wrap and Click-wrap licences in the U.K. and the United States’, (2003)  
E.I. P.R .98; Gringas, ‘The Validity of Shrink-wrap licences’, (1996) IJLIT  77. 
86 Johnson, ibid. 
87 S.55(4) Sale of Goods Act 1893.  Kingsway Hall Hotel Ltd v Red Sky IT [2010] EWHC 965 (TCC). 
88 93/13/EEC[1993] O.J. L95/29. 
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other party.89  The Third Schedule to the 1995 Regulations contains an indicative list 
of contractual terms that may be regarded as unfair. One clause in this list which may 
be relevant in the context of end-user license agreements attaching to the supply of 
software relates to a clause that ‘irrevocably binds the consumer to terms with which 
he had no real opportunity of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the 
contract’. This could be relevant to the way the contract is formed in the cases of 
click-wrap or shrink-wrap transactions. In relation to the contract terms themselves, 
limitation of liability clauses may be considered unfair under the open norm laid 
down in the Regulations depending on the circumstances of the particular case.90 
 
2.23. The present state of law in this area is particularly unsatisfactory in the case of 
business-to-business sales.  If software is customised, then the supplier of defective 
software might successfully contend that the contract is one for services and is thus 
governed by the provisions of sections 39-40 of the 1980 Act as to the implied quality 
terms and their exclusion rather than the corresponding provisions on goods at 
sections 14 & 55 of the 1893 Act.  As a disclaimer in a business-to-business services 
contract is not subject to a test of its fairness and reasonableness, the disclaimer will 
be effective in the context of a services contract.  Irish law, moreover, does not 
provide the additional protections found in UK law, specifically sections 3 and 11 of 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.91 We think that the present situation is 
anomalous and in Chapter 14 recommend changes to the existing statutory provisions.   
 
Options for Reform  
2.24. It is plainly unsatisfactory that the legal rights and remedies enjoyed by the 
purchasers of software of similar content vary with the medium on which the software 
is supplied.  The difficulties that have arisen in this respect reflect the limitations of 
nineteenth century categories and concepts in the face of twenty-first century 
technologies and commercial practices.  The most straightforward way of addressing 
the divergent legal treatment of software supplied via different media would be to 
regard all forms of software as goods for the purposes of sale of goods legislation.  
This has been done in New Zealand where the Consumer Guarantees Amendment Act 
                                                 
89 Regulation 3(2) 1995. 
90 See further, Guibault, L. ‘Accomodating the Needs of iConsumers: Making Sure They Get Their 
Money’s  Worth of Digital Entertainment’, (2008) J. Cons. Pol. 409. 
91 Kingsway Hall Hotel Ltd v Red Sky IT [2010] EWHC 965 (TCC). 
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2003 substituted a new definition of goods as ‘personal property of every kind 
(whether tangible or intangible), other than money and choses in action’ in the 
Consumer Guarantees Act 1993.92  The revised definition further provided that, ‘to 
avoid doubt’, goods ‘includes … computer software.’  While a parallel amendment of 
the definition of goods in the New Zealand Sale of Goods Act 1908 did not amend the 
main part of the definition, which remains similar to that at section 62 of the 1893 
Act, it included a similar provision about computer software.93 
 
2.25. Though we gave full consideration to a possible amendment to the definition of 
goods along these lines, it is not a change that, for a number of reasons, we can 
recommend. First, the inclusion of an intangible product such as computer software in 
the definition of goods (as choses in possession or chose in action) is open to the 
charge that it will cause confusion and distort the law of personal property.  Intangible 
software does not fit within the two forms of personal property recognised by the 
common law. It cannot be classified as a chose in action as it has long been 
established that a chose in action is an intangible thing capable of being enjoyed only 
in the last resort by the exercise of a right of action.  Clearly, software can be enjoyed 
and possessed without an action.  Equally, it is not a chose in possession because to be 
possessed, a thing must be tangible.94  The changes made to the definition of goods in 
New Zealand Consumer Guarantees Act have been the subject of domestic criticism 
on this ground:95   
    Declaring one intangible to be goods is a momentous change to the law.  The  
    definition in the Act is inclusive and not exclusive. It could now be argued that  
    other intangibles, so long as they are not choses in action, are goods.   
Second, simply declaring software to be goods by definitional fiat would not address 
other issues raised by the incorporation of software within sale of goods legislation.  
The essence of a contract of sale consists in the transfer of property in the goods. In 
software transactions, however, the supplier typically does not transfer ownership of 
the software program to the end user but instead grants a licence for the use of the 
program subject to copyright conditions.  Third, a number of provisions of the Sale of 
                                                 
92 No. 33 of 1993, section 3.  
http://www.legislation.govt.nz./act/public/2003/0033/latest/DLM198910/html  
93 No. 35 of 2003, section 3.  
http://www.legislation.govt.nz./act/public/2003/0035/latest/DLM198940.html.  
94 See Moon, ‘Software: Tangible or Intangible’, Magazine of the Society for Computers and Law 
June/July 2007, available at: http://www.ajpark.com/articles/2007/08/software_tangible_intangible.php 
95 Moon, ‘Intangibles as Property and Goods’, (2009) NZLJ 228. 
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Goods Act, such as those on the transfer of property and delivery, do not readily lend 
themselves to application to intangible products.  Fourth, declaring software to be  
goods might well lead to demands for a similar status for other products.  If software 
is classified as goods, it may well be asked why similar rights should not apply in the 
case of defective information such as that on websites or printed materials.  The 
present law may be anomalous but it is not chaotic.     
 
2.26. It is arguable in addition that further study, technical as much as legal, needs to 
be undertaken into the issues applicable to non-conforming software before final 
decisions are taken as to the substance and form of future legislative regulation in this 
area. It has been contended that software is qualitatively different from the traditional 
products which are the subject of sales transactions and that existing sales law rules 
are inherently unsuited to software transactions. The argument is made, for example 
that strict liability may not be an appropriate standard for software where the parties 
generally do not expect the product to function perfectly as soon as it is delivered, and 
where the fixing of bugs is part of the process.96 Others counter this by arguing that 
the Sale of Goods legislation is sufficiently flexible to take account of these 
arguments and that under the implied terms, goods do not have to be perfect when  
delivered.97 Although this may be accepted, the exact parameters of the supplier’s 
responsibility and the extent to which the parties may limit or exclude liability is 
uncertain nevertheless, and can be held to pose another challenge to the application of 
sales law to software contracts.98  The point is made by the software industry itself 
that the application of strict liability rules would be likely to stifle innovation in the  
sector.99  These debates have led to calls to abandon the approach of trying to classify 
software as goods or services and to adopt a specialised instrument dealing 
                                                 
96 The U.K. Court of Appeal has accepted that customised software may well carry defects on first 
release and will require further enhancement as defects come to light: In Saphena Computing v. Allied 
Collection Agencies [1995] FSR 616, Staughton LJ stated: ‘…software is not necessarily a commodity 
which is handed over or delivered once and for all at one time.  It may well have to be tested and 
modified as necessary.  It would not be a breach of contract at all to deliver software in the first 
instance with a defect in it…’(at 652) For further discussion, see Rowland and Macdonald, 
Information Technology Law, op. cit., fn.18  at pp 121-127 
97 Green and Saidov ,  (2007) ‘Software as Goods’, op. cit. 
98 See further, Atkins, ‘Software asks the Questions: What’s the Law’s Response?’ British and Irish 
Law, Education and Technology Association 2007 Annual Conference, available at: 
http://www.bileta.ac.uk/Document%20Library/1/Software%20asks%20the%20questions%20-
%20what's%20the%20law's%20response.pdf ; Macdonald, ‘Bugs and Breaches’, (2005) IJLIT 118; 
Callaghan and O’Sullivan, ‘Who Should Bear the Cost of Software Bugs?’ (2005) C.L.S.R. 56. 
99 See responses to the European Commission Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/detailed_analysis_en.pdf   
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specifically with software transactions.  Other differences between traditional sales of 
goods and digital services transactions have also been cited in support of the case for 
sector-specific digital services legislation.100 While in conventional sales transactions, 
the interaction between seller and buyer typically ends as soon as the parties leave 
each others’ presence, providers of digital content often interact with purchasers after 
the purchase in the form of updates, service customisation, and also through use of 
content control technologies and digital rights management.   
 
2.27. In view of the absence of physical barriers to digital transactions, it is important 
in our view that proposals for change in the law regulating software and digital 
content in Ireland have close regard to possible legislative developments in the 
European Union and, given the close connections between the two legal systems, in 
the United Kingdom.  The issue of protection for consumers in transactions for digital 
services is currently under consideration both at EU level and in the UK.  Though the 
European Commission’s 2006 Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis 
referred to the need to update consumer protection laws to take account of 
developments in digital technology and services, the subsequent proposal for a 
Directive on Consumer Rights did not contain any provisions of this kind.101 The 
Commission decided instead, in view of the complexity of the issues, to commission a 
study from researchers at the University of Amsterdam on the legal framework for 
digital content services for consumers. This report is due to be published in 2011 and 
is expected to present policy recommendations on ways of guaranteeing consumers an 
adequate level of legal protection when purchasing digital services online. While it 
remains to be seen whether the European Commission will propose a new sector-
specific legal instrument to deal with the range of issues facing consumers who 
purchase digital content, it would be inadvisable to propose far-reaching national 
reforms in this area pending a clear indication in the matter. In the UK, the White 
Paper, A Better Deal for Consumers, issued by the former Labour Government in July 
2009 included a commitment to ‘develop rules on new digital products to ensure that 
                                                 
100 For example, Van Hoboken and Helberger, “Looking Ahead – Future Issues when Reflecting on the 
Place of the iConsumer in Consumer Law and Copyright Law” (2008) J. Cons. Pol.  489. 
101 European Commission.  Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis, COM (2006) 744, 
para. 3.1. 
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the core principles of consumer protection apply’.102  A research report on the legal 
issues and options for such rules was subsequently commissioned and published.103 
 
2.28. Though we are not in a position for these reasons to recommend an overall 
solution to the legal classification of software and digital content, a number of our 
other recommendations will help to reduce the anomalies that currently exist where 
software is supplied through different media. We are recommending, in particular, 
that the rules governing exemption clauses for contracts of sale and contracts for 
services should be the same.  In particular, business-to-consumer sales and services 
disclaimers should be void in the case of the implied statutory terms, while 
disclaimers in business-to-business sales and services contracts should be subject to a 
test of fairness and reasonableness in respect of those terms.  We are recommending 
also that contracts for the supply of services should contain an implied term that the 
services are reasonably fit for any purpose, and are reasonably expected to achieve 
any particular result, made known by the purchaser. The formalities requirements 
applicable to contracts of sale under section 4 of the 1893 Act, but not to contracts for 
the supply of services, are also recommended for repeal.  The combined effect of 
these changes would mean that it would matter substantially less in practical terms 
whether a contract was classified as being for the sale of goods or the supply of 
services.  It is important to keep in mind also that case law suggests that quality terms 
not dissimilar to those applicable to goods under sale of goods legislation may be 
implied into software contracts by analogy at common law even if software is 
regarded as a contract sui generis.104   
 
Recommendation 
2.29. We do not recommend amending the definition of goods to include 
computer software. A comprehensive consultative process on the issues of 
whether strict liability standards are suitable for software contracts and on 
whether there is a need for a specialised instrument dealing with software 
                                                 
102 A Better Deal for Consumers: Delivering Real Help Now and Change for the Future. (London: 
HMSO) Cmnd. 7669, para. 4.2.3. 
103 Bradgate, R.  September 2010. Consumer Rights in Digital Products: Research Report for the UK 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. http://www.bis.gov.uk./assets/biscore/consumer-
issues/docs/c/10-1125-consumer-rights-in-digital-products   
104 St. Albans City and District Council v. ICL, above, fn.10. 
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transactions should be undertaken in advance of any further consideration of 
legislative regulation in this area.    
 
Electricity, Water, and Gas  
2.30. There is no clear-cut answer to the question of whether electricity, gas and water 
should be defined as ‘goods’ for the purposes of sale of goods legislation.  As noted at 
paragraph 2.3 above, the EU Directive on Consumer Sales and Guarantees expressly 
excludes electricity from the definition of ‘consumer goods’ and includes gas and 
water only where sold in a limited volume or set quantity such as bottled water or 
cylinders of gas. The proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights published in 
October 2008 contained a similar definition,105 but the definition in the final text of 
the Directive which is to come into force later in 2011 does not expressly exclude 
electricity, gas, and water from its scope, but states instead that these ‘shall be 
considered as goods within the meaning of this Directive where they are put up for 
sale in a limited volume or set quantity’.106 Electricity has been regarded as ‘goods’, 
however, by the European Court of Justice for the purposes of the European Treaty 
provisions on the free movement of goods.107 
 
2.31. The 1893 Act offers no specific guidance on the issue. While there is no doubt, 
as Benjamin observes, that energy in electrical or other form is capable of being 
bought and sold, there are clearly difficulties in attributing to it all the legal qualities 
of a physical object.108  When we look at the Act as a whole, moreover, it is apparent 
that many of its provisions – such as those on delivery, examination, the transfer of 
property, and stoppage in transit – were conceived with physical objects in mind and 
cannot readily be applied to the supply of electricity or gas.109 Though a case can 
more easily be made that water meets the criteria of being tangible and visible, the 
supply of water does not involve a finite moveable object in physical form in any 
                                                 
105 European Commission.  Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights.  COM (2008) 614, Art. 
2(4).  
106 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights, 
Article 2(3).  A provisional version of the final text of the Directive can be accessed at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/documents/activities/cont/201106/20110624ATT22578EN.pdf.  
107 Case C-393/92 Almelo and Others [1994] ECR I -1477, para. 28.  Case C-158/94  Commission v. 
Italy [1997] ECR I – 5789; Case C-213/96 Outukumpu [1998] ECR I – 1777.  
108  Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 1-085.   
109 As Bridge notes, however, the sale of bottled gas is clearly governed by the Act.  Bridge, The Sale 
of Goods, op. cit., para. 2.15. 
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straightforward sense. The arrangements under which water is currently supplied to 
most domestic users in Ireland, moreover, are not those of a contract of sale by virtue 
of the absence of any money consideration, though this is set to change in the 
future.110   
 
2.32. The limited case law on these issues is also inconclusive in the main.  The 
supply of power (whether in the form of ‘gas, electricity or any other motive power’) 
was treated as occurring under a contract of sale in Bentley Bros v Metcalfe,111 though 
the court was uncertain about the subject matter.112  The question of whether the 
supply of electricity was a sale of goods was left open in County of Durham Electrical 
Power Distribution Co v IRC,113 though in East Midlands Electricity Board v 
Grantham
114 electricity was held not to be goods for the purposes of companies 
legislation.  In Britvic Soft Drinks v Messer UK Ltd,115 the sale of carbon dioxide for 
use in the manufacture of sparkling drinks was treated as contract of sale within the 
meaning of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.   
 
2.33. Part IV of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 treats electricity 
as the supply of a service. Section 40 of the Act deals with the exclusion of the 
implied terms as to quality of service under section 39, with subsection 5(a) providing 
that nothing in section 40 shall invalidate ‘a term of an agreement for the supply of 
electricity exempting the supplier from liability (arising otherwise than from his 
negligence) for an interruption, variation and defect of supply.’  This attests to a clear 
intention on the part of the legislature to treat the supply of electricity as a service and 
not as goods.  The Consumer Protection Act 2007, however, includes electricity, gas, 
and water within its definition of ‘goods’.116  For the purposes of Value-Added Tax, 
                                                 
110 In Bridge’s view, the supply of running water should be regarded as a contact of sale of goods, 
especially if it is metered, the quantity recorded, and a unit price paid, ibid. para. 2.15.     
111 [1906] 2 KB 548 at 552-53.   
112  Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit, para 2.15.    
113  [1909] 2 K.B. 604.  
114  [1980] C.L.Y. 271.  
115  [2002] EWCA Civ 548.  Sealy observed of this case that, though goods as ‘chattels personal’ are 
defined as ‘things at once tangible, movable and visible’, there has never been any doubt that ‘gases 
(and even air itself, e.g. as compressed air) are ‘goods’ within the Sale of Goods Act, despite lacking 
two of these three attributes.’  Sealy, L.S. ‘Sale of goods – reliance on a third party’s skill and 
judgement’ (2003) C.L.J. 260.   
116 Consumer Protection Act 2007 (No. 19/207), s. 2(1).  As there are no differences in the treatment of 
goods and services under the Act, no practical consequences follow from the classification of 
electricity, gas and water as goods.    
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the Revenue Commissioners also treat the provision of electricity, gas and any form 
of power, heat, refrigeration or ventilation as a supply of goods.117 With the partial 
exception of New Zealand, no other jurisdiction whose sales law is based on the 1893 
Act has amended the definition of goods in its sale of goods legislation to include 
electricity, gas and water.118 Despite the replacement of, and a succession of 
amendments to, the 1893 Act in the UK, the definition of ‘goods’ in the UK Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 remains the same as that in the 1893 Act. The UN Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods also excludes electricity from its scope.119 
  
2.34. As stated in the preceding discussion of software and as elaborated in 
subsequent Chapters, we have sought where possible in our recommendations to 
minimise the differences in the legal treatment of contracts of sale and contracts for 
the supply of services. In the light of these changes, it would be materially less 
consequential whether electricity, gas and water were defined as goods or services.  
On balance, we think that the arguments for defining them as services are somewhat 
more persuasive. As noted in the discussion of software, we have concerns in 
particular about the implications of declaring intangible products to be goods for the 
coherence of the definition and the wider law of personal property.  While it might be 
possible to apply the statutory quality standard applicable to goods to electricity and 




                                                 
117 Revenue Commissioners.  2008. Guide to VAT (11th edition), para. 3.1.  The Guide equates 
‘supply’ with ‘sale’ and states that ‘a taxable supply of goods means the normal transfer of ownership 
by one person to another’.    
118 The definition of ‘goods’ in the New Zealand Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 was amended by the 
Consumer Guarantee Amendment Act 2003 to include electricity, gas, water and computer sofware.  A 
similar change was made to the New Zealand Fair Trading Act 1986.  According to one account, the 
amendment was made in response to a court decision which had held electricity to be neither goods nor 
services and was aimed in large part at addressing consumer issues that had arisen from electricity 
deregulation. Cox, N.  ‘The Definitions of Goods and Services in Consumer Protection Acts – Some 
Recent Changes’, (2003) NZLJ 281. Though the definition of goods in the New Zealand Sale of Goods 
Act 1908 was also amended in 2003 to include computer software in 2003, it was not similarly 
extended to electricity, gas and water.  There have been calls subsequently to amend the Sale of Goods 
Act in the interests of consistency with other statutes.  Moon, K.  ‘Intangibles as property and goods’, 
[2009] NZLJ 281.   
119  United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Art. 2(f).   
120 Howells, G. & Twigg-Flesner, C. (eds).   2010. Consolidation and Simplification of UK 
Consumer Law (Department for Business, Innovations & Skills), paras. 3.124-3.128.   
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2.35. Recommendation  
We recommend that electricity and, unless supplied for sale in a limited volume 
or set quantity, gas and water should be included in the definition of ‘services’ in 
future legislation.   
 
Human Body Parts and Remains 
2.36. Like digital content, this is an area where scientific advances are presenting new 
challenges to the law.121 The main matters at issue are anterior to the question of 
whether transactions involving parts of the human body are contracts of sale, but 
concern rather whether human remains and parts of the body can be owned and 
whether there are, or should be, specific statutory prohibitions on commercial 
transactions involving human remains and organs. In the case of human remains, the 
law has traditionally recognised no right of property in a dead body or any part 
thereof with the result that these are not ordinarily regarded as ‘goods’ that can be 
bought or sold.122  In an Australian case, Doodeward v Spence,123 which has been 
followed in the UK,124 parts of a corpse were regarded, however, as capable of 
constituting property because they had undergone sufficient transformation by virtue 
of the lawful application of human skill such as embalming.125 The Doodeward 
exception has been enshrined in the UK  Human Tissue Act 2004 which exempts 
from the Act’s general prohibition on commercial dealing in human organs and tissue  
material that is the subject of property because of an application of skill.  
 
2.37. The law relating to tissue and organs taken from the living has seen far-reaching 
developments in recent decades.126 While earlier cases tended to centre on bodily 
                                                 
121 The issues that have arisen to date concern organs and tissue taken from the dead or the living. 
Recent advances in regenerative medicine, however, have seen new bladders grown from cells cultured 
in a laboratory and the development of prototype ‘bioprinters’ that may prove capable at some point of 
‘manufacturing’ human tissue and organs.  ‘Printing body parts’, The Economist 20 February 2010.  
122 Creagh, C.  ‘Property in the dead body’ ( 2000) Bar Review 301.  As Bridge observes, however, it is 
‘a commonplace that human skeletons are owned by medical students and bought and sold 
accordingly’. Human hair has also ‘been bought and sold without controversy’ for centuries. Bridge, 
The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 2.16  
123 6 CLR 406, 413-14.  
124 Dobson v Northern Tyneside Health Authority [1996] 4 All ER 474.   
125 In a more recent UK case, it was held that a hospital acquired proprietary and possessory rights to 
organs removed from a dead baby’s body following a post-mortem on the grounds that the work and 
skill of the pathologists in removing the organs and preparing the blocks and slides for histological 
examination came within the Doodeward exception. Re Organ Retention Group Litigation [2004] 
EWHC 644 QB, para. 257.   
126 Creagh, C. ‘Property in the living body’, (2001) Bar Review 209.   
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products, notably blood,127 the focus of more recent attention has been on organs for 
use in transplantation and on genetic material.  A US case, Moore v Regents of the 
University of California,128 found that a patient had no property rights in parts of his 
body - spleen and genetic materials – following their removal in surgery.  In a 
subsequent American case, Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network,129 the court 
was more equivocal on the question and suggested that cases of lost or misdirected 
organs could involve deprivation that would justify a property claim.  In the UK, the 
recent landmark judgement by the Court of Appeal in Yearworth & Others v North 
Bristol NHS Trust
130 rejected the Doodeward exception as the only basis for the 
existence of property in the living body. The case concerned semen taken from cancer 
patients, with a view to later use, that became irreversibly damaged because of  
deficiencies in the hospital’s storage system. The court found that the claimants – 
though no other person, human or corporate - had ownership of the sperm and that 
there had been a bailment of it to the hospital capable of giving rise to liability. 
Though the bailment arrangements were not commercial, they were closely akin to 
contracts and came within the established principles on breach of contract. The 
significance of the Yearworth judgement lies in the fact that it moved beyond the 
Doodeward exception as the only basis of property in human tissue, and that the 
court’s reasoning is potentially applicable to other cases involving gametes and 
possibly embryos, though not necessarily other human tissue.131 
 
2.38. Even this brief discussion is sufficient to establish the complexity and sensitivity 
of the matters at issue.  Though Ireland has yet to enact legislation on the model of the 
UK Human Tissue Act 2004, legislation along these lines has been on the policy 
agenda since the publication in 2006 of the Madden Report on Post Mortem Practice 
                                                 
127 One US case , Perlmutter v Beth David Hospital 123 N.E. (2d) 792 (1955), held that the supply of 
blood for a transfusion was a contract for the provision of services to which the supply of blood was 
incidental, while a later US case, Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v Hansen 579 P (2d) 1158 
(1978), held the supply of blood by a blood bank to be a sale of goods.  A Canadian case, Pitman 
Estate v Bain (1994) 112 DLR (4th) 257, found that, because a patient in receipt of blood was not 
charged, there was no money consideration and hence no sale of goods.  In another Canadian case, ter 
Neuzen v Korn (1993) 103 DLR  (4th) 473, artificial insemination using HIV-infected semen was held 
not to be a sale of goods, and the doctor who supplied it was found not to owe the recipient the strict 
warranty obligations of a contract of sale.   
128 51 Cal. 3rd 120 (1990). 
129 No. 2 438 F. 3d. 214 (2006).   
130 [2009] EWCA Civ 37.   
131 Quigley, M.  ‘Property: the future of human tissue?’, (2009) Med. L.  Rev. 465.  
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and Procedures.132  In 2009, the Department of Health and Children undertook a 
public consultation on the General Scheme of the Human Tissue Bill 2009.133  Its 
provisions included a prohibition on the commercialisation of organs and tissues for 
transplantation.  Though the Bill itself has yet to be published, it is understood to be in 
preparation. These issues are more appropriate to special legislation of this kind  than 
to sale of goods legislation, and we make no recommendations in the matter 
accordingly.     
 
Sale of Goods and Sale of Interests in Land  
2.39. As noted earlier, the second part of the definition of goods at section 62(1) of 
the 1893 Act deals with the demarcation between the sale of goods and the sale of 
land or interests in land. Its purpose, and the issues to which it has given rise, are 
consequently of a more conventional character than many of the questions raised by 
the first part of the definition. One of the main reasons for the inclusion of an 
interpretation provision which sought to differentiate between the two types of 
contract lay in the different formalities requirements applicable to sale and land 
contracts under the Statute of Frauds.134   
 
2.40. The second part of the 1893 Act’s definition of goods provides that the term 
‘goods’ includes  
 ‘emblements’ – annual crops produced by agricultural labour such as corn, 
grain and labour, sometimes referred to as fructus industriales 135.  
 
 ‘industrial growing crops’ – according to Benjamin, this term was added to the 
definition when the Act was extended to Scotland, though it does not appear to 
be an expression in regular use in Scots law. While Benjamin and White 
consider that it may refer to crops produced by agricultural labour which take 
                                                 
132 The Report concluded, among other recommendations, that ‘human tissue legislation is urgently 
required to deal with issues relating to the removal, storage and uses of human biological material from 
the living and the deceased.’  Report of Dr. Deirdre Madden on Post Mortem Practice and 
Procedures.  2006. (Dublin: Stationery Office), para. 1.9. The only current legislation in this area, the 
European Communities (Quality and Safety of Human Tissues and Cells) 2006 (S.I. No. 158 of 2006) 
does not deal with property in, or the sale of, human tissue.    
133 http://www.dohc.ie/consultations/closed/human_tissue_bill/draft_proposals.pdf?direct.  
134 While the requirement that the agreement itself, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing 
was common to both types of transaction, section 13 of the Statute of Frauds 1695 on contracts for the 
sale of ‘goods, wares and merchandizes’, unlike section 2 on contracts for the sale of ‘lands, tenements 
or hereditaments or any interest in or concerning them’, exempted contracts under £10, and its 
requirements could be met by proof of part acceptance, part payment or the giving of an earnest.  The 
substance of section 13 was incorporated in section 4 of the 1893 Act, and the provision itself was later  
repealed by the Statute Law Revision (Pre-Union Irish Statutes) Act 1962.     
135 Goode on Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 213 fn. 45.     
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more than a year to mature, Bridge suggests that it appears to serve as the 
Scots equivalent of fructus industriales.136  
 
 ‘things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed 
before sale or under the contract of sale’.  This is the broadest category of this 
part of the definition and can include crops that are the natural growth of the 
soil (fructus naturales as opposed to fructus industriales) such as grass and, in 
many cases, fruit and timber, as well as buildings, fixtures, minerals and 
soil.137  
 
Though the definition declares things attached to or forming part of land to be ‘goods’ 
if they are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale, this has by no 
means resolved all of the issues surrounding the two types of contract.  In Saunders v 
Pilcher,138 a cherry orchard was sold along with its crop of cherries that was almost 
ready to be picked.  The Court of Appeal rejected the buyer’s contention that the sale 
of cherries as goods was severable from the conveyance of the land.  While the Court 
recognised that the 1893 Act had extended the scope of ‘goods’, cherries as fructus 
naturales were part of the land.  In Bridge’s view, there seems no reason to doubt 
consequently that crops and natural produce might be the subject of both a sale of 
land and a sale of goods.139  It is unclear similarly if a contract for the sale of minerals 
to be extracted by the buyer is to be regarded as a contract for the sale of goods.  In 
Morgan v Russell and Sons,140 a contract for the sale of cinders and slag which were 
to be removed by the buyer was held not to be a sale of goods under the 1893 Act.   
 
2.41. The distinction between contracts for the sale of goods and contracts for the sale 
of land or an interest in land will remain important.  The substance of the requirement 
that land contracts be evidenced in writing has been re-enacted in the Land and 
Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009.141 The Act’s retention of the formalities 
requirement reflects the fact that, as a recent review of the issue put it, 
‘notwithstanding all the difficulties which may be caused by a requirement of written 
                                                 
136  Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 1-093 & fn. 99.  White, Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 
195; Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 2.09. 
137 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 1-100.  
138 [1949]  2 All E.R. 1097.  
139 Bridge, op. cit., The Sale of Goods, para. 2.10.  
140 [1909] 1 K.B. 357.  
141 No. 27 of 2009, section 51. The Act repealed section 2 of the Statute of Frauds (Ireland) 1695 
insofar as it applied to contracts for the sale of land or an interest in land.  It followed a 
recommendation to this effect in the Law Reform Commission’s  2005 Report on Reform and 
Modernisation of Land Law and Conveyancing Law.   
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evidence, there is a general consensus that such a requirement is necessary in the case 
of contracts of sale of land.’142  As noted in Chapter 3 below, the consensus in the 
case of contracts of sale of goods, however, is that a formalities requirement of this 
kind is unnecessary and burdensome. We consider consequently that there remains a 
need for a modified provision along the lines of that in the second part of the current 
definition of goods.    
 
2.42. Recommendation  
We recommend that that part of the definition of ‘goods’ at section 62(1) which 
deals with matters relating to the demarcation between the sale of goods and the 
sale of land or interests in land should be simplified and updated. The term 
‘emblements’ should be replaced by more modern language which clarifies that 
it does not apply only to annual crops produced by cultivation. This would 
permit the deletion of the confusing and probably superfluous reference to 
‘industrial growing crops’.  
 
2.43.  We gave some consideration to the possibility of a more substantial recasting of 
this part of the definition of goods.  Again, the only jurisdiction to have done so to 
date is New Zealand which has amended the definition at section 2(1) of the 
Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, though not in its Sale of Goods Act 1908.  The 
relevant part of the revised New Zealand definition states that goods include:  
    (b) (i) goods attached to, or incorporated in, any real or personal property:.. 
         (iv) minerals, trees, and crops, whether on, under, or attached to land or not: 
 
    (c) despite paragraph (b)(i) (goods) does not include a whole building, or part of a   
    whole building, attached to land unless the building is a structure that is easily  
   removable and is not designed for residential accommodation. 
While this definition has interesting features, its provisions on buildings or fixtures 
attached to, or incorporated in real property, represent a considerable departure from 
the existing provision in Irish law and may give rise to as many, if not more problems, 
as they resolve. The adoption of substantially altered wording along these lines would 
also have the undesirable effect of invalidating some of the existing case law.  On the 
other hand, there are advantages in providing a degree of statutory clarity on questions 
                                                 
142 Ní Shúilleabháin, M.  ‘Formalities of contracting: a cost-benefit analysis of requirements that 
contracts be evidenced in writing’, op. cit. at 133-36.  
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such as whether portakabins are goods when intended for use on a construction site, 
while temporary accommodation units would not be so considered.  As these issues 
have implications that extend beyond our terms of reference, however, we make no 
positive recommendation on the adoption of a provision along the lines of paragraph 
(d) of definition in the New Zealand Act. Submissions should be invited, however, as 
to whether the simplification effected by paragraph (b) of the definition in the New 
Zealand Act should be considered for adoption in future sale of goods  legislation, 
particularly as it is not exhaustive in nature and is a common form of definition in 
Irish law.   
 
Undivided Shares in Goods  
2.44. Section 1(1) of the 1893 Act provides that there may be a contract of sale 
between one part owner and another. In Benjamin’s view, this subsection was 
probably inserted in order to remove any doubt on the issue, it being taken for granted 
that the owner of a part interest in goods could sell it to any person other than a co-
owner.143  In their 1993 report on Sale of Goods Forming Part of a Bulk, the Law 
Commissions for England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission concluded 
that there was an ‘element of doubt’ as to whether an undivided share in goods, 
expressed as a fraction such as a third or a half, qualified as ‘goods’ for the purposes 
of the Sale of Goods of Act 1979.144  There was a possibility in the Commissions’ 
view that a sale of a part share in goods could be regarded as a thing in action or 
incorporeal property. They recommended accordingly that the definition of goods in 
the Act should be amended to include an undivided share in goods.  The UK Sale of 
Goods (Amendment) Act 1995 duly extended the definition of goods at section 61(1) 
of the 1979 Act by adding the words ‘and includes an undivided share in goods’.  This 
has removed any doubt that a sale of an undivided share in goods (such as a half 
interest in a horse), whether by a sole or part owner, is a sale of goods within the 
meaning of the Act.  In making their recommendation, the Law Commissions 
acknowledged that some of the Act’s provisions – such as the implied undertaking as 
to quiet possession and the rules on delivery – were not readily applicable to an 
undivided share in goods by virtue of the fact that such a share is incapable of being 
                                                 
143 Benjamin, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 1-081.   
144 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  1993. Sale of Goods Forming Part of a 
Bulk (Law Com. No. 215 and Scot. Law Com. No. 145), para. 5.3    
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physically possessed or delivered separately from the goods as a whole.  In the Law 
Commissions’ view, however, any resultant problems were not sufficiently serious to 
merit a complicated set of special statutory rules.145  Though the doubt that exists on 
the issue is a minor one, it is desirable in our view that it be removed. A similar 
amendment to the definition of ‘specific goods’ is proposed in the next section of this 
Chapter.  
 
2.45.  Recommendation    
We recommend that the definition of ‘goods’ in future legislation should include 
an undivided share in goods. 
 
Classes of Goods  
2.46. The 1893 Act contains two classifications of goods: first, existing and future 
goods; and second, specific and unascertained goods. We will look at each of these 
classifications in turn, the issues they raise, and their inter-relation. 
 
Existing and Future Goods  
2.47. Section 5(1) of the 1893 Act states that the goods which form the subject of a 
contract of sale may be either:  
1) ‘existing goods owned or possessed by the seller’, or  
 
2) ‘goods to be manufactured or acquired by the seller after the making of the 
contract of sale … called ‘future goods’.   
 
Section 62 of the Act contains a definition of future goods – ‘goods to be 
manufactured or acquired after the making of the contract of sale’ – which replicates 
that in section 5(1), but does not contain a similar reiteration of the definition of 
existing goods. 146   
                                                 
145 In the Commissions’ view, the Act’s provisions based on possession or physical delivery ‘will 
simply disapply themselves and the intentions of the parties will prevail’, ibid. para. 5.5.  
146 Benjamin suggests a more elaborate classification of future goods as follows: (a) goods to be 
manufactured by the seller, whether from materials which are now in existence or not; (b) goods which 
are to become or may become, the property (or come into possession) of the seller, whether by 
purchase, gift, succession, occupation (eg. wild animals) or otherwise; (c) goods expected to come into 
existence as the property of the seller in the ordinary course of nature, eg. the young to be born of his 
livestock, or the milk to be produced by his cows; (iv) things attached to or forming part of the land 
(whether belonging to the seller or not) which are to be severed in the future, e.g. minerals to be won, 
timber to be cut, fixtures to be detached; and (e) crops in the category fructus industriales to be grown 
by the seller in the future. Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op.cit., para.1-102. 
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2.48. Bridge observes that the distinction between ‘existing’ and ‘future’ goods 
‘comprises the universe of goods: all goods are either one or the other but may not be 
both’.147  Goods which are the property, or are in the possession, of a person other 
than the seller at the time the contract is made and have yet to be acquired by the 
latter, however, are existing goods in the ordinary sense of the term but are ‘future 
goods’ for the purposes of the Act.  The distinction between the two types of goods is 
relevant, first, to the nature of the contract of sale. While both types of goods can 
form the subject matter of a sales contract, a contract for the sale of future goods  
operates as an agreement to sell the goods – that is one in which the transfer of the 
property in the goods is to take place at a future time or subject to some condition 
thereafter to be fulfilled. The classification of goods as ‘existing’ or ‘future’ is 
relevant, second, to one of the rules at section 18 of the Act for ascertaining the 
intention of the parties as to the time at which the property in the goods is to pass to 
the buyer.   
 
Specific and Unascertained Goods 
2.49. The Act’s second classification, that between ‘specific’ and ‘unascertained’ 
goods, is both more complex and more consequential. Section 62 defines ‘specific 
goods’ as ‘goods identified and agreed upon at the time a contract of sale is made’ – 
for example, a particular car with a specified registration number and not a car 
identified by reference to a generic marque. The critical attribute of specific goods is 
that only the individual item which has been identified and agreed upon will fulfil the 
contract. Alternative items, even if similar, will not suffice for this purpose. Many 
everyday consumer transactions involve specific goods.  As Goode observes:148 
    …if I go into a shop and buy two pounds of potatoes which I take away with me,  
    or if I try on and purchase a suit which I arrange to be sent to my home, the goods 
    are in each case specific goods, for the precise articles I am buying are known at  
    the time I agree to buy and do not depend on any later selection, made either by the  
    shopkeeper or by me from among the former’s stock. 
   
2.50.  The Sale of Goods Act does not define ‘unascertained goods’ but, as Benjamin 
notes, this must by inference mean goods not identified and agreed upon at the time 
                                                 
147 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 2.42.  
148 Goode on Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 228.   
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the contract is made.149 The term applies therefore to goods that have not been 
individually identified and distinguished, but have been defined only by description.  
As with existing and future goods, the distinction between specific and unascertained 
is similarly intended to exhaust the universe of goods at the contract date.  It has been 
suggested that the category of unascertained goods comprises two distinct sub-
divisions: first, wholly unascertained goods for which the parties have not designated 
a source of supply in the contract and, second, what are referred to as ‘quasi-specific’ 
goods because of an agreement between the parties that they will be supplied from an 
identified source – for example, 100 tons of wheat from a larger consignment on a 
particular ship.150 For the purposes of the Act, however, such quasi-specific goods 
remain unascertained.151  
 
2.51. Finally, the Act refers in section 16 to unascertained goods becoming 
‘ascertained’ and in sections 17(1) and 52 uses the expression ‘specific or ascertained 
goods’.  Though ‘ascertained’ is not defined in the Act, it clearly means goods that 
were initially unascertained but which have subsequently become identified to the 
contract.  For both of the Act’s classifications of goods – existing/future and 
specific/unascertained – the time at which the nature of the goods is determined is the 
time at which the contract is made. As discussed in subsequent Chapters, the 
distinctions between specific, unascertained and ascertained goods are relevant to the 
Act’s provisions on the perishing of contract goods, specific performance and, in 
particular, the passing of property.152   
 
Issues Arising 
2.52.  The Act’s two-fold classification of goods is not a model of clarity, particularly 
in regard to the overlap between the binary categories.  It follows from the respective 
                                                 
149 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 1-113.   
150 White, Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 196. Benjamin identifies three main categories of 
unascertained goods as follows: (a) generic goods or goods referred to only as being of a particular 
kind of description such as 100 tons of barley or a new Ford Fiesta car; (b) goods not yet in existence 
which have to be manufactured or produced by the seller or to accrue to him in some other way; and (c) 
a part as yet unidentified of a specified bulk such as 100 tons out of the 1,000 tons stored in the seller’s 
warehouse., ibid. para 1-117.  
151 In R v Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606, it was held that that a sale of 5,000 tons of wheat out of a cargo of 
10,000 tons on a particular ship was not a sale of specific or ascertained goods within the meaning of 
section 52 of the Act on specific performance.   
152 Prior to an amendment made by the 1980 Act, breach of contract for specific goods the property in 
which had passed to the buyer could only be treated as a breach of warranty and, in the absence of a 
contract term to this effect, not as a ground for rejecting the goods.   
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definitions that existing goods can be specific or unascertained and that future goods 
can be unascertained. While there is some dispute as to whether future goods can be 
specific, the broad, though not the universal, view is that, while this is not ordinarily 
the case, it can be so in some circumstances.153  Bridge is of the view that the Act’s 
two categories amount to a case of ‘statutory over-classification’, and argues that:154 
    a modern Sale of Goods Act does not need to have a conceptual distinction  
    between specific and unascertained goods (though it does need to have a notion of  
    goods that have not yet been ascertained). Even less does it need to have a  
    distinction between future and existing goods, which, with little forcing, could be  
    accommodated within the distinction between specific and unascertained goods if  
    this latter distinction were thought to be worth preserving.   
 
2.53. We have some sympathy with this view but have decided on balance against 
recommending any substantial change in either of the Act’s classifications. While it is 
may well be correct to say that a present-day Sale of Goods Act would not adopt these 
classifications in their existing form, they are an established part of the architecture of 
the existing Act and, for the most part, present no significant problems. No demand 
for their repeal or reform has been made to us from any quarter nor has there any been 
such repeal or reform in any of the other jurisdictions whose sales law remains based 
on the 1893 Act. While we do not recommend any fundamental changes to these 
provisions, a number of minor changes could bring greater clarity to them. It  would 
be helpful to make it clear in the Act that existing goods can be either specific or 
unascertained and that future goods can be specific. The inclusion of a definition of 
unascertained goods would also be of benefit. 
 
2.54. As noted at paragraph 2.44 above, the UK Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 
1995 extended the definition of goods by adding the words ‘and includes an 
undivided share in goods’ in order to clarify that an undivided share in goods (e.g. a 
half share in a horse or a third share in a boat) qualifies as ‘goods’ for the purposes of 
                                                 
153 Benjamin, Bridge, Goode and White are of the view that, while future goods are usually 
unascertained, they can be specific. Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit, paras. 1-101 & 1-114; Bridge, 
The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 2.44; Goode on Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 250; White, 
Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 196. The last-named source cites the example of a contract to purchase 
the first car off a particular production line at a particular plant at a specified future date.  Atiyah, 
however, states that it ‘is probably safe to say that future goods can never be specific goods within the 
meaning of the Act’, though he adds that, in cases under section 7 of the Act, ‘future goods, if 
sufficiently identified, may be specific goods in the limited sense that their destruction may frustrate 
the contract.’  Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit, pp. 80-81.  
154 Bridge, ‘Do we need a new Sale of Goods Act?’, op. cit., paras. 2.13-2.14.  
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the parent Act.  The 1995 Act made a corresponding amendment to the definition of 
‘specific goods’ by means of the addition of the words ‘and includes an undivided 
share, specified as a fraction or percentage, of goods identified and agreed on as 
aforesaid.’ The Law Commission for England and Wales and the Scottish Law 
Commission, on whose joint recommendation the amendment was made, expressed 
the rationale for the change as follows:155 
    … where there is a sale of an undivided share, specified as a fraction of specific  
    goods (such as a horse, or greyhound, or item of furniture, or the cargo of a named  
    ship) it would be inconvenient if the share were to be regarded as unascertained  
    goods.  That would mean that, in the case of property which could not be divided  
    without losing its identity (such as a living horse), property in the share could  
    never pass.   
The Commissions recommended accordingly that the Sale of Goods Act should 
provide that an undivided share, specified as a fraction, in specific goods is itself 
regarded as specific goods. 
 
2.55. Recommendations  
Future legislation should include a definition of ‘unascertained goods’ and 
should also clarify the relations between the categories of future/existing and  
specific/unascertained goods.  
 
The definition of ‘specific goods’ in future legislation should be extended to 
provide that an undivided share in specific goods which is specified as a fraction 
is itself specific goods.   
  
 







                                                 
155 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  1993.  Sale of Goods Forming Part a 
Bulk .  1993  (Law. Com No. 215, Scot. Law Com. No. 145), para. 5.4.  
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CHAPTER THREE SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893: FORMATION 
OF THE CONTRACT, SECTIONS 1-9 & 58  
 
3.1. Part I of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 comprises sections 1-15 and is titled 
‘Formation of the Contract’. As has been observed, however, these sections of the Act 
do not deal with the formation of the contract in the sense in which these words are 
normally used.156 The only section of the Act that deals with contract formation 
proper is in fact section 58 on auction sales which is located in Part VI. This Chapter 
of the  Report deals with sections 1-9 of the Act on the contract of sale (sections 1-2); 
formalities of the contract (sections 3-4); subject matter of the contract (sections 5-7); 
the price (sections 8-9); and, in view of the fact that the provision would be more 
appropriately placed in Part I of the Act, auction sales (section 58). The final section 
of the Chapter considers the case for including substantive provisions on contract 
formation in future sale of goods legislation. Chapter 4 of the Report considers the 
remaining sections of Part I of the 1893 Act on conditions and warranties (sections 11 
& 13-15) other than section 12 which is discussed in Chapter 7.   
 
I SECTIONS 1-9 SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893  
CONTRACT OF SALE  
Section 1 Sale and agreement to sell  
(1) A contract of sale of goods is a contract whereby the seller transfers or agrees to transfer 
the property in the goods to a buyer for a money consideration, called the price.  There 
may be a contract of sale between one part owner and another. 
 
(2) A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional 
 
(3) Where under a contract of sale the property in the goods is transferred from the seller to 
the buyer the contract is called a sale; but where the transfer of the property in the 
goods is to take place at a future time or subject to some condition thereafter to be 
fulfilled the contract is called an agreement to sell. 
 
(4) An agreement to sell becomes a sale when the time elapses or the conditions are fulfilled 
subject to which the property in the goods is to be transferred. 
 
3.2. Section 1 specifies the essential characteristics of the contract of sale and, in so 
doing, differentiates it from other transactions.  It should be read in conjunction with 
section 62(1) of the Act which defines the main elements of Section 1 (other than 
price which is defined in section 1) – contract of sale, sale, buyer, seller, property, and 
goods. Per section 62(1), ‘contract of sale includes ‘an agreement to sell as well as a 
sale’. A sale proper is thus both a contract and a conveyance under which the property 
                                                 
156 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p.34.  
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in the goods is transferred to the buyer, while an agreement to sell is only a 
contract.157  Section 62(1) further provides that a sale ‘includes a bargain and a sale as 
well as a sale and delivery’, thus reinforcing the point made in section 1 and 
elsewhere in the Act that delivery is not an essential element of a contract of sale and 
that the property in the goods may pass prior to delivery to the buyer.     
 
3.3.  The specification of the characteristics of the contract of sale in section 1 of the 
1893 Act serves to mark off this type of transaction from a number of related 
transactions:   
 A sale is distinguished from a bailment,158 such as a contract of hire, by virtue 
of the fact that property in the goods is not intended to pass in the latter 
transaction.  
 A sale is distinguished from a hire purchase transaction – for example, a 
finance lease - which is a form of bailment with an option, but not an 
obligation, to purchase the goods.  There is only a contract of sale when the 
option to purchase is exercised and property in the goods passes.   
 A sale is distinguished from a gift which constitutes a transfer of property 
without consideration.   
 A sale is distinguished for an exchange of goods with no specification of a 
money price by virtue of the absence of a money consideration in the latter 
transaction.159 
 A contract of sale of goods is distinguished from a contract for the supply of 
services by reason of the subject-matter of the contract.  
These non-sale transactions, and the law regulating them, are considered further in 
Chapter 14.   
 
Issues Arising 
3.4. Section 1 of the Act raises no major issues of itself and has not been subject to 
any substantive amendment in the successive revisions of the 1893 and 1979 Acts in 
                                                 
157 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 1-028.   
158 A bailment is defined by Benjamin as ‘a delivery of a thing by one person to another for a limited 
purpose upon the terms that the bailee will return the same thing to the bailor, or deliver it to someone 
in accordance with the bailor’s instructions, after the purpose has been fulfilled’, ibid. para. 1-057.  
159 A part-exchange transaction in which an agreed price is paid partly in money and partly in other 
goods, however, is a sale. Aldridge v. Johnson (1857) 7 E &B 885; Clarke v. Reilly & Sons [1962] 96 
I.L.T.R. 96 and Flynn v. Mackin & Mahon [1974] I.R. 101.   
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the United Kingdom. Its interaction with the definition of contract of sale in EU 
legislation, particularly the recently agreed Directive on Consumer Rights, is 
somewhat more problematical however. Directive 1999/44/EC on Consumer Sales 
and Guarantees does not contain a definition of sales contract.  The scope of such 
contracts is broader than under Irish legislation, however, by virtue of the provision at 
Article 2(5) of the Directive that any lack of conformity of goods with the contract 
resulting from their incorrect installation is deemed to be equivalent to lack of 
conformity of the goods if installation forms part of the contract of sale of goods. The 
Directive on Consumer Rights which is due to come into force later in 2011 goes 
further, however, and includes the following definition of ‘sales contract’:160 
    any contract under which the trader transfers or undertakes to transfer the  
    ownership of goods to the consumer and the consumer pays or undertakes to pay  
    the price, including any contract having as its object both goods and services.   
In treating mixed-purpose contracts as contracts of sale, this definition is at odds with 
the approach of the common law to the distinction between a sale of goods and a 
supply of services. While, as discussed at paragraph 2.12 above, the courts have 
applied different and not always consistent tests in seeking to distinguish the two 
types of transaction, the prevailing tendency appears now to involve an assessment of 
the substance of the contract with a view to determining which element of the contract 
is predominant. Where the exercise of skill and labour is primary and the supply of 
materials secondary, the contract will be regarded as one for the provision of a 
service; where the supply of a finished product by way of sale is primary, the contract 
will be treated as a sale of goods.161 
 
3.5. When the Directive on Consumer Rights comes into force, Ireland and other 
member states will have to implement its definition of ‘sales contract’ by the end of  
the stipulated transposition period. It will be within our legislative discretion, 
however, whether or not to apply this definition to commercial contracts of sale. As 
discussed further in Chapter 14, the practical significance of the distinction between 
sales and related contracts has narrowed somewhat in recent decades as the implied 
terms governing contracts of sale have been applied to consumer contracts such as 
hire and hire purchase, though not to commercial hire-purchase and hire 
                                                 
160 Proposal for a Directive of the Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights, Article 
2(5), a provisional version of the text can be accessed at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/documents/activities/cont/201106/20110624ATT22578EN.pdf 
161 Goode on Commercial Law, op. cit., pp. 214-15.  
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agreements.162 While a number of our recommendations will further reduce the 
significance of these differences, they will remain significant for some purposes, 
notably whether liability for breach is strict as for contracts for the sale of goods, or 
mainly fault-based as will remain the case for contracts for the supply of services.163   
 
3.6. We have mixed views about the definition of sales contract contained in the 
proposed Consumer Rights Directive. On the one hand, the adoption of the definition 
has the potential to simplify the law and to resolve the uncertainty currently caused by 
the seemingly irreconcilable cases of Robinson v. Graves164 and Lee v. Griffin.165 On 
the other hand, treating all mixed contracts as contracts of sale would limit the 
flexibility that the courts have traditionally shown in their approach to so-called 
hybrid contracts, particularly commercial contracts, with regard to their classification 
and to the determination of  issues such as remedies applicable in the event of 
breach.166 The equation of mixed-purpose contracts with contracts of sale may also 
give rise to issues in the case of contracts for the supply of goods to be manufactured 
and produced where some or all of the materials necessary for the manufacture or 
                                                 
162 The implied statutory terms applied to commercial hire-purchase agreements under the Hire 
Purchase Act 1946 and the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980, but the Consumer Credit 
Act 1995 restricts their application to hire-purchase agreements to which a consumer is a party.   
163 As Goode notes, the significance of whether a transaction is or is not a contract of sale depends on 
the circumstances.  ‘In some cases such a finding will make little or no difference to the rights of the 
parties.  In other situations the impact may be dramatic.’  Whether a transaction is to be characterized 
as a contract of sale or some other type of transaction may affect ‘the nature and extent of the rights of 
the parties inter se; the position of a third party who purchases from one of the contracting parties when 
that party does not have, or has ceased to have, a good title; the liability of the contract document to 
stamp duty, and the amount of such duty; the tax position of the parties; the existence and extent of 
statutory duties of which a breach would attract civil or criminal sanctions; the availability of 
government grants and tax allowances.’  Ibid., pp. 221-222.   
164 [1935] 1 KB 579. 
165 (1861) 1 B & S 272. 
166 The modern view of shipbuilding contracts, for example, is that they are of a hybrid nature.  This 
has had proved significant in determining the parties’ accrued rights upon cancellation of the contract. 
In Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. Ltd v Papadopoulous [1981] 1 WLR 219, the buyer defaulted on the 
second instalment due under the contract and the builder exercised his right under the contract to 
terminate it.  The issue for the court was whether the second instalment was payable by the guarantor.  
It was held that it was. The House of Lords ruled that the contract was not just for the sale of goods, but 
insofar as the construction of the ship was concerned, the contract resembled a building contract. The 
court therefore declined to apply a rule that there were no accrued rights to be enforced after 
termination of the contract. Had the contract been construed purely as a contract of sale, however, there 
would have been no such no accrued rights. As noted by Madakara-Shepherd: ‘A large part of a 
shipbuilding contract is directed towards the regulation of a substantial and complex construction 
project in which each party assumes long term obligations to the other and bears significant 
commercial risks.  Although the ultimate purpose of the contract is to transfer the legal title in the ship 
upon payment of the price, to categorise the contract as belonging to one or the other category would 
be misleading’. Madaraka-Sheppard, A. 2007. Modern Maritime Law (2nded.) (London: Routledge 
Cavendish), p. 423. 
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production are provided by the customer. Under the definition in the proposed  
Directive, this type of transaction would be treated as a contract of sale.  It is open to 
question, however, if this is necessarily the most appropriate approach in all such 
cases.  In Benjamin’s view, there can be no sale unless there is a specific transfer of 
the materials followed by a repurchase of the product.167 In a situation in which each 
party supplies some of the materials or components, the court will ask which of them 
has supplied the prinicipal materials. According to Benjamin, the materials supplied 
by the other then vest by accession in the owner of the principal materials. The 
question of who supplies the principal materials depends on all the circumstances, and 
the relative value of each part is not decisive in the matter.168 While this may not be a 
major issue in the context of consumer sales, it can be more significant in commercial 
contracts of sale. It is noteworthy in this connexion that Article 3(1) of the CISG 
provides that:  
   Contracts for the supply of goods to be manufactured or produced are to be  
   considered sales unless the party who orders the goods undertakes to supply a  
   substantial part of the materials necessary for such manufacture or production. 
 
Article 3 further states that the Convention does not apply to contracts in which the 
preponderant part of the obligations of the party who furnishes the goods consists in 
the supply of labour or other services.  
 
3.7. Ireland and other Member States will be required to apply the definition of 
‘contract of sale’ in the proposed Directive on Consumer Rights to consumer 
contracts of sale. The matter at issue accordingly is whether the definition should also 
be applied to commercial contracts of sale. Though we are in favour as far as possible 
of having common rules for consumer and commercial contracts, we do not consider 
on balance that the definition of  commercial contracts of sale should include mixed 
purpose contracts having as their object both goods and services.   
 
3.8. Recommendation  
While the definition of contract of sale in the recently agreed Consumer Rights 
Directive will require the corresponding definition in future Irish legislation to 
                                                 
167 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para.1-044 
168 ibid. 
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include consumer contracts having as their object both goods and services, this 
part  of the definition should not apply to commercial contracts of sale.   
  
Section 2 Capacity to buy and sell 
Capacity to buy and sell is regulated by the general law concerning capacity to contract, and to 
transfer and acquire property. Provided that where necessaries are sold and delivered to an 
infant, or minor, or to a person who by reason of mental incapacity or drunkenness is 
incompetent to contract, he must pay a reasonable price therefor. Necessaries in this section 
mean goods suitable to the condition in life of such infant or minor or other person, and to 
his actual requirements at the time of the sale and delivery.  
 
3.9. Minor or infant is a person, who has not reached the age of majority, which in 
Ireland since the Age of Majority Act 1985 has been eighteen, or if a person under 
that age marries, upon marriage per section 2(1)(b) of that Act.169  At common law, a 
minor’s contract which does not involve the supply of necessaries, or is not a 
beneficial contract of service, is voidable - that is, a contract which a party is entitled 
to rescind but which is valid and binding until rescinded. Following Imperial Loan 
Company v Stone,170 the relevant rule regarding contracts entered into by persons of 
diminished mental capacity is that a contract is valid unless a) the mental illness was 
such as to prevent the sufferer from knowing the nature of his actions, and b) the other 
party was aware of that mental illness. Contracts for necessaries are enforceable at a 
reasonable price even if the other party knew of the mental illness. The position of 
drunks is similar to that of the mentally ill. Before any question of unenforceability 
arises, the party must be so drunk as not to know the nature of his actions; mild 
inebriation will not suffice in such a case. Once this fact is established, then if the 
contract concerns necessaries, the drunken party, like the minor or the person of 
diminished mental capacity, will be bound to pay a reasonable price therefor, even if 
the other party knew of his drunkenness. In the case of non-necessaries, the party will 
be bound unless he can establish that the other party was aware of the intoxication at 
the time of the making of the contract. When this is established, the party may elect to 
affirm or repudiate the contract on sobering up. Recourse to the equitable doctrine of 
unconscionable bargain is also available in this context.171  
                                                 
169 For an overview of the law on contractual capacity, see Clark, Contract Law in Ireland, op. cit., 
pp. 485-516.  
170 [1892] 1 QB 559. 
171 In White v McCooey, Unreported High Court, June 24, 1976, a challenge by a person to a contract 
made while he was drunk was rejected on the basis that, although his inhibitions were undoubtedly 
 91
3.10. The necessaries rule at section 2 of the 1893 Act reflects the common law 
position, and the definition of the term also largely reproduces the common law 
definition as it has developed through case law. Where necessary goods (as distinct 
from services) have been sold and delivered to a minor or a person incompetent to 
contract by virtue of mental incapacity or drunkenness, section 2 requires that he pay 
a reasonable price for them. If the goods have not yet been delivered or have been 
delivered but the property has not passed to the buyer, the common law, and not the 
section, applies.172 Whether goods constitute necessaries in a particular case is a 
matter of law and fact, and the onus of proving that goods are necessaries rests with 
the seller.  The term is not limited to essentials such as food, clothing or medicine but 
can include other items as long as they are not purely ornamental.173  Though services 
are not governed by section 2, they may also be held to be necessaries at common 
law.174 
 
Issues Arising  
3.11. The necessaries rule at Section 2 of the 1893 Act has twice been considered by 
the Law Reform Commission.  The Commission’s 1985 report on Minors’ Contracts 
examined it in the context of an overall review of minors’ contractual capacity.  The 
report’s main recommendation was for legislation that would introduce a general 
principle of restitution whereby a contract made by a minor with an adult would be 
enforceable by the minor against the adult but not vice versa.175  The adult, however, 
                                                                                                                                            
lowered, he was not so drunk as not to understand what he was doing. Nevertheless it was held by the 
court that the contract was so one-sided as to justify its rejection on the grounds of unconscionability. 
172 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 1.40.     
173 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit, para. 2-031. Law Reform Commission.  1985. Report on 
Minors’ Contracts, pp. 6-12.  In Skrine v Gordon (1875) IR 9 CL 479, a horse required for stag 
hunting was not a necessary, but was regarded instead as a luxury or amusement. Per Ryder v Wombell  
(1868) LR 4 Ex 32, jewelled cufflinks were also held not to be a necessary. In Nash v Inman [1908] 2 
KB 1, fancy waistcoats were found not to be a necessary where an infant had sufficient clothing 
already. In Prokopetz v Richardsons Marina [1979] 93 DLR (3d) 442, a motorboat was decided not to 
be a necessary.  However, a vehicle required for work or domestic purposes may be a necessity as in 
First Charter Financial Bank v Musclow [1974] 49 DLR (3d) 138, as may books for a student per Soon 
v Wilson [1962] 33 DLR (2d) 428. 
174 Re Rhodes (1890) 44 Ch D 94. In Chapple v Cooper (1844) 13 M & W 252, funeral services for a 
spouse were held to be a necessary. The case also gives a useful definition of necessaries: ‘Things 
necessary are those without which an individual cannot reasonably exist. In the first place, food, 
raiment, lodging and the like. About these there is no doubt. Again, as the proper cultivation of the 
mind is as expedient as the support of the body, instruction in art or trade, or intellectual, moral and 
religious information may be a necessary also’, per Alderson B. Legal advice which results in 
substantial benefits to an infant may also be a necessary service per Helps v Clayton (1864) 17 C.B 
(N.S) 553.   
175 Law Reform Commission.  1985.  Report on Minors’ Contracts, p. 158.   
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would be entitled to apply to the court for compensation from the minor based on 
restitutionary rather than contractual principles.  The Commission decided against the 
retention of the necessaries rule by way of an exception to the restitutionary principle, 
but recommended that the legislation should include specific provisions enabling the 
Court, in applying the restitutionary principle, to have regard to whether the goods or 
services covered by the contract were suitable to the condition of life of the minor and 
to his requirements at the time of the contract so far as the other party was, or could 
reasonably be aware, having regard to the circumstances.176   
 
3.12. The Law Reform Commission returned to the topic in its 2006 Report on 
Vulnerable Adults and the Law.177 It concluded that the necessaries rule had a useful 
dual function in relation to adults with limited decision-making capacity. On the one 
hand, it facilitated the purchase of everyday items by such adults and ensured that 
these were paid for and, in this way, encouraged independent living by persons of 
restricted capacity. On the other, the rule had a protective function in that its 
application was limited to items which could be regarded as necessary in the light of 
the individual’s needs.  As it stipulated that a reasonable price was to be paid, it also 
prevented claims being made for exorbitant sums.  The Commission recommended 
accordingly that proposed mental capacity legislation should include an amended 
necessaries rule whereby an adult who lacked capacity to enter a contract for the sale 
of goods or supply of services would be obliged to pay the supplier a reasonable sum 
for necessaries supplied at his or her request.  The reference to ‘mental incapacity’ at 
section 2 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 should consequently be repealed.  
‘Necessaries’ should be defined as ‘goods or services supplied which are suitable to 
the individual’s personal reasonable living circumstances but excluding goods and 
services which could be classed as luxury in nature in all the circumstances’. Unlike 
the 1893 Act which confines the necessaries rule to ‘goods sold and delivered’, the 
Commission’s recommendation that it should apply to ‘goods or services supplied’ 
would, in addition to extending the rule to services contracts,  mean that it would also 
apply where goods were supplied under non-hire contracts such as hire-purchase or 
hire.   
 
                                                 
176 Ibid., pp. 103-04 & 159.   
177 Law Reform Commission.  2006. Report on Vulnerable Adults and the Law (LRC 83-2006).    
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3.13. The Law Reform Commission’s recommendation on necessaries and mental 
incapacity is in line with the present legislative position in England and Wales.  The 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 which applies in England and Wales includes a necessaries 
rule along the lines of that in the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979, and repealed the 
reference to mental incapacity in the latter enactment. The provision in the 2005 Act 
also applies to services as well as goods, and clarifies the uncertainty over executory 
contracts by providing that the rule applies ‘at the time when the goods or services are 
supplied’.  The necessaries rule in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (the wording of which 
is similar to that at section 2 of the 1893 Act) still applies in England and Wales to 
contracts for the sale of necessaries to minors and persons incompetent to contract 
because of drunkenness. In Scotland, however, following an amendment effected by 
the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, the necessaries provisions of the Sale 
of Goods Act 1979 no longer applies to contracts with minors but continues to apply 
to persons incompetent to contract by virtue of mental incapacity or drunkenness.178     
 
3.14. We are in agreement with the reformulation of the necessaries rule 
recommended by the Law Reform Commission. The changes proposed to the 
definition of the term would both update the concept of necessaries and extend it to 
encompass services, while the express exclusion of luxury goods from the definition 
would more accurately reflect the proper purpose of the rule. As the Law Reform 
Commission has stated,179 that purpose is:  
    to enable day-to-day living, not to provide an across the board solution where  
    contractual capacity is not present. The understanding of luxury will vary according  
    to the individual’s living circumstances.   
As noted above, the Law Reform Commission’s report recommended that the 
necessaries rule relating to mental incapacity should be contained in legislation on 
mental capacity rather than in sale of goods legislation. The Programme for 
Government 2011 includes a commitment to introduce a Mental Capacity Bill that is 
                                                 
178  The Act provides that a person under the age of sixteen shall have legal capacity to enter into a 
transaction (a) of a kind commonly entered into by a person of his age and circumstances, and (b) on 
terms which are not unreasonable.  It also provides that a person aged under twenty one may apply to 
the court to set aside a ‘prejudicial’ transaction he entered into between the ages of sixteen and 
eighteen.  Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, sections 2 & 3.    
179 Law Reform Commission.  Report on Vulnerable Adults and the Law, op. cit., para. 3.05. 
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in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,180 but it is 
not clear at this point whether or how this the proposed legislation will deal with 
contractual capacity in respect of necessaries.181  If the legislation deals with the 
necessaries issue, the reference to mental capacity should be deleted from the 
necessaries provision to be included in future legislation on the sale of goods and 
supply of services.   
 
3.15. Recommendation   
The Group recommends that the necessaries rule in future legislation on the sale 
and supply of goods and the supply of services legislation should be amended in 
line with the Law Reform Commission’s 2006 Report on Vulnerable Adults and 
the Law to provide as follows:  
 A person who lacks capacity to enter a contract for the sale of goods 
would be obliged to pay a reasonable sum for necessaries supplied at his 
or her request.   
 ‘Necessaries’ would be defined as ‘goods or services which are suitable to 
the individual’s personal reasonable living circumstances at the time 
when the goods are supplied but excluding goods and services which 
could be classed as luxury in nature in all the circumstances’.   
 The reference to ‘mental capacity’ should be excluded from the 
necessaries provision in future legislation on the sale and supply of goods 
and the supply of services if proposed legislation on mental capacity 
includes provisions on contractual capacity in relation to necessaries.   
 
FORMALITIES OF THE CONTRACT  
Section 3 Contract of sale, how made 
     Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any statute in that behalf, a contract of  
     sale may be made in writing (either with or without seal), or by word of mouth, or  
     may be implied from the conduct of the parties. Provided that nothing in this  
     section shall affect the law relating to corporations. 
                                                 
180 Programme for Government 2011, 
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Publications/Publications_2011/Programme_for_Government_2011.p
df   
pdf, p. 37.   
181 A Private Members Bill, the Mental Capacity and Guardianship Bill, sponsored by a number of 
independent Senators was introduced in 2007 and 2008, but lapsed on the dissolution of the Seanad in 
April 2011.  It was based on the Draft Scheme of the Mental Capacity and Guardianship Bill in the 
Law Commission’s Report on Vulnerable Adults and the Law, and included provisions which gave 
effect to the Commission’s recommendations on necessaries, 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents.bills28/bills/2008/1308/b1038s.pdf.  
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Section 4  Contract of sale for ten pounds and upwards  
1) A contract for the sale of any goods of the value of ten pounds182 or upwards shall not 
be enforceable by action unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold, and 
actually receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the contract, or in part 
payment, or unless some note or memorandum in writing of the contract be made and 
signed by the party to be charged or his agent in that behalf. 
2) The provisions of this section apply to every such contract, notwithstanding that the 
goods may be intended to be delivered at some future time, or may not at the time of 
such contract be actually made, procured, or provided, or fit or ready for delivery, or 
some act may be requisite for the making or completing thereof, or rendering the same 
fit for delivery. 
3) There is an acceptance of goods within the meaning of this section when the buyer does 
any act in relation to the goods which recognises a pre-existing contract of sale whether 
there be an acceptance in performance of the contract or not. 
 
3.16. Section 3(1) of the Act reflects the common law position which requires no 
formalities to be met for the creation of a contract for the sale of goods.  The 
provision is subject to section 4 of the Act and also to formalities required by other 
enactments such as the Consumer Credit Act 1995 and the Regulations which give 
effect to the Distance Selling and Doorstep Selling Directives.183 
3.17. Section 4 of the 1893 Act incorporated the substance of section 13 of the Statute 
of Frauds (Ireland) 1695, the preamble to which Act described its aim as the 
‘prevention of many fraudulent practices which are commonly endeavoured to be 
upheld by perjury and subornation of perjury’.184  Its provisions were aimed at 
preventing courts from being persuaded of the existence of contracts on the basis of 
false oral testimony.185  At the time of the adoption of the Statute, parties with an 
                                                 
182 By virtue of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1103/97 on Certain Provisions Relating to the 
Introduction of the Euro and Council Regulation (EC) No. 2866/98 on the Conversion Rates Between 
the Euro and the Currencies of Member States Adopting the Euro, the sum of 10 pounds in section 4(1) 
is now €12.70. 
183 Ss. 32 & 58 of the Consumer Credit Act 1995 require that hire-purchase and consumer hire 
agreements be made in writing and be signed by the hirer and all other parties to the agreement.  
Regulation 5 of the European Communities (Protection of Consumers in Respect of Contracts Made by 
Distance Communications) Regulations 2001 provides that a distance contract is not enforceable by the 
supplier unless the consumer has received confirmation in writing or on another durable medium of the 
information requirements of the Regulations.  Regulation 4 of the European Communities 
(Cancellation of Contracts Negotiated Away from Business Premises) Regulations 1989 provides that a 
contract is not enforceable against the consumer unless the supplier has provided a written cancellation 
notice and form in accordance with the information and other requirements of the Regulations.  For 
other examples of statutory requirements relating to contract formalities, see Ní Shúilleabháin, M.    
‘Formalities of Contracting: A Cost-Benefit Analysis Of Requirements That Contracts Be Evidenced in 
Writing’, op. cit.   
184 Statute of Frauds (Ireland) 1695 (7 Will 3 ch.12).  Section 13 was repealed by the Statute Law 
Revision (Pre-Union Irish Statutes) Act 1962 (s.1 & Schedule).   
185 Ní Shuilleabháin, ‘Formalities of Contracting: A Cost-Benefit Analysis Of Requirements That 
Contracts Be Evidenced in Writing’, op. cit, p.115.   
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interest in the outcome of a case were precluded from testifying in court proceedings, 
a rule which has long since been discarded.  
3.18. Though section 4 is sometimes said to stipulate that contracts of the value of 
€12.70 or more are unenforceable unless evidenced in writing, it provides in fact for 
the enforceability of sales contracts of this value in a number of ways: 
1) acceptance and receipt of part of the goods sold;186 
2) the giving of something in earnest to bind the contract;187 
3) the giving of part payment; and  
4) a note or memorandum in writing of the contract signed by the party to be 
charged or his agent.    
 
Issues Arising  
3.19. Section 3 of the 1893 Act gives rise to no significant issues and can be retained 
in its present form. Section 4, by contrast, has been the subject of extensive comment 
and criticism. It has been claimed that its original rationale no longer applies in view 
of the fact that the parties to a contract are no longer prohibited from giving 
evidence.188 Its application to sales contracts has been questioned on the basis that the 
regular, often everyday, character of these transactions makes requirements for formal 
documentation particularly inappropriate.189  The section has been further criticised 
for offering an expedient way out of freely entered into contractual obligations where 
changes in market conditions make this advantageous.190 As Lord Bingham noted of 
the application of the Statute of Frauds to a verbal guarantee:191 
   If the 17th century solution addressed one mischief it was capable of giving rise to  
   another: that a party, making and acting on what was thought to be a binding oral  
   agreement, would find his commercial expectations defeated when the time for  
   enforcement came and the other party successfully relied on the lack of a written  
   memorandum or note of the agreement.     
3.20. It has also been suggested that, as contracts for work and materials are not 
subject to section 4, the courts have sometimes conflated the distinction between these 
                                                 
186 The definition of ‘acceptance’ for the purposes of the Section at section 4(3) of the 1893 Act is 
broader than that which applies for the purposes of section 35 of the Act.  
187 Per Clark, Contract Law in Ireland, op. cit, p. 120, this ‘ancient and obscure provision’ would be 
satisfied if the buyer gave his business card as a gesture of his good faith or supplied his credit card 
number.  
188 Law Revision Committee.  1937.  Statute of Frauds and the Doctrine of Consideration: Sixth 
Interim Report (London: Stationery Office). Cmd. 5449., para. 9.  
189 Stephen, J.F. & Pollock, F. ‘Section 17 of the Statute of Frauds’ (1885) 1 L.Q.R 1.  
190 Ní Shuilleabháin, ‘Formalities of Contracting: A Cost-Benefit Analysis Of Requirements That 
Contracts Be Evidenced in Writing’, op.cit., pp. 117-19.   
191 Actionstrength v International Glass [2003] 2 W.L.R. 1060 at 1062.  
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and contracts of sale in order to find a way around the formalities requirements 
applicable to the latter transactions.192 Lastly, and most obviously, the threshold of 
€12.70 which currently applies for the purpose of section 4 is now wholly out of date. 
When originally fixed in the late 17th century and even when re-enacted in 1893, this 
level of threshold would have excluded a great range of routine sale transactions that 
now come within its compass.   
3.21. Most, not though all, of the jurisdictions which have based their sales law on the 
1893 Act have repealed section 4.193  In the United Kingdom, the section was repealed 
over half a century ago by the Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act 1954.  In 
New Zealand, the equivalent provision was repealed by the Contracts Enforcement 
Act 1956.  In Australia, it has been repealed in South Australia, Queensland, New 
South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory, Victoria, and the Northern Territory, 
though it remains in force in Western Australia and Tasmania.194 In Canada, the 
equivalent provision has been repealed in British Columbia, Manitoba, New 
Brunswick, and Ontario, though it remains in force with a threshold of $40-50 in a 
number of other provinces, including Alberta, Newfoundland, Saskatchewan and 
Nova Scotia. The equivalent provisions in sale of goods legislation in Hong Kong and 
Singapore have also been repealed. In the United States, the Uniform Commercial 
Code [UCC] has taken a different approach to the reform of formalities requirements.  
The threshold at which such formalities apply is currently set at $5,000, while 
contracts of this value are also enforceable in ways not provided for under Section 4 
of the 1893 Act.195   
                                                 
192 Ní Shúilleabháin has commented that: ‘Faced with unmeritorious formalities-based defences, some 
judges appear to have strained other concepts of law in order to exempt a contract from such a rule.  
There is some evidence of such interpretative bias in cases concerning the boundary-line between 
contracts for goods and contracts for services.’  Ní Shúilleabháin, ‘Formalities of Contracting: A Cost-
Benefit Analysis Of Requirements That Contracts Be Evidenced in Writing’, op. cit., p. 119. 
193 See Annex IV, sections 2.1., 3.2.,4.1., 5.1., 6.1., and 7.1.     
194 The Law Reform Commission of Western Australia recommended repeal of the provision in 1998  
but its recommendation has yet to be implemented.  Law Reform Commission of Western Australia.  
1998. The Sale of Goods Act 1895: Report, para. 2.8.   
195 As well as situations where goods or payment are received and accepted, the UCC allows for 
enforcement where: (i) in a transaction between merchants, confirmation of the contract is received 
within a reasonable time and is not objected to; and (ii) in the case of goods specially manufactured for 
the buyer and not suitable for sale to others, a substantial beginning to their manufacture has been 
made, or commitments have been made for their procurement. Uniform Commercial Code, Article 
2.201.   
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3.22. The reform of section 4 is long overdue in our opinion and it is surprising in 
many respects that, over a quarter of a century after its repeal in the United Kingdom, 
the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 left the section untouched.  The 
only matter for decision is whether the provision should be repealed as has been done 
in most jurisdictions or substantially recast and updated as has been done in the 
United States.  While a large increase in the monetary threshold and a widening of the 
bases for enforceability would address some of the concerns raised by the present 
formalities rule, we do not consider that there is a convincing case for the retention of 
even a modified provision.  
 
3.23.  Recommendation  
Section 4 of the 1893 Act should be repealed.    
 
SUBJECT MATTER OF CONTRACT  
Section 5 Existing or future goods  
    (1) The goods which form the subject of a contract of sale may be either existing  
    goods, owned or possessed by the seller, or goods to be manufactured or acquired  
    by the seller after the making of the contract of sale, in this Act called “future  
    goods”.196  
 
    (2) There may be a contract for the sale of goods, the acquisition of which by the  
    seller depends upon a contingency which may or may not happen. 
 
    (3) Where by a contract of sale the seller purports to effect a present sale of future  
    goods, the contract operates as an agreement to sell the goods. 
 
3.24. Per section 5, a seller can enter into a contract to sell goods that do not exist 
either because they have yet to be manufactured by him or because they are the 
property of another person and have yet to be acquired by the seller.  As discussed at 
paragraphs 2.47-2.48 above, goods that the seller neither owns nor possesses may be 
‘existing’ in the ordinary sense of the term, therefore, but will be ‘future’ goods for 
the purposes of the Act.  The significance of Section 5 lies in the express statement 
that future goods may be the subject of a contract of sale, a point reinforced by the 
stipulation at section 5(2) that the seller’s acquisition of future goods may depend 
upon a contingency. Although a contract for the sale of future goods is valid, section 
                                                 
196 Section 62 of the Act contains a definition of ‘future goods’ – ‘goods to be manufactured or 
acquired by the seller after the making of the contract of sale’ -  which replicates that  in section 5(1), 
but does not contain a similar reiteration of the definition of ‘existing goods’. 
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5(3) makes clear that such a contact can be only an agreement to sell and that there 
can thus be no passing of property in future goods.  As discussed in Chapter 5, the 
classification of goods as ‘existing’ or ‘future’ is also relevant to the rules on the 
passing of property at section 18 of the Act.  
 
Section 6 Goods which have perished 
    Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods, and the goods without the  
    knowledge of the seller have perished at the time when the contract is made, the  
    contract is void. 
 
Section 7 Goods perishing before sale but after agreement to sell 
    Where there is an agreement to sell specific goods, and subsequently the goods,  
    without any fault on the part of the seller or buyer, perish before the risk passes to  
    the buyer, the agreement is thereby avoided. 
 
3.25. Sections 6 and 7 introduce the category of ‘specific goods’ which, together with 
its converse ‘unascertained goods’, forms the second of the Act’s binary 
classifications of goods, and one of central importance to the Act’s provisions on the 
passing of property and risk.197  These terms are discussed in more detail at 
paragraphs 2.49-2.51 of Chapter 2 above. For the purpose of the substantive rules on 
perished goods in sections 6 and 7, it is sufficient to recall that section 62 defines 
‘specific goods’ as ‘goods identified and agreed upon at the time a contract of sale is 
made’ – for example, a particular car with a specified registration number and not a 
car identified by reference to a generic marque.  The two sections deal, from different 
temporal vantage points, with the case of goods which have perished  – section 6 with 
the situation where, at the time the contract is made, the goods have perished without 
the knowledge of the seller, and section 7 with the situation where the goods perish 
after the making of the contract but before the property in them has transferred to the 
buyer.  The result is the same in both cases - the parties are relieved of all of their 
obligations under the contract. Section 6 reflects the common law doctrine under 
which a mistake which is common to both parties and which relates to a fundamental 
matter of fact such as the existence of the goods that form the subject matter of the 
contract may lead to the contract being declared void.  Section 7 reflects the common 
law doctrine of frustration under which parties may be relieved of contractual 
obligations that cannot be performed because of circumstances outside their control.      
                                                 
197 Prior to an amendment made by the 1980 Act, the breach of a contract for specific goods the 
property in which had passed to the buyer could, in the absence of a term to the contrary, be treated 
only as a breach of warranty, and not as a ground for rejecting the goods.    
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3.26. As noted in the survey of sales law in other jurisdictions at Annex I, sections 6 
and 7 have remained unchanged in the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions for a 
century or more. Though this suggests that their provisions have not been a cause of 
major difficulties, it does not mean that the sections raise no issues at all.  We will 
look next at the main such issues: the meaning of ‘perish’, the nature of the rule at 
section 6, and the implications for sections 6 & 7 of the inclusion of ‘an undivided 
share in goods’ within the definition of ‘specific goods’.  
 
Meaning of ‘perish’ 
3.27. ‘Perish’ is defined neither in sections 6-7 nor in the interpretation provisions at 
section 62 of the 1893 Act. While the term might suggest that it denotes the actual 
destruction of goods, case law has held goods to have perished when they have ceased 
to exist in a commercial sense as the contract goods – that is if their merchantable 
character, as such, has been lost  - or if they suffer such a change in their nature as to 
prevent their use for the purposes contemplated by the transaction. In Asfar v. 
Blundell,198 dates which became contaminated and had begun to ferment after being 
under water for two days were held to have ceased to exist in a commercial sense as 
‘dates’, even though they still existed after their retrieval from submersion and could 
be used to distil with alcohol. This decision is difficult to reconcile, however, with a 
later case Horn v. Minister of Food199 in which it was held obiter that potatoes, unfit 
for consumption, could still be described as ‘potatoes’ and, thus, had not perished in 
the meaning of Section 6. Atiyah suggests that the interpretation taken in this case 
cannot be supported.200 White considers similarly that Asfar is a better view in 
general, but warns of the danger of equating ‘perishing’ with merchantable quality 
given the divergent rules applicable to the two situations (voidness of the contract as 
opposed to rejection, a claim for a refund of the price, or an action for damages for 
non-delivery).201 
                                                 
198 Asfar & Co. v. Blundell [1896] 1 Q.B. 123.  Lord Esher MR observed as follows in this case: ‘We 
are dealing with dates as a subject matter of commerce; and it is contended that, although these dates 
were under water for two days, and when brought up were simply a mass of pulpy matter impregnated 
with sewage and in a state of fermentation, there had been no change in their nature, and they still were 
dates.  There is a perfectly well known test which has for many years been applied to such cases as the 
present – that test is whether, as a matter of business, the nature of the thing has been altered.’, ibid. at  
127.  
199 Horn v. Minister of Food [1948] 2 All E.R. 1036. 
200 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit, p. 106.   
201 White, Commercial Law op. cit., p. 395. 
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3.28. Stolen goods were also held to have perished within the meaning of Section 6 in 
Barrow, Lane & Ballard Ltd v Phillip Phillips & Co. Ltd.
202  In this case, 109 bags of 
a specific parcel of 700 bags of groundnuts had been stolen, and the view was taken 
that the parcel had ceased to exist in the commercial sense. Benjamin questions, 
however, whether the mere theft of, for example, a car means that it has ‘perished’ in 
a commercial sense, or whether instead it should be regarded as having done so only 
after all hope of its recovery has been abandoned.203  Barrow, Lane & Ballard Ltd v 
Phillip Phillips & Co. Ltd. is also authority for the proposition that, where a contract 
for the sale of a specific parcel of goods is indivisible, the perishing of part of the 
goods will render the contract void under Section 6.  Benjamin submits that it would 
appear to follow that, where the contract is divisible, the destruction of part of the 
goods will not avoid the contract for the remainder – however the mere fact that the 
goods, or the price are divisible will not oblige either party to perform the contract as 
regards the remainder after a part has been destroyed. H R & S Sainsbury v Street,204 
although not itself falling under section 7, suggests that, where only part of the goods 
perish, the seller may well be obliged to offer the remaining goods to the buyer. The 
buyer, however, may not be obliged to take them.  Benjamin also notes that it is 
possible that goods which have been requisitioned or condemned as prize would be 
held to have perished.205 In view of the uncertainty on the point in the case law, it 
would be helpful in our opinion if statute law offered guidance as to the meaning and 
scope of ‘perish’. 
 
3.29. Recommendation  
We recommend that future legislation should clarify that the term ‘perish’ 
should be construed so as to cover situations where goods perish in a commercial 
as well as in a physical sense.      
 
Construction of Section 6  
3.30. As Bridge notes, section 6 enacts ‘what appears to be an inflexible rule of law 
making no allowance for a contrary intention that the seller should be contractually 
liable if by words or conduct he expressly or impliedly warrants the existence of the 
                                                 
202 Barrow, Lane & Ballard Ltd v Phillip Phillips & Co. Ltd.  [1929] 1 K.B. 574. 
203 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op.cit, para. 1-126. 
204 [1972] 1 WLR 834.   
205 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 1-126. 
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goods’.206 Unlike most other contractual provisions of the 1893 Act, the section is not 
expressed as a default rule.207  It is not clear either that section 55, which permits the 
parties to negative or vary ‘any right, duty or liability’ that arises under a contract of 
sale by implication of law, is applicable to section 6.  The purpose of section 6 after 
all is to prevent any right, duty or liability arising. The effect of the section, moreover, 
is arguably to abort any contract of sale to which section 55 could apply.   
 
3.31. Atiyah suggests that the ‘extraordinary result’ under which a seller who 
contracts that goods exist can avoid all liability by invoking section 6 can best be 
avoided by taking a liberal interpretation of section 55.208  This is consistent with the 
aim of section 55, namely to enable parties to vary, by agreement, all those provisions 
of the Act which do not affect third parties. Atiyah submits, therefore, that if, on the 
true construction of the contract, it appears that the seller is contracting that the goods 
do exist, section 6 should not apply and the seller will be liable for non-delivery. We 
consider that the uncertainty on this point should be addressed by means of an express 
provision that would clarify that parties to a commercial contract, though not a 
consumer contract, could vary the application of section 6.  
 
3.32. Recommendation 
We recommend that section 6 of the 1893 Act should be amended along the 
following lines to enable the parties to a commercial contract, though not a 
consumer contract, to vary its application. 
(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, where there is a contract for the sale of specific 
goods, and the goods without the knowledge of the seller have perished at the time 
the contract is made, the contract is void. 
(2) Where the buyer does not deal as consumer, the parties are free to stipulate 
expressly on which of them any loss is to fall.   
 
Amendment of Definition of ‘Specific Goods’ 
3.33. As discussed at paragraph 2.44 above, the UK Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 
1995 extended the definition of goods by adding the words ‘and includes an 
undivided share in goods’. The Act made a corresponding amendment to the 
definition of specific goods by means of the addition of the words ‘and includes an 
                                                 
206  Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 4.70.   
207  The other exceptions being sections 12 and 21-26 on the implied undertakings as to title and the 
transfer of title.   
208 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit, p. 102.  See also Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 4.72.   
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undivided share, specified as a fraction or percentage, of goods identified and agreed 
on as aforesaid.’  Thus, Sections 6 and 7 now apply to contracts for sale of undivided 
share in specific goods, specified as a fraction or percentage, for example a quarter- 
share in an identified racehorse or a 50 per cent share in the cargo of oil aboard a 
named ship.  In the case of the cargo of oil at least, the terms of the contract may save 
the contract from being void when part has perished – when the cargo is apportioned, 
the buyer would be entitled to take delivery of a predetermined percentage or quantity 
out of what remains. We have recommended similar changes at paragraphs 2.45 and 
2.55 above to the definitions of ‘goods’ and ‘specific goods’ in future Irish legislation.   
 
3.34. The report of the English and Scottish Law Commissions on which the 1995 Act 
was based did not consider the implications of the extended definition of ‘specific 
goods’ in contexts other than the passing of property, delivery and acceptance.209 It is 
clear that sections 6 and 7 (perishing of specific goods) and section 52 (specific 
performance) will now apply to contracts for the sale of part-interests in specific 
goods. Benjamin notes that it remains to be seen whether the change will be of any 
practical consequence in these areas.210 
 
THE PRICE  
Section 8 Ascertainment of Price  
1) The price in a contract of sale may be fixed by the contract, or may be left to be fixed in 
manner thereby agreed, or may be determined by the course of dealing between the 
parties 
 
2) Where the price is not determined in accordance with the foregoing provisions the buyer 
must pay a reasonable price. What is a reasonable price is a question of fact dependent 
on the circumstances of each particular case. 
 
Section 9 Agreement to Sell at Valuation  
1) Where there is an agreement to sell goods on the terms that the price is to be     
       fixed by the valuation of a third party, and such third party cannot or does not make    
       such valuation, the agreement is avoided; provided that if the goods or any part  
       thereof have been delivered to and appropriated by the buyer he must pay a  
       reasonable price therefor. 
 
2) Where such third party is prevented from making the valuation by the fault of the  
       seller or buyer, the party not in fault may maintain an action for damages against the  
       party in fault.  
                                                 
209 The Law Commission for England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission.  1993.  Sale of 
Goods Forming Part of a Bulk (Law Com. No. 215, Scot Law Com. No. 145), paras. 5.3-5.7.  
210 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 1-116. 
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 3.35. Section 8(1) commences by stating that the parties to a contract of sale are free 
to settle the price in the contract and goes on to say that the price may be left to be 
fixed ‘in a manner agreed by the contract’ or may be determined ‘by the course of 
dealing’ between the parties. While this provision appears straightforward, it is not as 
unproblematical as it first appears.  The section assumes that a contract has been made 
by the parties and then proceeds to set out the methods by which the price may be 
ascertained. The absence of agreement on something as fundamental as price, 
however, may mean that there is no binding contract in place. In May & Butcher v 
The King,211 the House of Lords held that an agreement for a sale of goods, where the 
price and other details were to be agreed later, was void for uncertainty. It should be 
noted, however, that the case involved an executory transaction – that is, one in which 
no part had been performed - and the agreement was not merely silent on the points in 
question but expressly stated that further agreement was necessary on them.212 As 
Atiyah observes, the later case of Hillas & Co. Ltd v. Arcos Ltd213 shows that May 
should not be seen as laying down a general rule. In Foley v Classique Coaches 
Ltd,214 the Court of Appeal ruled that an agreement to supply petrol ‘at a price to be 
agreed by the parties’ was a binding contract as the parties had clearly demonstrated 
an intention to be bound. The contract also contained an arbitration clause under 
which a reasonable price could be fixed in the event of disagreement.  Though there is 
still some uncertainty as to the status of ‘agreements to agree’, the courts appear to 
regard the intention of the parties as the critical factor.  Where the parties intend to be 
bound, and the terms of their agreement are sufficiently complete to be enforced as a 
contract, failure to agree on certain terms, even one as important as price, will not 
necessarily vitiate the existence of a contract.  This is more likely to be the case in 
executed or partly executed, as opposed to executory, contracts.215    
 
3.36. The ‘reasonable price’ to be paid for goods in accordance with Section 8(2) is 
typically set by reference to the current market price at the time and place of delivery, 
although other factors, such as the cost of production, may also be taken into account.  
                                                 
211 (1929) [1934] 2 KB 17. 
212 White, Commercial Law, op. cit, p.192 fn. 2    
213  (1932) 147 LT 503.   
214 [1934] 2 KB 1.   
215 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit, para. 1.43.  
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That the market price may not be the sole or conclusive test, was made clear in Acebal 
v Levy
216 where it was held that a reasonable price:   
    may or may not, agree with the current price of the commodity at the port of  
    shipment, at the precise time when such shipment is made. The current price of the  
    day may be highly unreasonable from accidental circumstances as on account of the  
    commodity having been purposely kept back by the vendor himself, or with  
    reference to the price at other ports in the immediate vicinity or from various other  
    causes.  
 
3.37. Section 9 deals with an agreement to sell rather than a sale; the passing of 
property in the goods in such a case is conditional upon the making of the valuation as 
to the price.  Subsection (1) covers two scenarios: 
(i) where the valuation machinery breaks down because the appointed valuer 
cannot or will not perform his function – in such circumstances the 
agreement is avoided; 
 
(ii) where the machinery breaks down but the goods, or any part of them, have 
been delivered to and appropriated by the buyer – the buyer is bound to 
pay a reasonable price for those goods. 
 
Subsection (2) provides for a special statutory action in damages where either the 
buyer or the seller is in fault in causing the valuation machinery to break down.   This 
could occur, for example, where one of the parties refuses to carry out an undertaking 
to name one of two agreed joint valuers, or where the seller refuses to allow the valuer 
access to the goods for the purpose of making the valuation. 
 
3.38. In Benjamin’s view, the wording of section 9 is appropriate to a case where a 
specific person is identified under the contract as the intended valuer.217  In Sudbrook 
Trading Estate v Eggleton,218 a case concerning an option to purchase land, the House 
of Lords drew a distinction between a contract of this kind and one where the price is 
to be fixed by a valuer or valuers to be chosen by the parties at a later date.  The latter 
contract could be seen as an agreement to sell at a fair and reasonable price, and if the 
proposed arrangements for fixing the price broke down, the court could substitute its 
own price ascertainment mechanism and enforce the contract accordingly.  Though 
this judgement did not involve a contract for the sale of goods, Benjamin argues that 
                                                 
216 (1834) 10 Bing. 376 
217 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para 2-050.   
218 [1983] 1 A.C. 444.   
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nothing in section 9 would appear to prevent the application of its reasoning to sales 
contracts. In Gillatt v. Sky Television,219 however, it was held that an agreement to 
refer the valuation to an ‘independent chartered accountant’ was an essential term of 
the contract and that the court was not entitled to substitute its own view as to the 
valuation.   
 
3.39. By virtue of section 9(1), if the valuer refuses to act or is unable to do so for 
whatever reason, neither party has any remedy against the other except for the 
restitution of his money or property.220 Although a valuer cannot be compelled to act 
by the parties to the contract, he may be liable in damages if he refuses to act after 
contracting to do so.221 The parties are normally bound by a valuation made pursuant 
to contract even if the valuer has been negligent or has set about his task in an 
unprofessional manner.  As Lord Denning stated in Campbell v Edwards:222 
    If two persons agree that the price of the property should be fixed by a valuer on  
    whom they agree, and he gives that valuation honestly, they are bound by it.  If  
    there were fraud or collusion, of course, it would be very different.   
The valuer may be liable for negligence, however, if he has arrived at his valuation on 
a manifestly unsound or incorrect basis.223 
 
3.40. Sections 8 and 9 have not been amended in the United Kingdom or the other 
common law jurisdictions whose sales law is based on the 1893 Act.  Though section 
8 raises some issues, these are not of a kind that can be satisfactorily dealt with by a 
legislative change and are best addressed by the courts on a case-by-case basis.  In the 
case of section 9, we consider that the provision that the contract is void where the 
valuer cannot or does not make a valuation is unwarranted.  It would be preferable in 
such cases to provide that the buyer should pay a reasonable price for the goods.     
 
3.41. Recommendation 
Section 9 of the 1893 Act should be amended to provide that, where the valuer 
cannot or does not make a valuation, the buyer should be required to pay a 
                                                 
219 [2000] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 461.   
220 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit, para. 2.051.   
221 Cooper v Shuttleworth (1856) 25 L.J. Exch. 114. 
222 [1976] 1 WLR 403.  
223 Wright v Frodoor [1967] 1 WLR 506; Burgess v Purchase & Sons (Farms) Ltd [1983] Ch 216.  
Dennard v Price Waterhouse Cooper plc [2010] EWHC 812 (CA).   
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reasonable price for the goods.     
 
II AUCTION SALES  
SECTION 58   
In the case of a sale by auction –  
1) Where goods are put up for sale by auction in lots, each lot is prima facie deemed to be 
the subject of a separate contract of sale; 
 
2) A sale by auction is complete when the auctioneer announces its completion by the fall 
of the hammer, or in other customary manner. Until such announcement is made any 
bidder may retract his bid; 
 
3) Where a sale by auction is not notified to be subject to a right to bid on behalf of the 
seller, it shall not be lawful for the seller to bid himself or to employ any person to bid at 
such sale, or for the auctioneer knowingly to take any bid from the seller or any such 
person: Any sale contravening this rule may be treated as fraudulent by the buyer; 
 
4) A sale by auction may be notified to be subject to a reserved or upset price, and a right 
to bid may also be reserved expressly by or on behalf of the seller. Where a right to bid is 
expressly reserved, but not otherwise, the seller, or any one person on his behalf, may 
bid at the auction. 
 
3.42. The 1893 Act does not define ‘sale by auction’ nor is the term defined in other 
Irish legislation. Benjamin defines auction sale as ‘a sale by competitive bidding 
normally held in public, at which prospective purchasers are invited to make 
successively increasing bids for the property, which is then usually sold to the highest 
bidder.’224 Though Directive 1999/44/EC on the Sale of Good and Associated 
Guarantees contains a discretionary provision permitting member states to exclude 
second-hand goods sold at public auction where the consumer has the opportunity to 
attend the sale in person, it does not contain a definition of ‘public auction’. The 
recently agreed Directive on Consumer Rights, however, will include a definition of 
‘public auction’ as ‘a method of sale where goods are offered by the trader to 
consumers, who attend or are given the possibility to attend the auction in person, 
through a transparent competitive bidding procedure run by an auctioneer and where 
the highest bidder is bound to purchase the goods.’225    
                                                 
224 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 2-004.   
225 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights, 
Article 2.15. This definition has been included in the text of the proposed Directive for the purpose of 
the exclusion of contracts concluded at public auction from the right of withdrawal for distance and 
off-premises contracts.  As the exclusion is confined to public auctions, consumer sales concluded 
through online auctions will, as discussed at paragraph 3.53 below, be subject to a right of withdrawal.  
A provisional version of the final text of the Directive can be accessed at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/documents/activities/cont/201106/20110624ATT22578EN.pdf 
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3.43. Section 58 of the 1893 Act codifies the common law rules governing certain 
aspects of auction sales.  In particular, subsection (2) provides that a sale by auction is 
concluded when the auctioneer announces its completion by the fall of the hammer or 
in some other customary manner. Per subsection (1), the contract thus concluded 
relates to the particular lot which has been declared to be the subject of the bidding. In 
accordance with common law rules, the display of the goods by the auctioneer and the 
request for bids are an invitation to treat, and the bids made at the auction are 
offers.226  A bidder can thus withdraw his bid prior to the fall of the hammer, the 
prospective seller can similarly withdraw the goods from sale even after the auction 
has begun,227 and the auctioneer as, agent for the seller, is entitled to accept or refuse 
any bid.228   
 
3.44. Section 58(4) of the 1893 Act provides that a sale by auction may be subject to a 
reserve price, and such auctions can constitute an exception to the binding nature of 
contracts concluded through the auctioneer’s announcement of the completion of the 
sale. As Atiyah notes, however, this subsection has independent force only where the 
auctioneer mistakenly knocks the goods down below the reserve price by virtue of the 
prior rule that no contract of sale is concluded until a bid has been accepted.229 In 
McManus v Fortescue,230 the items for sale at an auction were stated beforehand to be 
subject to a reserve price but the auctioneer knocked the goods down to the plaintiff 
for less than this price. On realising his mistake, the auctioneer refused to sign the 
memorandum of sale.  The Court of Appeal held that the auctioneer was not liable for 
breach of his warrant of authority as the prior statement that the auction was subject to 
a reserve price had clearly indicated to those in attendance that the auctioneer’s 
authority was limited.  As well as providing that auction sales may be subject to a 
reserve price, section 58(4) states that they may be advertised as subject to a right to 
bid by, or on behalf of, the seller. Where a right to bid is so notified, the seller, or any 
one person acting on his behalf, may bid at the auction.  If no such notification is 
                                                 
226 In so-called ‘Dutch auctions’, however, the auctioneer states the price at which he is willing to sell 
and, if no bidder is prepared to meet this price, progressively reduces the price until a bidder is 
prepared to meet it.  In such cases, the auctioneer is making an offer and the buyer’s bid is an 
acceptance.   
227 Fenwick v Macdonald Fraser & Co [1904] 6 F 850. 
228 British Car Auctions v Wright [1972] 3 All ER 462.  
229 Atiyah,  The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p.35.   
230 [1907] 2 KB 1.   
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made, it is unlawful for the seller or a person acting for him to make a bid.  An 
auctioneer who knowingly accepts such a bid also acts unlawfully. A sale concluded 
after an unlawful bid of this kind may be treated as fraudulent by the buyer.   
 
Issues Arising 
3.45. While section 58 is reasonably clear about auctions where a reserve price is 
notified, matters are less straightforward where no reserve price is advertised, 
particularly if the goods are withdrawn before the sale is complete.  As, per section 
58(2), a bid remains an offer even in a sale without reserve, the remedy available to 
the highest bidder in this event cannot be sought on the basis of a concluded contract 
of sale. In Barry v Davies,231 the Court of Appeal held that there was a collateral 
contract between the auctioneer and the highest bidder in such a case. This contract 
was constituted by the offer made by the auctioneer to sell to the highest bidder, 
acceptance of which occurred when the bid was made. The consideration necessary 
for the contract came from the detriment to the bidder in making a bid that could be 
accepted and the benefit to the auctioneer from the increased attendance likely at a 
sale without reserve and the prospect of the bids being driven up. Because there was 
only one bidder in this case, the question of whether there was a contract between the 
auctioneer and all of the bidders at an auction without reserve, or even all those 
attending the auction, was not considered. As it cannot be known at the time a bid is 
made whether or not it will be the highest bid, it is possible to make the case that there 
is a contract with all bidders, though these under-bidders would not usually be able to 
show loss.  
 
3.46. We consider that there is merit in incorporating in future sale of goods 
legislation the case law rulings that a notification that a sale by auction is not subject 
to a reserve price constitutes a collateral contract on the part of the auctioneer to sell 
                                                 
231 Barry v Davies [2000] 1 WLR 1962.  The case concerned the sale of two machines valued at 
£14,000 each that were put up for sale in an auction stated to be ‘without reserve’. The only bid 
received, however, was for £200 per machine. The auctioneer withdrew the machines and they were 
sold shortly afterwards for £750 each after being advertised in a magazine. The court awarded the 
plaintiff damages of €27,600 on the market rule – the machines to the value of £28,000 which he would 
have owned if the contract had not been broken less the £400 of his bid. The judgement drew on the 
reasoning in Warlow v Harrison [1858] 1 E&E 295 on the existence of a contract between bidder and 
auctioneer, though not on the measure of damages.  In Tully v Irish Land Commission [1961] 97 
I.L.T.R. 1974, the High Court held similarly that a statement in the conditions of sale of an auction of 
land that the highest bidder would be the purchaser was an offer which could be accepted by a bid, and 
could constitute a contract between the seller and the highest bidder.   
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the goods to the highest bidder.  Though not subsequently implemented, the draft Sale 
of Goods Act prepared by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada provided that, in a 
sale by auction without reserve, after the auctioneer calls for bids on an article or lot, 
that article or lot cannot be withdrawn unless no bid is made within a reasonable 
time.232  It has been suggested that, if an auctioneer is required to sell the goods to the 
highest bidder in a sale without reserve, there should be a corresponding obligation on 
the bidder in such cases not to withdraw a bid if, for example, he discovers that it is 
unrealistically high.233  The assumption of equivalence that underlines this suggestion 
is not valid in our view, and we would not favour a statutory provision along these 
lines. As auctioneers’ terms and conditions will commonly have a provision 
precluding retraction of a bid in such circumstances, moreover, a statutory rule of this 
kind would be unnecessary in many cases. We note in this connection that the draft 
Canadian Uniform Sale of Goods Act provided that, in a sale by auction with or 
without reserve, the bidder may retract his bid until the auctioneer’s announcement of 
completion, but a bidder’s retraction would not revive any previous bid.234 
 
3.47. Recommendations  
Future legislation should provide that:  
 In a sale by auction without reserve, a lot cannot be withdrawn from the 
sale by the owner or auctioneer after the auctioneer has called for bids 
unless no bid is made within a reasonable period of time.   
 Where goods are stated to be sold at auction ‘without reserve’, that 
statement shall be binding upon the auctioneer once bidding commences.  
Without prejudice to the remedy of specific performance, the highest 
bona fide bidder at the time the hammer falls, or when the sale is stopped 
by the auctioneer, shall have a right to damages for the loss occasioned by 




                                                 
232 Uniform Law Conference of Canada.  1981.  Draft Sale of Goods Act, s.25(5).  Section 25(4) of the 
Draft Act provided that, in a sale by auction with reserve, the auctioneer may withdraw the goods at 
any time until he announces completion of the sale.   
233 Foster, S.  ‘Auctions without reserve: Warlow v Harrison revisited’, (2000) Cov L.J. 5(2) 108-113.  
234 Uniform Law Conference of Canada.  1981.  Draft Sale of Goods Act, s.25(6).   
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Auction ‘Rings’  
3.48. Benjamin notes that an agreement between bidders to form a ‘ring’ - that is, to 
refrain from bidding in competition with each other in order to depress the price - is 
not illegal at common law.235 In the UK, however, this practice is the subject of 
specific statutory regulation. The Auctions (Bidding Agreements) Acts 1927 and 1969 
provide that it is an offence for a dealer to give any gift or consideration to another 
person as an inducement to, or reward for, abstaining from bidding at an auction; it is 
also an offence for another person to accept a gift or consideration in such 
circumstances.236  The Acts further provide that, where goods are purchased at auction 
by a person who has entered into an agreement with others to abstain from bidding, 
the seller may avoid the contract. Bona fide agreements by prospective buyers to 
purchase goods on a joint account, however, are permitted by the Acts if a copy of the 
agreement is deposited with the auctioneer before the goods are purchased.   
 
3.49. We considered the case for introducing similar criminal legislative provisions 
here, but are not convinced of its necessity. This type of practice would appear to be 
adequately covered by the provisions at section 6 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and 
Fraud Offences) Act 2001 on making gain or causing loss by deception.237  It would 
appear also to come within the scope of section 4 of the Competition Act 2002 on 
anti-competitive agreements and concerted practices.  However, there may be merit in 
introducing a provision dealing with the rights of the seller of goods by auction where 
goods have been purchased following a collusive agreement on bidding. Such a 
provision could be modelled on section 3 of the U.K Auctions (Bidding Agreements) 
Act of 1969, the relevant parts of which provide as follows: 
1) Where goods are purchased at an auction by a person who has entered into an 
agreement with another or others that the other or the others (or some of them) shall 
abstain from bidding for the goods (not being an agreement to purchase the goods bona 
fide on a joint account) and he or the other party, or one of the other parties, to the 
agreement is a dealer, the seller may avoid the contract under which the goods are 
purchased. 
 
                                                 
235 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 3-009.  See Rawlings v General Trading Co. [1921] 1 
K.B. 635; Cohen v Roche [1927] 1 K.B. 169. 
236 Auctions (Bidding Agreements) Act 1927 (1927 Chapter 12).  Auctions (Bidding Agreements) Act 
1969 (1969 Chapter 56).   
237 The effectiveness of the UK legislation on bidding agreements is also open to question.  There have 
been only two reported cases of criminal proceedings under the 1927 Act in the eight decades since its 
enactment.  Harvey, B.W. 2008.  ‘Misadventures of the Consumer in the Auction Room’ in Twigg-
Flesner, C. et al (eds), The Yearbook of Consumer Law 2008 (Aldershot: Aldgate), p. 354. 
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2) Where a contract is avoided by virtue of the foregoing subsection, then, if the purchaser 
has obtained possession of the goods and restitution thereof is not made, the persons 
who were parties to the agreement that one or some of them should abstain from 
bidding for the goods the subject of the contract shall be jointly and severally liable to 
make good to the seller the loss (if any) he sustained by reason of the operation of the 
agreement. 
 
5) For the purposes of this section, the expression ‘dealer’ means a person who in  
      the normal course of his business attends sales by auction for the purpose of  
      purchasing goods with a view to reselling them. 
 
3.50. Recommendation  
Future legislation should provide that, where goods are purchased at auction by 
a person who has entered into agreement with others to abstain from bidding, 
the seller may avoid the contract. Where a contract is avoided in such 
circumstances and the purchaser has obtained possession of the goods without 
restitution therefor being made to the seller, the parties to the agreement to 
abstain from bidding should be jointly and severally liable to make good to the 
seller any loss he  has sustained by reason of the agreement.   
 
Online Auctions 
3.51. Online auctions afford another example of how technological change has given 
rise to types of commercial transaction that were not envisaged when the provisions 
of the Sale of Goods Acts were being framed and which do not readily fit within the 
parameters of those provisions.  It is necessary to distinguish in this context between, 
on the one hand, conventional auctioneers who use the Internet as a supplementary or 
additional means of conducting auction sales and, on the other, online platforms such 
as eBay which provide an infrastructure for the holding of online auctions.  As 
Benjamin observes, the latter type of auction involves ‘no act of the auctioneer 
corresponding to the fall of the hammer’.238  It is usual instead to ‘set a closing time 
on the website, by which time all bids must be placed and (unless there is a reserve 
price which has not been reached) the highest bid is deemed to have been accepted 
when the auction closes.’ 
 
3.52. The courts in Ireland and in the United Kingdom have yet to rule on whether 
auctions conducted by means of online platforms come within the scope of section 58 
                                                 
238 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 2-004.   
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of the 1893 Act.  Different views have been expressed on the question of whether 
online auctions of this kind are equivalent to traditional auctions for legal purposes.  
Some commentators contend that the providers of platforms for online auctions differ 
fundamentally from traditional auctioneers in that they do not act as agent for the 
sellers.239  Nor do these providers write or post the listing of the goods, control the 
duration of the auction, or take possession of the goods. Furthermore, they neither 
perform the function of completing the auction sale or have the authority to do so.  
The dominant online auction platform, eBay, emphasises that it is not an auction 
house and that the transactions concluded on its website are not auctions, though it 
also wishes to be treated on the same basis as conventional auctioneers for the 
purpose of the application of the EU rules governing distance contracts, in particular 
their exemption from the right of withdrawal.240 Others maintain, however, that the 
features of the traditional auction absent in the online context (the existence of an 
auctioneer controlling the sale in a physical setting) are relevant to the practical 
conduct of the auction rather than being essential to its legal classification.241 On this 
view, auctions conducted via online platforms share many of the key features of  
conventional auctions in that the provider organises the means by which buyers and 
sellers interact and sets the rules under which the sale is conducted. The buyers bid in 
succession and, subject to a reserve price, the highest bidder wins the contract. On this 
view, consequently, the legal rules governing auctions should apply therefore to 
auctions conducted on online platforms.    
 
3.53. The status of online auctions has also been an issue in the context of EU 
consumer legislation. Directive 97/7/EC on distance sales excludes contracts 
concluded at auction from its scope.  The German Federal Supreme Court has held 
that an Ebay-type auction is not an auction within the meaning of the Directive and is 
hence subject to the rules on distance sales, including the right of withdrawal.242 A 
                                                 
239 Riefa C., ‘To be or not to be an Auctioneer? Some thoughts on the legal nature of online “eBay” 
auctions and the protection of consumers’, (2008) J Consum. Policy (31), 167. 
240 See eBay’s submission to the Green Paper on the review of Consumer Acquis, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/acquis/responses/eBay.pdf; and eBay’s submission 
to the Public Consultation on the implementation of the Distance Selling Directive (Directive 
1997/7/EC) http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/gen_rights_en.htm#distsell. 
241 Niemann, J-M., ‘Online auctions under German contract law’, (2001) CLSR 115.  Hornle, J.  ‘Is an 
online auction an “auction” in law?’ (2007) EBL 7-9.   
242 Hornle, op. cit.  Schulte-Nolke, H. et al (eds).  2008.  EC Consumer Law Compendium: 
Comparative Analysis, p. 524.   
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similar position obtains in number of other EU Member States, including France, 
Spain, Finland, Denmark and Sweden. The proposed Consumer Rights Directive 
sought to place online and conventional auctions on the same footing for the purpose 
of the rules governing distance contracts.  The original text of the proposal included a 
definition of ‘auction’ as follows which was intended to encompass both types of 
auction:243 
    ‘auction’ means a method of sale where goods or services are offered by the trader  
    through a competitive bidding process which may include the means of distance  
    communication and where the highest bidder is bound to purchase the goods or the   
    services.   
It further provided that, while both types of auction would be subject to the 
information requirements governing distance contracts, they would not be subject to 
the right of withdrawal. A majority of Member States were opposed, however, to 
treating conventional and online auctions as equivalent for this purpose, and the final 
text of the Directive is set to exclude this definition of ‘auction’ but to include the 
definition of ‘public auction’ cited at paragraph 3.42 above.  This definition would 
limit the scope of the term to auctions which consumers attend, or are given the 
possibility to attend, in person.   
 
Options for Reform  
3.54. As section 58 of the 1893 Act was not drafted with online auctions in mind, it is 
scarcely surprising that it is not readily applicable to such auctions, particularly in 
respect of the emphasis put on the role of the auctioneer. In our view, the central issue 
is not whether online auctions are auctions within the meaning of the section, but 
rather what type of provisions, including those in section 58, would serve a useful 
purpose in regulating this type of transaction. We consider that some of the provisions 
of the section – in particular those restricting the right of sellers to bid or to employ 
others to bid – could be applied to online auctions. EBay’s rules for sellers, for 
example, prohibit so-called ‘shill bidding’. As in the case of conventional auctions, 
therefore, the law could provide that an auction in which the seller bids, or gets 
someone to bid, without prior notification of the fact may be treated as fraudulent by 
the buyer.244 The application of other elements of section 58 to online auctions is less 
                                                 
243  European Commission.  Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights, COM (2008) 614, Article 
2(15).  The definition further provided that ‘a transaction concluded on the basis of a fixed-price offer, 
despite the option given to the consumer to conclude it is not an auction.’   
244 http://pages.ebay.co.uk/help/policies/seller-shill-bidding.html  
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straightforward and should be assessed following consultation with industry and 
consumer interests. While section 58(2) of the 1893 Act provides, for example, that a 
bidder may retract his bid prior to the completion of the auction sale, eBay’s policies 
regard bids as a ‘binding contract’ that can only be retracted in ‘exceptional 
circumstances’.245  As we received no submissions on these issues, we are reluctant to 
make hard-and-fast recommendations on them. 
 
3.55. Recommendation 
The provisions of section 58(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 regulating bids by 
sellers, or persons employed by sellers to bid, should apply to auctions conducted 
on online platforms as well as to conventional auctions. The recommendations at 
paragraph 3.50 on the right of the seller to avoid the contract where goods are 
purchased at auction by a person who has entered into an agreement with others 
to abstain from bidding, and the liability of the parties to any such agreement for 
any loss to the seller, should also apply to online auctions.  Issues of definition 
and the application of the other provisions of section 58 of the 1893 Act to online 
auctions, or the introduction of rules specific to such auctions, should be the 
subject of consultation with industry and consumer interests.   
 
III CONTRACT FORMATION AND SALE OF GOODS LEGISLATION  
3.56. As noted at paragraph 3.1 above, the only section of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 
which regulates the formation of the contract of sale is section 58 on auction sales.  It 
follows, however, from section 62(2) of the Act that the general principles of contract 
law on the formation of contracts are applicable to contracts of sale.  In accordance 
with those general principles, the formation of a contract depends on agreement which 
is usually shown by a valid offer and the acceptance of that offer.  The making and 
communication of offer and acceptance and the rules on revocation and termination of 
offers are all to be found in general contract law principles.  There are also statutory 
rules on electronic communications in the Electronic Commerce Act 2000 and the 
European Communities (Directive 2000/31/EC) Regulations 2003 (S.I. No. 68 of 
2003).   
 




3.57. Though the existing Sale of Goods Acts contain no such provisions, it can 
validly be asked if future sale of goods legislation should include detailed rules on key 
aspects of contract formation such as offer and acceptance, the ‘battle of the forms’, 
and parol evidence. A number of matters relating to electronic contract formation, 
such as when a contract is formed online or by e-mail and the incorporation of e-
contract terms, also call for consideration.  We will look at each of these issues in 
turn. 
 
Should Future Sale of Goods Legislation Contain Rules on Contract Formation? 
3.58. Other jurisdictions where the Sale of Goods Act 1893 applies, or whose sale of 
goods legislation is based on the 1893 Act, have not amended their legislation to 
include detailed provisions on contract formation. Both the United Nations 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods [CISG] and the Draft Common Frame 
of Reference, however, contain detailed provisions on contract formation. Proposals 
to incorporate provisions of this kind in national legislation have also been made in 
the past in both Scotland and Canada.      
 
United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods [CISG]  
3.59. Rules on the formation of sales contracts are set out in Articles 14-24 of the 
Convention. Per Article 14, an offer to contract must be addressed to one or more 
persons and be sufficiently definite – that is, describe the goods, quantity and price; 
and indicate an intention for the offeror to be bound on acceptance. Unlike the 
common law, the CISG does not appear to recognise unilateral contracts but, subject 
to clear indication by the offeror, treats any proposal not addressed to a specific 
person as only an invitation to make an offer (Article 14(2)). Generally, an offer may 
be revoked provided the withdrawal reaches the offeree before or at the same time as 
the offer, or before the offeree has indicated acceptance (Articles 15 and 16).  Some 
offers may not be revoked, for example when the offeree reasonably relied upon the 
offer as being irrevocable.(Article 16(2)).  Article 17 provides that an offer comes to 
an end when a rejection reaches the offeror. In general, under Article 18, a positive act 
is required to indicate acceptance; silence or inactivity are not acceptance. Of 
particular note is Article 18(2) which provides that ‘an acceptance of an offer 
becomes effective at the moment the indication of assent reaches the offeror.’  This 
contrasts with the present postal rule of acceptance under Irish law whereby, contrary 
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to the general rule that an acceptance becomes effective when it is communicated to 
the offeror, a postal acceptance becomes effective when the letter is posted.  
 
3.60. Article 19 of the Convention deals with qualified acceptance and what is known 
as the ‘battle of the forms’.  This refers to the issue that arises when a purported 
acceptance of an offer contains some additional or different terms, perhaps in a 
standard form used by the offeree generally, which do not materially affect the terms 
of the offer and which are ignored by the offeror.  The classic common law approach 
is that an acceptance has to meet the offer precisely or it will not conclude a contract.  
If a purported acceptance contains different or additional terms, the traditional 
solution is that this is a counter-offer which kills the original offer so that the person 
who wins the battle of the forms will be the person who last submits the counter-offer 
which is accepted by the other party, regardless of whether the original terms have 
been materially altered.246  This approach has attracted criticism on the grounds that it 
pays insufficient regard to how the parties actually contract, is too rigid and makes it 
difficult for the courts to propose a fair compromise.247  Article 19(2) of the CISG 
attempts to solve the problem by providing that a reply to an offer which purports to 
be an acceptance but contains additional or different terms that do not materially alter 
the terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance, unless the offeror, without undue 
delay, objects orally to the discrepancy or dispatches a note to that effect.  If he does 
not so object, the terms of the contract are the terms of the offer together with the 
modifications contained in the acceptance. Article 19(3) of the Convention provides 
that additional terms relating to the price, payment, the quality and quantity of goods, 
the place and time of delivery, the extent of one party’s liability to the other or the 
settlement of disputes are considered to alter the terms of the offer materially. Article 
20 deals with the calculation of the time for acceptance, and Article 21 with the effect 
of late acceptance.  Article 22 provides for withdrawal of acceptance, and Article 23 
with the conclusion of contracts by acceptance.   
 
3.61. Article 8 of the CISG deals with the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in 
relation to the interpretation of statements and the conduct of the parties, or what is 
                                                 
246 Butler Machine Tool Co Ltd. v. Ex-Cell-O Corporation (England) Ltd. [1979] WLR 401. 
247 For example, see Siems, ‘Unevenly Formed Contracts: Ignoring the Mirror of Offer and 
Acceptance’, (2004) E.R.P.L.  771.  Forte and McQueen, ‘Contract Procedure, Contract Formation and 
the Battle of the Forms’, (1986) J. Law Soc. Sc. 224. 
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known as parol evidence. The parol evidence rule in common law systems is a 
substantive rule in contract cases that prevents a party to a written contract from 
presenting oral evidence that contradicts or alters the written terms of the final 
contract.248 The rationale for the rule is that, as the parties have expressed their 
agreement in final written form, extrinsic evidence relating to other matters should not 
be considered in interpreting that agreement in view of the parties’ decision to 
exclude those matters from the written contract.249  In relation to such extrinsic 
evidence, Article 8(3) of the CISG provides that ‘in determining the intent of a party 
or the understanding a reasonable person would have had, due consideration is to be 
given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any 
practices which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any 
subsequent conduct of the parties.’  
 
Scottish Law Commission Report on Formation of Contracts 
 
3.62. In 1993, the Scottish Law Commission recommended the adoption of provisions 
based on the CISG as part of the general law of Scotland relating to the formation of 
contracts, and prepared a draft Bill to give effect to this recommendation.250  The 
proposed rules were to apply to contracts in general and not just to contracts of sale.  
In the Commission’s view, the UN Convention comprised a modern set of agreed 
rules on contract formation that were widely applied in international trade. As the 
CISG rules were an amalgam of civil and common law traditions, they were also  
similar to the existing rules of Scottish law. The Commission concluded consequently 
that the rules on contract formation in the Convention would offer a  suitable basis for  
Scottish domestic law in this area. Though the Commission’s consultation showed 
considerable support for its proposals, the proposed legislation on contract formation 
was not subsequently enacted.   
 
 
                                                 
248 For a discussion of the rule, and the exceptions to it, see Clark, Contract Law in Ireland, op. cit, 
pp. 147-158.  
249 The rule was stated in the following terms by Lord Morris in Bank of Australasia v Palmer: ‘parol 
testimony cannot be received to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a written contract 
or the terms in which the parties have deliberately agreed to record any part of their contract’. [1897] 
A.C. 540 at 545.   
250 Scottish Law Commission. 1993.  Report on Formation of Contract: Scottish Law and the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.  The CISG 
provisions recommended for adoption with minor modifications were Articles 4, 6-10, and 13-24.   
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Draft Uniform Sale of Goods Act 1981 
3.63. Inspired in part by the Uniform Commercial Code in force in the United States, 
the impetus for reform of Canadian sales law gathered pace in the late 1970s with the 
report of the Ontario Law Reform Commission.251 The Commission recommended 
that a committee be appointed to consider the need for new uniform federal sale of 
goods legislation. The Sale of Goods Committee established in 1979 drafted a 
Uniform Sale of Goods Act, Part 4 of which dealt with matters of contract 
formation.252 While some sections of the draft Act such as the rules on capacity to 
contract restated the provisions of the Sales of Goods Act, there were significant new 
provisions, based on both the UCC and the CISG, on matters such as the battle of the 
forms,253 the abolition of the parol evidence rule,254 and changes to the doctrine of 
consideration including provisions that offers may be irrevocable without 
consideration and that variations may be binding without new consideration. For 
reasons discussed further in Annex III, the draft Act was never implemented and sales 
law in the Canadian Provinces continues to be based on the 1893 Act.   
 
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) 
3.64. The European Commission’s Communication of 2001 on European Contract 
Law initiated a consultation on the problems arising from differences in contract law 
in Member States and on possible responses to such problems.255  This was followed 
in 2003 by an Action Plan which proposed to improve the quality of European 
contract law by establishing a Common Frame of Reference containing common 
principles, terminology and model rules to be used by EU legislators. The European 
Commission also financed the work of an international academic network on the 
Common Frame of Reference, work which led in 2008 to the publication of the Draft 
                                                 
251 Ontario Law Reform Commission.  1979.  Report on Sale of Goods, Volumes I & II.   
252 Uniform Law Conference of Canada.  Sale of Goods Act. 
http://www.ulcc.ca/en/cls/index.cfm?sec+2.  Also Proceedings of Annual Meeting 1981, Appendix S, 
pp. 185-321.   
253 The draft Act provided that a reply to an offer purporting to be an acceptance but containing 
different or additional terms that did not materially alter the terms of the offer constituted acceptance.  
This did not apply where the offeree notified the offeror within a reasonable time of his objection to the 
terms. Terms relating to price, payment, quality, quantity, place and time of delivery, liability, and 
disputes were classed as terms that materially altered the offer. 
254 Section 17 of the draft Act provided that: ‘No rule of law or equity respecting parol or extrinsic 
evidence and no provision in writing prevents or limits the admissibility of evidence to prove the true 
terms of the agreement, including evidence of any collateral agreement or representation or evidence as 
to the true identity of the parties.’ 
255 COM (2001) 398, 11 July 2001.  
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Common Frame of Reference (DCFR).256 The DCFR comprises principles, 
definitions and rules of civil law, including contract and tort, and covers both 
commercial and consumer contracts.  Book II, Chapter 4 of the proposed Frame of 
Reference contains rules on contract formation, including offer, revocation of offer, 
rejection of offer, acceptance, time of conclusion of contract, time limit for 
acceptance, late acceptance, modified acceptance and conflicting standard terms 
(battle of the forms).  Its provisions on the ‘battle of the forms’ are similar to those of 
the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods257 and, like the Convention, 
the DCFR further provides, contrary to the postal rule, that the contract is concluded 
when the acceptance reaches the offeror.258  
 
3.65. While the shape of further initiatives on the Common Frame of Reference was 
uncertain for some time, 2010 saw the publication of a Green Paper outlining a 
number of policy options for future action.259  These ranged from the anodyne – the 
Common Frame of Reference to serve as an optional ‘source of inspiration’ to 
national and EU legislators and to contracting parties – to the far-reaching, the 
adoption of a Regulation for a European Contract Law or even a European Civil 
Code.  In order to facilitate possible future actions, the European Commission also 
established an Expert Group in April 2010 to study the feasibility of a user-friendly 
instrument of European contract law.260 The Group’s main task was to identify the 
provisions of the Draft Common Frame of Reference of most relevance to such a  
contract law instrument and to consider whether or how those provisions should be 
amended or augmented. The Expert Group produced a Feasibility Study in May 
                                                 
256 Von Bar, C. et al. (eds).  2009.  Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private 
Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference.  (Munich: Sellier).  The DCFR built in particular on the 
work of a previous network of European academics entitled the Commission on European Contract 
Law which prepared Principles of European Contract Law with the aim of establishing a uniform 
contract law for the European Union.  
257 ‘If businesses have concluded a contract but have not embodied it in a final document, and one 
without undue delay sends the other a notice in textual form on a durable medium which purports to be 
a confirmation of the contract but which contains additional or different terms, such terms become part 
of the contract unless: (a) the terms materially alter the terms of the contract; or (b) the addressee 
objects to them without undue delay.  Ibid., II.4: 210. 
258 Ibid., II.4: 205. 
259 European Commission.  2010.  Green Paper on Policy Options for Progress Towards a 
European Contract Law for Consumers and Businesses.   
260 Commission Decision of 26 April 2010 setting up the Expert Group on a Common Frame of 
Reference in the Area of European Contract Law (OJ L 105, 27.4.2010, p. 109).  
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2011.261 Following a public consultation on the Green Paper, the EU Justice 
Commissioner, Viviane Reding, announced in June 2012 that a legislative proposal 
would be brought forward for a voluntary instrument of European contract law which, 
when selected by the parties, would provide the basis for both consumer and 
commercial contracts.262   
 
Conclusion   
3.66. There is little doubt in our view that several aspects of contract formation would 
benefit if an opportunity to restate, clarify or alter the position at common law 
presented itself.  Though we gave some consideration for this reason to the inclusion 
of rules on contract formation in future sale of goods legislation, this is not a step that 
we can recommend. First, such a change would involve a fundamental change in the 
structure of our sale of goods legislation towards a code along the lines of that in 
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code or in the draft Canadian Uniform Sales 
Act.  Whether such an approach is suited to the Irish legal system is questionable, and 
it would involve a major departure from the approach to the reform of sales law 
followed in most other jurisdictions whose law is based on the 1893 Act.  Secondly, 
and more fundamentally perhaps, statutory rules on contract formation should 
arguably be of general application and not apply only to contracts of sale. This was 
the approach recommended by the Scottish Law Commission. A general 
recommendation of this kind, however, would exceed our terms of reference and 
would also require detailed consideration of a range of other contract law issues such 
as the doctrine of privity of contract. Thirdly, any action at national level in this area 
will have to be considered in the light of future developments in the area of a 
European contract law regime.  There is little merit in proposing the introduction of 
national rules on contract formation based on the provisions of the UN Convention on 
the International Sale of Goods while a legislative proposal for an optional EU 
contract law instrument is awaited. Fourthly, it is not altogether certain that the 
adoption of rules based on the CISG in areas such as ‘the battle of the forms’ would 
                                                 
261 A European Contract Law for Consumers and Businesses: Publication of the Results of the 
Feasibility Study Carried out by the Expert Group on European Contract Law, 
http://ec.europa.ie/justice/contract/files/feasibility-study_en.pdf  
262 Viviane Reding, EU Justice Commissioner & Vice-President of the European Commission, 3 June 
2011. ‘The Next Steps Towards a European Contract Law for Businesses and Consumers.’  
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make a substantial difference in practice. Such rules might instead give rise to 
difficulties of their own.263 
 
Issues in Electronic Contract Formation  
3.67. The Electronic Commerce Act 2000 and the European Communities (Directive 
2000/31/EC) Regulations 2003 (S.I. No. 68 of 2003) provide important clarification 
on the time and place of dispatch and receipt of electronic communications.  The 
moment of formation of electronic contracts, however, continues to be governed by 
the traditional contract law rules on formation – that is, offer, acceptance and 
invitation to treat.  A number of issues arise as follows with regard to electronic 
contract formation: 
a) Is a web advertisement an offer or an invitation to treat?   
b) Should the postal rule or the receipt rule apply to online contracts? 
c) Is E-mail subject to the postal rule? 
d) The incorporation of contract terms and the use of so-called ‘click-
wrap’ and ‘browse-wrap’ methods of contracting. 
 
We will look at each of these issues briefly in turn.  As the matters at issue fall outside 
our terms of reference, no recommendations are made in respect of them.  In view of 
the growing prevalence of digital commerce, however, it is important in our view that 
these matters receive appropriate further consideration as some key issues - such as 
the provisions on the placing of orders pursuant to electronic contracts under 
Regulation 14 of the 2003 Regulations - are treated ambiguously by the Act and the 
Regulations.  
 
Is a web advertisement an offer or an invitation to treat?   
3.68. One of the problem issues in electronic contracting is the categorisation of a 
website as either a binding offer or a non-binding invitation to treat.  The 
classification which is adopted can have great significance for the online vendor who 
could be found to be bound by statements on a website. Under general contract law 
principles, it appears to be broadly accepted that, in the case of a web-based supplier 
communicating automatically with a customer who is purchasing online, the web page 
                                                 
263 Vergne, ‘The Battle of the Forms under the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods’, (1985) Am. J. Comp. L. (33) 233.  Scottish Law Commission, Report on 
Formation of Contract: Scottish Law and the United Nations Convention on the International 
Sale of Goods, op. cit, pp. 29-30 
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is an invitation to treat. The analogy of the display of goods in a shop will apply in 
such cases.264  However, it is possible that a web advertisement could be treated as a 
unilateral offer to the world at large in accordance with the principles in Carlill v. 
Carbolic Smokeball Co.265 where the placing of the advertisement effectively 
deprived the trader of his right to refuse. As a result, web traders are generally advised 
to provide for this situation in the design of their websites. 
 
The postal rule or the receipt rule? 
3.69. The general rule is that acceptance becomes effective when it is communicated 
to the offeror. There are two rules with regard to the moment of acceptance for the 
formation of contracts: the postal rule and the receipt rule. As noted earlier, where an 
acceptance is communicated by post, the contract is formed at the moment the letter 
of acceptance is posted.266 The receipt rule provides that, where the parties have 
continuous communications on a face-to-face basis or over the telephone, the contract 
is formed as soon as the offeror hears the acceptance.  The courts have also applied 
this rule to so-called ‘instantaneous’ methods of communication such as telex and 
fax.267 In Brinkibon, however, the House of Lords refused to lay down a universal rule 
for all telex communications given the many variants which may occur in the context 
of such communications.268 Where an advertisement is made on a website, the 
advertisement would normally be interpreted as an invitation to treat.  The customer 
makes the offer and the trader accepts the offer. This is an instantaneous method of 
communication and therefore the receipt rule applies.  The contract will be made as 
soon as the customer receives the acceptance. 
 
Is E-mail subject to the Postal Rule? 
3.70. Debate continues about whether e-mail should be subject to the postal rule or 
not.  The argument centres around whether e-mail is an instantaneous method of 
communication.  The Internet is not wholly reliable and communications by e-mail 
can get lost, delayed or fail to reach their destination.  Some argue therefore that it is 
                                                 
264 Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v. Boots. [1952] 2 All ER 456).   
265 [1893] 1 QB 256. 
266 Adams v. Lindsell (1818) 1 B & A 681. 
267 Entores v. Miles Far East Corp [1955] 2 QB 327.  Brinkibon v. Stahag Stahl [1983] 2 AC 34. 
268 Per Lord Wilberforce in Brinkibon: ‘No universal rule can cover such cases: they must be resolved 
by reference to the intentions of the parties, by sound business practice and in some cases by a 
judgment where the risks should lie.’  Ibid. at 43.   
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analogous to post.  However, others argue that, in terms of speed of transmission, e-
mail generally equates to fax, telex and telephone, so that the receipt rule is the 
appropriate one. There has been no resolution of this issue and much academic 
commentary as to which rule should apply.269 As outlined above, the E-Commerce 
Act and Regulations do not clarify whether the postal rule applies to e-mail 
communication, but do clarify when and where electronic communications are 
deemed to have been sent and received.   
 
Incorporation of Terms 
3.71. The use of so-called ‘click-wrap’ and ‘browse-wrap’ methods of contracting 
also raises questions as to whether terms have been validly incorporated.  ‘Click-
wrap’ contracts occur when a link is posted on a website which states that when 
clicked it amounts to agreement.  For example, the purchaser of goods or services 
may click on an icon with ‘I Agree’ on it.  The online vendor has usually displayed its 
terms and conditions and, in order to proceed with the transaction, the consumer must 
agree to be bound by those terms and conditions by the act of clicking the button.  The 
purchase of goods or the download of music or software cannot proceed until the user 
clicks the button. This is a convenient method for the vendor as the purchaser must 
actively assent to the terms presented before the contract proceeds.  However, there 
may be a question as to whether such terms have been validly incorporated.  
Traditional cases such as Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. v. Stiletto Visual Programmes 
Ltd
270 may apply and, if terms are considered to be unusual or unreasonable, they  
may have to be specifically brought to the attention of the customer. A court may 
question how prominently the terms were posted and whether it was possible to click 
the ‘I Agree’ button without seeing the terms.  In the recent High Court case of 
Ryanair v. Billefleuge,271 the court had regard to such traditional common law 
principles in finding that the terms of use on the Ryanair website had been validly 
incorporated. 
                                                 
269 See Fasciano, P ‘Internet electronic mail: A last bastion for the mailbox rule’, (1997) Hofstra L. 
Rev. 971; Christensen, S, ‘Formation of contracts by e-mail – Is it just the same as post?’, (2001) 1 
QUTLJJ 1; Rogers, K, ‘Contract conclusion on the web: Untangling the weakest link’, (2002) 36 Law 
Teach 220; Houghton, K and Vaughan-Neil, K, ‘E-Mail and the postal rule’, (2002) 12 C&L (5) 31; 
Watnick, V, ‘The electronic formation of contracts and the common law “mailbox” rule’, (2004) 56 
Baylor L. Rev. 175; Al Ibrahim, Ababneh, Tahat, ‘The postal rule in the digital age’, (2007) JICLT 47. 
270 [1989] QB 433. 
271 High Court, unreported 26th February 2010. 
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3.72. Browse-wrap agreements do not require any physical act by the user indicating 
acceptance of the terms and conditions of the agreement before purchasing goods or 
services or downloading or accessing material from the site.  Generally a website 
using this form of agreement requires the user to browse the website, often by 
clicking on a hyperlink that will take the user to another web page on the website to 
find the terms and conditions. Such an agreement then states that, by using or 
browsing the site, the user is assenting to the terms and conditions.  The use of the 
browse-wrap form of agreement is more controversial. Though courts in the United 
States have held that the terms are binding where the person browsing the site knew 
of the terms or ought reasonably to have known of them, there is continuing 
uncertainty on the point in the absence of clear criteria as to what constitutes notice to 
the offeree of the terms and conditions of a browse-wrap agreement sufficient to make 
such an agreement enforceable.  It seems likely that a court would take into account 
factors such as how the terms are physically presented, the size and type of font, and 
the location of the hyperlink to the terms and conditions.  In Specht v. Netscape,272 a 
U.S. District Court for the District of New York decision, the court noted that there 
was no constructive notice of the terms of the agreement because the user had to 
scroll down the page to the next screen before coming to the invitation to view the full 
terms available by hyperlink, and such notice of the terms of the agreement were not 
reasonably conspicuous to the average user.   
 
3.73. The use of standard terms in click-wrap and browse-wrap consumer contracts 
may also be subject to a test of fairness under the European Communities (Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts) Regulations 1995. For example, one of the terms on 
the Directive’s indicative list of terms regarded as unfair includes those which 
‘irrevocably binds the consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity of 
becoming acquainted before conclusion of the contract.’ 273 
 
3.74. The next Chapter looks at sections 11 and 13-15 of the 1893 Act together with a 
number of related provisions from the 1980 Act.  Section 10 of the 1893 Act which 
deals with stipulations as to time is discussed in Chapter 8 along with the provisions 
of Part III of the 1893 Act on delivery and payment.  Section 12 of the 1893 Act 
                                                 
272 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y.2001). 
273 S.I. 27 of 1995, Regulation 3(7) & Schedule 3.   
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concerning implied undertakings as to title is considered in Chapter 7 together with 







































CHAPTER FOUR SALE OF GOODS ACTS 1893 AND 1980: 
CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES, SECTIONS 11 & 13-15  1893 
ACT AND  SECTIONS 12-14 1980 ACT 
 
4.1 Sections 11 and 13-15 of the 1893 Act contain a number of its most important 
provisions – the apparent bifurcation of contract terms into conditions and warranties, 
the creation of implied statutory conditions as to the quality or fitness for purpose of 
goods, and the need for goods to correspond with sample and description. In this 
Chapter, we also consider a number of related provisions at sections 12-14 of the 
1980 Act concerning statements purporting to restrict the rights of buyers, the implied 
warranty for spare parts and after-sale service, the implied condition on the safety of 
motor vehicles, and the liability of finance houses. As outlined in Chapter 1, the 
provisions at sections 13-15 of the 1893 Act were substantially revised by the 1980 
Act in order primarily to strengthen the position of consumer buyers.  These sections 
of the Act have also undergone far-reaching amendment in other jurisdictions, most 
notably the United Kingdom, again with the principal aim of improving protections 
for consumer purchasers. Critically, the provisions at section 13-15 of the Act overlap 
directly with the rules on the quality of goods and their correspondence with 
description and sample in Directive 1999/44/EC on Consumer Sales and Guarantees.   
 
4.2 Before we look at the substance of the provisions on the quality and other aspects 
of goods, it is necessary first to discuss their form.  This involves, first, the 
consideration of the use of the technique of implied statutory terms and, second, the 
differentiation of those implied terms into conditions and warranties.  
 
The Implication of Terms by Statute 
4.3 The implied terms in sections 13 to 15 of the 1893 Act are based on provisions in 
the original Act as amended by the Act of 1980. As we saw in Chapter 1, those 
provisions were drawn from implied terms developed by the courts in a series of cases 
during the nineteenth century. Though the rights that buyers of goods enjoy under 
these sections of the Acts are rights conferred by statute, breaches of their provisions 
do not involve a breach of the Sale of Goods Acts per se. Because the terms are 
inserted into the contract between seller and buyer, their breach takes the form of a 
breach of the contract between the parties.  If goods do not meet the implied quality or 
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other terms under these sections of the Act, therefore, it is up to the buyer to pursue a 
remedy for breach of the contract.   
 
4.4 A recent report on the reform of UK consumer law has suggested a severing of the 
link between consumer rights and the underlying contract.274  It argues that the current 
reliance on implied terms injects an additional layer of complexity into the law and 
that the imposition of statutory requirements on a seller, vis-à-vis the goods sold,  
independent of an underlying agreement between the parties would provide a simpler 
and sounder basis for consumer rights. While statutory requirements of this kind need 
not differ in content from the existing implied terms, they would provide protections 
for consumers independent of their contractual or other relationship with the supplier 
of the goods. As possible models for such a change, the report instances, first, the 
Draft Common Frame of Reference which, instead of implying terms into contracts, 
applies a standard of contractual conformity which is independent of the individual 
contract and which, if breached, allows the consumer a remedy against the supplier.275 
As discussed below, Directive 1999/44/EC on Consumer Sales and Guarantees is 
based on a variant of this approach.  The report cites, secondly, the New Zealand 
Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 which sets out a range of statutory guarantees on 
quality, fitness for purpose and other matters that apply in all cases where goods are 
supplied to a consumer and which provides a right of redress against the supplier 
and/or manufacturer where goods fail to comply with these guarantees.276   
 
4.5 We are not persuaded, for a number of reasons, that placing statutory obligations 
of this kind on the seller of goods other than through the implication of terms into the 
contract is a change worth pursuing.  The terms implied into contracts of sale by the 
Sale of Goods Acts are just one element of the contract.  Placing the implied terms on 
a non-contractual footing while the other terms remain contractual in nature would do 
little to simplify or rationalise consumer rights.  It is difficult to see, moreover, that 
such a change would make any significant difference in practice. Though the quality 
and other stipulations inserted into the contract by the Sale of Goods Acts are classed 
                                                 
274 Howells, G. & Twigg-Flesner, C. (eds).  2010.  Consolidation and Simplification of UK 
Consumer Law (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills).   
275 Von Bar, C. et al (eds).  2009. Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private 
Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (Munich: Sellier), IV. A. 2.301-2.302.   
276 Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 (No. 91), Part 1.  
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as contract terms, they are effectively statutory rules, particularly in consumer 
contracts where their exclusion is prohibited.  Their substance would remain broadly 
similar if they were restated in some other way and, though the grounds for action 
where goods failed to meet the statutory standard would be couched in different 
terms, the consumer would still have to pursue a remedy against the trader who had 
sold or supplied them. Though, as recommended in this and other Chapters, the 
existing provisions can be improved in a range of ways, the model that underpins 
them remains essentially sound in our view.  As a separate UK study of consumer 
rights for digital products has recently argued,277 the potency of the implied terms 
under the Sale of Goods Act for consumer protection purposes stems from the 
following characteristics:  
 they are classed as conditions so that any breach allows the buyer to reject the 
goods and demand a refund; 
 they are easy to prove and establish; 
 liability for their breach is strict; 
 they cannot be excluded nor liability for their breach limited; 
 they provide a remedy against the retailer who will generally be relatively 
accessible to the consumer; 
 they are familiar to, and understood by, both consumers and retailers. 
While this assessment may understate some of the practical difficulties consumers can 
face in making use of the implied terms, it is broadly correct in its evaluation of the 
overall strengths of the existing statutory regime.  We are not in favour moreover of 
an approach that would isolate consumer sales law from general sales law. The Group 
agrees with the underlying notion that contracts freely negotiated between parties of 
equal bargaining power should, as a matter of public policy, be enforced.  The 
existing law recognises the utility of implied terms for business purchasers while also 
acknowledging issues of differential market power with consequential advantages in 
terms of uniformity of application.    
  
4.6. The preceding discussion is relevant to the assessment of the way in which the 
quality and related terms in Directive 1999/44/EC are framed.  Article 2(1) of the 
Directive sets out the general obligation on the seller to deliver goods in conformity 
with the contract. Article 2(2) provides next that goods ‘are presumed to be in 
conformity with the contract’ if they satisfy certain requirements in relation to 
                                                 
277 Bradgate, R.  2010. Consumer Rights in Digital Products: A Research Report for the UK 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, p. 30 & pp. 18-27.    
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compliance with description, sample and model, fitness for purpose, and quality and 
performance.  This presumption is rebuttable so that goods which satisfy Article 2(2) 
may be found not to be in conformity with the contract, most obviously where they do 
not conform to an express term of the contract.278  Though it would be difficult for a 
seller successfully to argue the point, it is possible also that goods which do not 
comply with the requirements of Article 2(2) could be in conformity with the 
contract.279 Unlike the corresponding implied terms in the Sale of Goods Act, the 
Directive does not lay down a clear and unequivocal requirement that goods should 
comply with its stipulations.   
 
4.7 The Regulations that give effect to Directive 1999/44/EC adhere closely to the 
wording of the Directive for the most part.280 As stated in previous Chapters, the 
failure to integrate the Directive’s provisions with those contained in domestic 
legislation has brought about a situation in which there are two parallel, and in some 
respects conflicting, sets of rules on key aspects of consumer sales. In the interests of 
legislative coherence and comprehensibility, it is essential that there is a single set of 
rules in this area in the future. The presumption of conformity formula employed in 
the Directive is, in our view, a less satisfactory basis for consumer rights than the 
implied terms approach adopted in the Sale of Goods Acts, and the latter should 
accordingly be retained in future legislation. The substance of the Directive’s quality 
and related provisions can be accommodated within the framework of the Sale of 
Goods Acts. In contrast to the Irish approach, the transposition of Article 2 of the 
Directive in the UK was effected by means of relatively minor additions to the 
implied terms at sections 13-15 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.281 This way of 
proceeding is consistent with the legal nature of Directives under the EU Treaty and 
                                                 
278  Recital 8 of the Directive states, among other things, that ‘in order to facilitate the application of the 
principle of conformity with the contract, it is useful to introduce a rebuttable presumption of 
conformity with the contract covering the most common situations.’   
279 Bradgate, R. and Twigg-Flesner, C.  Blackstone’s Guide to Consumer Sales and Associated 
Guarantees, op. cit., pp. 41-43.  
280 The European Communities  (Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated 
Guarantees ) Regulations 2003 (S.I. No. 11 of 2003). The Regulations, however, did not transpose 
Article 2(1) of the Directive which fixed a liability period of two years for goods not in conformity 
with the contract.  The Directive’s minimum harmonisation basis permitted the retention of the general 
six-year time limit for contractual claims.   
281 Bradgate, R. and Twigg-Flesner, C., op. cit., p. 71.   
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can thus be followed in Irish legislation.282 As discussed in Chapter 9, more 
systematic adjustments are required to the provisions of domestic and EU legislation 
regarding remedies for goods that do not conform to the contract.   
 
SECTION 11 WHEN CONDITION TO BE TREATED AS WARRANTY   
(1) Where a contract of sale is subject to any condition to be fulfilled by the seller, the buyer 
may waive the condition, or may elect to treat the breach of such condition as a breach 
of warranty, and not as a ground for treating the contract as repudiated. 
 
(2) Whether a stipulation in a contract of sale is a condition, the breach of which may give  
        rise to a right to treat the contract as repudiated, or a warranty, the breach of which may  
        give rise to a claim for damages but not to a right to reject goods and treat the contract  
        as repudiated, depends in each case on the construction of the contract. A stipulation  
        may be a condition, though called a warranty in the contract. 
 
(3) Where a contract of sale is not severable, and the buyer has accepted the goods, or part  
        thereof, the breach of any condition to be fulfilled by the seller can only be treated as a  
        breach of warranty, and not as a ground for rejecting the goods and treating the  
        contract as repudiated, unless there be a term of the contract, express or implied, to that  
        effect. 
 
(4) Nothing in this section shall affect the case of any condition or warranty, fulfilment of  
        which is excused by law by reason of impossibility or otherwise 
 
Conditions and Warranties 
4.8 The division of contract terms into conditions and warranties reflects the origins 
of the 1893 Act in the common law of the nineteenth century.  The Act does not 
define ‘condition’ in either section 11 or section 62, but instead characterises it by 
reference to its legal effect compared with that of warranty.  Atiyah defines 
‘condition’ as follows:283   
    … in its usual meaning a condition is a term which, without being the fundamental  
    obligation imposed by the contract, is still of such vital importance that it goes to  
    the root of the transaction.  The importance of a condition in contracts for the sale  
    of goods is that its breach, if committed by the seller, may give the buyer the right  
    to reject the goods completely and to decline to pay the price, or, if he has already  
    paid it, to recover it.   
 
Section 62 of the 1893 Act defines ‘warranty’as:284 
                                                 
282 Per Article 288(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: ‘A directive shall be 
binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall 
leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.’   
283 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 86. 
284  Warranty is also commonly used to refer to manufacturers’ or product guarantees, particularly those 
which offer extended protections in return for a payment.  This meaning of the term should not be 
confused with the legal warranty under consideration here.  Manufacturers’ guarantees are considered 
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    an agreement with reference to goods which are the subject of a contract of sale,  
    but collateral to the main purpose of such contract, the breach of which  
    gives rises to a claim for damages, but not to a right to reject the goods and  
    treat the contract as repudiated.  
 
The definition of ‘warranty’ thus sets out both the meaning and the legal effect of the 
term.  Though the description of warranties as ‘collateral’ to the main terms of the 
contract might suggest that these are in some way separate from the contract, they are 
plainly a term of the contract.    
 
4.9 The division of contract terms into ‘conditions’ and ‘warranties’ cross-cuts the 
division between express and implied terms.  Express terms are those specifically 
mentioned and agreed by the parties at the time the contract is made, whether orally or 
in writing. In addition to the express terms, other terms can be implied into a contract 
in various ways, including by prior course of dealing, custom or usage, rules of the 
common law, and statute.285 The last-mentioned is the most important for our 
purposes, particularly the terms implied by Sections 13-15 of the amended 1893 Act 
which are considered in this Chapter. All of these implied terms are classed as 
conditions under the Act, though two of the implied terms as to title under section 12 
of the Act discussed in Chapter 7 are classed as warranties.   
 
Innominate Terms  
4.10 The common law distinction between conditions and warranties that was 
incorporated in the 1893 Act related to contract terms at the time the contract was 
made and, as such, did not require regard to be had to the actual effects of any 
subsequent breach. This led to a tendency for many contract terms to be regarded as 
conditions even where their breach had caused minor, or even no, loss or 
inconvenience.286 While this approach was conducive to commercial certainty, it 
made it possible for contracts to be terminated for breaches of little or no material 
consequence.  The decision in 1962 of the English Court of Appeal in Hong Kong Fir 
                                                                                                                                            
in Chapter 13.  To compound the confusion, ‘warranty’ has a number of other meanings, including an 
older sense of the term which refers to representations that have contractual effect, regardless of the 
associated remedy for breach, as opposed to ‘mere representations’ which do not.  Clark, Contract 
Law in Ireland, op. cit., p. 145.  In insurance law, moreover, ‘warranty’ is used to refer to a core or 
central term of the contract, breach of which allows the innocent party to repudiate the contract.   
285 Goode on Commercial Law, op. cit, pp. 96-98.  
286  Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 87. 
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Shipping Co. Ltd. v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha,287 however, signalled a major change of 
judicial thinking in the matter. The case concerned an express term relating to the 
seaworthiness of a vessel chartered by the plaintiffs to the defendants.  The court 
found that the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel was neither a condition, whose 
breach would permit the charterer to terminate the contract, nor a warranty, whose 
breach could give rise only to a claim for damages.  It belonged instead to a separate 
category of innominate or intermediate terms, the applicable remedy for breach of 
which would depend on the nature and effect of the breach.288     
 
4.11 A subsequent case, The Hansa Nord,289 applied the reasoning in HongKong Fir 
to a contract of sale.  The case concerned a shipment of citrus pulp pellets intended 
for processing as animal feed, part of which had suffered damage, though not of a 
substantial kind, while in transit. The express terms of the contract required the pellets 
to be ‘in good condition’ and the purchasers, who had paid for them against the 
shipping documents, rejected the goods on the grounds of both this requirement and 
of the implied condition of merchantability, and sought the return of the price.  With 
the market price in decline, they proceeded through an agent to repurchase the goods 
for a third of the contract price.290 The English Court of Appeal held that the express 
‘good condition’ stipulation in the contract was an innominate term and that the 
breach of the term in this case was not sufficiently serious to justify rejection of the 
goods. Though it was argued that section 11 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 required 
that all contract terms had to be classified as either conditions or warranties, the Court 
ruled that section 62 of the Act permitted express terms in a contract of sale to be 
subject to the general law of contract. While the judgment confirmed that the terms 
implied by the Act, including the condition relating to merchantability, were 
                                                 
287 Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha [1962] 2 Q.B. 26. 
288  The test laid down by Diplock L.J. for the purpose of determining whether the remedy of rescission 
becomes available to the injured party requires an affirmative answer to the following question: ‘Does 
the occurrence of the event deprive the party who has further undertakings still to perform of 
substantially the whole benefit which it was the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract that 
he should obtain as the consideration for performing those undertakings.’, ibid at p.66.  The test was 
applied in the Irish courts by Costello, J. in Irish Telephone Rentals v Irish Civil Service Building 
Society Ltd [1991] I.L.R.M. 377, although the case primarily concerned the implied terms under section 
39 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 which are not classified as conditions or 
warranties.  This case is discussed further in Chapter 14.   
289 Cehave NV v Bremer Handelsgesellschaft [1976] Q.B. 44. 
290 The contract price was €100,000; the market price at delivery for sound goods was estimated at 
€86,000; a reasonable adjustment for the damage was put at €20,000; and the buyers’ agents paid 
€33,720 for the goods; ibid., pp. 55-56.   
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conditions in the strict sense of the term, the merchantability condition was held not to 
have been breached in the particular circumstances of the case.291   
 
4.12 These judgements notwithstanding, the courts remain prepared to accord the 
status of condition to some contract terms, particularly stipulations relating to time of 
performance in commercial contracts. In Bunge Corporation v Tradax S.A.,292 the 
House of Lords upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeal that an express obligation 
requiring the buyers of a bulk shipment of soya beans to give fifteen days notice of 
their readiness to load the cargo was a condition. Though the contract did not 
expressly provide for a remedy of rescission, the need for certainty in the planning 
and management of this type of transaction justified treating time obligations as 
conditions which, if breached, gave the injured party the right to terminate without 
regard to the effects of the breach.  Lord Wilberforce observed that, while the courts 
‘should not be too ready to interpret contractual clauses as conditions’, they should 
not be reluctant ‘in suitable cases … if the intentions of the parties, as shown by the 
contract so indicate, to hold that an obligation has the force of a condition, and that 
indeed they should usually do so in the case of time clauses in mercantile contracts.  
To such cases … the ‘gravity of the breach’ approach of the Hongkong Fir case … 
would be unsuitable.’293  Bridge has summarised the position regarding termination 
rights following this judgement as follows:294 
    … the decision accepted in principle intermediate stipulations whilst denying their  
    application to time provisions in commercial contracts.  The autonomy of the  
    parties in grading a contractual term as a condition if they so wished was also  
    underwritten.  In consequence the approach to termination rights is a two-fold one:  
    first, the construction of the contract to see if the term breached was a condition;  
    and secondly, failing this, the appraisal of the effects of the breach to see if it went  
    to the root of the contract.  As a summary of the antecedent law, Bunge suggests a  
    basic distinction between quality and time obligations.  The former are particularly  
    apt for an intermediate stipulations approach, though the implied conditions of  
    quality, fitness and description are put beyond the reach of this by the Sale of  
    Goods Act.   
 
                                                 
291 Atiyah observes that, ‘in order to arrive at a reasonable result, the court had to conclude that the 
goods in this case were merchantable, but not ‘in good condition’, a somewhat contradictory holding.’  
Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 88.   
292  1981 1 W.L.R. 71.  This approach to the contractual status of time obligations in commercial 
contracts has been upheld in subsequent cases.  Cie Commercial Sucres et Denrées v C Czarnikow Ltd 
(The Naxos) [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1337.  The Seaflower [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 341.   
293 Bunge Corporation v Tradax S.A.  1981 1 W.L.R. at pp. 715-716.   
294 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 10.35.   
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Issues Arising  
4.13 The principal issue raised by of section 11 is that of the retention of the 
distinction between conditions and warranties in its present form.  Change could be 
effected in either of two ways.  First, the distinction between conditions and 
warranties could simply be abolished and it could be provided that all implied and 
express terms in contracts of sale would be innominate in character.  Second, the 
distinction could be retained, but future legislation could expressly provide that the 
implied statutory terms were variously conditions, warranties or innominate terms.295   
 
4.14 We are not in favour of a change along either of these lines. In our view, 
abolition of the condition/warranty classification in future legislation, and its 
replacement by the category of innominate term would be ill-advised for a number of 
reasons.  First, it would create an undesirable rift between sales law and the wider law 
of contract.  Second, it is entirely justified on grounds of both policy and practice that 
the law should recognise that some contract terms are more important than others and 
should attract more potent remedies. Classifying all terms as innominate, the remedies 
for which would depend on the nature and effects of a breach, would create 
commercial uncertainty and, in all likelihood, lead to more litigation.296 Third, the loss 
of automatic entitlement to the right to reject in consumer cases would considerably 
weaken the position of, and protections available to, consumers.  A provision that 
damages would be the only remedy for some breaches of the implied terms in 
consumer sales contracts, furthermore, would not be in compliance with the remedies 
requirements of Directive 1999/44/EC on consumer sales and guarantees.  The 
relation between the remedies regime under the Directive and under the Sale of Goods 
Act is discussed further in Chapter 9.    
 
4.15 We see no advantage similarly in providing that the terms implied by the Act 
could be innominate in character. There is possible merit in clarifying in the 
                                                 
295 This is effectively the present position if both the 1893 and 1980 Acts are considered.  Most of the  
implied terms as to goods under the 1893 and 1980 Acts are conditions, but a small number are 
warranties.  The implied undertakings as to services at section 39 of the 1980 are said to be ‘terms of 
the contract’, and have been treated as innominate terms by the courts.  
296 Case law on insurance, for example, reflects a judicial reluctance to move away from an a priori 
classification of terms as conditions: Legh-Jones, M. et al (eds).  2008.  MacGillivray on Insurance 
Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell), para. 10-014.  Certainty of result is a much valued policy objective 
in commercial contracts.    
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legislation that express terms can be innominate297 but, as in the case of terms implied 
by way of custom and practice, it is arguable that the process of construction approach 
in Hong Kong Fir already does this and that legislation on these lines would achieve 
little. With the exception of the implied undertakings as to freedom from undisclosed 
charges or encumbrances and quiet possession under section 12, all of the implied 
terms relating to goods under the 1893 Act have the status of conditions.  While the 
exclusion or limitation of these implied terms is void in consumer contracts, it is 
permissible in commercial contracts where the restriction is shown to be fair and 
reasonable.  As discussed in Chapter 5, we propose to retain the existing rules 
governing exemption clauses in contracts of sale and are of the view that these rules 
give the required degree of protection in consumer cases and the desired level of 
flexibility in commercial transactions.  The implied terms in contracts for the supply 
of services under Part IV of the 1980 Act, which are not expressly classified as 
conditions or warranties, are discussed in Chapter 14. 
 
4.16 Though the rules governing termination rights under the Sale of Goods Act 
should broadly be maintained in their existing form, some rebalancing is justified in 
the case of commercial contracts of sale. In the UK, the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 
1994 introduced a limitation on the right of buyers in non-consumer sales to terminate 
for slight breach of the implied conditions as to quality, fitness for purpose, and 
correspondence with description and sample. The provision which inserted a new 
section 15A in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 states as follows: 
    (1) Where in the case of a contract of sale – 
          the buyer would, apart from this subsection, have the right to reject goods by  
          reason of a breach on the part of the seller implied by section 13, 14, or 15  
          above, but the breach is so slight that it would be unreasonable for him to reject  
          them, then, if the buyer does not deal as consumer, the breach is not to be  
          treated as a breach of condition but may be treated as a breach of warranty. 
  (2) This section applies unless a contrary intention appears in, or is to be implied   
        from, the contract. 
    (3) It is for the seller to show that a breach fell within subsection (1)(b) above. 
 
A provision along these lines had been recommended by the Law Commission for 
England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission in order to ‘prevent rejection in 
                                                 
297 In New South Wales, for example, the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1988 inserted a new section 
4(5) as follows in the Sale of Goods Act 1923: ‘Nothing in this Act shall be construed as excluding a 
right to treat a contract of sale as repudiated for a sufficiently serious breach of a stipulation that is 
neither a condition nor a warranty but is an intermediate stipulation.’   
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bad faith where the breach was really so insignificant that, as a matter of justice, 
rejection should not be permitted.’298  The Commissions viewed the proposal as a 
‘slight change’ which ‘aimed to preserve the present law as far as possible whilst 
lessening the risk of its abuse.’  The ‘slight breach’ limitation it proposed fell 
considerably short of the more exacting test set out in the Hong Kong Fir case, 
namely whether the breach was so serious as to deprive the affected party of 
substantially the whole benefit of the contract.  As enacted, moreover, the provision 
allows contracting parties, expressly or impliedly, to exclude its application.  The 
inclusion of a provision giving buyers the option of partial rejection of goods where a 
breach does not affect all of the goods under contract is considered in chapter 8.     
 
4.17 Recommendations 
Future legislation should retain the distinction between conditions and 
warranties. The legislation should clarify, however, that express contractual 
terms may be innominate in character where the ordinary principles of 
construction of the contract, lead to such a conclusion.  
 
Future legislation should include a default provision restricting the right of 
buyers in non-consumer sales to reject goods for slight breach of the implied 
terms as to quality and fitness for purpose and correspondence with description 
and sample.   
 
SECTION 13 SALE BY DESCRIPTION   
 
13. (1) Where there is a contract for the sale of goods by description, there is an implied 
condition that the goods shall correspond with the description; and if the sale be by sample 
as well as by description, it is not sufficient that the bulk of the goods corresponds with the 
sample if the goods do not also correspond with the description. 
 
 (2) A sale of goods shall not be prevented from being a sale by description by reason only 
that, being exposed for sale, they are selected by the buyer. 
 
 (3) A reference to goods on a label or other descriptive matter accompanying goods exposed 
for sale may constitute or form part of a description.  
 
                                                 
298 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  1987.  Sale and Supply of Goods (Law 
Com. No. 160.  Scot. Law Com. No. 104), para. 4.18 & paras. 4.16-4.17 & 4.19-4.24.   The 
Commissions saw no case for the application of a similar provision to consumer contracts because of 
consumers’ weaker bargaining power and the fact that remedies other than rejection were less 
appropriate to consumer transactions.    
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4.18  Subsections (2) and (3) were inserted in the 1893 Act by the Sale of Goods and 
Supply of Services 1980, while subsection (1) remains unchanged from the original 
provision in the 1893 Act.  Subsection (2) is based on a provision first included in the 
UK Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 with the aim of clarifying that  
section 13 applied to cases where the buyer selected the goods in a self-service 
store.299  There is no provision corresponding to subsection (3) in UK legislation. The 
corresponding provision at Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 1999/44/EC on Consumer 
Sales and Guarantees provides that goods are presumed to be in conformity with the 
contract if they comply ‘with the description given by the seller’. Public statements by 
the seller and producer, particularly in advertising or on labelling, are relevant in 
respect of quality under Article 2(2)(d) of the Directive and would overlap with the  
provisions on ‘description’ under section 13 of the 1893 Act.  Article 2(2)(a) of the 
Directive was transposed verbatim at Regulation 5(2)(a) of the European 
Communities (Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated 
Guarantees) Regulations 2003.   
 
4.19 Though section 13 appears relatively straightforward, it has given rise to a 
sizeable number of issues of interpretation and application.300  Most of these have 
revolved around the related issues of what constitutes a sale by description and what 
statements are to be regarded as forming part of the contractual description.  More 
fundamentally, there are questions about the utility of section 13 relative to the 
express terms of the contract -  principally, what if anything does it add to these 
terms?301  The next sections look at each of these issues in turn.   
 
What Is Sale by Description? 
4.20 Though section 13 applies only to contracts for the sale of goods by description, 
it does not define sale by description.  It is clear, however, that the term covers all 
contracts for the sale of unascertained goods – that is goods not identified and agreed 
                                                 
299 The then Minister for State at the Department of Industry, Commerce and Energy explained the 
rationale for the subsection as follows: ‘The benefits of section 13 which provides for the implied 
condition that goods being sold by description must correspond with the description are being extended 
so as to apply to goods selected off the shelf in a shop.’  Dáil Debates, Vol. 309, 16 November 1978. 
Sale of Goods and Supply of Service Bill 1978 Second Stage: col.1107.  
300 In Benjamin’s opinion, ‘Conceptually this [s.13] is one of the most troublesome sections of the Act.’  
Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 11-002.   
301 Or as the old canard has it: A contract to sell a man a golf cloth cap ‘is not fulfilled by sending him a 
stylish silk hat’.  Dodd J. in Fogarty v Dickson (1913) 47 ILTR 281.   
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upon at the time the contract is made.  It also effectively covers all contracts for the 
sale of future goods – that is goods to be manufactured or acquired after the making of 
the contract of sale.  In Varley v Whipp,302 a case decided just a few years after the 
enactment of the section, the court held that:  
     the term ‘sale of goods by description’ must apply to all cases where the purchaser  
     has not seen the goods, but is relying on the description alone… The most usual  
     application of that section no doubt is the case of unascertained goods.   
Though the case concerned specific goods – a ‘second-hand self-binder reaping 
machine’ –  it was found to come within the scope of the section as the buyer had not 
seen it before agreeing to the sale. Subsequent cases ruled that there could be a sale by 
description even where the buyer had seen the goods.  In the words of Lord Wright in 
Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd:303  
    It may also be pointed out that there is a sale by description even though the buyer  
    is buying something displayed before him on the counter: a thing is sold by  
    description, though it is specific, so long as it sold not merely as the specific thing,  
    but as a thing corresponding to a description, e.g. woollen undergarments, a hot- 
    water bottle, a second-hand reaping machine to select a few obvious illustrations.   
 
Subsequent cases have confirmed the readiness of the courts to give an expansive 
interpretation to sale by description.304  It has been held that a sale could be by 
description where the buyer had carefully examined the goods prior to the sale,305 and 
where he had personally selected the goods from stock shown him by the seller.306  As 
Salmond J stated in Taylor v Combined Buyers Ltd:307 
    In the case of specific articles … it is possible to sell them without any description  
    at all… In practice, however, even specific articles are generally sold by description  
    in some sense.  They are sold as being of some specified or disclosed nature. 
 
It is reasonable to conclude therefore that almost all sales are sales by description. As 
Atiyah observes,308 ‘it is probably true to say that the only case of a sale not being by 
description occurs where the buyer makes it clear that he is buying a particular thing 
because of its unique qualities and that no other will do.’  
                                                 
302 Varley v Whipp [1900] 1 QB 513.   
303 [1936] AC 85, 100.  The ‘illustrations’ referred to are drawn from the case law on section 13.   
304  This tendency may have been influenced by the fact that, prior to 1973 in the UK and 1980 in 
Ireland, the implied condition as to merchantable quality under section 14 of the 1893 Act applied only 
to goods ‘bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description’.     
305 Beale v Taylor [1967] 1 WLR 1193.   
306 H Beecham & Co Pty Ltd v Francis Howard & Co Pty Ltd [1921] VLR 28.  
307 [1924] NZLR 627, 633-34. 
308 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 151.   
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4.21 Though the courts have accorded a broad meaning to sale by description, they 
have shown themselves prepared in recent decades to restrict the application of 
section 13 on other grounds.  In particular, it has been held that not all statements of 
description come within the scope of the section and give rise to a right to terminate 
the contract if the description is not complied with.309  In accordance with traditional 
common law doctrine, some such statements may be mere representations with no 
contractual effect. In Harrison v Knowles and Foster,310 statements about the 
deadweight capacity of two vessels were judged to be mere representations.  A similar 
view was taken of statements by a private seller to a dealer concerning the age of a car 
in Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams.311 A restrictive reading of description was evident 
similarly in Ashington Piggeries Ltd v Christopher Hill Ltd.312 The sellers contracted 
to sell herring meal to the buyers to be compounded and used as feed for mink.  The 
meal was treated with a preservative which reacted with it to produce a toxin that 
proved fatal when fed to the mink.  The buyers contended, inter alia, that the feed did 
not comply with its description.  The House of Lords held, however, that there was no 
breach of section 13.313  The feed was still capable of being described as herring meal. 
The judgement thus excluded what were held to be non-essential parts of the 
description from the scope of the implied condition under the section.  In Reardon 
Smith Line v Yngvar Hansen Tangen,314 Japanese shipbuilders contracted to charter a 
tanker to the defendant to be built to a detailed specification at Osaka and to be known 
as Yard No. 354 until named. In the event, the construction of the ship was 
subcontracted to a different yard and given a different identifying name.  By the time 
the vessel was built, the market for tankers was in decline and the charterer sought to 
reject the ship on the ground that it did not comply with its description.  The House of 
Lords found for the shipbuilder and held that the words identifying the vessel and the 
location of its construction were only ‘simple substitutes for a name’ and did not form 
part of the contractual description of the goods.  Lord Wilberforce drew a distinction 
                                                 
309 In Ireland, though not the UK, section 13(3) provides that a reference to goods on a label or other 
descriptive material accompanying the goods (such as a sales brochure or manufacturers’ guarantee) 
may form part of the contractual description.   
310 [1918] 1 KB 608.  
311 [1957] 1 WLR 370.   
312 [1972] AC 441.  
313 The buyer’s claim for a breach of the implied quality terms under section 14 of the Act was upheld 
however.  
314 [1976] 1 W.L.R. 989.  Although not a sale of goods case, a detailed account of it can be found in 
Bridge, M.  ‘Description and the sale of goods: the Diana Prosperity’ in Mitchell, C. & Mitchell, P. 
(eds).  2008. Landmark Cases in the Law of Contract (Oxford: Hart), pp. 321-49.   
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between words which state or identify ‘an essential part of the description of the 
goods’ and words which merely ‘provide one party with a specific indication 
(identification of the goods) so that he can find them’.315   
 
4.22  It has further been held that, in order for a sale to be by description for the 
purposes of section 13, the description must be influential in the sale so as to 
constitute an essential element of the contract. Harlingdon and Leinster Enterprises 
Ltd v Christopher Hull Fine Art Ltd
316 concerned the sale for £6,000 of a painting 
described as a work by Gabriele Munter, a German expressionist artist.  The seller 
was not a specialist in fine art and made this known in the course of the sale while the 
buyer was a dealer who specialised in German expressionism and had inspected the 
painting prior to the sale.  The painting was later discovered to be a fake worth no 
more than £100 whereupon the buyer sought to reject it and to recover the price on the 
ground of nonconformity with description in breach of section 13.  The Court of 
Appeal held that the sale was not by description as, per Nourse LJ, ‘the description 
must have a sufficient influence in the sale to become an essential term of the contract 
and the correlative of influence is reliance.’317  There had been no such reliance in this 
instance.  
 
Issues Arising  
4.23 For some commentators, the main issue raised by section 13, as it has come to be 
interpreted by the courts, is that it states as an implied term an obligation which is 
central to the contract as an express term, namely to deliver the agreed goods under 
the contract.318 Apart from labelling the obligation as a condition, the section, on this 
view, does nothing that is not also done by section 27 which stipulates that it is the 
duty of the seller to deliver the goods in accordance with the terms of the contract of 
                                                 
315 Ibid., at p. 999.   
316 [1990] 1 All E.R. 737.   
317 Ibid., at p. 744.  Bridge has commented of the judgement that: ‘There is nothing in the text and little 
in the history of section 13 of the Sale of Goods Act that requires the buyer, as a condition of the 
seller’s liability, to rely upon descriptive words uttered by the seller.  Yet this requirement was 
entrenched in the law by the Court of Appeal in a development that reconciled description to the 
perceived requirements of the law of express warranty, thus averting the type of divergence between 
the Sale of Goods Act and the complementary general law of contract that would have been most 
harmful for the rational development of the law.’  Bridge, M.  2007.  ‘Do We Need a New Sale of 
Goods Act?’, op. cit, para. 2.11  
318 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 155; Bridge, ‘Do We Need a New Sale of Goods Act?’, op. 
cit., para. 2.10; Goode on Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 325.   
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sale.  As well as contending that it is redundant, critics of section 13 argue that the 
treatment of what is properly an express term as an implied term may give rise to 
difficulties where, for example, a contract clause provides for the exclusion of implied 
terms.319    
 
4.24 While we have some sympathy with this view, we cannot go as far as to 
recommend that future sale of goods legislation should dispense with a provision on 
correspondence with description. First, as noted above, Directive 1999/44/EC 
includes a requirement on compliance with description and it is far from clear that the 
obligation on Member States to give effect to this provision would be met by the 
statement of the seller’s duty to deliver the goods at section 27 of the Act.  Secondly, 
something that is obvious to experts in contract law should not be assumed to be 
similarly obvious to businesses and consumers. Statute law serves a function in 
setting out in a clear manner the duties and obligations of the parties, and a provision 
like section 13 may serve this purpose even if its effect is limited in strictly legal 
terms. As Atiyah notes, a statutory codification may include ‘propositions … which 
are not designed in any sense to alter the law’.320  Section 13 provides the parties to a 
contract of sale with a convenient reminder of a key contractual requirement and 
should accordingly be retained. It is noteworthy in this context that, despite the 
academic commentary on the redundancy of section 13, no jurisdiction whose sales 
law is based on the 1893 Act has repealed the section to date.321  Though the draft 
Uniform Sale of Goods Act prepared in Canada in the early 1980s deleted the implied 
term as to description and absorbed it into the provision on express warranties, this 
and the other provisions in the draft Act have still to be implemented.322  
 
4.25  It has been suggested that reliance on a provision along the lines of section 13 to 
give effect to Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 1999/44/EC on correspondence with 
description may be problematical in that the latter provision appears to require 
absolute correspondence with description to satisfy the presumption of conformity.323  
As we have seen, however, the interpretation of section 13 by the courts has held that 
                                                 
319 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 11-003.   
320 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 149.   
321 Annex IV, section 8.4.11.   
322 Ibid., section 3.1.     
323 Bradgate, R. and Twigg-Flesner, C.  2003.  Blackstone’s Guide to Consumer Sales and 
Associated Guarantees, op. cit., para. 3.4.1.1.  
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not all descriptive words applied to goods form part of the contract; some have no 
contractual effect, while others which have contractual effect do not form part of the 
description for the purposes of the section. Though there is a point to this concern, it 
is not sufficient in our view to preclude implementation of Article 2(2)(a) by means of 
a provision along the lines of section 13.  In the case of consumer goods, it will be up 
to the courts to interpret a section 13 type provision in the light of the corresponding 
provision in the Directive. There are grounds moreover for holding that it may be 
legitimate to restrict the scope of the Directive’s provision on description to 
descriptions that a reasonable person would regard as contractual.324  Though we gave 
consideration to the inclusion of a definition of ‘sale of description’ in future 
legislation, a definition that reflected the case law on the section might give rise to an 
issue about whether the Directive had been correctly transposed and, on balance, 
would be better excluded.     
 
4.26 Article 2(2)(a) further provides that goods are presumed to be in conformity with 
the contract if they comply with the description given by the seller, although, as noted 
above, statements by producers and in advertising are relevant under Article 2(2)(d) 
of the Directive. Section 13 contains no such limitation and, in fact, subsection 3 
states that a reference to goods on a label or other descriptive matter accompanying 
goods exposed for sale may constitute or form part of a description. As the 
descriptions that influence consumer decisions are more likely to come from 
manufacturers than from sellers, use should be made of the Directive’s minimum 
harmonisation basis to retain a provision in future legislation along the lines of section 
13(3) of the Sale of Goods Act.    
 
Recommendation  
4.27  Section 13 of the 1893 Act should be retained in its present form in future 
legislation.   
 
SECTION 14 IMPLIED UNDERTAKINGS AS TO QUALITY OR 
FITNESS 
 
1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any statute in that behalf, there is no    
       implied condition or warranty as to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of  
       goods supplied under a contract of sale. 
                                                 
324 Ibid., pp. 55-56.   
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2) Where the seller sells goods in the course of a business there is an implied condition that 
the goods supplied under the contract are of merchantable quality, except that there is 
no such condition  
(a) as regards defects specifically drawn to the buyer’s attention before the contract 
is made, or  
(b) if the buyer examines the goods before the contract is made, as regards defects 
which that examination ought to have revealed. 
 
3) Goods are of merchantable quality if they are as fit for the purpose or purposes for 
which goods of that kind are commonly bought and as durable as it is reasonable to 
expect having regard to any description applied to them, the price (if relevant) and all the 
other relevant circumstances, and any reference in this Act to unmerchantable goods 
shall be construed accordingly.  
 
4) Where the seller sells goods in the course of a business and the buyer, expressly or by 
implication, makes known to the seller any particular purpose for which the goods are 
being bought, there is an implied condition that the goods supplied under the contract 
are reasonably fit for the purpose for which such goods are commonly supplied, except 
where the circumstances show that the buyer does not rely, or that it is not unreasonable 
for him to rely on the seller’s skill or judgment.  
 
5) An implied condition or warranty as to quality or fitness for a particular purpose may be 
annexed to a contract of sale by usage. 
 
6) The foregoing provisions of this section apply to a sale by a person who in the course of 
a business is acting as agent for another as they apply to a sale by a principal in the 
course of a business, except where that other is not selling in the course of a business 
and either the buyer knows that fact or reasonable steps are taken to bring it to the 
notice of the buyer before the contract is made. 
 
Per section 61 of the 1893 Act, the ‘quality of goods includes their state and 
condition.’  
 
4.28 Section 14 must be considered in conjunction with the parallel provisions on the 
conformity of goods with the contract in the European Communities (Certain Aspects 
of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Guarantees) Regulations 2003 which give effect 
to Article 2 of Directive 1999/44/EC. Regulations 5 and 6 of the Regulations provides 
as follows:  
    5. (1) The consumer goods delivered under a contract of sale to the consumer must be in  
    conformity with the contract. 
 
     (2) For the purposes of these Regulations, consumer goods are presumed to be in  
       conformity with the contract if they: 
(a) comply with the description given by the seller and possess the qualities of the 
goods which the seller has held out to the consumer as a sample or model, 
(b) are fit for any particular purpose for which the consumer requires them and 
which he or she made known to the seller at the time of conclusion of the contract 
and which the seller has accepted, 
(c) are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same type are normally used,  
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(d) show the quality and performance which are normal in goods of the same type 
and which the consumer can reasonably expect, given the nature of the goods and 
taking into account any public statements on the specific characteristics of the goods 
made about them by the seller, the producer or his representative, particularly in 
advertising or on labelling. 
 
          (3) There shall be deemed not to be a lack of conformity for the purposes of these  
          Regulations if either –  
            (a) at the time the contract was concluded, the consumer was aware, or ought  
            reasonably have been aware the lack of conformity, or  
            (b) the lack of conformity has its origin in materials supplied by the consumer. 
 
    6.   (1) The seller shall not be bound by a public statements referred to in Regulation 5(2)(d) if  
   the seller: 
            (a) shows that he was not, and could not reasonably have been, aware of the  
            statement,      
            (b) shows that by the time of conclusion of the contract the statement had been  
            corrected, or  
     (c )  shows that the decision to buy the consumer goods could not have been  
           influenced by the statement. 
 
        (2) Any lack of conformity resulting from incorrect installation of the consumer goods     
        shall be deemed to be equivalent to lack of conformity of the goods if installation forms  
        part of the contract of sale of the goods and the goods were installed by the seller or under  
        his responsibility. This shall apply equally if the product, intended to be installed by the  
        consumer, is installed by the consumer and the incorrect installation is due to a  
        shortcoming in the installation instructions. 
 
As compliance with description has been discussed above and the duty to supply 
goods which are in compliance with sample is discussed later in the Chapter, the 
focus of the following paragraphs is on the provisions of section 14 of the 1893 Act 
which correspond to Regulation 5(2) of the Regulation.  
 
4.29 As Atiyah notes, the seller’s obligations as to the quality of goods are ‘at the very 
heart of the law of sale’ and are ‘in many respects the most important part’ of that 
law.325  It is no surprise consequently that these obligations have given rise to a good 
deal of case law on the subject, together with substantial legislative reform of the 
original statutory provisions. We will look first at the evolution of section 14 before 
considering what further changes may be necessary to its provisions. As the relevant 
Irish legislative provisions throughout this period have been modelled on those in 
United Kingdom legislation and as the main cases of note have also arisen in the UK, 
the account will necessarily deal in some detail with developments in the UK.   
 
                                                 
325 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 157.   
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Evolution of Section 14  
4.30 Over the course of the nineteenth century, courts became more willing in certain 
circumstances to imply terms as to quality into contracts of sale.326 As well as cases 
where the description of goods contained an implied undertaking that they be 
merchantable, the courts were disposed to imply a term of this kind where the buyer 
had not been in a position to assess the quality of the goods prior to the contract of 
sale, whether because the goods were unascertained or the buyer had had no 
opportunity to inspect them.327  The courts were more likely also to import quality 
obligations into contracts for manufactured goods than for natural products on the 
ground that defects could be more readily prevented in the former than in the latter 
case.328    
 
4.31. The principal provisions of the implied conditions as to quality or fitness as 
originally enacted in section 14 of the 1893 Act were as follows: 
 The preamble to the section restated the caveat emptor orthodoxy that, subject 
to the provisions of the Act, there was no implied warranty or condition as to 
the quality or fitness for purpose of goods supplied under a contract of sale. 
 
 Subsection (1) implied a condition that goods of a description which it was in 
the sellers’ business to supply should be reasonably fit for any particular 
purpose made known, expressly or by implication, by the buyer so as to show 
that he relied on the seller’s skill or judgement.     
 
 Subsection (2) implied a condition that goods bought by description from a 
seller who dealt in goods of that description should be of merchantable quality 
provided that, if the buyer had examined the goods, there should be no such 
implied condition as regards defects which that examination ought to have 
revealed.   ‘Merchantable quality’ was not defined in the section or elsewhere 
in the Act.329   
 
 Subsection (3) provided that an implied warranty or condition as to quality or 
fitness for a particular purpose could be annexed by the usage of trade, and 
subsection (4) stated that an express warranty or condition did not negative a 
warranty or condition implied by the Act unless it was inconsistent with it.   
                                                 
326 Mitchell, P.  ‘The Development of Quality Obligations in Sale of Goods’, (2001) L.Q.R (117) 645.   
327 Writing in 1868, Benjamin was unable to express a general rule as to when an obligation of quality 
would be implied, stating only that there was no warranty where the sale concerned ‘an ascertained 
specific chattel, already existing, and which the buyer has inspected’.  Cited in ibid., pp. 655-56. 
328 Ibid., pp. 651-652.  Bridge, M.  ‘The evolution of modern sales law’, (1991) L.M.C.L.Q. 52 at 55. 
329 According to Benjamin, merchantable quality ‘has always been a commercial man’s notion: this 
explains why the original Act did not define it – commercial juries needed no direction on how to make 
the appropriate findings.’  Benjamin’s  Sale of Goods, 2nd ed. (1981), cited in The Law Commission 
and the Scottish Law Commission.  Sale and Supply of Goods, op. cit., para. 2.10. 
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4.32.  The cases decided in the decades subsequent to the introduction of the implied 
conditions under section 14 pointed up the difficulties encountered in seeking to 
regulate the great range and diversity of sale transactions by means of a single 
standard of quality. These difficulties were aggravated by the fact that changes in 
technology and markets increasingly meant that the type of goods covered by the 
Act’s standard of quality were different to those featuring in the cases which had 
given rise to that standard.  As the English and Scottish Law Commissions noted in 
1987:330 
    … the word ‘merchantable’ was derived from Victorian cases where (putting the  
    matter at its simplest) the question was, ‘were the goods of such a quality that one  
    merchant buying them from another, would have regarded them as saleable.’  But  
    as so often happens, although the word had been perfectly apt on the facts of the  
    cases in which it was first used by the judges, when the word became of universal  
    application in the 1893 Act, it was gradually seen not to be suitable for all cases…      
    A sale may be of a new jet aircraft from the manufacturers to a major international  
    carrier, of a washing machine still in its packaging from a department store to a  
    young married couple, of a catapult to a child, of an old motor car from a backstreet  
    garage to a student, of a breeding ewe from one farmer to another, of thousands of  
    tons of a primary product, such as wheat, from one trader to another (neither of  
    whom will ever see the goods), of a newspaper or a box of matches from a street  
    vendor to a passer-by.   
 
4.33. Eight decades were to elapse from the enactment of section 14 to its first 
substantive amendment in the UK or Ireland. It is difficult to discern a consistent 
thread in the approach of the courts over this period to the interpretation of the quality 
and fitness obligations placed on sellers by the section. In Bristol Tramways Carriage 
Co. Ltd v Fiat Motors Ltd,331 a case decided less than two decades after the passing of 
the 1893 Act, Farwell L.J. treated merchantable quality as akin to a minimum 
acceptable standard of quality, holding it:332 
    as meaning that the article is of such quality and in such condition that a reasonable  
    man acting reasonably would after a full examination accept it under the  
    circumstances of the case in performance of his offer to buy that article whether he  
    buys it for his own use or to sell again.     
 
                                                 
330 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  Sale and Supply of Goods, op. cit., para. 
3.7. 
331 [1910] 2 KB 831. 
332  Ibid. at 841. In Australian Knitting Mills v Grant (1933) 50. C.L.R. 387 at 418, Dixon J. used a 
modified version of this test, holding  that the goods ‘should be in such an actual state that a buyer fully 
acquainted with the facts and, therefore, knowing what hidden defects exist and not being limited to 
their apparent condition would buy without abatement of the price obtainable for such goods if in 
reasonably sound order and condition and without special terms.’  
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He added that the term seemed ‘more appropriate to a retail purchaser buying from a 
wholesale firm than to private buyers, and to natural products such as grain, wool, or 
flour, than to a complicated machine, but it is clear that it extends to both.’333  In a 
subsequent New Zealand case, Taylor v Combined Buyers,334 Salmond J criticised the 
approach in Bristol Tramways and restated a more traditional market-oriented view of 
the Act’s quality standard: 
    … the term merchantable does not mean of good, fair or average quality. Goods  
    may be of inferior or even of bad quality but yet fulfil the legal requirement of  
    merchantability. For goods may be in the market in any grade, good, bad or  
    indifferent, and yet all equally merchantable.  On a sale of goods there is no  
    implied condition that they are of any particular grade or standard.  If the buyer  
    wishes to guard himself in this respect he must expressly bargain for the particular  
    grade or standard that he requires.  If he does not do so, caveat emptor, and he must  
    accept the goods, however inferior in quality, so long as they conform to the 
    description under which they are sold and are of merchantable quality.335   
 
In Cammell Laird & Co Ltd. v Manganese Bronze and Brass Co. Ltd,336 Lord Reid 
put  the emphasis on the fitness for purpose of goods, stating that goods would not be 
merchantable where they were ‘of no use for any purpose for which such goods would 
be ordinarily used and hence … not saleable under that description.’ 
 
Legislative Developments in the UK to 1979  
4.34.  As noted in Chapter 1, there was increasing pressure from the 1950s onwards in 
the UK to adapt the implied quality and other terms in the 1893 Act to reflect the 
growing importance of consumer sales. Though the UK’s Molony Committee on 
Consumer Protection did not propose changes to the merchantable quality standard, it 
recommended the removal, first, of the restriction of the implied quality term to goods 
bought by description and, second, of the implied fitness term to goods of a 
                                                 
333 [1910] 2 KB at 840.  
334 [1924] NZLR 627.     
335 Ibid. at 646.  Salmond J. added that ‘goods sold by description are merchantable in the legal sense 
when they are of such quality as to be saleable under that description to a buyer who has full and 
accurate knowledge of that quality, and who is buying for the ordinary and normal purposes for which 
goods are bought under that description in the market.’ Bridge has commented that, though the case at 
issue concerned manufactured goods, Salmond J’s observations ‘belong to a world of horse and 
agricultural produce sales’.  Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 7.43.   
336 [1934] A.C. 402 at 430.  This test was essentially restated by Lord Reid in Henry Kendall & Sons v 
William Lillico & Sons Ltd. [1969] 2 A.C. 31 at 77 when he stated that what was meant by 
merchantable quality was that ‘goods in the form in which they were tendered were of no use for any 
purpose for which goods which complied with the description under which these goods were sold 
would normally be used, and hence were not saleable under that description.’   
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description which it was in the seller’s course of business to supply.337 The restriction 
of the merchantable quality standard to sales by description had contributed in some 
cases to a tendency to invoke the fitness for purpose provision of section 14 rather 
than the quality term.338 In addition to endorsing the Molony Committee’s 
recommendations, the Law Commission for England and Wales and the Scottish Law 
Commission subsequently proposed other substantial changes to section 14, most 
notably the inclusion of a definition of ‘merchantable quality’.339 These 
recommendations were given effect by the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 
1973 which substituted a new section 14 for that in the original Act.340 The new 
section included a definition of merchantable quality based on the concept of the 
fitness of goods for the usual purposes for which they were bought. The 1893 Act’s 
restriction of the implied condition of merchantable quality condition to goods 
‘bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description’ was 
replaced by a provision that the condition applied ‘where the seller sells goods in the 
course of a business’. The Act retained the substance of the 1893 Act’s limitation of 
the implied quality condition where the buyer had examined the goods in respect of 
defects which the examination ought to have revealed, adding a new exemption in 
respect of defects specifically drawn to the buyer’s attention before the contract was 
made. The ‘in the course of a business’ stipulation was applied to the fitness for 
particular purpose provision; this provision was otherwise broadly similar to that in 
the 1893 Act.  Finally, a new provision dealt with sales by an agent (such as an 
auctioneer) acting for a principal in a contract of sale, and provided that the implied 
condition of merchantable quality applied where the agent sold goods in the course of 
a business unless the principal was not so acting, and the buyer was either aware of 
this fact or reasonable steps were taken to bring it to his attention.  The provisions 
relating to the sale of goods in the UK Act of 1973 were repealed and replaced by the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 prior to the passing of the Sale of Goods and Supply of 
                                                 
337 Final Report of the Committee on Consumer Protection.  1962.  (London: HMSO).  Cmd. 1781: 
paragraphs 441-447. 
338 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 11-025.   
339 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  1969.  Exemption Clauses in Contracts 
First Report: Amendments to the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (Law Com. No. 24, Scot Law Com. No. 
12), paras. 27-56.  
340 Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973.  1973 c.13, sections 3 & 7.   
 150
Services Act 1980 in Ireland.341 The 1979 Act was essentially a consolidating statute 
and, apart from the inclusion of a provision relating to credit brokers in the subsection 
on fitness for particular purpose, the implied terms about quality and fitness under 
section 14 were similar to those in the 1973 Act.    
 
Legislative Developments in Ireland: The Sale of Goods and Supply of Services 
Act 1980   
4.35. The Whincup Report and the National Consumer Advisory Council 
recommended amendments to section 14 of the 1893 in line with those effected by the 
UK Act of 1973.342  The new section 14 on implied undertakings as to quality or 
fitness substituted by the Sale of Goods and Supply and Services Act 1980 for the 
section in the Act of 1893 was identical to that in the UK Supply of Goods (Implied 
Terms) Act 1973 save in one significant respect. The definition of merchantable 
quality in the Irish Act provides however, unlike that in the UK provision on which it 
was based, that goods should be ‘as durable as it reasonable to expect’ having regard 
to description, price and all other relevant circumstances. In the second stage speech 
introducing the legislation, the then Minister for State at the Department of Industry, 
Commerce and Energy referred to the reforms of the implied terms at Sections 11 to 
14 of the 1893 Act as ‘the heart of the matter’ when it came to improving the buyer’s 
lot under the Act.343 She added that the proposed legislation would also remedy the 
‘weaknesses’ in section 14 of the original Act caused by the absence of a definition of 
merchantable quality and the fact that the section did not cover those acting as agents 
rather than dealers in goods.   
 
Developments in the UK since 1979  
4.36. In 1987 the Law Commission for England and Wales and the Scottish Law 
Commission produced a joint report which dealt, among other things, with the implied 
                                                 
341 As noted in Chapter 1, however, the Bill that led to the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 
1980 was first published in 1978 and, as a result, was influenced by the UK Supply of Goods (Implied 
Terms) Act 1973 rather than by the Sale of Goods Act 1979.   
342  National Prices Commission.  1973.  Occasional Paper No. 9. Consumer Protection Law in 
America, Canada and Europe (Dublin: Stationery Office), p. 204.   National Consumer Advisory 
Council.  December 1974.  Submission to the Minister for Industry and Commerce on Proposals 
for Legislation to Assure the Consumers’ Interests (Dublin: Stationery Office), pp. 15-16. 
343 Dáil Debates, Vol. 309 16 November 1978, Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Bill Second 
Stage, cols. 1107-08.    
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term as to quality under section 14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.344 The report made 
three main criticisms of the existing statutory provision.  First, the term 
‘merchantable’ was outmoded and inappropriate.  Second, the definition of 
merchantable quality focused too much on fitness for purpose and did not make it 
sufficiently clear that other aspects of quality, such as appearance and finish and 
freedom from minor defects, could also be important.  A new car, for example, should 
be capable not only of being driven safely and effectively on the road but, in the 
words of Mustill LJ in Rogers v Parish Motors (Scarborough) Ltd., should also do so 
‘with the appropriate degree of comfort, ease of handling, and reliability … and of 
pride in the vehicle’s outward and interior appearance’.345 Third, the definition did not 
expressly deal with either the safety or durability of goods.   
 
4.37. The recommendations of the Law Commissions in their 1987 Joint Report 
amounted to a substantial overhaul of section 14. First, the existing definition of 
merchantable definition should be repealed and replaced by a new two-pronged 
definition – a basic principle formulated in language sufficiently general to apply to 
all kinds of goods and a list of specific aspects of quality, any of which could be 
important in a particular case.  Secondly, the basic principle should be that of 
acceptable quality, namely that the quality of goods sold or supplied under a contract 
should be such as would be acceptable to a reasonable person having regard to the 
description of goods, the price (if relevant) and all the other circumstances. The 
Commissions settled on acceptable quality after considering a number of other 
options, both qualitative (good, sound) and neutral (suitable, proper, appropriate). 
Thirdly, the specific aspects of quality that would supplement the general principle 
should include the fitness of goods for all their common purposes; appearance and 
finish; freedom from minor defects; safety; and durability. The suggested  substitution 
of the fitness of goods ‘for all their common purposes’ for the 1979 Act’s wording of 
fitness ‘for the purpose or purposes for which goods of that kind are commonly 
bought’ was intended to address a possible concern that goods would be held to be 
merchantable if they were fit for some common purpose consistent with their 
                                                 
344 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  1987.  Sale and Supply of Goods (Law 
Com. No. 160, Scot Law Com. No. 104), paras. 3.1-3.66 & 8.1.   
345 [1987] 2 All ER 232.   
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description and price even if the buyer had in mind a different but still common 
purpose.346  
 
4.38. The Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994 substantially adopted the 
Commissions’ recommendations as regards section 14, but opted for ‘satisfactory 
quality’ rather than their preferred option of ‘acceptable quality’.347 Section 14(2)(a) 
of the 1979 Act, as amended in 1994, provides that goods are of satisfactory quality 
‘if they meet the standard that a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, taking 
account of any description of the goods, the price (if relevant) and all the other 
relevant circumstances.  Section 14(2)(b) lists a number of ‘aspects of the quality of 
goods’ that may apply ‘in appropriate cases’: fitness for all the purposes for which 
goods of the kind in question are commonly supplied; appearance and finish; freedom 
from minor defects; safety; and durability.  
 
4.39. There have been relatively few cases of substantive significance on the 
interpretation of ‘satisfactory quality’ since the enactment of the 1994 Act.348 The 
report of the Law Commissions which was the basis for the statutory amendments had 
stated that the proposed reforms were ‘intended to be useful but not revolutionary’.349 
The substitution of ‘satisfactory quality’ for ‘merchantable quality’ was intended to 
reflect the approach to the interpretation of the latter term taken by the courts in cases 
such as Rogers v Parish.350  It was, as Bridge has observed, ‘largely a terminological 
change designed to reflect the altered emphasis of the law that took effect over a 
lengthy period.’351  The case law since the 1994 Act would tend to support this 
                                                 
346 It had been held in the pre-1979 Act cases of James Drummond and Sons v EH Van Ingen & Co 
(1887) 12 App. Cas. 284  and Henry Kendall & Sons v William Lillico & Sons Ltd. [1969] 2 AC 31 that 
goods with a number of purposes were of merchantable quality if fit for at least one purpose that came 
within the ambit of their ordinary purposes.  Despite the changes made by the inclusion of the 
definition of merchantable quality in the 1979 Act, the Commissions were of the view that the 
definition was not intended to change the law on this point.  See further Aswan Engineering 
Establishment Co v Lupdine Ltd [1987] 1 All ER 135.   
347 ‘Satisfactory’ was preferred to ‘acceptable’ as it was thought to denote a more demanding standard.  
During the Bill’s second reading, its sponsor stated that ‘a non-complaining buyer might decide 
reluctantly that goods he bought were of acceptable quality, even if by objective standards the quality 
was not satisfactory.’ Cited in Ervine, W.C.H., ‘Satisfactory Quality: What Does It Mean?’, (2004) 
J.B.L. 684 at  688.    
348 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para.  
349 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  1987.  Sale and Supply of Goods (Law 
Com. No. 160, Scot Law Com. No. 104), para. 1.11.  
350 [1987] 2 W.L.R. 353.  
351 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 7.32.   
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view.352  The reformulation of the definition in terms of the buyer’s reasonable 
expectations, however, has arguably encouraged a more explicit reliance on this test.  
In Jewson Ltd v Boyhan,353 Sedley LJ observed that the ‘satisfactory quality’ standard 
was ‘directed principally to the sale of substandard goods … [and] the court’s 
principal concern is to look at their intrinsic quality using the tests indicated.’  The 
‘reasonable person’ was ‘a construct by whose standards the judge is required to 
evaluate the quality of the goods’.354 The nature of the ‘reasonable person’ in any 
given case would depend in part on the nature of the product; the safety and durability 
of a child’s toy, for example, would have to be assessed by how a child would handle 
it.  In Bramhill v Edwards,355 Auld LJ elaborated as follows on the application of the 
‘reasonable person’ test:  
    The reasonable person must be one who is in the position of the buyer, with his   
    knowledge, for it would not be appropriate for the test to be that of a reasonable  
    third party observer not acquainted with the background of the transaction.   
 
4.40. The outcomes of the cases decided to date are consistent with the flexibility 
inherent in this test. Jewson v Boyhan356concerned boilers bought by a property 
developer for installation in a number of newly-converted apartments. Though they 
functioned properly, the boilers proved to have a low energy rating and the developer 
claimed that this adversely affected the marketability of the apartments. The Court of 
Appeal held that the boilers were of satisfactory quality in that they were fit for all the 
purposes for which goods of this kind were commonly supplied, rejecting the claim 
that one such purpose was that of ensuring that the goods did not make the apartments 
difficult to sell.  As Sedley LJ observed,357 the buyer: 
    … got exactly what he had bargained for: twelve boilers which worked perfectly  
    well.  
In Clegg v Anderson,358 a new yacht that had cost £250,000 had a keel substantially 
heavier than the manufacturer’s specification with the result that the rigging was 
                                                 
352 Ervine, ‘Satisfactory Quality: What Does It Mean?’, op. cit, p. 684.   
353 [2003] EWCA Civ 1030 at 77.   
354 Ibid., at 77.  
355 [2004] EWCA Civ 403 at 39.   
356 [2003] EWCA Civ 1030. 
357  Ibid at 79. A separate claim that the boilers were unsatisfactory for the particular purpose for which 
they were required was also rejected by the Court of Appeal on the ground that this purpose had not 
been made clear by the buyer.   
358 [2003] EWCA Civ 320. 
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potentially unsafe. The Court of Appeal held that the vessel did not meet the standard 
of satisfactory quality, with Hale LJ observing obiter:359 
   … [in] some cases, such as a high priced quality product, the customer may be  
   entitled to expect that it is free from even minor defects, in other words perfect or  
   nearly so.   
 
In Thain v Anniesland Trade Centre,360 by contrast, the Sheriff Principal of Glasgow 
held on appeal that a fault in the gear box which materialised two weeks after the 
purchase of a five-year-old Renault car with a mileage of 80,000 was not in breach of 
the satisfactory quality requirement, stating that:  
   … the sheriff’s conclusion can only be described as that of the reasonable person.      
   Even a negligible degree of durability may not represent unsatisfactory quality  
   where the second-hand car supplied is as old and as heavily used as the Renault had  
   been…Durability, in all the circumstances, was simply not a quality that a  
   reasonable person would demand of it.   
 
In Britvic Soft Drinks Ltd v Messer UK Ltd,361 the defendants had supplied carbon 
dioxide to the plaintiffs for use in drinks.  The carbon dioxide was contaminated by a 
carcinogen, though not to an extent that posed a health risk.  The Court of Appeal 
upheld the view of the trial judge that:362 
    … it is impossible to conclude that a reasonable person would regard the CO2  
    supplied as meeting a satisfactory standard.  Consumers would not wish to drink  
    products which had been inadvertently contaminated with a measurable quantity of  
    a known carcinogen, notwithstanding the quantity was not harmful to their health.  
 
In Ervine’s view, it is doubtful if any of these cases would have been decided any 
differently under the previous merchantable quality standard.363  In all of these cases, 
finally, it is relevant to note that little or no use was made of earlier case law on 
‘merchantable quality’.364 Academic commentary, however, tends to be of the view 
that this case law can still serve a purpose in some instances, if a limited one.  Though 
acknowledging that the 1994 amendments marked a more thoroughgoing break with 
                                                 
359 Ibid., at 72.   
360 [1997] S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 102 at 106.  Ervine is critical of the judgment in this case, though he notes 
that is of limited application.  Ervine, ‘Satisfactory Quality: What Does It Mean?’, op. cit., at 701-02.  
361 [2002] EWCA Civ 548.  
362 [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 20 at 92.   
363  Ervine, ‘Satisfactory Quality: What Does It Mean?’’, op. cit.: 703.    
364  Ibid.: 689-90.  
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the preceding provisions than those made in 1979, Howells and Weatherill suggest 
nevertheless that:365 
   … as the essential question remains the same – what is the minimum standard  
   expected of goods? – judges (and advocates) will still seek to rely on existing case  
   law, although perhaps in a more indirect, inspiration-seeking way than in the past.        
 
Issues Arising 
4.41. Section 14 gives rise to one relatively straightforward matter and to a number of 
more complex questions. The straightforward matter is the replacement of the term 
‘merchantable quality’.  In our opinion, the term is archaic and unsuited to modern 
day legislation. While it is sometimes suggested that it remains relevant to 
commercial, though not consumer, sales, we do not share this view. Most people 
engaged in business are no more likely to understand, or be familiar with the term, 
than are consumers.366 The main issues of a less straightforward nature raised by 
section 14 are as follows: 
 What form should the implied quality term take?  Should it include a single 
quality standard expressed in adjectival form?   
 
 Should there be a common quality standard for consumer and commercial 
sales or is there now a case for having separate rules for the two types of 
contract? 
 
 What should be the substance of the quality term?  Should it be based on the 
implied terms in Sale of Goods legislation here and in other jurisdictions?  
 
Form of the Quality Term  
4.42. The quality rules under a range of regulatory legislative –  the Sale of Goods Act 
1979 in the UK, the Australian Competition and Consumer Act 2010, the New 
Zealand Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, Directive 1999/44/EC on Consumer Sales 
and Guarantees, the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 
and the US Uniform Commercial Code – share in their respective ways a similar 
structure, namely a statement of general principle as to the general quality of goods 
that is to be (i) interpreted in the light of specified factors and (ii) supplemented by 
more specific elaborations of particular dimensions of quality. This model seeks to 
                                                 
365 Howells, G. & Weatherill, S.  2005.  Consumer Protection Law (2nd ed.).  (Aldershot: Ashgate):  
173.   
366 Over thirty years ago, Ormrod L.J. noted in Cehave NV v Bremer Handelsgesellschaft [1976] Q.B. 
44. that ‘merchantable’ had ‘fallen out of general use and largely lost its meaning, except to merchants 
and traders in some branches of commerce.’   
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balance the imperatives of clarity and flexibility and has obvious merits in our view.  
The first question presented in respect of any such statement of general principle of 
quality is whether it should take the familiar epithetical form, be it ‘satisfactory 
quality’ as in the UK, ‘acceptable quality’ as in Australia and New Zealand, or some 
other variant.  It is not difficult to make the case against this type of summary 
statement of quality. As noted earlier, contracts of sale cover transactions of quite 
different kinds for a very wide range of goods. It is difficult as a result to conceive of 
a single all-purpose statement of quality capable of adequately encompassing this 
diversity of circumstances. As Rougier J noted in Bernstein v Pamson Motors 
(Golders Green) Ltd.:367  
    Any attempt to force some exhaustive, positive and specific definition of such a  
    [quality ] term, applicable in all cases, would soon be put to mockery by some new  
    undreamt of set of circumstances.   
Though there is force in this argument, we are reluctant nevertheless to recommend 
that the quality provisions in future sale of goods legislation should dispense with a 
summary statement of quality such as ‘satisfactory’ or ‘acceptable’. While the 
substance of the quality rules must necessarily be found in the more developed 
general principle and its elaborations, such a statement can serve an important 
purpose in encapsulating the quality rules in a form accessible to, and understandable 
by, consumers and businesses.368 On balance, we think that ‘satisfactory quality’ is 
preferable for this purpose to ‘acceptable quality’ or any of the other possible options. 
We consider this, however, to be a recommendation that is primarily directed at the 
removal of archaic language rather than at making any substantive change to the law.  
 
4.43. Recommendation  
‘Satisfactory quality’ should replace ‘merchantable quality’ as the standard for 
the purpose of the implied terms as to the quality of goods.   
 
4.44. It is sometimes argued that the difficulties with section 14 and other elements of 
the Sale of Goods Act stem in part from the fact that the same provisions are called 
                                                 
367 [1987] 2 All ER 220 at 222.   
368 As Ervine notes: ‘This aspect of the inclusion of a definition is not to be discounted given that most 
disputes about substandard goods never reach the courts and, indeed, will not have the benefit of high 
level advice.’ Ervine, W.C.H., ‘Satisfactory Quality: What Does It Mean?’op. cit., p. 694.  
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upon to regulate both consumer and commercial sales.369  We are not in favour, 
however, of having different implied quality terms for consumer and commercial 
sales. First, the retailer who sells goods to a consumer has in most cases bought those 
goods from a manufacturer or distributor. If there were different implied terms for the 
two types of sale, the retailer could find himself in breach of contract with the 
consumer in circumstances where the same fault in the same goods would not involve 
a breach of contract on the part of the supplier, thereby creating problems where 
liability is sought to be passed down the supply chain. In our view, this would not be a 
desirable or reasonable outcome. Secondly, the dividing line between cases where a 
strict quality standard is merited and cases where a more flexible standard is 
appropriate does not coincide neatly with the division between consumer and 
commercial sales. Both consumers and businesses commonly buy high-specification 
manufactured goods to which exacting standards of quality properly apply. Both types 
of buyer also purchase products, such as commodities or foodstuffs, where gradations 
of quality are recognised. What is necessary, therefore, is a standard that, as far as 
possible, can accommodate these kinds of variation within and between goods. Rules 
permitting discrimination between consumer and commercial sales transactions are 
more appropriate to the provisions governing exemption clauses and remedies than to 
the quality standard of goods itself.  Thus, we have recommended at paragraph 4.17 
above that rejection of the contract would no longer be permissible for slight breach 
of the implied terms in commercial sales.       
 
Substance of the ‘Satisfactory Quality’ Standard 
4.45. As stated earlier in the Chapter, the statutory standard of quality to apply to 
contracts of sale in future legislation should be drawn from the Sale of Goods Act  
rather than from the EU Directive on Consumer Sales. As well as the advantages of 
retaining familiar terminology and permitting existing case law to be drawn on for 
guidance where appropriate, this standard is a more suitable basis for rules that must 
accommodate both consumer and business sales. When it comes to the substance of 
the general statement of quality, there seem to us to be two principal  options.  The 
first is that which has applied in UK legislation since 1994, and is also broadly in line 
with the provisions in consumer legislation in Australia and New Zealand: 
                                                 
369 Bridge, M. ‘The Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994’ [1995] J.B.L. 401.  Goode on Commercial 
Law, op. cit., p. 206.   
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    … goods are of satisfactory quality if they meet the standard that a reasonable  
    person would regard as satisfactory taking account of any description of the goods,  
    the price (if relevant) and all the other relevant circumstances.    
 
While all tests of this kind must rely in large part on an evaluation of reasonableness, 
this formulation is open to the charge of being circular in character - goods are 
satisfactory if they meet the standard that a reasonable person would regard as 
satisfactory. 
 
4.46. The other option is to adopt a modified version of the existing provision at 
section 14 of the 1893 Act along the following lines:   
   Goods are of satisfactory quality if they are as fit for all the purposes for which  
   goods of that kind are commonly supplied as it is reasonable to expect having    
   regard to any description of the goods, the price (if relevant) and all the other  
   relevant circumstances.     
 
Apart from the substitution of ‘satisfactory for ‘merchantable’, the other substantive 
changes to the existing provision that are necessary involve, first, the substitution of 
‘all the purposes for which goods of that kind are commonly supplied’ for the existing 
formulation of ‘the purpose or purposes for which goods of that kind are commonly 
bought.’ This is in line with the change in the corresponding provision in UK 
legislation and is intended to ensure that goods will not meet the quality standard if 
they are fit for some, but not other, of the purposes common to the goods in question.   
This change would, in tandem with the elaboration of the specific aspects of quality, 
address the main criticism levelled at the existing definition, namely that it stresses 
fitness for purpose to the exclusion of other dimensions of quality such as the 
appearance of goods.370  The ‘fitness for all purposes’ proviso would be subject to a 
test of reasonableness in the light of the description of the goods, their price, and other 
relevant circumstances.  This should be sufficient in our view to prevent it from 
operating in a manner that would be unfair to sellers.  The second change that we 
propose to the existing definition is the deletion of the stipulation that the goods 
should be as durable as it is reasonable to expect.  This now features in the separate 
list of specific aspects of quality discussed below. Though there is no great difference 
                                                 
370 As Atiyah notes, however, fears that the definition of merchantable quality in the UK Supply of 
Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 would lead the courts to have insufficient regard to the non-
functional aspects of quality were not borne out by subsequent case law.  Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, 
op. cit., p. 179.   
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of substance between the two definitions, our preference is for a definition similar to 
that at section 14(2)(a) of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 as this would give us the 
benefit of being able to draw upon the greater volume of UK, Australian and New 
Zealand case law when interpreting the test in the Irish courts.     
 
4.47. The general definition of ‘satisfactory quality’ in future legislation should be 
further supplemented by an indicative list of aspects of the quality of goods as 
follows: 
1) appearance and finish,  
2) freedom from minor defects, 
3) safety, and  
4) durability.   
These aspects of the quality of goods also feature in the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979, 
and in consumer legislation in Australia and New Zealand. In line with section 
14(2)(b) of the UK Act, it should be provided that these aspects of the quality of 
goods and the fitness for all common purposes proviso apply ‘in appropriate cases’.   
 
4.48.  Recommendations  
Goods should be defined as being of ‘satisfactory quality’ if ‘they meet the 
standard that a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory taking account of 
any description of the goods, the price (if relevant) and all the other relevant 
circumstances’.   
 
An indicative list of the following specific aspects of quality should apply 
alongside the general definition in appropriate cases: fitness for all the purposes 
for which goods of the kind in question are commonly supplied; appearance and 
finish; freedom from minor defects; safety; and durability. 
 
Other Changes to Section 14 
4.49. Sections 14(4), (5) and (6) of the 1893 Act on fitness for particular purpose 
made known by the seller, the annexation of implied conditions by usage, and sales by 
persons acting as agents are broadly satisfactory in our view and do not require 
substantive amendment.  A number of other changes to the section, mainly of a minor 
nature, are however necessary or desirable. First, while section 14 satisfies the main 
requirements of Article 2 of Directive 1999/44/EC, its provisions on public statements 
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about the specific characteristics of goods have no direct equivalent in the Sale of 
Goods Acts and would need to be incorporated in future sale of goods legislation.  
Article 2(2)(c) of the Directive provides that goods are presumed to be in conformity 
with the contract if they show the quality and performance normal in goods of the 
same type and which the consumer can reasonably expect given the nature of the 
goods, taking into account any public statements on the specific characteristics of the 
goods made about them by the seller, the producer or his representative, particularly 
in advertising or on labelling. Such statements could be regarded as constituting 
‘relevant circumstances’ to be taken into account under our proposed definition of 
‘satisfactory quality’. Article 2(4) of the Directive provides that the seller shall not be 
bound by such a public statement where he shows that he was not, or could not 
reasonably have been, aware of it, or where it had been corrected at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract, or where he shows that the decision to buy the goods could 
not have been influenced by the statement.  Secondly, as noted earlier, the provision 
at section 62 of the 1893 Act that the quality of goods includes ‘their state or 
condition’ should be among the specific aspects of the quality of goods in future 
legislation.  Thirdly, section 14 begins at subsection (1) with a statement of nineteenth 
century orthodoxy to the effect that, except as provided by the Act or other legislation, 
there is no implied condition as to the quality or fitness for purpose of goods supplied 
under a contract.  As Bridge has observed, the subsection ‘is the husk of a general 
rule, deprived of almost all content by the various exceptions’.371 We note that section 
14(1) has been repealed in Hong Kong372 and consider that this could should be done 
here also.     
 
4.50. Recommendations  
The provisions of Article 2(2)(c) of Directive 1999/44/EC relating to public 
statements about the specific characteristics of goods should be incorporated in 
the provisions on implied quality terms in future legislation.  
 
The definition of the quality of goods as including their state or condition now at 
section 62 of the 1893 Act should be incorporated in the provision on the specific 
aspects of the quality of goods in future legislation.   
                                                 
371 Bridge, M.  ‘The evolution of modern sales law’, (1991) L.M.C.L.Q 54. 
372 Hong Kong Sale of Goods Ordinance Cap 26.   
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Section 14(1) of the 1893 Act should not be retained in future sale of goods 
legislation.   
 
SECTION 15 SALE BY SAMPLE  
15.(1) A contract of sale is a contract for sale by sample where there is a term in the contract, 
express or implied, to that effect. 
 
     (2) In the case of a contract for sale by sample– 
                   (a) there is an implied condition that the bulk shall correspond with the sample in  
                   quality: 
                   (b) there is an implied condition that the buyer shall have a reasonable opportunity  
                   of comparing the bulk with the sample: 
                   (c) there is an implied condition that the goods shall be free from any defect,  
                   rendering them unmerchantable, which would not be apparent on reasonable  
                   examination of the sample. 
 
4.51. Together with sections 11-14, this section was inserted in the 1893 Act by the 
Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 in substitution for the original 
section.  Unlike sections 11-14, however, section 15 was not amended by the 
substitution and remains as enacted in 1893. The equivalent provision at Article 
2(2)(a) of Directive 1999/44/EC on Consumer Sales and Guarantees provides that 
goods are presumed to be in conformity with the contract if they ‘possess the qualities 
which the seller has held out to the consumer as a sample or model’.  This was 
transposed verbatim at Regulation 5(2)(a) of the European Communities (Certain 
Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees) Regulations 
2003.   
  
4.52. Though section 15(1) purports to define sale by sample, it is not especially 
helpful in clarifying the scope of this type of sale. Where there is an express provision 
that goods will be sold ‘as per sample’, the sale will be by sample.  The standard form 
contracts of some trade associations in the commodity sector, for example, include 
provisions on the methods of taking samples with a view to ensuring that they are 
representative of the bulk.373  The mere display of a sample prior to sale, however, 
will not of itself mean that the sale is by sample.  As Goode notes:374 
                                                 
373 As Bridge observes, however, in modern commodities trading goods are more likely to be sold 
according to grades based upon content analysis formulated by inspection agencies than by sample.  
Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 7.134. 
374 Goode on Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 353.  
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    It is necessary that the sample displayed be intended to form the contractual basis  
    of comparison with the bulk subsequently tendered.  As a working rule, it may be  
    said that a sale is unlikely to be considered a sale by sample unless the sample is  
    released by the seller to the buyer or to a third party for the purpose of providing a  
    means of checking whether the goods subsequently tendered correspond with the  
    sample.   
 
4.53. The leading judicial statement on the nature of sale by sample is that of Lord 
Macnaghten in Drummond v Van Ingen:375 
    The office of a sample is to present to the eye the real meaning and intention of the  
    parties with regard to the subject matter of the contract which, owing to the      
    imperfection of language, it may be difficult or impossible to express in words..  
Sample can serve accordingly both as an alternative or, more commonly perhaps, as a 
complement to description.  Where a sale is by description and by sample, sections 13 
and 15 of the 1893 Act will both apply. As noted above, section 13(1) acknowledges 
the fact in providing that, where a sale is by sample as well as description, it is not 
sufficient if the bulk of the goods corresponds with the sample if the goods do not also 
correspond with the description.  The examination referred to in section 15(2)(c) must 
be ‘reasonable’ in the circumstances having regard factors such as the practice in the 
trade in question.  As further stated in Drummond v Van Ingen:376   
    The sample speaks for itself. But it cannot be treated as saying more than such a  
    sample would tell a merchant of the class to which the buyer belongs, using due  
    care and diligence, and appealing to it in the ordinary way and with the knowledge  
    possessed by merchants of that class at that time. No doubt the sample might be  
    made to say a great deal more. Pulled to pieces and examined by unusual tests  
    which curiosity or suspicion might suggest, it would doubtless reveal every secret  
    of its construction. But that is not the way in which business is done in this country. 
 
4.54. In Steels & Busks Ltd v Bleecker Bik & Co,377 a quantity of crepe rubber was 
supplied which, because of a preservative added in the course of its manufacture, 
discoloured materials exposed to it.  The preservative was not present in the sample 
but, as its absence from the bulk could only have been verified by a complex technical 
examination, the seller was held not to be in breach of section 15. In Godley v 
Perry,378 a retailer buying plastic catapults tested a sample of the items by pulling 
back the elastic.  When one of the catapults was later found to be unmerchantable, the 
court held that the examination in this case was in accordance with the requirements 
                                                 
375 (1887) 12 App Cas 284, 297.   
376 Ibid. 
377 [1956] 1 Lloyds Rep. 228.  
378 [1960] 1 W.L.R. 9. 
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of the section, noting that the Act ‘speaks not of a “practicable” but of a “reasonable” 
examination’.379 Atiyah notes, however, that it is likely nowadays that samples will be 
expected to be subjected to extensive scientific examination in which case judicial 
dicta along these lines such as this will not apply.380  It should be noted, furthermore, 
that section 15(2)(c) excludes the implied condition that goods will be free of any 
defect rendering them unmerchantable if the defect would have been apparent on a 
reasonable examination of the sample regardless of whether or not such an 
examination has been undertaken. This exclusion is presumably grounded in an 
assumption that, in the case of a sale by sample, an examination of the sample will be 
made. If the buyer chooses not to do so, it is appropriate that he be denied a statutory 
remedy in respect of any defects that a reasonable examination would have revealed.  
The examination provision under Section 15 differs in this respect from the implied 
term as to merchantable quality under section 14(2). The implied term in regards to 
defects which an examination ought to have revealed is excluded in that case only if 
the buyer has actually examined the goods.  
 
4.55. Consumer sales may sometimes involve the display of a sample as, for example, 
where a small sample of carpet is shown to prospective buyers.  It is common, 
however, in consumer transactions for prospective buyers to be shown a model or 
specimen of the goods rather than a sample.  The goods with which the consumer 
buyer is typically supplied in such a situation will not be the specific item which he 
examined but an identical item which remains unexamined in its packaging at the 
time of the purchase or may be delivered subsequently.  These transactions do not fit 
readily within the Act’s notion of sale by sample with its emphasis on the 
correspondence of bulk with sample. Atiyah suggests that these instances might 
instead be called ‘sale by model’.381  As noted above, Directive 199/44/EC requires 
that, in order to be presumed to be in conformity with the contract, goods must be 
possess the qualities which the seller has held out to the consumer as a model as well 
as a sample.   
 
 
                                                 
379 Ibid. at 15.  
380 Atiyah,  The Sale of Goods, op. cit., fn. 364 at p.205.  
381 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 207.   
 164
Issues Arising 
4.56. As with section 13 on sale by description, the first question raised by section 15 
is whether the provision is necessary at all. Atiyah, Bridge, Murdoch and White have 
all queried whether the section does anything that is not otherwise done by sections 
13, 14 and 34 of the Act.382 While there is substance to this contention, we cannot 
recommend, for reasons similar to those given for the retention of section 13, that 
future sale of goods legislation should dispense with a provision on sale by sample. 
Directive 1999/44/EC provides that the presumption of conformity with the contract 
requires that goods possess the qualities which the seller has held out as a sample or 
model and, to avoid doubt that it has been effectively transposed, there should be an 
express provision to this effect in future legislation.  Such a provision will need to be 
broader than the present provision at section 15 of the 1893 Act. First, as we have 
seen, ‘sale by sample’ would appear to have a more restricted scope than that entailed 
in holding out goods as a sample.  Secondly, the requirement in the Directive that 
goods ‘possess the qualities’ of the sample is arguably broader than the stipulations in 
section 15 that the bulk correspond with the sample in quality and be free of defects 
not apparent on a reasonable examination.  Thirdly, the existing provision does not 
deal expressly with correspondence with model as opposed to correspondence with 
sample.   
 
4.57. Recommendation 
Section 15 of the 1893 Act should be retained in amended form in future 
legislation to provide also for sale by model and the other requirements of 
Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 1999/44/EC on Consumer Sales and Guarantees.   
 
4.58. A number of further changes are necessary in our view to the provision on sale 
by sample in future legislation. As noted at paragraph 4.54 above, there is a difference 
between the examination rule applicable to the implied condition of merchantable 
quality under section 14(2)(b) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and the examination rule 
applicable to the implied condition of merchantable quality in the case of sale by 
sample at section 15(2)(c) of the Act.  Where the buyer examines the goods before the 
contract is made, the implied condition of merchantable quality under section 14(2)(b) 
                                                 
382 Ibid., p. 215; Bridge, The Sale of Goods, para. 7.139; Murdoch, J.R., ‘Sale by Sample – A 
Distinction without a Difference? (1981) MLR 388; White, Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 215.   
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does not apply in respect of defects which that examination ought to have revealed. 
The implied quality condition applies without limitation, however, where no such 
examination takes place. Section 15(2)(c) provides that, in the case of a contract for 
sale by sample, there is an implied condition that the goods shall be free from any 
defect rendering them unmerchantable which would not be apparent on reasonable 
examination of the sample. Unlike in the case of section 14(2)(b), therefore, the 
merchantable quality condition under section 15(2)(c) will not protect the buyer 
where he failed to examine the sample but would have discovered a defect had he 
done so. As section 14(2)(b) covers sale by sample as well as all other sales, however, 
there is nothing to prevent a buyer in this situation from circumventing the restriction 
in section 15(2)(c) by having recourse to section 14(2)(b). When the Law 
Commission for England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission reviewed 
these provisions, they concluded that this possibility was a cause of uncertainty as 
well as being contrary to the policy intention behind section 15(2)(c).383 They 
recommended accordingly that the Act should make clear that section 15(2)(c) should 
prevail over section 14(2)(b) in the case of sale by sample. The Sale and Supply of 
Goods Act 1994 subsequently inserted a new section 14(2)(c) in the UK Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 which provides that the implied quality term under the section does 
not extend to any matter making the quality of the goods unsatisfactory in the case of 
a contract for sale by sample which would have been apparent on a reasonable 
examination of the sample. As the relevant subsections of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 
are similar to those then to be found in the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979, the 
Commissions’ analysis is applicable to the present Irish law. Though the discrepancy 
between the two provisions is likely to arise only in very limited circumstances, it is 
desirable in our view that inconsistencies of this kind between statutory provisions are 
minimised.   
 
4.59. The wider issue raised by section 15(2)(c) is that of its relevance to consumer 
contracts of sale. In our view, a good case can be made that the subsection’s 
restriction of the implied condition of merchantable quality in the case of defects that 
should have been apparent on a reasonable examination of the sample is a provision 
appropriate to the circumstances of commercial transactions but not to those of 
                                                 
383 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  Sale and Supply of Goods,  op. cit., 
paras. 6.24-6.27.   
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consumer transactions. Benjamin points out that consumer sales are less likely to be 
regarded as sales by sample precisely because of the fact that the specific examination 
rule which applies to these sales may not be appropriate in the circumstances of 
consumer contracts.384  
 
4.60. Recommendations  
Section 15(2)(c) of the 1893 Act which limits the implied condition as to quality 
in the case of sale by sample to defects which would not be apparent on 
reasonable examination of the sample should not apply to consumer contracts of 
sale. 
 
Under section 14(2)(b) of the 1893 Act, the implied general condition as to 
quality applies in the case of sale by sample where the buyer fails to examine the 
sample, while the implied condition as to quality specific to sale by sample under 
section 15(2)(c) of the Act does not apply where the buyer fails to examine the 
goods and the defect is one that would have been apparent on a reasonable 
examination of the sample. Future legislation should address this inconsistency 
by providing that, in the case of commercial contracts of sale by sample, the 
implied general condition as to quality does not apply to any defect that would 
have been apparent on a reasonable examination of the sample.     
 
4.61. The UK Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994 made a further change to section 
15 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, on the recommendation of the Law Commissions.  
As noted earlier in this Chapter, the 1994 Act included a provision which removed the 
right to reject in commercial sales for slight breach of the implied terms under 
sections 13-15.  Because the slight breach proviso could not readily be applied to the 
implied condition of reasonable opportunity to compare the bulk with the sample 
under section 15(2)(b), this was deleted from section 15 and transferred in substance 
to section 34 of the Act.  The right of examination under section 34 of the UK Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 now reads: 
    Unless otherwise agreed, when the seller tenders delivery of the goods to the buyer,  
    he is bound on request to afford the buyer a reasonable opportunity of examining  
    the goods for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the  
    contract and, in the case of a contract for sale by sample, of comparing the bulk  
                                                 
384 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit, para. 11-075. 
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    with the sample.  
 
Though the reasonable opportunity to compare bulk with sample is no longer an 
implied condition, we agree with the Law Commissions that this change does not 
effect any substantial alteration in the law.385  As we have recommended the 
introduction of a similar restriction on rejection for slight breach in commercial sales, 
we recommend that the same consequential amendments should be made to sections 
15 and 34 of the Act.   
 
4.62. Recommendation 
The implied condition at section 15(2)(b) of the 1893 Act that the buyer shall 
have a reasonable opportunity of comparing the bulk with the sample should be 
replaced by a substantively similar right of examination at section 34 of the Act.   
 
 
SECTION 12 SALE OF GOODS AND SUPPLY OF SERVICES ACT 1980 
IMPLIED WARRANTY FOR SPARE PARTS AND SERVICING  
 
(1) In a contract for the sale of goods there is an implied warranty that spare parts and an 
adequate after-sale service will be made available by the seller in such circumstances as are stated 
in an offer, description or advertisement by the seller on behalf of the manufacturer or on his 
own behalf and for such period as is so stated or, if no period is so stated, for a reasonable 
period. 
 
(2) The Minister may, after such consultation with such interested parties as he thinks proper, by 
order define, in relation to any class of goods described in the order, what shall be a reasonable 
period for the purpose of subsection (1). 
 
(3) Notwithstanding section 55(1) of the Act of 1893 (inserted by section 22 of this Act) any term 
of a contract exempting from all or any of the provisions of this section shall be void. 
 
4.63. This section of the 1980 Act was based on a recommendation in the Whincup 
and National Consumer Advisory Council reports, and sought to tackle claims about 
after-sales service and spare parts ‘given lightly as a selling device’, particularly in the 
motor trade.386  It gives the status of a warranty – not a condition as with most of the 
implied terms under the 1893 Act -  to undertakings by a seller as to the future supply 
of spare parts and availability of after-sale service.  If a period for the availability of 
                                                 
385 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  Sale and Supply of Goods,  op. cit., 
para. 6.28. 
386
Dáil Debates.  Vol. 309, 16 November 1978.  Sale of Goods and Supply of Service Bill 1978: 
Second Stage, col. 1111.   
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parts or after-sale service is stated by the seller, that is the period of the warranty.  If 
no such period is indicated, the warranty applies for a ‘reasonable period’. The 
duration of this period is a question of fact having regard to the nature and quality of 
the goods.387 Though subsection (2) empowers the Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and 
Innovation to define by order what is a ‘reasonable period’ for goods of a specified 
class, no such order has been made in the three decades since the enactment of section 
12. Subsection (3) provides that contract terms which exclude the implied warranty 
are void. It is relevant to note in the context of the section that section 43(3) of the 
Consumer Protection Act 2007 provides, among other things, that a commercial 
practice is misleading if it includes the provision of false information in relation either 
to the after-supply assistance available to consumers in relation to a product or to the 
need for any part, replacement, servicing or repair in relation to the product.   
 
Issues Arising 
4.64. Prior to the deletion of Chapter IV of the proposed Consumer Rights Directive, 
it was assumed that the proposal’s full harmonisation status would preclude the 
retention of section 12. The subsequent deletion of the relevant provisions of the 
proposed Directive, however, means that the following three options apply in respect 
of the section: 
1) retain it in its existing form; 
2) repeal it; 
3) extend it to provide more substantive contractual entitlements to after-sale 
service and the availability of spare parts. 
 
4.65. The strongest statutory provisions on after-sale service of which we are aware 
are to be found in the Consumer Protection Act 1996 in the Canadian province of 
Saskatchewan.388 Section 48 of the Act includes the following among the warranties 
deemed to be given by retail sellers to consumers: 
    (h) where the product normally requires repair that spare parts and repair facilities  
    will be reasonably available for a reasonable period after the date of sale of the  
    product.   
Section 12 of the New Zealand Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 includes among the 
statutory guarantees conferred by the Act:389 
                                                 
387 Grogan, V. et al.  Sale of Goods and Supply of Services: A Guide to the Legislation, op. cit, para. 
36.  
388 The Consumer Protection Act 1996.  Chapter c-30.1 of the Statutes of Saskatchewan 1996.   
389 Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, Public Act 1993 No. 91.   
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(1)… where goods are first supplied to a consumer in New Zealand (whether or not  
that supply is the first-ever supply of the goods) there is a guarantee that the manufacturer will 
take reasonable action to ensure that facilities for repair of the goods and supply of parts for 
the goods are reasonably available for a reasonable period after the goods are so supplied.   
 
Under section 41 of the New Zealand Act, however, this guarantee does not apply 
where reasonable action is taken to notify the consumer, at or before the time the 
goods are supplied, that the manufacturer does not undertake that repair facilities and 
parts will be available for the goods.  A broadly similar provision on after-sale service 
and spare parts is also to be found in Australian consumer legislation.390   
 
4.66. A case can certainly be made in principle for an obligation on sellers to make 
after-sale service and spare parts available for a reasonable period of time after 
purchase. Goods and equipment are increasingly complex technologically, and correct  
maintenance and repair often requires both specialist knowledge and non-standard 
parts that may be available only from the manufacturer.  The lack of facilities for parts 
or service post-purchase can, therefore, erode the practical value of the implied 
undertakings as to quality and fitness for purpose.  It is arguable that the 
Saskatchewan provision is more balanced than it first appears in that it draws a 
distinction between goods that are normally repaired (such as cars and large white 
goods) and those that are not (such as toasters, kettles and other small household 
appliances).  Despite such arguments, however, we are not convinced that a provision 
of this kind is a practical proposition.391 In a globalised economy, the goods on sale in 
Irish stores increasingly come from all parts of the world and there can be a lengthy 
supply chain between manufacturer and final seller.  It would be neither fair nor 
realistic in this situation to impose a general obligation on retailers in respect of spare 
parts and after-sale service. The cost of complying with such an obligation could also 
be significant and would ultimately have to be met by consumers.  
 
                                                 
390 Competition and Consumer Act 2010, s.58.  See also the discussion of the three options – 
‘regulatory’, ‘voluntary’ and ‘information-type’ - for provisions on after-sale service in the European 
Commission’s 1993 Green Paper.  Commission of the European Communities.  1993.  Green Paper 
on Guarantees for Consumer Goods and After-Sales Services.  Com (93) 509. 
391 The inclusion in the Sale of Goods Act and related legislation of an implied statutory term on spare 
parts and after-sale facilities was considered and rejected by the Law Commission for England and 
Wales in 1979 and the Law Commission for England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commision in 
1987.  Law Commission for England and Wales.  1979.  Report on Implied Terms in Contracts for 
the Supply of Goods (Law Com. No. 95), para. 115. Law Commission for England and Wales and 
Scottish Law Commission.  1987.  Sale and Supply of Goods, op. cit., para. 3.36.   
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4.67. The provisions in force in New Zealand and Australia do not require sellers to 
offer after-sale and spare facilities in the same way as those in Saskatchewan and are 
thus closer to  section 12 of the 1980 Act. While the 1980 Act creates a warranty only 
where an express commitment to the provision of after-sale service and spare parts is 
stated by the seller, the New Zealand and Australian provisions create a statutory 
guarantee as to repairs and spare parts in the absence of an express disclaimer by the 
seller. We think, on balance, that this would impose too great an obligation on 
retailers, particularly small retailers.  Though section 12 has probably had a limited 
impact in practice, it can still serve a purpose in enhancing the rights and remedies of 
buyers where the seller, whether on his own behalf or on behalf of the manufacturer, 
states that after-sale service and spare parts will be available post-purchase. We invite 
observations as to whether the failure by successive Ministers to use section 12(2) to 
define a ‘reasonable period’ for the purpose of the 1980 Act’s provisions on spare 
parts and after-sale service has contributed to the under-utilisation of the provision.  
Observations should also be sought from interested parties as to what would constitute 
a ‘reasonable period’ in respect of certain classes of goods.   
 
4.68. Recommendation 
The implied warranty as to the availability of spare parts and an adequate after-
sale service at section 12 of the 1980 Act should in principle be retained in future 
legislation. The operation of the section, including the reasons for its under-
utilisation, should be the subject of consultation with interested parties.    
 
SECTION 13 IMPLIED CONDITION ON SALE OF MOTOR VEHICLES  
4.69. Section 13 which inserts into contracts for the sale of motor vehicles a condition 
that the vehicle be free from defects that would render it a danger to the public, 
including persons travelling in the vehicle, is a lengthy provision that we will 
summarise, rather than reproduce, here. A number of the section’s provisions are 
premised on the making  of Regulations about certificates of roadworthiness that, in 
the event, were never made.   The main provisions of the section are as follows:  
 The implied condition as to freedom from dangerous defects is in addition to 
other conditions and warranties, including the implied terms as to 
merchantability and fitness under the 1893 Act, but does not apply in the case 
of the sale of a motor vehicle to a dealer (sub-section 2).   
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 The implied condition can be excluded where it is agreed between seller and 
buyer that the vehicle is not intended for use in the condition in which it is to 
be delivered under the contract, a document to this effect is signed by the 
parties to the contract, and the agreement between the parties is fair and 
reasonable (sub-section 3). 
 
 A person using a motor vehicle with the consent of the buyer who suffers loss 
as a result of a breach of the implied condition may maintain an action for 
damages against the seller as if he were the buyer (sub-section 7).  In this 
event, the action must be brought within two years of the date on which the 
cause of action accrued, and not within the general six-year time limit for 
actions for breach of contract set by the Statute of Limitations 1957 (sub-
section 8).  
 
 Any term of a contract exempting from all or any of the provisions of the 
section shall be void (sub-section 9).   
 
4.70. The inclusion of section 13 in the 1980 Act followed a recommendation in the 
Whincup Report that was based on a provision in the Ontario Highway Traffic Act, 
and was subsequently endorsed by the National Consumer Advisory Council.392 The  
rationale for the provision was that faults in motor vehicles, unlike in other consumer 
goods, could seriously affect persons other than the purchaser, most obviously where 
those faults resulted in an accident.393 There was a demonstrable need accordingly for 
a ‘high level of mechanical efficiency and roadworthiness in all motor vehicles sold 
for ordinary road use’.  The departure from the doctrine of privity of contract entailed 
by the extension of the right of warranty to persons using the vehicle with the owner’s 
consent reflected, ‘whatever the theoretical considerations involved … a pragmatic 
approach when dealing with a product which if defective can constitute a grave 
personal and public hazard.’ The first case to be considered under the section, 
Glorney v O’Brien,394 involved a car sold for £250 which crashed three weeks after 
the sale due to a failure in its suspension.  The High Court dismissed the contention 
that, in view of its low price, the vehicle was intended for spare parts rather than for 
use, stating: 
    … no matter how old or cheap a motor vehicle may be it must not be sold to an  
    ordinary member of the public not in the motor trade in a condition which would  
                                                 
392 National Prices Commission.  1973.  Occasional Paper No. 9. Consumer Protection Law in 
America, Canada and Europe (Dublin: Stationery Office), pp. 66-67.   National Consumer Advisory 
Council.  December 1974.  Submission to the Minister for Industry and Commerce on Proposals 
for Legislation to Assure the Consumers’ Interests (Dublin: Stationery Office), p. 16. 
393
 Dáil Debates.  Vol. 309, 16 November 1978.  Sale of Goods and Supply of Service Bill 1978 
Second Stage: cols. 1110-1111. 
394 High Court, Unreported, 14 November 1988.  See also Flynn v Dermot Kelly [2007] IEHC 103.  
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    render it a danger to the public including the occupants of the vehicle if driven on  
    the road. 
 
Damages totalling £18,650 were awarded to the driver and passenger in respect of 
injuries sustained in the crash.   
 
Issues Arising 
4.71. The implied condition specific to motor vehicles is a provision virtually unique 
to Ireland among the jurisdictions whose sales law is based on the 1893 Act.  In those 
other jurisdictions, vehicle safety is covered by the implied statutory terms on the 
quality or, in some cases, the safety of goods.  As with the implied warranty on after-
sale service and spare parts, it was assumed, prior to the narrowing of the scope of the 
proposed Consumer Rights Directive, that retention of section 13 would be 
incompatible with the proposal’s full harmonisation status.  While this is no longer the 
case, the retention of the provision can be queried on other grounds.  Motor vehicles 
are safer and more reliable now than when the 1980 Act was enacted and their 
roadworthiness must be assessed at regular intervals under mandatory vehicle testing 
requirements. We have also recommended at paragraph 4.48. above that safety should 
be one of the express aspects of the quality of goods for the purposes of the implied 
undertaking as to quality in future sale of goods legislation.   
 
4.72. While the case for a provision along the lines of section 13 may not be as strong 
as in the past, the retention of the core elements of the section remains justified in our 
view.  Though the safety of motor vehicles has undoubtedly improved, there are still 
significant safety issues with second-hand and reconditioned vehicles. The distinction 
between private and commercial sales can also be blurred in some segments of the car 
market and, as the quality terms under section 14 are confined to sales in the course of 
a business, their application can be uncertain. Section 13 is wider in scope than the 
implied quality and fitness conditions under section 14 in two important respects.  
First, it is not restricted to sales by the seller in the course of a business; the sole 
exclusion is the sale of a vehicle to a buyer.  Second, the exception to the privity rule 
which gives a right of action to persons using a vehicle with the owner’s consent does 
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not apply to the implied conditions under section 14.395  Motor vehicles remain more 
likely than the generality of consumer goods to cause loss or injury to persons other 
than their owners.  The fact that sellers are only liable if the vehicle is dangerous (as 
distinct from being merely unfit for purpose or unmerchantable) justifies the retention 
of this provision in our view.  The section is simple and capable of being used by third 
parties as well as the buyer and, in the interests of road safety, we believe that even a 
private seller should not be able to rely on the principle of caveat emptor in this 
situation.   
 
4.73. Recommendation 
A provision along the lines of Section 13 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of 
Services Act 1980 on the implied condition of freedom from dangerous defects in 
motor vehicles should be retained in future legislation, and should be 
supplemented by a presumption that the defect existed in the vehicle at the time 
of the contract of sale.  The burden of proof should be on the seller to show 
either that the defect was drawn specifically to the attention of the buyer who 
undertook to repair it before use, or that the defect arose after the contract was 
concluded.            
   
SECTION 14 LIABILITY OF FINANCE HOUSES  
    Where goods are sold to a buyer dealing as a consumer and in relation to the sale an agreement  
    is entered into by the buyer with another person acting in the course of a business (in this  
    section referred to as a finance house) for the repayment to the finance house of money paid  
    by the finance house to the seller in respect of the price of the goods, the finance house shall  
    be deemed to be a party to the sale and the finance house and the seller shall, jointly and  
    severally, be answerable to the buyer for breach of contract of sale and for any  
    misrepresentations made by the seller with respect to the goods. 
 
4.74. This section of the 1980 Act applies to transactions in which the purchase price 
of goods sold to a consumer is paid to the seller by a finance house and the consumer 
enters an agreement with the finance house for the repayment of the money advanced 
to fund the purchase.396  The main aim of the section was to address problems caused 
                                                 
395 Though the Law Reform Commission has proposed the introduction of legislation for a 
comprehensive scheme of third party rights, it recommended that existing statutory exceptions to the 
privity rule, such as section 13 of the 1980 Act, should be retained.  Law Reform Commission. 2008.  
Report on Privity of Contract and Third Party Rights, paras. 3.80-87.  
396 In O’Callaghan v Hamilton Leasing (Ireland) Ltd [1984] I.L.R.M. 146 a claim against a finance 
house in respect of a vending machine purchased through a finance house under a leasing agreement 
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to consumer buyers in such cases by the doctrine of privity of contract.397 As payment 
for the goods was made to the seller by the finance house, the consumer buyer might   
be held not be to a party to the contract of sale and, as a consequence, to have no right 
of action under the express or implied terms of the contract if the goods proved 
defective or were otherwise in breach of  contract.  As the seller and the finance house 
were typically part of a joint venture in such cases, it was thought appropriate 
consequently to make them jointly and severally liable for breach of the contract of 
sale and for any misrepresentations made by the seller. Under the section, the 
agreement with the finance house must be ‘in relation to the sale’ and the money to be 
repaid must be money paid by the finance house ‘in respect of the price of the goods.’  
General advances of money to consumers to fund purchases, such as those under 
credit card agreements, are, unlike the provision at section 75 of the UK Consumer 
Credit Act 1974 on which the section is based, excluded from its scope.    
 
Issues Arising  
4.75. Section 14 remains a useful measure in our view and the main issues it presents 
concern its relation to not dissimilar provisions in consumer credit legislation.  
Section 42 of the Consumer Credit Act 1995, which gave effect to Article 11 of 
Directive 87/102/EEC on Consumer Credit, covers situations where, in order to buy 
goods or services, a consumer enters into a credit agreement with a person other than 
the supplier, and the creditor and supplier have a pre-existing agreement under which 
credit is made available exclusively by that creditor to customers of that supplier.  
Where the goods or services in question are not supplied in full or part, or are not in 
conformity with the contract, and the consumer has unsuccessfully sought a remedy to 
which he is entitled from the supplier, the section grants him the right to take 
proceedings against the creditor.  The section also expressly provides that the 
existence of a credit agreement shall not affect the rights of a consumer under the 
1980 Act against the supplier of goods or services purchased by means of such an 
agreement.   
                                                                                                                                            
was rejected by the High Court on the ground that the contract was made in the course of the plaintiff’s 
business and, as a consequence, was  outside the scope of section 14 as a result.  While the plaintiff 
argued that he did not intend to deal further in the goods, the court held that this was not sufficient to 
render him a consumer for the purposes of the section.      
397  National Prices Commission.  1973.  Occasional Paper No. 9. Consumer Protection Law in 
America, Canada and Europe (Dublin: Stationery Office), pp. 130-31 & 206.  Dáil Debates.  Vol. 
309, 16 November 1978.  Sale of Goods and Supply of Service Bill 1978: Second Stage, col. 1109. 
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4.76. Directive 87/102/EEC has since been repealed and replaced by Directive 
2008/48/EC on Consumer Credit Agreements. Article 15 of the new Directive 
contains a provision on linked credit agreements which is broadly similar to Article 
11 of its precursor. Article 15(3) further states that its provisions are without prejudice 
to national rules rendering the creditor jointly and severally liable in respect of any 
claim which the consumer may have against the supplier where the purchase of goods 
or services from the supplier has been financed by a credit agreement. Though Article 
15 has been transposed by Regulation 18 of the European Communities (Consumer 
Credit Agreements) Regulations 2010 (S.I. No. 281 of 2010), section 42 of the 
Consumer Credit Act 1995 also remains in force. The co-existence of the overlapping 
provisions in the 1980 and 1995 Acts and the 2010 Regulations is a source of 
confusion, and it is to be regretted that the opportunity for their rationalisation 
presented by the transposition of Directive 2008/48/EC was not taken.  As our remit 
does not extend to consumer credit legislation, the question we have had to consider is 
whether the provisions of the Consumer Credit Act 1995 and the Consumer Credit 
Agreement Regulations 2010 make section 14 of the 1980 Act redundant. The 
relevant provisions in these two pieces of consumer credit legislation are more 
restrictive than those in the 1980 Act in that they apply only where there is a pre-
existing and exclusive agreement between the creditor and the supplier of the goods 
or services, and give the consumer a right of action against the creditor only where he 
has tried and fail to obtain satisfaction from the supplier.  There remains a case 
accordingly for the retention of section 14 of the 1980 Act and, indeed, for its 
extension to services. As Directive 2008/48/EC on Consumer Credit Agreements 
expressly permits the maintenance of national rules on the joint and several liability of 
suppliers and creditors, this suggests that there is an appreciation at EU level that such 




4.77. Section 14 of the 1980 Act on the liability of finance houses should be 
retained in future legislation , and extended to cover similar transactions 
involving the supply of services.   
 
 176
CHAPTER FIVE SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893: EXCLUSION OF 
IMPLIED TERMS AND CONDITIONS, SECTION 55    
 
SECTION 55 EXCLUSION OF IMPLIED TERMS AND CONDITIONS  
(1) Subject to the subsequent provisions of this section, where any right, duty or 
liability would arise under a contract of sale of goods by implication of law, it may 
be negatived or varied by express agreement, or by the course of dealing between 
the parties, or by usage if the usage is such as bind both parties to the contract. 
 
(2) An express condition or warrant does not negative a condition or warranty implied 
by this Act unless inconsistent therewith. 
 
(3) In the case of a contract of sale of goods, any term of that or any other contract 
exempting from all or any of the provisions of section 12 of this Act shall be void. 
 
(4) In the case of a contract of sale of goods, any term of that or any other contract 
exempting from all or any of the provisions of section 13, 14, 15 of this Act shall 
be void where the buyer deals as a consumer and shall, in any other case, not be 
enforceable unless it is shown that it is fair and reasonable. 
 
(5) Subsection (4) shall not prevent the court from holding, in accordance with any 
rule of law, that a term which purports to exclude or restrict any of the provisions 
of section 13, 14, 15 of this Act is not a term of the contract. 
 
(6) Any reference in this section to a term exempting from all or any of the provisions 
of any section of this Act is a reference to a term which purports to exclude or 
restrict, or has the effect of excluding or restricting, the operation of all or ay of 
the provisions of that section, or the exercise of a right conferred by any provision 
of that section, or any liability of the seller for breach of a condition or warranty 
implied by any provision of that section. 
 
(7) Any reference in this section to a term of a contract includes a reference to a term, 
which although not contained in a contract is incorporated in the contract by 
another term of the contract. 
 
(8) This section is subject to section 61(6) of this Act. 
The section was substituted by section 22 of the 1980 Act for the original section in 
the 1893 Act.  Subsection (1) is the only part of the section carried over from the latter 
Act.  The equivalent provision at section 40 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of 
Services Act 1980 which deals with the exclusion of the implied terms as to the 
quality of services at section 39 of the 1980 Act is discussed in Chapter 14.   
 
5.1. Section 55(4) has to be read in conjunction with the Schedule to the 1980 Act on 
‘Fair and Reasonable Terms’.  This states as follows: 
1) In determining for the purposes of section 13, 31, 40 or 46 of this Act or 
section 55 of the Act of 1893 (inserted by section 22 of this Act) if a term is fair 
and reasonable the test is that it shall be a fair and reasonable one to be 
included having regard to the circumstances which were, or ought reasonably to 
 177
have been, known to or in contemplation of the parties when the contract was 
made. 
2) Regard is to be had in particular to any of the following which appear to be 
relevant: 
(a) The strength of the bargaining position of the parties relative to each 
other, taking into account (among other things) alternative means by 
which the customer’s requirements could have been met; 
(b) Whether the customer received an inducement to agree to the term, 
or in accepting it had an opportunity of entering into a similar 
contract with other persons, but without having to accept a similar 
term; 
(c) Whether the customer knew or ought reasonably to have known of 
the existence and extent of the term (having regard, among other 
things, to any custom of the trade and any previous course of dealing 
between the parties); 
(d) Where the term excludes or restricts any relevant liability if some 
condition is not complied with, whether it was reasonable at the time 
of the contract to expect that compliance with that condition would 
be practicable; 
(e) Whether any goods involved were manufactured, processed or 
adapted to the special order of the customer. 
 
5.2. Though the Sale of Goods Act 1893 imported rules into contracts of sale in 
respect of merchantable quality and other matters, these rules were firmly 
subordinated to the autonomy of the contracting parties.  Section 55 as originally 
enacted provided that any right, duty or liability arising under a contract of sale by 
implication of law could be negatived or varied by agreement between the parties, by 
the course of dealing between them, or by usage of a kind binding both parties to the 
contract.  As noted in Chapter 1, the widespread recourse to exemption clauses – that 
is, contractual provisions which oust or qualify the implied or express terms of the 
contract - had come to be seen as a significant problem by the 1950s, particularly in 
standard form consumer contracts. Two main types of exemption clause are 
commonly distinguished – exclusion clauses which exempt all liability, and limitation 
clauses which curtail liability or the buyer’s remedies in some way, for example by 
stipulating that damages cannot not exceed a specified figure.398 While the distinction 
is relevant, it can be one of degree rather than kind.399 In some cases, moreover, 
clauses may not be expressed so as to exclude the seller’s obligations in respect of the 
                                                 
398 For a detailed account of the different forms that such clauses can take, see Benjamin’s Sale of 
Goods, op. cit., paras. 13-020-13-041.  
399 As Atiyah points out, if a clause limits a party’s liability to a trivial sum which bears no relation to 
the likely loss or damage, it is misleading to treat it as something wholly different from an exclusion 
clause.  Exclusion and limitation clauses can sometimes also be found in one contract.  Atiyah, The 
Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 220.  
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implied terms, but can have this effect in practice as, for example, with a clause 
requiring a buyer to accept goods ‘with all faults’.400  
 
5.3. The response to the increased recourse to exemption clauses was two-fold.  First, 
the courts sought to curb the use of these clauses by developing and deploying the 
doctrine of fundamental breach.401  In a number of decisions from the mid-1950s, it 
was held that exemption clauses could not protect against liability where there had 
been a ‘fundamental breach’ of the contract or a breach of a fundamental term of the 
contract.402 While the doctrine was expressed as a corollary of the rules of contract 
construction in some cases, in others it appeared to have the status of an independent 
rule of law. Secondly, pressure grew for legislative measures to curb this type of 
clause. The Molony Committee on Consumer Protection which reported to the UK 
government in 1962 recommended that contracting out of the implied terms should be 
prohibited in consumer transactions.403   
 
5.4. In 1967 the House of Lords rejected the doctrine of fundamental breach as a 
substantive rule of law in Suisse Atlantique, with Lord Reid making the case as 
follows that exemption clauses should be subject to legislative regulation:404 
   Exemption clauses differ greatly in many respects.  Probably the most objectionable  
   are found in the complex standard conditions which are now so common.  In the  
   ordinary way the customer has no time to read them, and if he did read them he  
   probably would not understand them.  And if he did understand and object to any of  
   them, he would generally be told he could take it or leave it.  And if he then went to  
   another supplier the result would be the same.  Freedom to contract must surely  
   imply some choice or room for bargaining.       
    
                                                 
400 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit, para. 9.02.  
401 The courts also found against exemption clauses on the ground that they had not been incorporated 
into the contract in accordance with the basic principles of contract law.  Such clauses could also be 
ruled out under the contra proferentem rule under which any ambiguity or omission in a contract term 
is to be construed against the person proferring it for his protection.  Bridge, ibid., paras. 9.04-9.13.     
402 Karsales (Harrow) Ltd v Wallis [1956] 1 WLR 936; Yeoman Credit Ltd v Apps [1962] 2 QB 508; 
Charterhouse Credit Co. Ltd v Tolly [1963] 2 QB 683.  In the first of these cases, Denning LJ stated 
that ‘exempting clauses of this kind, no matter how widely they are expressed only avail the party 
when he is carrying out the contract in its essential respects… They do not avail him when he is guilty 
of a breach that goes to the root of the contract.  The thing to do is to look at the contract apart from the 
exempting clause and see what are the terms, express or implied, which impose an obligation on the 
party.  If he has been guilty of a breach of those obligations in a respect which goes to the very root  of 
the contract, he cannot rely on the exempting clauses.’ Ibid., at 938.   
403 Final Report of the Committee on Consumer Protection.  1962.  (London: HMSO Cmd. 1781): 
paras. 431-435. 
404 Suisse Atlantique Societe d’Armement Maritime SA v NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] 1 
A.C. 361 at 406.     
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   At the other extreme, is the case where parties are bargaining on terms of equality  
   and a stringent exemption clause is accepted for a quid quo pro or other good  
   reason.  But this rule [fundamental breach] appears to treat all cases alike. There is  
   no indication in the recent cases that the courts are to consider whether the  
   exemption is fair in all the circumstances or is harsh and unconscionable or whether  
   it was freely agreed by the customer… This is a complex problem which intimately  
   affects millions of people and it appears to me that its solution should be left to  
   Parliament.  
 
Despite this judgement, the fundamental breach doctrine lingered on in the UK until 
its conclusive disavowal by the House of Lords in Photo Production Ltd v Securicor 
Transport Ltd
405 and George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd.406   
 
5.5. In 1969, the Law Commission for England and Wales and the Scottish Law 
Commission recommended a ban on the contracting out of the conditions and 
warranties implied by the Sale of Goods Act in consumer sales contracts.407 Though 
Commissioners were agreed that the protection against contracting out should not be 
limited to sales to consumer buyers, they were divided as to the extent of the 
protection that should be provided to business buyers. Some Commissioners favoured 
extending the ban on contracting out to transactions in which  consumer-type goods 
were sold to businesses. Others supported making exemption clauses in business 
contracts subject to a reasonableness test that would allow a court to render 
unenforceable any such clause that it did not find to be fair or reasonable. The UK 
Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 subsequently gave effect to these 
recommendations; in the case of commercial contracts, the main emphasis was put on 
subjecting exemption clauses in commercial contacts to a test of reasonableness. In 
1977, the provisions of the 1973 Act were incorporated in the UK Unfair Contract 
Terms Act which, in addition to the implied terms under the Sale of Goods Act, also 
regulates avoidance of liability for negligence causing death, personal injury or other 
loss or damage, the exclusion or restriction of liability for breach of contract, and 
unreasonable indemnity clauses.   
  
                                                 
405 [1980] 2 WLR 283.   
406  [1983] 2 A.C. 803.  For an account of the doctrine in this period, see Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, 
op. cit., paras. 13-046-049. 
407The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  Exemption Clauses in Contracts First 
Report: Amendments to the Sale of Goods Act 1893, op. cit., paras. 64-123.    
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5.6. The introduction of statutory controls on exemption clauses in Ireland was 
proposed by both the Whincup report and the National Consumer Advisory 
Council.408  Their recommendations were acted upon in the Sale of Goods and Supply 
of Services Act 1980, one of whose main aims was to bring exemption clauses under 
statutory control.  In introducing the Bill in Dáil Eireann, the then Minister for State at 
the Department of Industry, Commerce and Energy stated:409   
   Another aspect of the 1893 Act which has led to an erosion of the buyer’s position  
   is the regular use by many suppliers of the provision … in section 55 of that Act 
   whereby the seller can exclude his contractual liabilities to the buyer.  I am sure that  
   every member of this House, at one time or another, has experienced the device of  
   the exclusion clause. Its purpose and effects have been to trim or undermine entirely  
   the implied rights of buyers.  We have all lived with the fiction that the buyer  
   willingly accepted these clauses excluding his rights.   
 
5.7. In prohibiting exemption clauses in consumer contracts and subjecting them to a 
reasonableness test in commercial contracts, the 1980 Act closely followed the 
substance and form of the corresponding provisions in UK legislation. The approach 
taken to the regulation of contracting out in consumer and commercial contracts 
respectively was stated as follows in the second stage speech on the legislation:410 
    A good deal of thought was given to the question of whether the use of exclusion  
    clauses should be debarred only in the case of consumer sales or whether the  
    prohibition should extend also to business sales.  The House will, for instance,  
    recognise that it would be unfair that a small retailer should be robbed of his right  
    of redress against a large corporation through the use by the latter of an exclusion  
    clause particularly as the retailer would himself be liable for any deficiency in the  
    goods when sold to consumers.  Whilst the complete prohibition of exclusion  
    clauses will apply only in the case of consumer sales, in the case of sales between  
    business people there is provision … for a test of reasonableness to be determined  
    by the courts in respect of exclusion clauses.  This … strikes a fair balance between  
    the need on the one hand to guard against exploitation of the small man by  
    economically stronger and more resourceful groups and on the other the need to  
    allow reasonable freedom to strong groups to bargain with each other on whatever  
    terms they please.   
 
In contrast to the UK Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, however, the Act’s regulation 
of exemption clauses did not extend beyond clauses excluding or limiting the quality 
                                                 
408 National Prices Commission.  1973.  Occasional Paper No. 9. Consumer Protection Law in 
America, Canada and Europe (Dublin: Stationery Office), pp. 89-91.  National Consumer Advisory 
Council.  December 1974.  Submission to the Minister for Industry and Commerce on Proposals 
for Legislation to Assure the Consumers’ Interests (Dublin: Stationery Office), p. 17.  
409 Dáil Debates, vol. 309 16 November 1978, Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Bill Second 
Stage: col. 1104. 
410 Ibid., cols. 1108-09.  
 181
and other terms implied into sales, services, hire-purchase and consumer hire 
contracts by the 1893 and 1980 Acts.411   
 
5.8. Unlike in the United Kingdom, the doctrine of fundamental breach has not been 
expressly overturned by the courts in Ireland. In the leading case of Clayton Love v 
B+I Transport,412 there was a contract between the parties for the transport of frozen 
scampi from Dublin to Liverpool. The loading was conducted in conditions that led 
the scampi to be unfit for consumption.  The plaintiffs sued and the defendants cited 
two exemption clauses in the contract, the second of which debarred claims that were 
not made within three days of loss or injury. The Supreme Court applied the doctrine 
of fundamental breach to preclude reliance on this limitation clause, with Ó Dálaigh 
C.J. stating that:413  
    In my opinion the basis on which this doctrine rests requires that a party, who like  
    the defendants, has been held to be in breach of a fundamental obligation cannot  
    rely on a time bar in a contract to defeat a claim for damages.   
 
Though repudiation of this approach must await a Supreme Court decision, a number 
of subsequent High Court cases have cited with approval the contrary UK case law to 
the effect that the application of exclusion clauses to breaches of contract is always 
dependent on the construction of the contract.414  Most recently, in ESL Consulting 
Ltd v Verizon (Ireland) Ltd,415 Finlay Geoghegan J, though not disavowing the ruling 
in Clayton Love, suggested obiter that fundamental breach should not apply in 
commercial contracts, stating that: 
   … if I was free to decide the issue in the light of subsequent judgements in other  
   jurisdictions, as has been observed already by a number of my colleagues in the  
   High Court, there appear to be strong arguments in favour of the reconsideration of  
   the application of the so-called doctrine of fundamental breach to agreements  
   between two commercial entities for the reasons outlined by the House of Lords in  
   Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd …    
 
                                                 
411 As noted in Chapter 1, the 1980 Act had a long gestation and was first published in Bill form in 
1977. It is likely therefore that the Bill’s main elements were framed before the enactment of the 1977 
Act in the UK.   
412 [1970] 104 I.L.T.R. 157.   
413 Ibid. at 170.   
414 Western Meats v National Ice and Cold Storage Co. [1982] I.L.R.M. 101.  Fitzpatrick and Harty v 
Ballsbridge International Bloodstock Sales, unreported High Court, 25 February 1983.  For a 
discussion, see Clark, R., Contract Law in Ireland, op. cit, pp. 209-211.   
415 [2008] IEHC 369 at 383.   
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5.9. As a High Court judge, Finlay Geoghegan J. was seeking to limit the scope of the 
fundamental breach doctrine to take account of the fact that, until the Supreme Court 
reviews Clayton Love, a High Court judge is bound by stare decisis to follow that 
decision.  Happily, the Sales Law Review Group does not operate under any such 
restriction.  Insofar as many of the cases in which fundamental breach was applied 
were sales contracts, argued before the 1973 reforms in the United Kingdom and the 
1980 reforms in Ireland were in place, we think that the ‘fundamental breach as a rule 
of law’ approach has outlived its usefulness. We propose accordingly that this rule, 
inconsistent as it is with the statutory framework for regulating exemption and 
limitation clauses in contracts for the sale of goods and the supply of services, should 
be abrogated in the future legislation to replace the 1893 and 1980 Acts.  
 
5.10 Recommendation   
The ‘fundamental breach’ of contract as a rule of law should not be applied in 
any contract for the sale of goods or the supply of services and the new 
legislation that will replace the 1893 and 1980 Acts should specifically abrogate 
that rule.   
 
Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts  
5.11. The European Communities (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) Regulations 
1995 and 2000 which give effect to Directive 93/13/EEC provide for more extensive 
regulation of unfair terms in consumer contracts. Unlike the corresponding provisions 
of the 1893 and 1980 Acts which apply only to exemption clauses, the Regulations 
cover any non-individually negotiated term in a consumer contract other than the 
definition of the main subject matter of the contract and the adequacy of the price.  
Under the Regulations, a contract term is regarded as unfair if, contrary to the 
requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and 
obligations to the detriment of the consumer, taking into account the nature of the 
goods or services, all circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract, and all 
other terms of the contract.  Schedule 2 of the Regulations sets out the following 
guidelines for the application of the test of good faith: 
    In making an assessment of good faith, particular regard shall be had to  
    -  the strength of the bargaining position of the parties, 
    -  whether the consumer had an inducement to agree to the terms,     
    -  whether the goods or service were sold or supplied to the special order of the   
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        consumer, 
    -  the extent to which the seller or supplier has dealt fairly and equitably with the   
        consumer whose legitimate interests he has to take into account.   
 
5.12. The Schedule to the Regulations derives from recital 16 of the Directive which 
in turn was heavily influenced by the criteria for the reasonableness of contract terms 
at Schedule 2 of the UK Unfair Terms Act 1977.416  As the test for the fairness and 
reasonableness of clauses that seek to exclude or limit the implied terms under the 
Sale of Goods Act contained in the Schedule to the 1980 Act was also based on the 
UK Unfair Terms Act, there are underlying similarities between the two fairness tests 
in Irish legislation. Despite this common basis, there are some significant differences 
of approach and effect between the Sale of Goods Acts and the Unfair Terms 
Regulations. While the Acts render exemption clauses in consumer clauses 
automatically ineffective, such clauses are unfair under the Regulations only if found 
to be so by reference to its test of fairness.  Schedule 3 of the Regulations includes the 
following term among ‘an indicative and non-exhaustive list of terms which may be 
regarded as unfair’ pursuant to that test: 
    Terms which have the object or effect of:...     
(b) inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis-à-vis the 
seller or supplier or another party in the even of total or partial non-performance or 
inadequate performance by the seller or supplier of any of the contractual 
obligations, including the option of offsetting a debt owed to the seller or supplier 
against any claim which the consumer may have against him.   
 
5.13. The adoption of Directive 1999/44/EC on Consumer Sales and Guarantees 
created an additional complication. The Directive was given effect in Ireland by the 
European Communities (Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and 
Guarantees) Regulations 2003 (S.I. No. 11 of 2003).  Regulation 10 which transposes 
Article 7(1) of the Directive in virtually verbatim form states as follows: 
   Any contractual terms or agreements concluded with the seller before the lack of  
   conformity is brought to the seller’s attention which purport directly to waive or  
   restrict the rights resulting from these Regulations shall not be binding on the  
   consumer. 
 
                                                 
416 Directive 93/13/EEC was first transposed in the UK by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1994 (S.I. 3159/1994).  This gave effect to the good faith guidelines at recital 16 of the 
Directive in the form of a Schedule identical to that in the Regulations implemented in Ireland in 1995.  
The 1994 Regulations were later replaced,  however, by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Regulations 
1999 (S.I. 2013/1999) in which the Schedule does not feature.   
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Thus clauses which exempt the implied quality and related terms in consumer 
contracts of sale are (i) void under the Sale of Goods Act 1893, (ii) may be regarded 
as unfair under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1995, and (iii) 
are not binding on the consumer under the Consumer Sales and Guarantees 
Regulations 2003. 
 
Issues Arising     
5.14. We consider that the broad approach to the regulation of exemption clauses in 
contracts of sale at section 55 of the 1893 Act remains valid in its essentials, namely 
that such clauses should be prohibited in consumer contracts and subject to a test of 
fairness in business contracts. In its present form, however, section 55 raises a number 
of issues in respect of its application to both consumer and commercial contracts.   
 
Exemption Clauses in Consumer Sales Contracts 
5.15. The present situation under which exemption clauses in consumer contracts are 
regulated in different ways under different enactments is manifestly unsatisfactory 
and needs to be addressed. As other of our recommendations would mean that there 
would no longer be separate consumer sales enactments based on domestic and EU 
legislation, the dual regulation of such clauses under the Sale of Goods Acts and the 
Consumer Sales and Guarantees Regulations would be brought to an end. The overlap 
in respect of exemption clauses under sale of goods legislation and the Unfair Terms 
Regulations, however,  would not be addressed by this change. In our view, the Unfair 
Terms Regulations are the most appropriate vehicle for the regulation of exclusion 
clauses in consumer sale and related contracts. Such clauses should be deemed 
automatically unfair under the Regulations, however, rather than being assessable by 
reference to the criteria governing fairness. The effect of unfairness under the 
Regulations – with unfair terms being no longer binding on the consumer but with the 
contract otherwise continuing to bind the parties if it is capable of remaining in force 
without the unfair terms – is appropriate to exemption clauses.417 A precedent for this 
type of provision can be found at section 19(6) of the Arbitration Act 2010 which 
provides that, without prejudice to the generality of the European Communities 
                                                 
417 As Bridge notes: ‘In the case of exemption clauses, as integral as they may be to the bargain, it 
ought to be the case that the contract is capable of continuing despite their excision.’  Bridge, The Sale 
of Goods, op. cit, para. 9.43.   
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(Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) Regulations 1995 and 2000, an arbitration 
agreement to which one of the parties is a consumer and a term of which provides that 
each party shall bear his or her own costs shall be deemed to be an unfair term for the 
purposes of those Regulations.  As well as dealing with the confusion caused by the 
co-existence of overlapping statutory rules, this approach would enable the National 
Consumer Agency to take action, where appropriate, against contract terms which 
sought to exclude the implied quality and other terms in sale and related contracts.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 
5.16. Clauses exempting the implied statutory terms as to goods in consumer sale 
and related contracts should be automatically unfair in all circumstances under 
the European Communities (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) Regulations 
1995 and 2000.  The 1995 Regulations should be amended in order to give effect 
to this recommendation.   
 
‘Deals As Consumer’  
5.17. Section 55(4) of the 1893 Act provides that terms in contracts of sale which 
exempt any or all of the provisions of sections 13-15 of the Act shall be void where 
the buyer ‘deals as consumer’ and shall, in any other case, not be enforceable unless 
shown to be fair and reasonable.  Section 3 of the 1980 Act defines ‘dealing as 
consumer’ as follows:  
1) In the Act of 1893 and this Act a party to a contract is said to deal as consumer in 
relation to another party if –  
(a) he neither makes the contract in the course of a business nor holds himself out 
as doing so, and  
(b) the other party does make the contract in the course of a business, and  
(c) the goods or services supplied under or in pursuance of the contract are of a 
type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption. 
 
2) On - 
(a) a sale by competitive tender, or  
(b) a sale by auction –  
         (i)  of goods of a type, or  
         (ii) by or on behalf of a person of a class  
         defined by the Minister by order, 
      the buyer is not in any circumstances to be regarded as dealing as consumer.   
 
3) Subject to this, it is for those claiming that a party does not deal as consumer to show 
that he does not.   
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The provision on ‘dealing as consumer’ also governs the application of section 14 of 
the 1980 Act on the liability of finance houses which was discussed in Chapter 4, 
section 53 of the 1893 Act on cure remedies for breach of warranty which is discussed 
in Chapter 11, and section 40 of the 1980 Act on the exclusion of the implied terms in 
contracts for the supply of services which is discussed in Chapter 14.418   
 
5.18. The Act’s definition of ‘deals as consumer’ was taken from the UK Supply of 
Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 where it served a similar purpose in demarcating 
contracts in which exemption clauses would be void from those in which they would 
be subject to a test of reasonableness.  It originated in the proposals of the Law 
Commission for England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission which sought 
to ensure that some purchases of consumer-type goods by businesses would enjoy 
statutory protection in respect of exemption clauses.419 The definition was then 
incorporated in the UK Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 where, with some subsequent 
modifications, it continues to apply.   
 
5.19. The ‘deals as consumer’ provision is not fit for purpose in our view for a 
number of reasons. First, with its convoluted tripartite structure, it is too complex for 
the purpose it is intended to serve. Both buyers and sellers need to know whether the 
other party to the transaction is dealing as a consumer without having to engage in the 
kind of detailed analysis required by the provision. Second, the construction of the 
provision is problematical in that it applies the same formulation to businesses in their 
capacity as buyers and sellers. If a restrictive interpretation is given to ‘in the course 
of a business’ test in subsection (1)(a), business buyers, including companies, will be 
regarded as ‘consumers’ for the purposes of certain transactions. A similarly 
restrictive reading of ‘in the course of a business’ in subsection (1)(b), however, will 
see business sellers treated as ‘consumers’ in other cases to the detriment of an actual 
consumer buyer.420 In R&B Customs Brokers v United Dominion Trust,421 the Court 
                                                 
418 Prior to the repeal of the section by the Consumer Credit Act 1995, the ‘deals as consumer’ test also 
applied to section 31 of the 1980 Act on the exclusion of the implied terms in hire-purchase 
agreements.   
419 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  Exemption Clauses in Contracts First 
Report: Amendments to the Sale of Goods Act 1893, op. cit.,  paras. 90-94. 
420 Macdonald, E. ‘‘In the course of a business’ – a fresh examination.’ (1999) Web JCLI 3.   
421  [1988] 1 All ER 847.  The judgement in this case relied on a House of Lords decision in Davies v 
Sumner [1984] 1 WLR 1301 which involved a similarly worded provision in the Trade Descriptions 
Act 1968.  The latter case concerned the sale by a self-employed courier of a car with a false odometer 
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of Appeal ruled that the purchase of a car by a shipping broker for the use of two 
directors of the company was not made ‘in the course of a business’. The purchase 
was held to be incidental and not integral to the buyer’s business activity, and 
transactions of this kind would have to take place on a regular basis in order for them 
to be regarded as occurring ‘in the course of a business’. On the basis of the approach 
followed in this case, a subsequent private purchaser of the same car would not be 
‘dealing as a consumer’ either by virtue of the test’s requirement that one party to the 
transaction must act in the course of a business. By extending the protections afforded 
consumers to business purchasers in some cases, therefore, this approach denies those 
protections in other cases to consumer purchasers with a better claim to them. In a 
subsequent case, Stevenson v Rogers,422 which involved the interpretation of ‘in the 
course of a business’ in the context of section 14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, 
the Court of Appeal ruled that the sale of a fishing boat by a fisherman was made in 
the course of a business.  Potter LJ observed that the purpose of this formulation was:     
   … to distinguish between a sale made in the course of a seller’s business and a  
   purely private sale of goods outside the confines of the business (if any) carried on  
   the seller.  
 
The Court made clear, however, that the reasoning in R&B Customs Brokers remained 
valid for the purposes of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.423   
 
5.20. The two Irish cases which have considered the meaning of ‘dealing as  
consumer’ have both involved section 14 of the 1980 Act on the liability of finance 
houses.  In O’Callaghan v Hamilton Leasing (Ireland) Ltd,424 the High Court held 
that the lessee of a drinks vending machine which was supplied for use in his take-
away food business was not dealing as a consumer within the meaning of the section 
and that, as a consequence, the exclusion of liability in the leasing agreement with the 
finance house was effective.425 In Cunningham v Woodchester Investments Ltd,426 the 
                                                                                                                                            
reading.  The court held, while the use of a car was integral to the way in which a courier carried on his 
business, its sale of a car was not unless such sales were made on a regular basis.     
422 [1999] Q.B. 1028 (CA (Civ Div)).  
423 Sealy, L.S.  ‘When is a sale made ‘in the course of a business?’ (1999) C.L.J. 277.  Benjamin’s 
Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 13-074.   
424 [1984] ILRM 146.  
425 McWilliam J. observed that: ‘It seems to me that this contract was made in the course of the 
plaintiff’s business.  It was certainly made for the purpose of his business. .. In order to interpret the 
words of s.3 otherwise I would have to amend paragraph (a) of subsection (1) by reading it as though it 
provided ‘in the course of a business which includes a further dealing with the goods’ or some words of 
that sort.  I cannot depart from the clear words of a Statute and try to construe it in accordance with my 
 188
High Court ruled that an agricultural college which had leased an automated 
telephone system was not ‘dealing as consumer’.  Though the college was a non-profit 
making venture, it had an extensive farming business and a substantial annual 
turnover. These activities could not be seen as anything other than a business, and the 
evidence indicated that the telephone equipment was mainly or largely intended for 
use in connection with them. While these judgments may suggest a disposition on the 
part of Irish courts to take a broader interpretation of ‘in the course of a business’ test 
than their English counterparts, the goods in neither case could be regarded as being 
of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption.   
 
5.21. While the problems posed by the existing provision are sufficient grounds for 
change, we consider that such change is also justified on policy grounds. Exemption 
clauses in contracts between businesses should not be automatically ineffective in our 
view. It is proper and sufficient that they should be subject to a test of fairness and 
reasonableness.427 The existing test, and the guidelines for its application in the 
Schedule to the 1980 Act, allow disparities in bargaining power between the parties to 
business contracts and other relevant factors to be taken into account.428 The 
definition of a consumer for the purpose of the regulation of exemption clauses in 
future sale of goods legislation should refer accordingly to a natural person acting for 
purposes unrelated to his or her business.   
 
5.22. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Clauses exempting the implied statutory terms as to goods in sales and related 
contracts between businesses should be unenforceable unless shown to be fair 
and reasonable.    
 
                                                                                                                                            
view of an unexpressed intention of the Legislature although I suspect that the legislature was more 
concerned with the business of engaging in further dealings with the goods.’  Ibid. at 146.  
426 Unreported, High Court 16 November 1984.   
427 The report of the Law Commission for England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission which 
was the basis for the legislative provisions governing exemption clauses in the UK and subsequently in 
Ireland put forward as alternatives the proposals for (i) a fairness test and (ii) provisions permitting 
certain types of purchase by businesses to be regarded as consumer purchases. In the event, however, 
both options were included in the legislation in the UK and Ireland.    
428 It is interesting to note that, in R&B Customs Brokers, the court was inclined to the view that, had it 
been treated as a non-consumer sale, the requirement of reasonableness would have been met.  The 
buyer had bought cars on similar terms on two or three previous occasions and were not lacking in 
commercial experience while the seller was a finance company that had not seen the car.  Atiyah, The 
Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 241.   
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The ‘deals as consumer’ test at section 3 of the 1980 Act which governs the 
application of section 55 of the 1893 Act and a number of the provisions of the 
1980 Act should be repealed.  The definition of ‘consumer’ for the purposes of 
the regulation of exemption and other clauses in future legislation should refer 
accordingly to a natural person acting for purposes unrelated to his or her 
business.   
 
5.23. We wish to make clear that our conclusions regarding the adequacy of the 
provisions at section 55 of the Act for the regulation of contracts between businesses 
relate only to their application to clauses exempting the terms implied by the Act.  As 
noted above, the regulation of exemption clauses under Irish legislation is narrower 
than in the UK where the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 applies to a wider range of 
exclusion and indemnity clauses. The UK Act has itself been criticised for the relative 
narrowness of its scope compared with unfair terms legislation in other countries.429  
While the introduction of broader statutory provisions regulating unfair terms in 
business-to-business contracts is a legitimate and important and legitimate topic, it is 
not one that comes within our original terms of reference.   
 
5.24 A further issue that requires consideration in this context is the differential 
treatment of exemption clauses in respect of sections 12 and 13 of the 1980 Act.  As 
discussed earlier in the Chapter, these sections deal respectively with the implied 
warranty for spare parts and servicing and the implied condition on the sale of motor 
vehicles. The implied terms under each section apply equally to consumer and 
business buyers and, in both cases, any term of a contract exempting any or all of 
these terms is void regardless of whether the buyer deals as consumer or otherwise.  
We see no reason why the treatment of exemption clauses in respect of these 
provisions should differ from the treatment of clauses exempting the implied terms in 
respect of quality, fitness for purpose and correspondence with description and 
sample.  Future sale of goods legislation should provide accordingly that exclusion of 
implied terms regarding spare parts and servicing and the safety of motor vehicles 
                                                 
429 Benjamin points out, for example, that the UK Unfair Terms Act is limited to exemption clauses 
(albeit widely defined) and has no application to other forms of unfair contract term regulated in other 
jurisdictions such as price escalation clauses, clauses providing for forfeiture and clauses providing that 
the agent of the party acts as agent of the other in certain respects.  Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., 
para. 13-063.   
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should be automatically unfair in consumer contracts and enforceable in business 
contracts only if shown to be fair and reasonable.  It may be argued that terms 
exempting the implied condition of safety in motor vehicles should always be 
ineffective.  Section 13 currently makes provision, however, for the implied term not 
to apply in specified circumstances. The safety of goods other than motor vehicles is 
encompassed by the implied term as to quality under section 14 and this can be 
excluded in the case of business contracts where shown to be fair and reasonable.     
 
5.25. RECOMMENDATION  
The provisions at sections 12(3) and 13(9) of the Sale of Goods and Supply of 
Services Act 1980 regarding contract terms which exempt any or all of the 
implied terms as to spare parts and after-sale service and the safety of motor 
vehicles should be amended so that they apply on the same basis as the 
provisions governing the exemption of other terms implied by the 1893 Act.    
 
Other Changes to Section 55 
5.26. Subsection 1 of the section, the only one carried over from the original Act of 
1893, restates the nineteenth century view of freedom of contract, though it adds that 
it is subject to the subsequent provisions of the section. Those other provisions 
undermine that assumption of contractual autonomy in stipulating that the terms 
implied into contracts by the Act cannot be excluded or varied in consumer sales and 
can only be excluded in commercial sales where shown to be fair and reasonable.  
Subsection 1 no longer serves a function in our view and should not be retained in 
future sale of goods legislation.   
 
5.27. Section 13(1) of the UK Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 contains a useful 
elaboration of the varieties of exemption clause as follows: 
   To the extent that this Part of the Act prevents the exclusion or restriction of any  
   liability it also prevents -  
(a) making the liability or its enforcement subject to restrictive or onerous conditions;  
(b) excluding or restricting any right or remedy in respect of the liability, or subjecting a 
person to any prejudice in consequence of his pursuing any such right or remedy; 
(c) excluding or restricting rules of evidence or procedure. 
   and (to that extent) … (the relevant sections of the Act) also prevent excluding or  
   restricting liability by reference to terms and notices which exclude or restrict the     
   relevant obligation or duty.  
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A provision along these lines should be included in future Irish sale of goods 
legislation. 
 
5.28 By virtue of the definition of ‘dealing as consumer’ at section 3 of the 1980 Act, 
section 55 and a number of provisions of the 1980 Act are restricted in their 
application to consumer sales to goods or services ‘of a type ordinarily supplied for 
private use or consumption’.  The definition also provides that, in the case of a sale by 
competitive tender, the buyer is not in any circumstances to be regarded as dealing as 
consumer.  A similar restriction in the case of sale by auction which was conditional 
on the making of a Ministerial order has not come into effect as no such order has 
been made.  These restrictions are not compatible in our view with the requirement to 
give effect to Directive 1999/44/EEC and should be repealed in future legislation.  
The UK Regulations which gave effect to the Directive repealed similar restrictions in 
the UK Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.430  Though Ireland is not currently in breach 
of the Directive by virtue of the fact that the Regulations which give effect to the 
Directive contain no such restrictions, our recommendation for the abolition of the 
present regime of dual regulation of consumer sales would mean an end to separate 
Regulations of this kind in the future.   
 
5.29  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The provisions regulating exemption clauses in future legislation should include 
a provision on the model of section 13(1) of the UK Unfair Terms Act 1977 that 
would specify, and prohibit, the principal ways in which liability is excluded or 
restricted.    
 
                                                 
430 The Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations 2002 (S.I. 3045/2002), Regulation 14.  
Article 1(3) of Directive 1999/44/EC on Consumer Sales and Guarantees gives Member States the 
option of excluding ‘second-hand goods sold at public auction where consumers have the opportunity 
of attending the sale in person’ from the definition of ‘consumer goods’.  The UK exercised this option, 
while Ireland did not.  The UK Regulations which give  effect to the Directive exclude buyers of 
second-hand goods at public auction from the scope of ‘dealing as consumer’ for the purposes of the 
remedial scheme derived from the Directive and incorporated at Part 5A of the Sale of Goods Act 
1979. The UK Regulations also amended section 12 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 to remove 
the previous blanket exclusion of  sales by competitive tender and auction from the scope of ‘dealing as 
consumer’, but inserted a new provision that an individual buyer of second-hand goods sold at public 
auction is not to be regarded as dealing as consumer.  The terms implied into contracts of sale by the 
UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 may be excluded in such cases consequently if the exclusion satisfies the 
test of reasonableness under section 6 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.    
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Subsection (1) of section 55 of the 1893 Act is at odds with the substance of the 
remainder of the section and should not be retained in future legislation.   
 
The restriction of section 55 of the 1893 Act and of a number of the provisions of 
the 1980 Act in their application to consumer sales and services to ‘goods or 
services of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption’ and the 
exclusion of sales by competitive tender which results from the definition of 
‘deals as consumer’ is not compatible with Directive 1999/44/EC and should not 
be retained in future legislation.   
 
 
SECTION 11 1980 ACT STATEMENTS PURPORTING TO RESTRICT 
RIGHTS OF BUYER  
 
(1) Subsections (2) and (3) apply to any statement likely to be taken as indicating that a 
right or the exercise of a right conferred by, or a liability arising by virtue of, section 12, 13, 14 or 
15 of the Act of 1893 is restricted or excluded otherwise than under section 55 of that Act. 
 
(1) It shall be an offence for a person in the course of a business to do any of the  
following things in relation to a statement to which subsection (1) refers: 
(a) to display on any part of any premises a notice that includes any such statement, 
or 
(b) to publish or cause to be published an advertisement which contains any such 
statement, or 
(c) to supply goods bearing, or goods in a container bearing, any such statement, or 
(d) otherwise to furnish or to cause to be furnished a document including any such 
statement. 
 
     (3) For the purposes of this section a statement to the effect that goods will not be    
          exchanged, or that money will not be refunded, or that only credit notes will be given for  
          goods returned, shall be treated as a statement to which subsection (1) refers unless it is so  
          clearly qualified that it cannot be construed as applicable in circumstances in which the  
          buyer may be seeking to exercise a right conferred by any provision of a section mentioned  
         in subsection (1). 
 
 (4) It shall be an offence for a person in the course of a business to furnish to a buyer goods 
bearing, or goods in a container bearing, or any document including, any statement, 
irrespective of its legal effect, which sets out, limits or describes rights conferred on a buyer or 
liabilities to the buyer in relation to goods acquired by him or any statement likely to be taken 
as such a statement, unless that statement is accompanied by a clear and conspicuous 
declaration that the contractual rights which the buyer enjoys by virtue of sections 12, 13, 14 
and 15 of the Act of 1893 are in no way prejudiced by the relevant statement. 
Section 41 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980, which contains a 
similar provision relating to statements purporting to restrict the rights of recipients of 
services, is discussed in Chapter 14.     
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5.30. Section 11 of the 1980 Act was introduced essentially as a back-up to the  
restrictions on exclusion clauses at section 55 of the Act.  As section 55 was modelled 
on the UK Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1963, section 11 was based on the 
UK Consumer Transactions (Restrictions of Statements) Order 1976.  The rationale 
for the section was outlined as follows in the second stage speech introducing the 
proposed legislation:431   
    To support these provisions making the various implied terms inescapable in  
    contracts it is also necessary to ensure that they cannot be evaded in any other way  
    and that sellers cannot even claim or pretend to withhold them by notices or  
    advertisements. This is done in section 11 of the Bill which makes it an offence to  
    put up notices in shops that goods will not be exchanged or money refunded and so  
   on . 
Though the reference to notices in shops makes clear that consumer protection was 
the main rationale of the provision, the scope of section 11, unlike that of the UK 
Order on which it was based, is not restricted to consumer transactions. While breach 
of the implied terms under the 1893 Act or of the Act’s restrictions on exclusion 
clauses is a civil matter the remedy for which must be pursued by the injured party, 
breach of section 11 is a criminal offence.  Responsibility for the investigation of 
alleged offences under the section and for any subsequent enforcement action now 
rests with the National Consumer Agency. 
 
5.31. Despite the fact that section 11 has been in force for thirty years, it is not 
uncommon for retailers to display statements that prima facie are in breach of it.  
Notices that simply state ‘No Refunds’ or ‘No refunds on Sale Items’ are clearly in 
contravention of the section.  The more common form of such notices states ‘No 
Refunds: This Does Not Affect Your Statutory Rights.’  As those statutory rights give 
consumers a right to reject the goods and obtain a full refund of the price where goods 
which have not been accepted by the buyer are in breach of the implied statutory 
terms,432 such statements are likely in our view to be taken as indicating that a right 
conferred by, or a liability arising under, sections 12-15 of the 1893 Act is restricted 
                                                 
431 Dáil Debates, vol. 309 16 November 1978, Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Bill Second 
Stage: col. 1109. 
432 Or where, in accordance with section 53 of the 1893 Act, a seller has refused to comply with a 
request, or fails to do so within a reasonable time, from a buyer dealing as consumer that the seller 
either remedy a breach of any condition which the buyer is compelled to treat as a breach of warranty 
or replace any goods not in conformity with the condition.   
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or excluded otherwise than under section 55 of that Act.  They do not appear to us 
either to meet the requirement of section 11(3) of being so clearly qualified that they 
cannot be construed as applicable in circumstances where the buyer is seeking to 
exercise a right conferred by the relevant sections of the 1893 Act. The same can be 
said of statements which limit the buyer’s remedies for breach of the implied terms to 
a credit note that can only be redeemed by another purchase or purchases from the 
same seller. As the present wording of section 11 appears to us to be adequate to 
preclude such statements, the issue would appear to be primarily one of enforcement.   
 
Issues Arising 
5.32 The main issue raised by section 11 is whether it remains necessary in view of 
section 43 of the Consumer Protection Act 2007 which gives effect to the provisions 
of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive on false, misleading and deceptive 
information.  Sections 43 (1) & (3)(j) of the Act state as follows: 
         43(1) A commercial practice is misleading if it includes the provision of false  
         information in relation to any matter set out in subsection (3) and that  
         information would be likely to cause the average consumer to make a  
         transactional decision that the average consumer would not otherwise make.   
 
        (3)(j) the legal rights of a consumer (whether contractual or otherwise) or matters  
        respecting when, how or in what circumstances those rights may be exercised.  
 
Per section 47 of the Act, a trader who engages in any misleading commercial 
practice described in section 43 commits an offence. Though section 43(3)(j) of the 
Consumer Protection Act is clearly aimed at the type of practices covered by section 
11 of the 1980 Act, it is expressed in more general and less detailed form.  If section 
11 Act is to be retained, however, the full harmonisation nature of the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive would appear to require the application of the 
Directive’s average consumer and transactional decision tests to any such provision in 
future legislation that is applicable to consumer transactions.433  
 
                                                 
433 Twigg-Flesner, C. et al.  2005.  An Analysis of the Application and Scope of the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive: A Report Prepared for the Department of Trade and Industry, 
pp. 158-62.   
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5.33. Though the Consumer Protection Act 2007 applies only to business-to-consumer 
commercial practices, the European Communities (Misleading and Comparative 
Marketing Communications) Regulations 2007434 contain equivalent prohibitions of 
misleading marketing communications in transactions between traders.  Regulation 
3(4)(j) which is worded identically to section 43(3)(j) of the 2007 Act prohibits 
misleading marketing communications about the legal rights of the trader. Unlike in 
the case of the Consumer Protection Act, breach of the Regulations is not a criminal 
offence, but injured parties can apply to the Circuit Court or the High Court for an 
order prohibiting the offending communication.   
 
5.34. Though a case might be made for retaining section 11 of the 1980 Act by reason 
of its more detailed and specific provisions, its purpose and function are adequately 
met in our view by the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act 2007 and the 
European Communities (Misleading and Comparative Marketing Communications) 
Regulations 2007. As statutory duplication of this kind is inherently undesirable, we 
favour the repeal of section 11.  We note in this connection that the UK Regulations 
which gave effect to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive revoked the 
Consumer Transactions (Restrictions of Statements) Order 1976 on which section 11 
was based.435   
 
5.35 RECOMMENDATION 
Section 11 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 should be 
repealed as it duplicates the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act 2007 and 
the European Communities (Misleading and Comparative Marketing 





                                                 
434 S.I. No. 774/2007.  
435 Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (S.I. 1277/2008), Regulation 30 & 
Schedule 4, Part 2.   
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CHAPTER SIX SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893: TRANSFER OF 
PROPERTY AS BETWEEN SELLER AND BUYER, SECTIONS 
16-20 
 
6.1. As discussed in Chapter 3, the distinguishing feature of a contract of sale is the 
transfer of property from seller to buyer. As Bridge observes,436 the passing of 
property in goods: 
    …affects contractual rights and duties.  It is the fulcrum on which depends issues as  
    diverse as the seller’s entitlement to sue for the price and the incidence of risk of  
    loss or casualty to the goods.  The passing of property may also have an incidental  
    effect on the remedies of the parties, including specific performance… The passing  
    of property is also of prime significance in defining the position of buyer and seller  
    on the other’s insolvency.  The whereabouts of the property may affect third parties  
    as it touches upon liability in conversion, insurable interest, liability in tax, criminal  
    responsibility, and the amenability of goods to execution of goods and insolvency  
    creditors.   
The rules regulating the transfer of property and the related issues of the reservation 
of the right of disposal of goods and the passing of risk are contained in section 16-20 
of the 1893 Act. As the rules on the passing of property in sections 16-18 apply 
differently to specific and unascertained goods, the first part of this Chapter will 
consider the two types of goods in turn.  The provisions applicable to specific goods 
are set out in section 17 and rules 1-4 of section 18 of the Act, while those applicable 
to unascertained goods are contained in section 16 and rule 5 of section 18.  The 
Chapter will then consider section 19 on the reservation of the right of disposal, and 
will conclude with an examination of section 20 on the passing of risk.   
 
I THE PASSING OF PROPERTY  
The Passing of Property in Specific Goods 
Section 17: Property Passes when Intended to Pass 
(1) Where there is a contract for the sale of specific or ascertained goods the  
property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract intend it 
to be transferred. 
 
(2) For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties regard shall be had to  
the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties, and the circumstances of the case. 
 
6.2. Specific goods are defined in section 62 of the 1893 Act as ‘goods identified and 
agreed upon at the time the contract of sale is made’ - a particular car or other item 
and not a car or other item of a generic kind.  Though ‘ascertained’ is not defined in 
                                                 
436 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 3.01.  
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the Act, it means goods that have been identified to the contract; as discussed later in 
the Chapter, section 16 of the Act refers to unascertained goods becoming 
‘ascertained’. Section 17(1) stipulates that the intention of the parties is the paramount 
criterion for the purposes of the passing of property, and section 17(2) provides that 
the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case 
are to be taken into account in ascertaining these intentions. A retention of title clause 
stipulating that property will not pass until the price has been paid, for example, is a 
clear expression of the intention of the parties. As some contracts, however, do not 
deal explicitly with the question of when property is to pass, section 18 contains four 
rules for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties in respect of specific 
goods. These rules, and the fifth rule concerning the passing of property in 
unascertained goods, are presumptive.  The law permits the parties to ‘settle the point 
for themselves by any intelligible expression of their intention.’437 We will look at 
each of these rules in turn.   
 
Section 18: Rules for Ascertaining Intention 
    Unless a different intention appears, the following are rules for ascertaining the  
    intention of the parties as to the time at which the property in the goods is to pass to  
    the buyer. 
 
     Rule 1.—Where there is an unconditional contract for the sale of specific goods, in  
     a deliverable state, the property in the goods passes to the buyer when the contract  
     is made, and it is immaterial whether the time of payment or the time of delivery,  
     or both, be postponed. 
 
6.3. The critical aspect of Rule 1 is the presumption that, in the absence of a contrary 
intention, the property in specific goods passes at the time the contract is made 
regardless of when delivery or payment take place.  Though the Rule expressly states 
that the postponement of the time of payment or delivery is immaterial for the 
purposes of the passing of property, such a postponement cannot be entirely 
disregarded in that it may be indicative of a contrary intention.438   
 
6.4. While Rule 1 is relatively straightforward, some of its elements have given rise to 
uncertainty. The first such uncertainty concerns the meaning of the term 
‘unconditional contract’. Commentaries on the Act are in agreement that the correct 
interpretation of ‘unconditional’ is that the contract is not subject to any condition 
                                                 
437 McEntire v Crossley Bros Ltd [1895] A.C. 457 at 467.   
438 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 315.   
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precedent, such as a retention of title clause, intended to determine the passing of the 
property in the goods.439 A number of English cases in the first six decades of the 
twentieth century, however, suggested that the term referred to a contract containing 
no ‘conditions’ in the sense of essential terms, breach of which would give the buyer 
the right to treat the contract as repudiated.  In Varley v Whipp which concerned the 
sale of a particular reaping machine, Channell J. held that, notwithstanding the 
absence of any suspensive condition, section 18(1) did not apply as ‘this was not an 
unconditional contract for the sale of specific goods’.440  It is possible, however, that 
this interpretation was influenced by a desire to circumvent the bar on the right of 
rejection which, by virtue of section 11(1)(c) of the 1893 Act, then applied to the sale 
of specific goods in which the property had passed.  Though the subsequent repeal of 
this particular provision may have lessened the likelihood that this interpretation 
would now be followed, it would be beneficial to clarify the matter in future 
legislation.   
 
6.5 Recommendation  
Rule 1 of section 18 of the 1893 Act should be amended to make clear that the 
term ‘unconditional contract’ does not refer to conditions in the sense of essential 
terms of the contract.   
 
6.6. A second issue raised by Rule 1 is that of the meaning of the words ‘deliverable 
state’; this term is also found in Rules 2, 3 and 5 of section 18.  Per section 61(4) of 
the 1893 Act, goods ‘are in a deliverable state within the meaning of this Act when 
they are in such a state that the buyer would under the contract be bound to take 
delivery of them.’  It can be argued that goods are not in a deliverable state if they are 
in breach of an express or implied condition relating to their state or quality as the 
buyer would not be bound to take delivery of them in such an event.  In practice, 
however, the requirement in Rule 1 has been given a more restrictive interpretation 
with the result that goods may be defective and yet be in a deliverable state.  Bridge 
suggests that ‘deliverable state’ can be ‘sensibly confined to the performance by the 
sellers of duties such as packing, repair, dismantling, and servicing between the 
                                                 
439 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., pp. 311-13.  Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 5.19.  
Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 3.10.  White, Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 370.   
440 [1900] 1 QB 513.  See also Ollett v Jordan [1918] 2 KB 41;  Leaf v International Galleries [1950] 2 
KB 86; and Long v Lloyd [1958] 1 WLR 753.   
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contract date and the delivery.’441  As discussed below, this eventuality is expressly 
provided for in rule 2 of Section 18.  In Underwood Ltd v Burgh Castle Brick and 
Cement Syndicate,442 a contract was made for the sale ‘free on rail’ of an engine 
weighing thirty tons. At the time the contract was made, the engine was fixed to the 
floor of the plaintiff’s premises and had to be separated from its base and dismantled 
before it could be delivered. The engine was damaged while being loaded onto a 
railway truck.  The Court of Appeal held that the property had not passed at the time 
the contract was made and the engine was still at the seller’s risk.  The engine was not 
in a deliverable state in accordance with the requirement of Rule 1 as it had to be 
detached and dismantled before it could be put in a condition in which the buyer 
would be bound to accept it.  Bankes L.J. observed:443 
   A ‘deliverable state’ does not depend upon the mere completeness of the subject  
   matter in all its parts.  It depends on the actual state of the goods at the date of the  
   contract and the state in which they are to be delivered by the terms of the  
   contract.  
 
     Rule 2.—Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods and the seller is  
     bound to do something to the goods, for the purpose of putting them into a  
     deliverable state, the property does not pass until such thing be done, and the buyer  
     has notice thereof. 
 
6.7. This Rule appears to be operative only where there is a term of the contract 
requiring the seller to do something to the goods to put them in a deliverable state.  It 
would not apply where, for example, the seller agreed to undertake repairs or 
adjustments that were not needed in order for the goods to be in a deliverable state.444  
Once goods have been put in a deliverable state, the buyer must be given notice of the 
fact before the property will pass. As the Rule does not stipulate that the seller shall 
give notice, but that the buyer shall have notice, Benjamin suggests that ‘notice’ 
means ‘knowledge’.445  Notice, however, must be actual and not constructive.446   
 
     Rule 3.—Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods in a deliverable  
     state, but the seller is bound to weigh, measure, test, or do some other act or thing  
     with reference to the goods for the purpose of ascertaining the price, the property  
     does not pass until such act or thing be done, and the buyer has notice thereof. 
                                                 
441 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 3.12.  
442 [1922] 1 K.B. 343.   
443 Ibid., at 345.  
444 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit. p. 317.  
445 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 5.034. 
446 Ibid., para. 5.034. Bridge, The Sale of Goods, para. 58. 
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6.8. The duty to weigh, measure, test etc. under this Rule must be one which has to be 
performed by the seller and not by the buyer or a third party.447  The acts to be 
performed by the seller must also be for the purpose of ascertaining the price.  If the 
seller is not bound to do some act for this specific purpose, the Rule does not apply.  It 
is not applicable, consequently, where goods are sold for a lump sum which is 
unaffected by any acts of weighing, measurement etc that are to be performed.448    
 
     Rule 4.—When goods are delivered to the buyer on approval or ‘‘on sale or  
     return’’ or other similar terms the property therein passes to the buyer:— 
(a) When he signifies his approval or acceptance to the seller or does any other  
act adopting the transaction: 
(b) If he does not signify his approval or acceptance to the seller but retains the  
goods without giving notice of rejection, then, if a time has been fixed for the return of 
the goods, on the expiration of such time, and, if no time has been fixed, on the expiration 
of a reasonable time. What is a reasonable time is a question of fact. 
 
6.9. Rule 4 deals with two types of transaction, ‘sale on approval’ and ‘sale or return’, 
but does not define either. Though these transactions have been differentiated in a 
number of ways, there is no conclusive authority on the distinction. Atiyah suggests 
that a sale on approval may legally amount to a contract of sale with a condition 
subsequent which permits the buyer to rescind the transaction if he finds the goods 
unsuitable, while a sale or return may not be a contract of sale but rather an offer to 
sell, accompanied by delivery, which must be accepted before it becomes a contract 
of sale.449  Bridge maintains that there is no contract of sale, as defined by the section 
1 of the 1893 Act, in either of these cases as the buyer has not yet bought or agreed to 
buy the goods.450  Prior to any contract of sale, the goods are held under a contractual 
bailment with the buyer having an option to buy. In Atari Corp (UK) Ltd v Electronics 
Boutique (UK) Stores Ltd,451 the Court of Appeal held that ‘sale or return’ contracts 
are contracts of bailment up to the time when property passes.  Bridge notes that, 
while ‘sale on approval’ seems primarily to deal with the acquisition of goods for 
personal use, and ‘sale or return’ with the acquisition of goods for resale, the latter is 
not invariably linked with resale.452  The true distinction between the two transactions 
                                                 
447 Nanka-Bruce v Commonwealth Trust Ltd [1926] A.C. 77.  
448 Hansen v Meyer (1805) 6 East 614; Alexander v Gardner (1835) 1 Bing (NC) 671; Lockhart v 
Pannell (1873) 22 UCCP 597 (Can).  
449 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 318.   
450 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 3.17.  
451 [1998] QB 539.  
452 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para.3.16.  
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may lie, therefore, in the active duty to return goods in ‘sale or return’ transactions, 
while in ‘sale on approval’ cases the obligation is to make them available to the 
bailor.    
 
6.10. In the absence of any contrary intention in the matter, rule 4 provides that 
property in the goods under sale on approval or sale or return arrangements passes to 
the buyer in any of the following circumstances : 
1) When the buyer signifies approval or acceptance of the goods to the seller; 
 
2) When the buyer does any other act adopting the transaction, for example by 
reselling or pledging the goods or taking any other action inconsistent with his 
free power to return the goods. In Kirkham v Attenborough,453 a buyer of 
goods on sale or return pledged them with a pawnbroker.  The Court of 
Appeal held that the property in the goods had passed to the buyer by this Act 
with the result that the pawnbroker acquired a good title to them, with Lord 
Esher stating that:454 
There must be some act which shows that he adopts the transaction; but 
any act which is consistent only with his being the purchaser is sufficient.   
 
3) When the buyer retains the goods, without giving notice of rejection, beyond 
the time set for their return.  The form of the notice will depend on the terms, 
express or implied, of the contract between the parties.  In Atari v Electronics 
Boutiques,455 the Court of Appeal held that, in the absence of any contrary 
intention, the notice did not have to be in writing.  In addition, it did not have 
to identify the precise goods subject to return; a generic designation (such as 
‘unsold stock’) which would permit individual identification at a later stage 
sufficed for this purpose.   
 
4) When no time limit is fixed for the return of the goods, on the expiry of a 
reasonable time.  What is reasonable will depend on the circumstances of the 
case; a shorter time will be allowed, for example, for perishable items than for 
durable goods.456 In Poole v Smith’s Cars (Balham) Ltd,457 the lapse of a 
‘reasonable time’ in a sale or return transaction between two car dealers was 
assessed by reference to a range of factors including the state of the second-
hand car market at the time of the year, the car’s depreciation, the bailor’s 
repeated requests for the return of the car, and the apparently short-term nature 
of the bailment.   
    
 
 
                                                 
453 [1897] 1 Q.B. 201.  
454 Ibid., at 203.  
455 [1998] QB 539. 
456 White, Commercial Law, op. cit., p.374.  
457 [1962] 1 WLR 744.  
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The Passing of Property in Unascertained Goods 
 
Section 16: Goods must be ascertained 
    Where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained goods no property in the  
     goods is transferred to the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained. 
6.11. The 1893 Act does not define ‘unascertained goods’ but, as discussed at 
paragraph 2.50. above, the term mean goods not identified and agreed upon at the 
time the contract is made. Though future goods can be specific in certain 
circumstances, this does not hold in the case of the passing of property.  Goods must 
be either future or specific for this purpose.458 As further outlined in Chapter 2, there 
are two distinct categories of unascertained goods: first, wholly unascertained goods 
for which the parties have not designated a source of supply in the contract and, 
second, ‘quasi-specific’ goods which are to be supplied from an specified bulk and are 
thus partially identified – for example, 100 tons of wheat from a consignment of 1,000 
tons on a named ship.  For the purposes of the 1893 Act, however, such quasi-specific 
goods remain unascertained. 
 
6.12. Section 16 lays down the fundamental and mandatory rule that property cannot 
pass until goods are ascertained.  This rule cannot be excluded or altered by the terms 
of the contract or the intention of the parties. As Mustill J. stated in Karlshamns 
Oljefabriker v Eastland Navigation Corp
459: 
    Whatever the intention of the parties, where there is a contract for the sale of  
     unascertained goods, no property can pass until the goods are ascertained… Once  
     ascertainment has taken place, the passing of property depends on the intention of  
     the parties and the circumstances of the case. 
Per Atkin LJ in re Wait, goods which are not ascertained at the time of the contract 
become ascertained by becoming ‘identified in accordance with the agreement after 
the time a contract of sale is made.’460  In Goode’s view461, the identification of goods 
to the contract involves two stages separated by a temporal interval: 
    At the moment the contract is made, the parties must, as terms of the contract, agree  
    upon the characteristics by which the goods to be supplied are to be identified.   
    This means at least some verbal description in writing or by word of mouth… At  
    the second stage, goods possessing the specific characteristics must be set aside and  
    appropriated to the contract, so that the seller ceases to be entitled to proferr or the  
    buyer to take other goods, even if having all the designated characteristics.   
                                                 
458 White, Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 384.  
459 [1982] 1 All ER 208 at 212.    
460 [1927] 1 Ch. 606 at 630.  
461 Goode on Commercial Law, op. cit., p.233.  
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6.13. In the leading case of re Wait,462 the buyer purchased 500 tons of wheat from a 
shipment of 1,000 tons.  Before the ship reached its destination, however, the seller, 
Wait, became bankrupt.  The Court of Appeal held that, although the buyer had part-
paid for the wheat, his share of the bulk had not been earmarked, identified or 
appropriated as the wheat to be delivered under the contract. The goods were 
unascertained, consequently, and the property in them had not passed.  The buyer was 
left to claim repayment of the price as an unsecured creditor and was also precluded 
from obtaining a decree of specific performance of the contract. In re London Wine 
Co. (Shippers) Ltd.,463 the company sold wine to consumers as an investment and 
stored the wine on their behalf.  The purchasers paid the price and the costs of 
insurance and storage and, in return, received certificates of title for the wine. The 
wine was stored in common, however, and was not earmarked or designated for 
individual buyers. The seller subsequently went insolvent and the buyers failed in 
their attempt to secure a proprietary right to the wine on the ground that, as it had not 
been ascertained, the property in it had not passed to them. A different outcome 
ensued, however, in another wine investment case, re Staplyton Fletcher.464 The 
sellers were wine merchants who stored wine for their customers. Though specific 
cases were not earmarked for individual purchasers, detailed records were kept of the 
wine bought by each customer and the customers’ wine was kept separate from the 
company’s own stock.  The court held that the separation of the wine from this stock 
rendered it sufficiently ascertained to enable property to pass with the customers 
owning it as tenants in common.  The problems resulting from section 16 were again 
apparent, however, in re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd465 in which the seller misled over 
1,000 New Zealand investors in gold and other precious metals into believing that he 
would store their bullion free of charge in a vault. The buyers received a certificate of 
ownership which indicated the quantity of bullion purchased and entitled them to take 
delivery of that quantity.  Pending delivery, however, the bullion was kept as part of 
the company’s general stock and was not apportioned to individual purchasers. When 
the company became insolvent, there was insufficient bullion to meet the claims of 
purchasers, and the available bullion was claimed in its entirety by a bank that had a 
floating charge over the company’s assets. The buyers’ claim for a share in the bullion 
                                                 
462 [1927] 1 Ch. 606. 
463 [1986] P.C.C. 121. 
464  [1994] 1 WLR 1181.  
465 [1995] 1 AC 74. 
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failed.  The Privy Council held that their contracts were for the sale of unascertained 
goods and, as a consequence, that they had no proprietary rights to the bullion.    
 
6.14. A specified quantity of unascertained goods forming part of an identified bulk 
may become ascertained, however, by a process of exhaustion.  In Wait and James v 
Midland Bank,466 the buyers purchased 1,250 quarters of wheat under three separate 
contracts from a bulk held in a warehouse.  The buyers took delivery of 400 quarters 
of their order and, over time, following deliveries to other purchasers, only 850 
quarters of the original bulk remained in the warehouse, all of which was originally 
owned by the sellers.  The court held that the wheat remaining in the warehouse had 
been ascertained as the quantity of goods agreed to be sold by the sellers to the buyers 
and that the property had passed.   In Karlshamns Oljefabriker v Eastport  Navigation 
Co. Ltd (The Elafi),467 the plaintiff purchased 6,000 tons of copra (dried coconut flesh 
used to make coconut oil) from a larger quantity on board the Elafi.  The rest of the 
cargo was sold to other buyers.  The plaintiffs then bought a further 500 tons from one 
of these other buyers. All but the 6,500 tons of the consignment was discharged at 
Rotterdam and Hamburg. The ship then sailed to Karlshamn where the remaining 
cargo was damaged by sea water. The court held that, while no property had passed 
on shipment as the copra was shipped in undivided bulk, the goods had been 
ascertained by exhaustion at Hamburg when all the copra meant for other buyers had 
been unloaded.  The court further held that the property should pass even though it 
was not possible to say which part of the copra constituted the 6,000 tons sold directly 
by the main seller and which part comprised the additional quantity purchased under a 
separate contract from the other seller. The situation in which goods forming part of a 
bulk become ascertained when separate contracts become vested in a single buyer, or 
when the whole of the bulk is sold under separate contracts to a single buyer, is 
sometimes referred to as ascertainment by consolidation.468   
 
6.15. Section 16 does not say when property will pass once the goods are ascertained.  
This will depend on the intention of the parties.  In deciding what the parties intended, 
regard will be had, in accordance with section 17(2), to the terms of the contract, the 
                                                 
466 (1926) 31 Com. Cas. 172.   
467 [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 679.   
468 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 5-063.   
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conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case.  In the absence of a clear 
expression of the parties’ intention, the passing of property will be governed by Rule 
5 of section 18.   
     Rule 5.—(1) Where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained or future goods  
     by description, and goods of that description and in a deliverable state are  
     unconditionally appropriated to the contract, either by the seller with the assent of  
     the buyer, or by the buyer with the assent of the seller, the property in the goods  
     thereupon passes to the buyer. Such assent may be express or implied, and may be  
     given either before or after the appropriation is made: 
 
(2) Where, in pursuance of the contract, the seller delivers the goods to the buyer  
 or to a carrier or other bailee or custodier (whether named by the buyer or not) for     
 the purpose of transmission to the buyer, and does not reserve the right of disposal,   
     he is deemed to have unconditionally appropriated the goods to the contract. 
This rule provides that, under a contract for the sale of unascertained or future goods 
by description, property passes to the buyer when goods of the contract description 
are ‘unconditionally appropriated to the contract’ by one party with the assent of the 
other. This requirement of unconditional appropriation essentially means that ‘some 
ascertained and identified goods must be irrevocably attached and earmarked for the 
particular contract in question’.469 Actual delivery of the goods to the buyer is the 
most straightforward form of appropriation. Rule 5(2) expressly provides that delivery 
to a carrier or other bailee or custodier will also suffice for this purpose.   
 
6.16. Appropriation can also occur while goods remain in the possession of the seller.  
In Aldridge v Johnson,470 the plaintiff agreed to buy 100 quarters of barley from a 
bulk of 200 quarters which he had seen and agreed to. He then sent two hundred sacks 
to the defendants to fill with the barley. The defendants filled 155 sacks, but 
subsequently emptied these shortly before becoming insolvent.  The House of Lords 
held that the goods had been unconditionally appropriated when they were placed in 
the sacks and that the property in them had passed at that point.  In Carlos Federspiel 
& Co SA v Charles Twigg & Co Ltd,471 however, the setting aside, labelling and 
packing of goods was held not to amount to unconditional appropriation.  The 
defendant agreed to manufacture and ship a consignment of bicycles to the plaintiff in 
Costa Rica.  The latter paid in advance and the bicycles were placed in crates marked 
with the buyer’s name on board a ship.  The defendant became insolvent before the 
                                                 
469 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 323.  
470 (1857) 7 E. & B. 885.  
471 [1957] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 240 at 255.  
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delivery took place and the receiver refused to deliver the goods.  The court held that 
the goods had not been unconditionally appropriated to the contract.  Pearson J stated 
that:472    
    A mere setting apart or selection by the seller of the goods which he expects to use  
    in performance of the contract is not enough.  If that is all, he can change his mind. 
    and use those goods in performance of some other contract and use some other  
    goods in performance of this contract.  To constitute an appropriation of the goods  
    to the contract the parties must have had, or be reasonably supposed to have had an  
    intention to attach the contract irrevocably to those goods, so that those goods and  
    no others are the subject of the sale and become the property of the buyer.  …  
He added that ‘usually but not necessarily, the appropriating act is the last act to be 
performed by the seller.’473  In Hendy Lennox Ltd v Grahame Puttick Ltd,474 it was 
held that electricity generators ordered by the buyers had been unconditionally 
appropriated to the contract with their assent when the goods were ready for delivery, 
and invoices and delivery notes, identifying the particular items to be delivered, had 
been received by them. At this point the sellers had done everything required of them 
under the contract of sale and could no longer substitute other generators for those 
designated for the buyer without the latter’s agreement.   
 
Issues Arising  
The Basis of the Rules  
6.17. The provisions of the 1893 Act on the passing of property raise a number of 
different issues. At the most general level, some commentators such as Bridge 
deprecate the pre-eminence of property in sales law, contending that this is out of step 
with both modern commercial realities and with a consumer society in which goods 
are more often than not bought to be consumed rather than retained.475  The Uniform 
Commercial Code which makes the transfer of possession, rather than property, the 
pivotal event for determining many of the rights and duties of sellers and buyers 
offers, on this analysis, a more coherent and practical basis for a modern sales law 
regime. Though a cogent case can be made for change along these lines, reform of the 
law of this nature and on this scale would require a major commitment of resources 
                                                 
472  Ibid., at 255.  
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474 [1984] 2 All ER 252.  
475 Bridge, M.G.  ‘The Evolution of Modern Sales Law’, (2003) L..M.C.L.Q. 52 at 63.  
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and a clear indication of political support.476  In the absence of evidence that the 
existing provisions are a cause of substantial practical difficulty or of any appreciable 
demand for change from business or consumer interests, fundamental reform of this 
element of the Sale of Goods Acts is not a practical proposition at the present time in 
our opinion.  It is telling in this context that, apart from the United States, no 
jurisdiction whose sales law is based on the 1893 Act has seen fit to amend sections 
16-20 in order to make delivery or possession, rather than the passing of property, the 
fulcrum of the legislation.     
 
6.18.  Though the UCC model has undoubted merits, it would be wrong, moreover, to 
assume that it would resolve all of the problems that have arisen in this area of the 
law. It is interesting to note in this connection that the editors of Atiyah’s Sale of 
Goods who had previously been supportive of a rule that would see the property in 
goods pass on, and not before, delivery, have  expressed reservations on the issue 
more recently, stating:477 
    The truth is that the problems concerned cannot be eliminated by changing the  
    rules about the transfer of property.  Questions will still arise (for instance) as to  
    who is the proper plaintiff to sue a third person when goods are damaged en route;  
    questions will still arise about risk; and the right to sue for the price.  Above all,  
    questions will still arise about the claims of a buyer against an insolvent seller (and  
    those claiming through him) as well as about the claims of a seller against an  
    insolvent buyer (and likewise those claiming through him).  These claims must be  
   disposed of by the law somehow.  One way of doing it is the traditional common  
    law way of trying to use a concept like ‘property’ to decide most of the problems,  
    while recognising that many exceptions must be made.  This has the disadvantage  
    … that the exceptions seem to eat up the rule.    
 
   Alternatively, the law might have abandoned the conceptual approach altogether  
   and adopted the ‘specific issue’ approach, that is, have dealt with each specific  
   question, such as the buyer’s ability to pass title to a third party, the passing of risk,  
   liability for the price etc. without reference to the passing of property.  That is the  
   approach of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code… But the alternative  
   approach, while it has many attractions, fails to provide answers to new problems  
                                                 
476 Goode, R. ‘Removing the obstacles to commercial law reform’, [2007] L.Q.R. 123.  Bridge has also 
acknowledged the practical obstacles to large-scale reform of sales law, stating that: ‘[there] is little 
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purist might argue the case for a wholesale revision of sales law, it is quite plain that such a project is 
not sufficiently economically important to lay claim to a substantial share of the nation’s wealth.  It is 
also quite plain that the great diversity among sales transactions would make that a most difficult 
venture.’  Bridge, ibid., p. 68.   
477  Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., pp. 309-310.  
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   unforeseen by the law, or indeed to problems newly created by subsequent laws …  
   the traditional common law approach has at least the virtue that in principle there is  
   always a way of meeting new problems, namely by looking to see who has the  
   property in the goods at the relevant moment, and treating that person as owner,  
   with consequences which are assumed to meet the new problems.   
 
In a later Chapter, however, the Group does, however, invite submissions as to 
whether reform of section 49 is possible or desirable as a ‘stand-alone’ reform  
( paragraph 11.5.).   
 
The Complexity of the Rules 
6.19. There is no doubt that the rules governing the passing of property are complex.  
They involve three different categories of goods (specific, unascertained, and future).  
A different core rule applies to the passing of property in the two main categories of 
specific and unascertained goods, while there are four rules for ascertaining the 
intention of the parties in respect of the passing of property in specific goods, and a 
further rule, in two parts, for elucidating intention in regard to unascertained goods.  
As discussed above, the terminology in these rules – ‘unconditional contract’, 
‘deliverable state’, sale ‘on approval’, ‘sale or return’ ‘unconditionally appropriated’ - 
is not a model of clarity, nor is the case law on some of these terms a model of 
consistency.   
 
6.20. A recent report on the consolidation of UK consumer law has put forward 
proposals for simplifying the provisions on the passing of property in specific goods 
at Rules 1-4 of Section 18.478  The main elements of these proposals are as follows: 
1) The ‘deliverable state’ concept should be removed from Rule 1 as it is largely 
superfluous in consumer sales. As the risk of loss or damage to goods in 
consumer sales does not pass until delivery following legislative changes 
made in the UK in 2002, it is no longer necessary to provide that risk stays 
with the seller until he has completed whatever must be done to put the goods 
in a deliverable state.  The only significance of the ‘deliverable state’ concept 
consequently is in relation to the passing of property and there is no good 
reason for its passing to be delayed on this ground. 
 
2) If the ‘deliverable state’ concept is removed from Rule 1, Rule 2 would need 
to be abolished as the only point of the latter Rule is to address the situation in 
which the goods were not in a deliverable state at the time of the conclusion of 
                                                 
478 Howells, G. & Twigg-Flesner, C.  (eds).  Consolidation and Simplification of UK Consumer 
Law, op. cit., paras. 8.59-8.69. .   
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the contract.  In other words, ownership would pass under Rule 1 so long as 
the contract was unconditional and it would not matter that something had to 
be done to the goods to make them deliverable.   
 
3) Rule 3 should also be abolished as its abolition would seem to follow logically 
from the deletion of the ‘deliverable state’ concept.  If there is no real reason 
to delay the passing of property until goods are deliverable, the corollary is 
that there is no reason to delay it until the precise price is determined, 
particularly as the degree of price variation is likely to be marginal in 
consumer cases.   
 
4) Rule 4 should be abolished and replaced by a simpler provision stating that, in 
the case of ‘sale or return’, property passes at the time of the contract but 
would revest in the seller if the buyer chooses not to buy the goods. 
 
As well as significantly simplifying the rules on the passing of property, the 
proponents of these reforms suggest that they would also reduce the risk posed by 
insolvency.  Consumers are currently exposed to this risk where the requirements of 
Rules 2, 3 and 14 of section 18 remain to be satisfied.  If Rules 2 and 3 were 
abolished, ownership would pass despite the fact that goods had still to be put in a 
deliverable state or had still to be weighed, measured or tested.  Ownership would 
also pass to the consumer where goods were obtained on a sale or return basis, subject 
to the possibility of ownership re-vesting in the seller if the consumer chose not to 
buy the goods.  While these reforms would strengthen the position of consumers, their 
proponents contend that they would not prejudice the position of sellers.  If the 
consumer refused to pay for the goods, the seller would not be obliged, in accordance 
with section 27 of the Act, to deliver them.  It would remain open to the parties, 
moreover, to stipulate that ownership would not transfer until payment had been 
made. We discuss this issue further at paragraphs 6.27 to 6.32. in relation to pre-
paying consumers, and are not recommending changes to section 18, rules 1 to 4 on 
that ground.  In this context, we do not see a case for adjusting rules to deal indirectly 
with insolvency considerations that have no real impact on consumers, particularly 
when contractual ‘boilerplate’ clauses could step around the reform in any event.   
 
Unascertained Goods Forming Part of a Bulk  
6.21. As outlined above, case law on section 16 highlighted the vulnerable position of 
pre-paying buyers of goods in bulk in that, despite having paid for the goods and 
perhaps even receiving a document purporting to be a document of title to them, the 
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buyer had no property rights over the goods while they remained part of the larger 
bulk. The issue received further prominence in 1985 as a result of The Gosforth, a 
case decided by the Commercial Court in Rotterdam on the basis of the English law 
that governed the contract.479 The case aroused concern among commodity traders, 
and the Law Commission for England and Wales was approached by a leading 
international commodity trading association, the Grain and Feed Trade Association, 
and asked to review the relevant law. Following a number of consultation papers, the 
Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission issued a joint final report in 1993 
on Sale of Goods Forming Part of a Bulk.480 The report concluded that the rule in 
section 16 was contrary to the principle of freedom of contract and to the reasonable 
expectations of contracting parties. The rule applied in an anomalous and inconsistent 
way in that, first, it appeared not to prevent property passing to a buyer who agreed to 
buy an undivided share in a bulk expressed as a fraction of the whole (e.g. half the 
cargo from a named ship), but did prevent it passing where a specified quantity from a 
larger bulk was purchased (e.g. 500 tons from 1000 tons aboard a named ship). 
Secondly, it did not prevent property passing where a buyer purchased the whole bulk 
under one contract, or where one buyer purchased the whole bulk under several 
contracts.  If the whole bulk was purchased by different buyers under separate 
contracts, however, none of them acquired any property in any goods.  Thirdly, it 
appeared that, if a buyer contracted to buy goods from a bulk and the contract quantity 
was momentarily separated and then returned to the bulk, the buyer became the co-
owner, as tenant in common with the seller, of the new bulk. The effect of section 16 
was particularly harsh where the buyer had paid the price but the seller became 
insolvent before the goods were ascertained.  The buyer was then left as an unsecured 
creditor and might see the goods re-sold and the proceeds used to pay other creditors. 
 
6.22. The recommendations put forward by the Law Commissions to address these 
deficiencies were implemented in the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995 which 
inserted new sections 20A and 20B in the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979. These sections 
provide that, where there is a contract for the sale of a specified quantity of 
unascertained goods forming part of an identified bulk, a buyer who has paid for some 
                                                 
479 For a discussion of the case, see Davenport, B.  ‘Ownership of Bulk Cargos – The Gosforth’, (1986)  
L.M.C.L.Q. 4. 
480 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  1993.  Sale of Goods Forming Part of 
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or all of the contract goods obtains an undivided share in the bulk and becomes a 
tenant in common of the whole. The tenancy in common is realisable upon 
apportionment of the identified quantity to the individual contracts of the tenants (i.e. 
the buyers). While ascertainment and appropriation are still required in order for the 
goods to be subject to individual proprietary rights, the amending provisions establish 
new proprietary rights for buyers while the goods remain in bulk - the tenancy in 
common. This does not amount to ownership of part of the bulk, but means that, 
together with the other tenants in common, the buyer has a shared property interest in 
the contents of the bulk.  
 
6.23. Section 20A of the 1979 Act lays down three conditions that must be satisfied 
for a tenancy in common to apply:  
1) the contract must be for the sale of goods from an identified bulk 
source;  
2) the contract must be for a specified quantity of goods (as opposed to a 
share);  
3) the buyer must have paid some or all of the price of the goods.  
The section also stipulates how the quantum of each buyer’s share is to be calculated.  
If the total of the amounts paid for by the buyers does not exceed the whole of the 
bulk, each buyer’s share is proportionate to his share of the price of the bulk as a 
whole. If the total of the amounts paid for by the buyers exceeds the bulk, each 
buyer’s share is reduced proportionately. Section 20B deals with the effects of 
creating a tenancy in common, and requires all owners to be joined in order to transfer 
any part of the bulk.  It provides for a deemed consent on behalf of the buyers that a 
tenant in common agrees that the goods may be dealt with, e.g. appropriated and 
delivered etc, and that no cause of action may accrue in this instance as against the 
seller. Furthermore, there is no obligation on the other tenants to compensate for a 
shortfall in delivery. The 1995 Act also made consequential amendments to section 16 
and Rule 5 of section 18 of the Sale of Goods Act. The changes to the latter rule 
confirmed the doctrine of ascertainment by exhaustion.  As noted in Chapter 2, there 
were also consequential amendments to the definitions of ‘goods’ and ‘specific 
goods’.   
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6.24. The reforms effected by the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995 were 
generally welcomed by commercial interests and academic commentators.481 
Criticism in academic commentary centred on specific aspects of the provisions - such 
as their restriction to pre-paying buyers and the absence of rules about the allocation 
of risk in the event of the deterioration of the goods before the buyer took delivery of 
his share of the bulk – as well as on broader questions such as the implications of the 
reforms for concepts of possession, constructive possession and co-ownership.  While 
there was some criticism of the piecemeal nature of the changes, there was also a 
recognition that a limited, targeted response to the matters at issue stood a better 
chance of enactment.482 To date, no case law arising from the reforms made by the 
1995 Act has been reported in the UK.   
 
6.25. The 1995 Act has proved influential in other common law jurisdictions. Similar 
reforms have been adopted in Singapore, New South Wales, Southern Australia, and 
Victoria and have been proposed in Hong Kong.  The ownership in common approach  
is also the basis for the Uniform Commercial Code’s rules on goods forming part of a 
bulk.  Section 2-105(5) of the Code provides:  
    An undivided share in an identified bulk of fungible goods is sufficiently identified  
    to be sold although the quantity of the bulk is not determined.  Any agreed  
    proportion of such a bulk or any quantity thereof agreed upon by number, weight or  
    other measure may to the extent of the seller’s interest in the bulk be sold to the  
    buyer who then becomes an owner in common.   
This underlines the fact that, while the reforms enacted by the Sale of Goods 
(Amendment) Act 1995 are open to criticism, credible alternative approaches are 
lacking.  The legislative changes made in the UK to address the issues raised by the 
sale of unascertained goods forming part of an identified bulk are balanced and 




                                                 
481  Bradgate, R. & White, F. ‘Sale of Goods Forming Part of a Bulk: Proposals for Reform’, (1994)  
L.M.C.L.Q.  315; Ulph, J. ‘The Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995: co-ownership and the rogue 
seller’, (1996) L.M.C.L.Q. 93;  Burns, T. ‘Better Late than Never:  the reform of the law on sale of 
goods forming part of a bulk’, (1996) MLR (59) 260; Gullifer, L. ‘Constructive Possession After the 
Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995’, (1999) L.M.C.L.Q. 93; Worthington, S. ‘Sorting Out 
Ownership Interest in a Bulk: Gifts, sales and Trusts’, (1999)  J.B.L. 1; Crinion, J. ‘ “All that Glitters 
…” Re Wait, Section 16 and the Peril for the Pre-Paying Buyer: is it time for a fresh approach?’, (2004) 
UCD Law Review 76. 
482 Ulph, J., ibid. at 106.  
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6.26. Recommendation  
Provisions along the lines of those contained in the UK Sale of Goods 
(Amendment) Act 1995 should be introduced to deal with the issue of 
unascertained goods forming part of an identified bulk.   
 
Consumer Buyers and Insolvent Sellers 
6.27. Insolvencies are a not uncommon occurrence in the retail sector.483 Though most 
of these insolvencies do not lead to losses for consumers, serious detriment can result 
for consumers in cases where they have paid for goods in advance of delivery.484  
When Jim Langan Furniture Value Ltd went into liquidation in 2009, for example, 
some 2,000 customers had paid deposits of €1m.485 The liquidator, however, was able 
only to supply stock to the value of €65,000 to these customers.  If the property in the 
goods has passed, the consumer will be able to claim ownership of the goods from the 
receiver or liquidator. The difficulty for buyers in such situations, however, is that, 
under the rules in sections 16 to 18 of the Sale of Goods Act, payment of the price is 
not linked to the passing of property. Goods ordered and paid for in advance – for 
example, electrical goods or furniture chosen on the basis of a sample on display in 
the store which have then to be dispatched from a warehouse or ordered from a 
manufacturer – will normally be unascertained. The pre-paying buyer will have no 
proprietary right over the goods as a result, and his payment will be used, together 
with the insolvent seller’s other assets, to pay the creditors. Though the buyer is one 
of these creditors, he will rank as an unsecured creditor behind the preferred and 
secured creditors when it comes to the distribution of the assets. There will often be 
no, or very limited, funds available to meet claims for price recovery or actions for 
damages by unsecured creditors. In the Jim Langan Furniture Value Ltd liquidation, 
                                                 
483 According to www.insolvencyjournal.ie, there were 201 retail insolvencies in Ireland in 2009 and 
177 in 2010.  In its 2009 Annual Report, the National Consumer Agency noted increased concern 
among consumers on the issue, stating: ‘Commencing at the very end of 2008 and continuing 
throughout 2009, a significant upsurge in calls was received in respect of consumers with fears about 
firms going out of business.  Principal amongst the concerns of callers was consumer rights in respect 
of deposits paid for goods not yet received or services not yet rendered, the rights of gift voucher and 
credit note holders and concerns around recourse in the event of faulty goods once a retailer had ceased 
trading.’  National Consumer Agency Annual Report 2009, p. 38.   
484 For a detailed discussion, see Bradgate, R. & White, F.  2007.  ‘Insolvent  Sellers and Pre-Paying 
Buyers’ in Howells, G. et al (eds).  2007.  The Yearbook of Consumer Law 2007 (Aldershot: 
Ashgate), pp. 31-85.  
485 Jim Langan Furniture Value Limited (in Liquidation): Statement of Affairs by Liquidator.  
http://www.liquidation.ie/Jim_Langan_Furniture_Value_Limited_in_Liquidation.764.html   See also 
Irish Times 3 March 2009, ‘Customers Lose as Furniture Firm Shuts’.   
 214
for example, none of the creditors received payment.  Depending on the rules of their 
payment card scheme, buyers who have paid by credit card, or in a minority of cases 
debit card, may be able to recoup payments in such circumstances through chargeback 
mechanisms.    
 
6.28. Though the changes recommended in the previous section to address the issue of  
unascertained goods forming part of an identified bulk discussed in the preceding 
section will apply to both consumer and commercial sales, their relevance to 
consumer sales is slight. The Report of the English and Scottish Law Commissions 
that formed the basis for the corresponding amendments to the UK Sale of Goods Act 
1979 acknowledged that ‘the reform is not designed primarily for consumers’.486  The 
provisions have no application to the sale of wholly unascertained goods which are 
probably the norm in pre-paid consumer sales. The concepts of bulk and co-
ownership which are central to the provisions were formulated with large-scale 
commodity transactions in mind and do not readily fit the characteristics of consumer 
sales.487  
 
6.29. While limited changes have been made to insolvency rules in some countries to 
improve the position of unsecured creditors, reform of sale of goods legislation to 
strengthen the position of pre-paying consumer buyers of unascertained goods has 
been undertaken only in British Columbia.  Following a report of the Law Reform 
Commission of British Columbia,488 the Consumer Protection Statutes Amendment 
Act SBC 1993 added a new Part 9 to what is now the Sale of Goods Act 1996 in order 
to give consumer buyers a mandatory, non-possessory lien over the seller’s goods. 489 
The lien cannot be excluded and applies where the following conditions are met:  
1) the seller makes an agreement to sell goods in the usual course of his business; 
2) the buyer pays all or part of the price;  
3) the goods are unascertained or future goods; and 
4) the buyer is acquiring the goods in good faith for use primarily for personal, 
family or household purposes. 
                                                 
486 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  Sale of Goods Forming Part of a Bulk, 
op. cit., para. 4.3.  
487 Bradgate & White, ‘Insolvent  Sellers and Pre-Paying Buyers’, op. cit., pp. 69-70.  
488 Law Commission of British Columbia.  1987. Report on the Buyer’s Lien: A New Consumer 
Remedy (LCR 93).    
489 Then the Sale of Goods Act 1979.  
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The lien is for the amount the buyer has paid towards the purchase price of the goods 
and applies against all goods in possession of the seller that correspond with the 
contract description, and the property in which has not passed to another buyer.  The 
lien can also apply to any bank account in which the seller usually deposits the 
proceeds of his sales. The legislation contains further rules dealing with the 
termination of the lien (when property passes to the buyer, or where the purchase 
price has been refunded at the seller’s option); the lien’s priority over other security 
interests; proceedings to enforce the lien; and cases of conflict where two or more 
liens exist over the same property (any shortfall in such a case is attributed to the 
buyers’ claims in the proportion that their respective claims bear to the sum of those 
claims). As against other buyers with liens, therefore, the lien operates akin to a 
tenancy in common; where there is a shortfall, each buyer shares proportionately in 
the deficit. 
 
6.30. The proposals of the British Columbia Law Commission and the subsequent 
legislation were largely welcomed by academic commentators for providing a 
relatively straightforward scheme to protect consumer buyers in certain, though not 
all, circumstances.490 Unlike the legislative provisions in the UK on unascertained 
goods forming part of a bulk, however, the reforms adopted in British Columbia have 
not been adopted either in other Canadian provinces or in other jurisdictions. Though 
the mandatory lien approach has some merits, it is not one that we can recommend.  It 
is necessary to bear in mind in this context that, as the rules governing insolvency 
come within the remit of the federal authorities in Canada, British Columbia did not 
have the option of protecting pre-paying consumer buyers by means of changes to 
insolvency legislation. An outcome similar to that brought about by the consumer lien 
could be achieved more simply by giving consumer buyers preferential status, like 
employees as regards unpaid wages, in insolvencies.  Dealing with the issue through 
reform of the rules on insolvency would also allow protection to be provided for pre-
paying buyers of services.  Consumer detriment is as, if not more, likely to arise in 
situations where consumers have paid in advance for services as it is for goods, and 
                                                 
490 See further Wood, ‘Law Reform Commission of British Columbia Report on the Buyer’s Lien: A 
new consumer remedy’, (1988) 14 C.B.L.J. 118; Bridge, ‘The Prepaying Buyer and the Bankrupt 
Seller’, (1989) 3 B.F.L.R, 171; Close, ‘The British Columbia Buyer’s Lien - a new consumer remedy’, 
(1995) 25 C.B.L.J. 127.  
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tackling the problem through reform of the statutory rules on the passing of property 
in goods does nothing to improve the position of these buyers.491  It is necessary also 
to acknowledge that giving consumer buyers preferential status raises issues of 
fairness vis-à-vis other categories of creditor. These issues are more appropriately 
considered in the context of the overall rules on insolvencies than in the narrower 
context of the rules governing the passing of property in contracts of sale.  The 
question of the priority of the buyer’s lien vis-à-vis other secured creditors has been 
left for the judiciary to determine in British Columbia.  This gives rise to uncertainty 
as matters relating to the priority of security interests are likely prima facie to invite 
legal challenge, particularly perhaps where, as in the case of the buyer’s lien, it takes 
the form of an unregistered security interest.   
 
6.31. An alternative approach to the protection of pre-paying consumer buyers of 
unascertained goods has recently been proposed in a report on the reform of UK 
consumer law prepared by a group of academics for the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills.492  The report proposes that the ownership of goods held in 
stock by the seller would pass to the consumer on the basis of the order in which they 
were purchased.  As each item was purchased, one such item would be treated as 
belonging to that customer. If there were no items in stock when the purchase was 
made or if that stock was all committed to earlier customers, new incoming stock 
purchased by the seller would be treated as owned by customers according to when 
their purchase was made.  Property in the goods would pass therefore at the time the 
contract was made if the goods in question were in stock or, where the goods were not 
in stock, as soon as the next item of these goods came into stock.  According to its 
proponents, the advantage of this approach is that it would reduce the risk of 
consumer exposure to consumer insolvency while avoiding the uncertainties of an 
approach based on ascertainment and unconditional appropriation. 
 
6.32. While this is an interesting proposal, we have a number of reservations about it.  
Most obviously, it would offer no protection to consumers ‘at the end of the queue’ in 
                                                 
491 In March 2011, the Dublin gym chain Total Fitness went into liquidation owing an estimated €1.6m 
to 11,150 members who had paid annual subscription fees in advance. The liquidator informed these 
members that no dividend would be paid to unsecured creditors in their position. Irish Times, 25 April 
2011.  ‘Buyers Beware – Company Closures Can Cost You.’  
492 Howells, G. & Twigg-Flesner, C. Consolidation and Simplification of UK Consumer Law, op. 
cit., paras. 8.79-8.82.  
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cases where more sales had been made than corresponding items bought in.  The 
passing of ownership to the pre-paying buyer would only apply, moreover, to goods 
owned by the seller. Where the consumer’s order remained to be met by a 
manufacturer or supplier, the proposed remedy would not be available. On a practical 
level, it is conceivable that difficulties could arise in matching orders with existing 
and incoming stock for the purpose of allocating ownership. The position of buyers  
who have only part-paid for goods in advance is also unclear. As its authors 
acknowledge, a further risk with the proposal is that the enhanced status it would give 
consumers in cases of insolvency could significantly reduce the value of floating 
charges as between banks and trader borrowers. They acknowledge that this might 
make banks less willing to lend to such borrowers and suggest that research should be 
carried out to establish if adoption of this approach would have an adverse effect on 
bank lending to retailers and other businesses.  As is well known, it is difficult enough 
for businesses to secure lending from banks at present and anything that would add to 
these difficulties is not a realistic proposition on this ground alone.   
 
6.33.  Recommendation  
No other changes are recommended to the provisions governing the passing of 
property in sections 16 to 18 of the 1893 Act.   
 
 
Section 19: Reservation of Right of Disposal 
 
(1) Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods or where goods are subsequently 
appropriated to the contract, the seller may, by the terms of the contract or 
appropriation, reserve the right of disposal of the goods until certain conditions are 
fulfilled. In such case, notwithstanding the delivery of the goods to the buyer, or to a 
carrier or other bailee or custodier for the purpose of transmission to the buyer, the 
property in the goods does not pass to the buyer until the conditions imposed by the 
seller are fulfilled. 
 
(2) Where goods are shipped, and by the bill of lading the goods are deliverable to the order 
of the seller or his agent, the seller is prima facie deemed to reserve the right of disposal. 
 
(3) Where the seller of goods draws on the buyer for the price, and transmits the bill of 
exchange and bill of lading to the buyer together to secure acceptance or payment of the 
bill of exchange, the buyer is bound to return the bill of lading if he does not honour the 
bill of exchange, and if he wrongfully retains the bill of lading the property in the goods 
does not pass to him. 
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Section 19 has not been amended since its enactment, nor have the equivalent 
provisions at section 19 of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979.  
 
6.34. As discussed in Chapter 3, section 1(2) of the 1893 Act provides that a contract 
of sale may be absolute or conditional, and conditional sale arrangements have been 
judicially approved since the late nineteenth century.493 Section 19 deals with 
important types of conditional contract in both general and specific terms.  As Bridge 
notes, its purpose is to counter the presumptive rules on the passing of property in 
section 18 by stipulating that, in the cases of a contract for the sale of specific goods 
or the appropriation of goods to a contract for the sale of unascertained goods, the 
property will not pass where the seller reserves the right of disposal.494  Reservation 
of the right of disposal is most common in the case of unascertained goods and its 
principal effect is to delay the passing of property after delivery as this is the usually 
the event that determines that passing.  In the case of specific goods where, in 
accordance with Rule 1 of section 18, property would otherwise pass when the 
contract was made, the title reservation must take place by the terms of the contract 
and, as a consequence, before delivery.   
 
6.35. Section 19(1) authorises the seller of the goods to insert a term in the contract of 
sale that property in the goods will not pass to the buyer until certain conditions are 
fulfilled. As discussed below, the most common such condition is payment of the 
price, but the seller is at liberty to seek the reservation of the right of disposal on 
whatever conditions he wishes to make.495 Such reservation may be express or be 
implied from the circumstances of the agreement.  If the contract is one for the sale of 
specific goods, the seller must by the terms of the contract, reserve the right of 
disposal. If the contract is one for the sale of unascertained goods, the parties may 
agree either by the terms of the appropriation or the contract that the right of disposal 
is reserved. However, a seller may also, when appropriating unascertained goods to 
the contract, unilaterally reserve the right of disposal and impose conditions to be 
fulfilled before the property in the goods will pass.496 Where the seller reserves the 
right of disposal, he retains prima facie both the legal and equitable title to the goods. 
                                                 
493 McEntire v Crossley [1895] AC 457.  
494 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 3.74.   
495 Benjamins Sale of Goods, op. cit. para. 5-131.  
496 Glenbarron v Kreeft (1875) L.R. 10 Ex. 274 
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However, it is open to the parties to agree that the seller is to retain the beneficial 
ownership of the goods only,497 or that the seller, though retaining the legal ownership 
of goods, is to hold them on trust for the buyer.498  
 
6.36. Historically, cases involving the reservation of the right of disposal arose mainly 
in connection with contacts for the sale of goods to be carried by sea where the seller 
sought security against default by, or the insolvency of, the buyer.  Sections 19(2) and 
(3) deal with two such cases where the seller is taken by implication to have reserved 
a right of disposal:  
2) Where a seller ships goods and, by the bill of lading, the goods are deliverable 
to the order of the seller or to the seller’s agent, the seller is prima facie 
deemed to have reserved the right of disposal,499 and 
3) Where the seller sends a bill of exchange for the price of the goods to the 
buyer for acceptance or payment together with a bill of lading. 
Under subsection (2), a seller who takes a bill of lading which makes the goods 
deliverable to his own order or to his agent (such as a bank) is held to reserve the 
right of disposal until he is paid or his other conditions are met. As other parties 
cannot take delivery of the goods without the bill of lading, the seller’s possession 
of these bills allows him to treat the goods as security for payment. Under 
subsection (3), the seller can reserve the right of disposal even where the bill of 
lading is delivered to the buyer by transmitting this bill to the buyer together with a 
bill of exchange for the price.  If the buyer does not honour the bill of exchange, he 
must return the bill of lading.  If the buyer wrongfully retains the bill of lading, the 
subsection provides that the property in the goods does not pass to him.   
 
6.37. While reservation of the right of disposal can afford the seller effective 
protection against the buyer’s default or insolvency, it cannot provide a similar level 
of protection against the risk that the buyer may resell the goods to a third party 
before he has paid the seller for them. As discussed in Chapter 7, the buyer in this 
situation may be able to pass a good title to the goods under various provisions of 
sections 21-23 & 25-26 of the 1893 Act even where the property in the goods has not 
                                                 
497 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit. para. 5-134 fn. 57, points out that a reservation of beneficial 
ownership might operate only by grant of legal and beneficial ownership followed by a re-grant of 
beneficial ownership as in re Bond Worth Ltd [1980] Ch.228.  
498 Re London Wine Co. (Shippers) Ltd. [1986] P.C.C. 121.  
499 This presumption may be rebutted by proof of a contrary intention or the circumstances of the case. 
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passed to him because of the seller’s reservation of the right of disposal.  Reservation 
of title clauses which seek to address this risk to the seller are discussed later in the 
Chapter.   
 
Retention of Title Clauses  
6.38. As discussed in Chapters 10 and 11, the 1893 Act offers unpaid sellers a range 
of remedies. Sections 49 and 50 provide respectively that, where the buyer wrongfully 
neglects or refuses to pay for the goods, the seller can sue for the price or for damages 
for non-acceptance. These remedies are of little use, however, where the buyer’s 
inability to pay results from insolvency. The rights available to unpaid sellers under 
sections 38-48 of the Act in these circumstances  – a lien over the goods, a right to 
stop the goods in transit, and a right to resell the goods and terminate the originate 
contact – are subject to a range of restrictions and, as discussed further in Chapter 11, 
the remedies they provide have proved to be of limited value in modern commercial 
circumstances. It has become common consequently for sellers to have recourse to 
retention of title clauses in order to protect themselves from non-payment by buyers. 
Under such clauses, the seller retains title to the goods supplied to the buyer until they 
have been paid for. If the clause is effective, the goods cannot then be subject to any 
security interest granted by the buyer to his creditors. Though retention of title clauses 
are mainly found in commercial contracts, they can occur also in consumer 
contracts.500 As the main issues raised by section 19 relate to these clauses rather than 
to the statutory provision itself, it is necessary to consider them in more detail.    
 
6.39. Retention of title clauses take a variety of forms.501  The simplest form of such 
clause – sometimes referred to as an original goods claim - seeks to retain title to the 
goods supplied under the contract until the price has been paid.  In Bernard Somers v 
James Allen (Ireland) Ltd,502 the respondent company had supplied animal feed to a 
manufacturer subject to a simple retention of title clause. The manufacturer became 
insolvent before the goods were used for manufacturing purposes. The receiver 
contended that the retention of title clause was ineffective where it was known that the 
                                                 
500 Hire-purchase agreements which are mainly used in consumer transactions can be seen in some 
respects as a functional equivalent of reservation of title clauses, but are unsuited to cases where goods 
are supplied for resale or for use in manufacturing.    
501 For a more detailed account, see White, Commercial Law, op. cit., pp. 336-345.  
502 [1985] I.R. 340; [1984] I.L.R.M. 437.   
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goods were supplied for use in a manufacturing process. The High Court held, 
however, that as long as the goods still existed in the state in which they had been 
supplied and had not been mixed with other goods or subject to conversion through 
the manufacturing process, a simple title retention clause was effective. Where goods 
supplied under a contract of sale subject to such a clause are used in a manufacturing 
process, the seller may retain title to them if they remain identifiable in their original 
form and can be detached from the manufactured goods in which they have been 
used.  In Hendy Lennox v Grahame Puttick Engines Ltd,503 diesel engines covered by 
such a clause were incorporated into generator sets. The court found that, as the 
engines were identifiable by their serial numbers and could be removed in a relatively 
short time without damage being done to either the engines or generators, the seller’s 
retention of title clause remained effective.  
 
6.40. Where the manufacturing process leads to the irreversible incorporation of the 
goods into a new product or to a degree of alteration that causes the loss of their 
identity, a simple retention of title clause will be ineffective. In Clough Mill v 
Martin,504 Goff L.J. stated that ‘where A’s material is lawfully used by B to create 
new goods, whether or not B incorporates other material of his own, the property in 
the new goods will generally vest in B, at least where the goods are not reducible to 
the original materials.’ In Borden v Scottish Timber Products Ltd,505 the seller’s title 
to resin supplied to a timber manufacturer was held by the Court of Appeal to be 
extinguished once the resin was used in the manufacture of chipboard and had ceased 
to exist independently. A similar view was taken in Re Bond Worth Ltd506 which 
involved fibre incorporated first into yarn and then into carpet.  
 
6.41.  Attempts to preserve title claims in such circumstances by means of retention of 
title clauses with a ‘manufactured products’ claim over any new product made with 
the original goods have been largely unsuccessful.507 In Kruppstahl AG v Quitman 
Products Ltd,508 the plaintiff seller supplied steel to the respondent manufacturer for 
use in manufacturing.  When the respondent went into liquidation, the seller claimed 
                                                 
503 [184] 2 All ER 152.   
504 [1985] 1 W.L.R. 111 at 125.  
505 [1981] Ch. 25.  
506 Re Bond Worth Ltd [1980] Ch. 228. 
507 Webb, ‘Title and Incorporation: Who Owns Manufactured Goods?’ [2000] J.B.L. 513.   
508 [1982] I.L.R.M. 551. 
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ownership of both worked and unworked steel. The High Court held that, while the 
steel still in its original form remained the property of the seller, the seller’s interest in 
the steel that has been used in the manufacturing process amounted to a charge on the 
goods and was unenforceable for lack of registration under the Companies Act 1963.  
In Re Peachdart Ltd,509 leather supplied by the seller under a retention of title clause 
that had an express provision regarding subsequent goods was used by the buyer in 
the manufacture of handbags, some of which were wholly, and others partly, 
completed. Vinelott J. held that the parties must have intended that the leather would 
cease to be the exclusive property of the seller once it had been incorporated into the 
handbags. While the supplier of the leather would have a charge on the end products 
of the manufacturing process, that charge required registration under the Companies 
Act to be effective. In Clough Mill Ltd v Martin,510 a reservation of title clause 
covered both yarn sold to the buyers and any goods into which the yarn was 
incorporated.  The Court of Appeal saw no reason in principle why the property in the 
new goods should not be transferred to the seller of the yarn in such a case. It held 
nevertheless that the seller’s interest was subject to a charge which was void for non-
registration.  The retention of title clause could not be read, moreover, as conferring a 
right to the full value of the new goods on the seller of materials incorporated in the 
goods as this value would also be made up of the labour and materials of the buyer as 
well perhaps of materials supplied by other sellers under similar terms.  As Benjamin 
notes, it is likely consequently that, other than in the most exceptional circumstances, 
any ‘manufactured products’ provision in a retention of title clause will be held to 
create a registrable charge.511 Attempts by insolvency practitioners, however, to argue 
that simple retention of title clauses should be construed as agreements under which 
the property in the goods passes to the buyer who then grants the seller a registrable 
charge over the goods to the value of the debt have been rejected by the courts in both 
Ireland and England.512  Attempts to challenge such clauses on the basis that they 
have not been properly incorporated in the sales contract have also been  unsuccessful 
in the main.513 
                                                 
509 [1984] Ch. 131.  
510 [1985] 1 W.L.R. 111.   
511 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 5-150.   
512 Frigoscandia Ltd v Continental Irish Meat Ltd [1982] I.L.R.M. 396; Clough Mill Ltd v Martin 
[1985] 1 W.L.R. 111.   
513 Sugar Distributors Ltd v Monaghan Cash and Carry [1982] I.L.R.M. 399.  For an exception, see 
Union Paper Co. v Sunday Tribune (In Liquidation), [1983] IEHC 98.    
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6.42. Where a buyer resells goods before paying for them, the seller’s rights over the 
goods will normally be extinguished as the sub-buyer will acquire a good title to the 
goods under section 25 of the 1893 Act.  In response, some reservation of title clauses 
claim an interest in the proceeds of any such resale. In Aluminium Industrie Vaasen 
BV v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd,514 the plaintiffs sold large quantities of aluminium foil 
to the respondents subject to a retention of title clause which provided, among other 
things, that, until full payment was made, property in the goods would remain with 
the seller and that the buyer was ‘fiduciary owner’ of new goods made with the foil 
and was accountable to the seller for the proceeds of resales. The Court of Appeal 
held that the relationship between seller and buyer in respect of the resale proceeds 
was that of principal and fiduciary agent and not that of creditor and debtor. All of the 
moneys received by the respondents from the resale of the goods, including their 
profit, had therefore to be held on trust for the plaintiffs. The Romalpa ruling has 
attracted considerable criticism,515 and a claim for the proceeds of resales has not been 
successful in any subsequent reported case in England.516 As Bridge observes, later 
cases dealing with clauses extending to the proceeds of new goods have set down 
conditions to be satisfied if these clauses are not to be treated as registrable charges 
that ‘in practical terms, are impossible to satisfy’.517 While resale claims had some 
success in the Irish courts in the immediate aftermath of the Romalpa judgment,518 
later judgments have taken an approach more in line with English case law post 
Romalpa. In Carroll Group Distributors v G & F Burke,519 the plaintiff supplied 
goods to the respondent subject to a retention of title of clause which provided, among 
other things, that the goods were to remain the property of the seller until all payments 
had been made and required the buyer to keep the proceeds of resales of the goods ‘in 
trust’ for the supplier in a separate bank account.  The buyer went into liquidation and 
the seller sought to trace into the proceeds of the resales.  The High Court dismissed 
the claim and, though no separate bank account had in fact been created, held that any 
such account would have contained sums in excess of the seller’s claim because of the 
                                                 
514 [1976] 1 W.L.R. 676.   
515 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit, p. 471.  Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 3.90. Goode 
on Commercial Law, op cit., p. 765.  
516 Re Andrabell Ltd [1984] 3 All ER 407; Tatung (UK) Ltd v Galex Telesure Ltd [1989] 5 BCLC 325. 
Compaq Computers Ltd v Abercorn Group [1993] BCLC 602; 
517 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 3.94.   
518 Re Sugar Distributors Ltd [1982] I.L.R.M. 399; SA Foundries Du Lion v International Factors Ltd 
[1985] I.L.R.M. 66; Re WJ Hickey Ltd [1988] I.R. 126.  
519 [1990] I.L.R.M. 285.   
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buyer’s price mark-up and other factors. Any such account would represent 
accordingly a source of funds to which the supplier could have recourse to discharge 
monies due to him and, as such, would have the characteristics of a mortgage or 
charge. As no charge of this kind had been registered under the Companies Act 1963, 
the seller’s claim was void.    
 
Issues Arising  
6.43. The purpose and, if unchallenged or upheld, the effect of a retention of title 
clause is to reduce the pool of assets available for distribution to the creditors of an 
insolvent buyer. A clause of this kind enables an unpaid seller who would otherwise 
be an unsecured creditor to have preferential treatment in the event of insolvency.  As 
the volume of case law on these clauses suggests, the operation of title reservation 
clauses is contentious and has been the subject of reforms of the law regulating 
security interests in personal property in some jurisdictions and, in others, including 
Ireland, and the UK, of calls and proposals for reform. Article 9 of the US Uniform 
Commercial Code provides for a general system of regulation of security interests, 
including retention of title clauses. If a seller wishes to make a retention of title clause 
effective against third parties, he must register it by filing a financial statement. 
Broadly similar provisions apply in Personal Property Security Acts in force in most 
of the Canadian Provinces.520 Legislative regulation of retention of title clauses as 
security interests under a general regime dealing with security interests has also 
applied in New Zealand since 1999 and in Australia since 2009.521 
 
6.44. The issue of retention of title clauses was considered by the Law Reform 
Commission in 1989 in the context of a review of debt collection.522  The 
Commission proposed that such clauses should not be enforceable unless evidenced in 
writing and signed by the buyer.  Title retention clauses would not be deemed, 
moreover, to create any form of charge over the goods unless expressly stipulated as 
doing so at the time of the conclusion of the contract. The Commission’s report 
further proposed the establishment of a system of registration of retention of title 
clauses, and also left open the possibility of the subsequent establishment of a more 
                                                 
520 See Annex I, p.480. 
521 Ibid., pp. 484 & 498.   
522 Law Reform Commission.  1989.  Report on Debt Collection (2): Retention of Title (LRC 28).    
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comprehensive registration regime for other types of security interests in goods. 
Neither register, however, has been put in place in the period of over two decades 
since publication of the report, nor have any of the Commission’s other 
recommendations been given legislative effect.   
 
6.45. The issue of retention of title clauses and of the law on personal property 
security interests more generally has also been the subject of a succession of reviews 
and reform proposals in the UK.523 The Crowther Committee on Consumer Credit 
(1971),524, the Cork Committee on Insolvency Law (1981),525 and the Diamond 
Review of Security Interests in Property (1989)526 all identified a range of deficiencies 
in the existing legal framework and recommended a single statutory regime for 
security interests in personal property.  None of these recommendations were 
implemented.  Security interests over personal property returned to the agenda in the 
UK in the late 1990s when the Department of Trade and Industry launched a 
fundamental review of company law. In 2001, the Company Law Review Steering 
Group proposed  the ‘radical option’ of changing the existing system of registration to 
one of ‘notice-filing’.527  As the Steering Group had not had sufficient time to 
consider fully its proposals and in particular whether, as Crowther and Diamond had 
recommended, any new scheme should cover ‘quasi-security devices’ such as 
retention of title clauses, it recommended that these issues be referred to the English 
and Scottish Law Commissions. The English Law Commission published a 
consultation paper in 2002 followed by a consultative report in 2004.528  The latter 
report proposed a scheme for personal property security interests, modelled on the 
Saskatchewan Personal Property Security Act 1993, which would apply in the first 
instance to security interests created by companies and would later be extended to 
unincorporated businesses.529  The report was more guarded on the subject of 
                                                 
523 De Lacy, J.  ‘The evolution and regulation of security interests over personal property in English 
law’ in De Lacy, J. (ed). 2010. The Reform of UK Personal Property Security Law (London: 
Routledge Cavendish), pp. 3-82. 
524 Report of the Committee on Consumer Credit.  1971 (Cmnd. 4596).   
525 Report of the Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice.  1981.  (Cmnd. 8558).    
526 A Review of Security Interests in Personal Property (Diamond Report).  1989.  (London: 
Department of Trade and Industry).  
527 Final Report, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy, URN 01/942. 
528 Consultation Paper No. 164, Registration of Security Interests: Company Charges over 
Property other than Land.  Consultation Paper No. 176, Company Security Interests: a 
Consultative Report: 
529 Law Commission.  Consultation Paper No. 176, op. cit., para. 1.20.  
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retention of title clauses.  While it recommended that such devices should be brought 
within the proposed general scheme for security interests, it recognised that this 
proposal was contentious and sought further views about its costs and benefits. 
Responses to this report were again mixed.  In particular, there was little support for 
including retention of title devices in a companies-only scheme.  The Law 
Commission published its final Report on Company Security Interests in 2005 which 
proposed electronic notice filing, and associated rules, for security interests created by 
companies.530 It recommended that the issue of retention of title clauses should be 
deferred for further consideration pending a review of the whole question of transfer 
of title to goods by non-owners, and should be considered for all debtors and not just 
companies. The main substantive reforms proposed by the Law Commission have not 
been adopted to date and there appears to be little prospect that they will be enacted in 
the near future. As de Lacy has observed, ‘it is remarkable that this area of law has 
generated such a mass of reform proposals and so little action.’531 
 
6.46. The failure of reform initiatives in this area in both Ireland and the UK is 
testimony both to the complexity of the issues and to the divided opinions on them. It 
has been argued in the UK context that the attractions of personal property security 
legislation are questionable in the case of retention of titles clauses.532  At common 
law, there is a significant degree of certainty surrounding the law on retention of title 
clauses.  From the seller’s perspective a scheme that would require registration would 
make it harder to pursue certain claims – for example to original goods.  While such a 
scheme would allow sellers to create a security interest over ‘new goods’, a claim not 
effective at common law, it is not clear that this is a priority for sellers.  The courts, as 
Atiyah notes, have insisted that parties ‘are free to make whatever contracts they wish 
on whatever terms they choose and that there is nothing illegitimate about the result if 
they succeed in evading the requirement of registration.’533 As outlined in Chapter 1, 
moreover, Directive 2000/35/EC534 on late payments, furthermore, requires member 
                                                 
530  Law Comm No. 296. 
531 De Lacy, J.  ‘The evolution and regulation of security interests over personal property in English 
law’, op. cit., p. 81. 
532  Beale, H. ‘The Exportability of North American Chattel Securities Regimes: the Fate of the English 
Law Commission’s Proposals’, (2006) C.B.L.J. 178. 
533 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 475.  
534 Recently replaced by Directive 2011/7/EU on Combating Late Payment in Commercial 
Transactions which member states are required to transpose by March 2013 and whose provisions on 
retention of title clauses are similar to those of its precursor.   
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states to take appropriate measures to ensure that national legislation contains 
provisions enabling sellers to retain title to goods and, where necessary to recover 
goods, until payment is made.  The Directive was given effect in Ireland by the 
European Communities (Late Payment in Commercial Transactions) Regulations 
2002.535  
 
6.47. The above considerations constitute a significant prima facie case for the 
retention of the existing statutory regime relating to reservation of title, and we are not 
disposed accordingly to recommend any substantive amendment of section 19 of the 
1893 Act.  This is not to say that the status quo is satisfactory or would not benefit 
from reform.  A number of aspects of the law regarding retention of title clauses are 
unclear. The case law is based on the clauses in the specific contracts that have given 
rise to litigation and it is not always easy as a result to discern a consistent approach 
on the part of the courts. It is debatable as a matter of principle, furthermore, whether 
the freedom of contracting parties should not be subject to greater control when its 
purpose and effect is to impair the rights of third parties who have had no say in the 
contract. Though the Law Reform Commission recommended specific statutory 
reforms relating to retention of title clauses, experience in other jurisdictions suggests 
that it is preferable to address these issues in the broader context of personal property 
security reform. We are not unsympathetic to a broader programme of reform along 
these lines, but a recommendation to this effect is outside our terms of reference.   
 
Section 20: Risk prima facie passes with the property 
 
    Unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at the seller’s risk until the property  
    therein is transferred to the buyer, but when the property therein is transferred to  
    the buyer, the goods are at the buyer’s risk whether delivery has been made or not. 
 
    Provided that where delivery has been delayed through the fault of either buyer or  
    seller the goods are at the risk of the party in fault as regards any loss which might  
    not have occurred but for such fault. 
 
    Provided also that nothing in this section shall affect the duties or liabilities of  
    either seller or buyer as a bailee or custodier of the goods of the other party. 
 
                                                 
535 S.I. No. 388 of 2002.  The Regulations do not directly transpose Article 4(1) on retention of title 
clauses, presumably on the ground that such clauses are already recognised under Irish law.    
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6.48. Section 20 has not been amended in Ireland since its enactment.  In the UK, an 
important amendment was made to the equivalent provision in 2002 by means of the 
addition of the following subsection to Section 20 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
    (4) In a case where the buyer deals as consumer or, in Scotland, where there is a  
    consumer contract in which the buyer is a consumer, subsections (1) to (3) above  
    must be ignored and the goods remain at the seller’s risk until they are delivered to  
    the consumer.  
This amendment was effected by the Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers 
Regulations 2002536 which implemented Directive 1999/44/EC on Consumer Sales 
and Guarantees.  Though recital 17 of the Directive states that ‘the references to the 
time of delivery do not imply that Member States have to change their rules on the 
passing of risk’, the British Government took the view that an amendment to section 
20 was desirable for the avoidance of doubt.  The uncertainty on the issue arose in 
their view from the fact that, in requiring goods to be in conformity with the contract 
at the time of their delivery to the consumer, the Directive was potentially at odds 
with the Sale of Goods Act 1979 which required goods to conform to the contract at 
the time when risk passed from seller to buyer.537 Unless otherwise agreed between 
the parties, risk under the Sale of Goods Act passed with the transfer of the property 
in the goods and could thus precede delivery.  
 
6.49. Under the proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights published in 2008, 
Chapter IV of which was to replace Directive 1999/44/EC, risk of loss of, or damage 
to, goods was to pass to the consumer when he or a third party, other than the carrier 
and indicated by the consumer, had acquired the physical possession of the goods.538  
Though the main provisions of Chapter IV of the Directive have been deleted from 
the text of the Directive agreed following discussions between the European 
Parliament and Council, the following provision on the passing of risk is included at 
Article 23:539 
    In contracts where the trader dispatches the goods to the consumer, the risk of loss  
    of or damage to the goods shall pass to the consumer when he or a third party  
                                                 
536 S.I. 2002/3045.   
537 Bradgate, R. & Twigg-Flesner, C.  Blackstone’s Guide to Consumer Sales and Associated 
Guarantees, op. cit., paras. 3.4.7.2. & 3.5.6.  
538 Commission of the European Communities.  Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights (COM 2008 614), Article 23.   
539 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights, Article 
23. A provisional version of the final text of the Directive can be accessed at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/documents/activities/cont/201106/20110624ATT22578EN.pdf 
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    indicated by the consumer and other than the carrier has acquired the physical  
    possession of the goods.  The risk shall pass to the consumer upon delivery to the  
    carrier if the carrier was commissioned by the consumer to carry the goods and that  
    choice was not offered by the trader, without prejudice to the rights of the  
    consumer against the carrier.   
 
6.50. The present rules on risk at section 20 of the 1893 Act serve to allocate 
responsibility as between seller and buyer for loss of, or damage to, goods which is 
not attributable to the act or fault of either party. If goods are damaged while at the 
seller’s risk, he will be required to repair or replace them in order to perform his 
obligations under the contract.  If goods are damaged while at the buyer’s risk, the 
buyer must accept and pay for them and bear the cost of the loss or damage. Section 
20 restates in default form the common law rule, res peruit domino, that, if goods are 
lost or damaged, the loss is to their owner.540 Unless otherwise agreed between the 
parties, therefore, risk passes with property.  In determining when exactly risk passes, 
therefore, the rules on the passing of property at sections 16 to 19 of the 1893 Act 
apply.  In the case of specific goods where possession is retained by the seller under 
rule 1 of section 18, property passes at the time the contract is made and, as a result, 
risk also passes at this time regardless of when delivery is made.  In the case of 
unascertained goods, no property can pass until the goods have been ascertained, and 
property and risk will pass in accordance with the intention of the parties under 
section 17 or with the unconditional appropriation of the goods to the contract under 
rule 5 of section 18.  Where goods are supplied on approval or on sale or return, 
property and risk will not pass until the buyer ‘adopts’ the transaction in accordance 
with rule 4 of section 18.  
 
6.51. The rule in section 20 may be displaced by express or implied agreement 
between the contracting parties. Where goods are sold subject to a retention of title 
clause, for example, the contract may state that, although property remains with the 
seller, risk passes to the buyer on possession of the goods.  Though section 20 has not 
given rise to a large volume of case law, the cases have arisen that represent important 
exceptions to the general rule governing risk. In Sterns Ltd v Vickers Ltd,541 the 
                                                 
540 Per Blackburn J. in Martineau v Kitching, ‘As a general rule, res peruit domino, the old civil law 
maxim, is a maxim of our law; and when you can show that the property passed, the risk of the loss 
prima facie is in the person in whom the property is.’  (1872) L.R. 7 Q.B. 436 at 454.   
541 [1923] 1 K.B. 78. 
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respondents sold the plaintiffs 120,000 tons of white spirit which was part of a larger 
volume of 200,000 tons held in a storage tank owned by a third party. Though the 
plaintiff buyers obtained a delivery warrant from the sellers, and accepted by the third 
party,  that enabled them to take possession of the spirit, they left it in the tank for a 
period of time. When they eventually collected it, it was discovered that the spirit had 
suffered a deterioration in quality during the storage period. Despite the fact that the 
goods remained unascertained and, in consequence, that the property in them had not 
passed to the buyer, the Court of Appeal held that the risk had passed to the buyer.  
The buyer’s acceptance of the delivery warrant appears to have been regarded as the 
critical factor by reason of the fact that this gave the buyer a right of immediate 
possession.  In Comptoir d’Achat et de Vente SA v Luis de Ridder Limitada (The 
Julia),542 Lord Normand observed: 
    In those cases in which it has been held that the risk without the property has  
    passed to the buyer it has been because the buyer rather than the seller was seen to  
    have an immediate and practical interest in the goods, as for instance when he has  
    an immediate right under the storekeeper’s delivery warrant to the delivery of a  
    portion of an undivided bulk in store, or an immediate right under several contracts  
    with different persons to the whole of a bulk not yet appropriated to the several  
    contracts.543   
 
6.52. While the risk in Sterns v Vickers was held to have passed before the property, 
in Head v Tatersall,544 a case decided two decades before the enactment of the 1893 
Act, it was held to have passed after the property.  The plaintiff in the case bought a 
horse from the respondent that was warranted to have been hunted with the Bicester 
hounds and he was given a week in which to return the horse if it did not match up to 
the contract description.  The horse was accidentally injured during the week and the 
plaintiff sought to return it after learning that it had not hunted with the hounds 
concerned. The court held that, although the property in the horse had probably 
passed, the risk remained with the seller, and the plaintiff was entitled to return the 
horse and recover the price. Similar facts today would probably lead to the same 
result but on the basis of different reasoning.  Under rule 4 of section 18 of the 1893 
Act on sale on approval, the property, and hence the risk, would not pass until the 
expiry of the time  fixed for the return of the goods – in this case, one week. Atiyah 
                                                 
542 [1949] AC 293.   
543 Ibid. at 319. 
544 (1870) LR 7 Ex 7.  
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has suggested that the decision in Head v Tatersall is indicative of a broader principle 
to the effect that the risk always remains on the seller while the buyer has a right to 
reject the goods.545  Although no such rule is expressly stated in the Act, it appears on 
this view to follow from the rules on acceptance, and in particular from the fact that 
there is nothing in these rules to preclude rejection merely because goods have been 
accidentally lost or damaged.   
  
6.53. Section 20 also provides that, where delivery is delayed through the fault of 
either buyer or seller, the goods are at the risk of the party at fault for any loss or 
damage caused by the delay in delivery.  In Demby Hamilton & Co Ltd v Barden,546 
the sellers agreed to sell 30 tons of apple juice ordered as ‘per sample’ for delivery by 
the buyers to third parties.  The buyers took delivery of part of the order, but delayed 
taking delivery of the remainder.  Because of the delay, the uncollected juice 
deteriorated and was no longer fit for consumption.  The court held that, although the 
property in the goods had not passed to the buyer, he should bear the risk of the 
damage to the goods as it had resulted from his delay.  Lastly, section 20 provides that 
nothing in the section shall affect the duties or liabilities of either seller or buyer in 
their capacity as bailee or custodier of the goods for the other party.  Where, for 
example, under a retention of title clause, property and risk remain with the seller but 
the buyer has possession of the goods, the buyer will be a bailee of the goods.  Where 
property and risk have passed to the buyer, however, but the seller retains possession 
of the goods, the latter will be the bailee.  A bailee’s duty is to take reasonable care of 
the goods in his custody and, as such, he will ordinarily be liable only for loss or 
damage caused by his negligence. The allocation of risk for goods in transit under 
sections 32 and 33 of the 1893 Act is discussed in Chapter 10 of the Report.   
 
Issues Arising 
6.54. Section 20 gives rise to one major issue – whether risk should continue to be 
linked to the passing of property – which needs to be considered separately for 
consumer and commercial sales.  Where consumer sales are concerned, the case for 
linking risk with delivery is clear-cut in our opinion.  A mandatory rule operating on 
this basis would be more in accordance with the expectations of the parties to 
                                                 
545 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 345.  
546 [1949] 1 All ER 435.   
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consumer transactions, in particular the consumer buyer.  It would also accord more 
closely with the practicalities of the insurance of the goods.  In retail sales, as Atiyah 
observes547, a very strong case can be made for maintaining that ‘the most appropriate 
person to insure would nearly always be the party with physical possession, if only 
because in practice this is what would normally happen’. As noted above, moreover, 
the recently agreed EU Directive on Consumer Rights will require a change along 
these lines in the case of contracts where the trader dispatches the goods to the 
consumer, and it would be anomalous and confusing to have a different rule for other 
consumer contracts of sale.   
 
6.55. The matter is less clear-cut in the case of commercial contracts of sale.  Subject 
to separate rules governing the shipping of goods by carriers and the holding of goods 
by bailees, section 2-509 of the UCC provides that the risk passes to the buyer on his 
receipt of the goods. No other common law jurisdiction whose sales law is based on 
the 1893 Act, however, has amended its sale of goods legislation to reverse the link 
between risk and property for commercial contracts of sale. This may reflect the fact 
that, as Bridge notes:548 
    the rule in section 20(1) is only a presumptive one and the modern law on the  
    passing of property ties it in with delivery, so any statutory reform associating   
    risk with possession rather than property would yield modest results in practice. 
Though there is force to this point, we think, on balance, that linking risk with 
delivery rather than with the passing of property would be a more appropriate rule for 
commercial as well as consumer sales. As this Chapter has shown, the rules on the 
passing of property are far from straightforward.  As delivery is usually a visible 
occurrence that leaves little or no scope for doubt or dispute, a rule formulated on this 
basis would be simpler and clearer than the existing rule.  The issue of who is 
required to insure the goods that form the subject-matter of the contract of sale is 
highly material to the passing of risk in commercial transactions and, in general, the 
party who is in possession of the goods will be in a better position to insure them. A 
provision revised on this basis, however, should remain a default rule for commercial 
transactions.     
 
                                                 
547 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 347.  
548 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 4.08.  
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6.56. Recommendation 
Section 20 of the 1893 Act should be amended to provide that risk will pass with 
delivery.  This provision should be mandatory for consumer contracts of sale, 



































CHAPTER SEVEN SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893: TRANSFER OF 
TITLE, SECTIONS 12, 21-23 & 25-26  
 
7.1. This chapter deals with the regulation of issues relating to title in the form, first, 
of the implied terms as to title at section 12 of the 1893 Act and, second, the nemo dat 
rule, and the exceptions to it, on transfers and conflicts of title at sections 21-23 and 
7.1. This chapter deals with the regulation of issues relating to title in the form, first, 
of the implied terms as to title at section 12 of the 1893 Act and, second, the nemo dat 
rule, and the exceptions to it, on transfers and conflicts of title at sections 21-23 and 
25-26 of the Act.549 As previously outlined in Chapter 3 and discussed further in 
Chapter 6, the Act’s definition of a contract for the sale of goods identifies the transfer 
of the property in goods from seller to buyer as the constitutive feature of the sales 
transaction. The proprietary provisions of the legislation use a number of related 
terms – property, title, owner/ownership550 - without fully defining their respective 
meanings. Only ‘property’ is defined as meaning ‘the general property in goods, and 
not merely a special property’.551  The ‘general property’ means the absolute interest 
in the goods or, for all practical purposes, their ownership. A ‘special property’ is a 
possessory interest of a kind claimed by those to whom goods have been pledged or 
bailed.552  While this lack of clarity has attracted academic commentary,553 it appears 
to have caused few, if any, difficulties in practice.   
 
7.2. We gave some consideration in this context to the alternative framework for the 
regulation of matters of title and ownership contained in the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference [DCFR].554 Under the DCFR the seller ‘must transfer the ownership of the 
goods’, as well as deliver the goods, transfer such documents representing or relating 
to the goods as may be required by the contract, and ensure that the goods conform to 
                                                 
549 Section 24 of the 1893 Act on the revesting of property in stolen goods on conviction of the 
offender was repealed by the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences Act) 2001, s.3(1) and sch.1.   
550 ‘Ownership’ features only in section 34 of the Act on acceptance, but ‘owner’ occurs in sections 1, 
12, 21, 24-25 and 47.   
551 1893 Act, s.62.    
552 Goode on Commercial Law, op. cit. pp. 216-220.  White, Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 365.  
553 For further discussion of these issues, see Kiralfy ‘The problem of a Law of Property in Goods’ 
(1949) MLR 424; Battersby, ‘A Reconsideration of “Property” and “Title” in the Sale of Goods Act’, 
(2001) J B.L 1; Battersby and Preston, ‘The Concepts of “Property”, “Title” and “Owner” used in the 
Sale of Goods Act 1893’ (1972) MLR. 269, and Ho, ‘Some Reflections on “Property” and “Title” in the 
Sale of Goods Act’, (1997) C.L.J. 571.  See also Goode, ‘Ownership and Obligations in Commercial 
Transactions’, (1987) L.Q.R. 433. 
554  Von Bar, C. et al. (eds).  2009. Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private 
Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (Munich: Sellier).   
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the contract.555 ‘Ownership’ is defined as ‘the most absolute right a person, the owner, 
can have over property, including the exclusive right, so far as consistent with 
applicable laws or rights granted by the owner, to use, enjoy, modify, destroy, dispose 
of and recover the property’.556  The DCFR also addresses the issue of third party 
rights or claims.  It provides that the goods must be free from any right or reasonably 
well founded claim of a third party.557 Where such a right or claim is based on 
intellectual property rights, the rules provides that the goods must be free from any 
right or claim of a third party which is based on industrial property or other 
intellectual property and of which the seller knew or could reasonably be expected to 
have known at the time of the conclusion of the contract. This does not apply, 
however, where the right or claim results from the seller’s compliance with technical 
drawings, designs, formulae or other such specifications furnished by the buyer.558 
While the DCFR provisions have merits in respect of simplicity and clarity, they do 
not address all of the issues encompassed by the Sale of Goods Acts and the 
accompanying case law. The uncertainty over the future development and status of 
the Common Frame of Reference, moreover, means that it cannot be regarded as a 
practical basis for reform in this area in the immediate future.559   
 
SECTION 12 IMPLIED UNDERTAKING AS TO TITLE, ETC  
(1) In every contract of sale, other than one to which subsection (2) applies, there is- 
(a) an implied condition on the part of the seller that in the case of a sale he has a 
right to sell the goods and, in the case of an agreement to sell, he will have a 
right to sell the goods at the time when the property is to pass, and  
(b) an implied warranty that the goods are free and will remain free until the time 
when the property is to pass, from any charge or encumbrance not disclosed to 
the buyer before the contract is made and that the buyer will enjoy quiet 
possession of the goods except so far as it may be disturbed by the owner or 
other person entitled to the benefit of any charge or encumbrance so disclosed.  
 
(2) In a contract of sale, in the case of which there appears from the contract or is to be  
inferred from the circumstances of the contract an intention that the seller should transfer 
only such title as he or a third person may have there is- 
(a) an implied warranty that all charges or encumbrances known to the seller have 
been disclosed to the buyer before the contract is made, and 
(b) an implied warranty that neither- 
                                                 
555  Ibid., IV. A – 2:101. 
556  Ibid., VIII. – 1:202.  
557  Ibid., IV. A – 2:305. 
558  Ibid., IV. A – 2:306. 
559 For an outline of the range of options for the future evolution of the DCFR, see European 
Commission.  2010. Green Paper on Policy Options for Progress towards a European Contract 
Law for consumers and businesses.  COM (2010) 348.  See also paragraphs 3.64-3.65 above.  
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(i) the seller, nor 
(ii) in a case where the parties to the contract intend that the seller should      
            transfer only such title as a third person may have, that person, nor 
(iii) anyone claiming through or under the seller or that third person otherwise  
             than under a charge or encumbrance disclosed to the buyer before the  
             contract is made, 
      will disturb the buyer’s quiet possession of the goods.   
 
7.3. Section 12 was substituted for the original section in the 1893 Act by section 10 
of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980.  The original provision had 
provided that the implied condition and warranties as to title applied ‘unless the 
circumstances of the contract are such as to show a different intention’.  Per section 
55 of the original Act, these implied undertakings could also be waived or varied.  
The effect of the 1980 Act’s changes to section 12, together with those to section 55, 
was, first, that exclusion or variation of the implied undertakings as to title was 
prohibited, though per section 12(2) it remains open to the parties to agree that ‘the 
seller should transfer only such title as he or a third party may have’.560  Secondly, 
even where the seller made clear that he was selling only a limited title, he could not 
exclude in their entirety the warranties of quiet possession and of freedom from 
charges or encumbrances in favour of third parties.  The seller must disclose to the 
buyer, before the contract is made, any encumbrances known to him and must further 
warrant that no one claiming through or under him or the third party will disturb the 
buyer’s quiet possession of the goods.  Save for the fact that the buyer’s warranties as 
to quiet possession and freedom from charges or encumbrances are more absolute in 
the Irish statute,561 the changes made to section 12 by the 1980 Act were identical to 
those made in the UK by the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 and later 
incorporated in the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979. The amendments to the section in the 
UK followed recommendations of the Law Commission for England and Wales and 
the Scottish Law Commission.562  
 
7.4. Section 12 can be distinguished from the other implied terms under the Act on a 
number of grounds. First, its application is wider in that it applies to all sales, whereas  
                                                 
560 As Bridge observes, ‘the line between a prohibited exclusion and a limited title sale is a peculiarly 
elusive one to draw.’  Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 5.20.  
561 The implied warranties under UK legislation cover charges or encumbrances not disclosed or known 
to the buyer before the contract is made, whereas those under Irish legislation cover charges or 
encumbrances not disclosed to the buyer.   
562 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  Exemption Clauses in Contracts First 
Report: Amendments to the Sale of Goods Act 1893, op. cit., paras. 11-19, 124 , and Appendix A, 
p.52.  
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section 13 applies only to sales by description, section 14 only to sales in the course 
of a business, and section 15 only to sales by sample.  Secondly, liability for breach of 
section 12 can never be excluded, even where the buyer does not deal as a 
consumer.563  Thirdly, a different remedial regime applies to section 12 than to the 
other implied terms; in particular, the rules on acceptance do not apply.  Fourthly, in 
line with this separate remedial regime, case law seems to view section 12 as 
‘fundamental’ in nature and hence it has been interpreted more strictly than other 
implied terms.564  These features suggest that section 12 should be considered 




7.5. The main issues raised by section 12 concern, first, the seller’s liability in respect 
of the right to sell under subsection (1)(a) and, second, the remedies available for 
breach of this provision. The question of the classification of the Act’s implied 
undertakings as conditions or warranties has been considered in Chapter 4.  
 
The right to sell in section 12(1)(a) 
7.6. Section 12(1)(a) requires that, in the case of a sale, the seller has a right to sell the 
goods and, in the case of an agreement to sell, that he will have the right to sell the 
goods at the time when property is to pass.  The leading case on the meaning of ‘the 
right to sell’ is Niblett v Confectioners’ Materials Co Ltd.566  The defendants were an 
American company which had agreed to sell 3,000 cases of tinned milk to the 
plaintiffs. When the goods arrived in England, they were detained by customs 
officials on the ground that part of the consignment infringed the trade mark of 
another manufacturer.  The plaintiffs had to remove the offending labels to secure the 
release of the goods, an action that substantially reduced their value.  The court held 
that there had been a breach of section 12(1) by reason of the fact that, as the 
company whose trade mark had been infringed could have obtained an injunction to 
restrain the sale, the vendor did not have the right to sell the goods. The precise 
                                                 
563  1893 Act, s.55(3). 
564  Bridge speaks of ‘title fundamentalism’ in this regard. Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 
5.21.   
565  Bradgate, R.  2000. Commercial Law (3rd ed.) (London: Butterworths) p. 357. 
566  [1921] 3 KB 387; see also O’Reilly v Fineman, Ir Jur Rep 36 and The Irish Digest 1939-1948 Col 
107. 
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implications of this judgment are open to interpretation. At its broadest, it is authority 
for the proposition that where an owner of goods can be stopped by process of the law 
from selling the goods, he does not have the right to sell and is in breach of section 
12(1)(a).567  Benjamin, however, takes a contrary view, maintaining that the words 
‘right to sell the goods’ mean that the seller has the power to vest full rights in the 
goods to the buyer, but makes no promise about his own proprietary rights.568 For 
instance, where a seller without title sells goods in circumstances where the buyer 
acquires good title to the goods,569 there would be no breach of section 12(1)(a).  
While there is no direct judicial authority on the point, Atkin LJ stated obiter in 
Niblett:570 ‘It may be that the implied condition is not broken if the seller is able to 
pass to the purchaser a right to sell notwithstanding his own inability…’.  Similarly, 
the ratio of the Niblett judgment, according to Benjamin, does not extend beyond the 
situation where the property rights which the seller purports to vest in the buyer are 
encumbered by a right vested in a third party, such as an intellectual property right, 
which affects the goods in the hands of the buyer. In our view, however, the 
contention that there is no breach of the right to sell condition under section 12 where 
a seller without title sells goods in circumstances where the buyer acquires good title 
to the goods under one or more of the exceptions to the nemo dat rule must be 
questioned. Goode argues that section 12 is breached in such a situation because, as 
against the true owner, the seller’s disposition is unlawful, meaning that he has no 
right to sell.571   
 
7.7. A related issue was raised Rowland v Divall,572 a case involving the sale of a car 
by the defendant to the plaintiff, a car dealer. The latter exhibited the car in his 
showroom for two months and then sold it to a buyer who used it for two months 
before it was repossessed by the police on the ground that it had been stolen by the 
person who had sold it to the defendant. The dealer reimbursed the buyer and brought 
an action against the defendant for recovery of the full purchase price.  The Court of 
                                                 
567  Ivamy, Casebook on Sale of Goods.  1980.  (4th ed.) (London: Lloyd’s of London Press), p.6. 
568  Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 4-004. 
569  For example under any of the nemo dat exceptions in ss. 21-25 of the 1893 Act: see further below. 
570  [1921] 3 KB 387 at 401. Chitty on Contracts, Volume 2. 2009. (30th ed.) (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell), para. 43-061 also supports this viewpoint. 
571 See Goode on Commercial Law, op. cit., pp. 311-312; Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 109; 
Bradgate, Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 358.; see further R v Wheeler (1991) 92 Cr App R 279, and 
Brown, ‘The Scope of Section 12 and the Sale of Goods Act’  (1992) L.Q.R. 221. 
572 [1923] 2 KB 500.   
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Appeal found in his favour, holding that failure to pass a good title to goods in 
accordance with section 12(1) meant that ‘the buyer has not received any part of that 
which he contracted to receive – namely the property and right to possession – and, 
that being so, there has been a total failure of consideration.’573 The fact that the 
dealer and the second buyer had had the use of the car for a period of four months was 
held not to have conferred a benefit sufficient to preclude the claim of total failure of 
consideration.   
 
7.8. This judgment has been questioned for being unduly favourable to the buyer who 
had use of the goods for a substantial period and yet was entitled to a full refund of 
the price.574 It has been argued conversely, however, that the decision was fair as the 
car-dealer buyer had no use for the vehicle unless he had good title or property in the 
goods to enable him to resell it.575  Such a buyer is always exposed to the risk of 
claims in conversion by the true owner, and, once the defect of title is discovered, the 
buyer’s title may be unmarketable. Despite the criticisms of the judgment, and calls 
for statutory intervention to overturn it, it has been approved in recent decades by 
both the Supreme Court in Ireland576 and the English Court of Appeal.577 
 
7.9. A number of more minor issues have also arisen in relation to section 12.  First, 
even where there is a breach of section 12(1)(a), there is authority that the breach may 
be repaired by title being fed through at a later stage provided this is done before the 
buyer elects to treat the contract as repudiated and rejects the goods.578 Secondly, the 
implied warranty as to freedom from undisclosed charges or encumbrances, which 
may have derived from land law, has proved to have little practical application to sale 
of goods transactions (although a similar express term is standard in ship and aircraft 
sales). Its future relevance may therefore be questioned. Bridge notes that it is 
practically impossible to envisage a case that falls within the encumbrance warranty 
                                                 
573 Ibid. at 507.  See also Mallett and Son (Antiques) Ltd v Rogers [2005] IEHC 131; [2005] 2 ILRM 
471 where it was held that an antique bookcase was sold in breach of s.12 of the 1893 Act and the 
plaintiff buyer was thus entitled to a full refund of the price paid (£80,000) and damages of £31,533 to 
cover the cost of restoration work done on the bookcase. 
574 Bradgate, Commercial Law, op. cit., p.360; see also Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., paras. 
5.07-5.19. 
575  See Peel, Treitel’s Law of Contract.  2007. (12th ed.) (London: Sweet & Maxwell), para. 22-007.     
576  United Dominion Trust (Ireland) Ltd v Shannon Caravans Ltd [1976] IR 225. 
577  Barber v NSW Bank plc [1996] 1 All ER 906. 
578  Butterworth v Kingsway Motors Ltd [1954] 2 All ER 694. 
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but not within section 12(1)(a) or the quiet possession warranty, and hence suggest 
that its repeal would yield no practical consequences.579 Thirdly, the implied warranty 
as to quiet possession has given rise to case law which has clarified some matters of 
detail while raising others.  For example, case law has clarified that breach of this 
provision encompasses both physical interference580 and interference through the 
assertion of third party rights.581 Moreover, case law has clarified that this undertaking 
is continuing in nature,582 although the question remains for how long.  There will be 
a breach if the buyer is disturbed in possession by the wrongful acts of the seller, or 
any person claiming under him; or by the lawful acts of any other person, including 
the true owner.583  But, there is authority that there will be no breach where the 
buyer’s possession is disturbed by the wrongful acts of third parties,584 although this is 
not expressed in the wording of the provision. Fourthly, sales of limited title 
(regulated by section 12(2)) can be difficult to distinguish from exclusion clauses 
(which are prohibited in relation to section 12).  There is little evidence, however, that 
this causes difficulty in practice.585 
 
Conclusions   
7.10. While the ambiguity concerning the ratio of Niblett v Confectioners Materials 
Ltd
586 has given rise to much academic commentary, it appears to have caused few 
practical problems and hence the case for legislative reform in this regard is weak. 
Given the criticisms of Rowland v Divall587 outlined above, there is arguably a 
stronger case for  legislative intervention to alter or overturn this decision.  It has been 
suggested in the UK that, in claims under section 12, a buyer should be required to 
give credit to the seller for his use and enjoyment of the goods.588 In a joint 
consultative document published in 1983, the Law Commission for England and 
                                                 
579  Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para 5.35. 
580  e.g. Computer Systems Ltd v United Paints Ltd (2000) 2 TCLR 453. 
581  e.g. Niblett v Confectioners Materials Ltd [1921] 3 KB 387 at 401.  
582  Microbeads AC v Vinhurst Road Markings Ltd  [1975] 1 All ER 529, [1975] 1 WLR 218. 
583  Mason v Burningham [1949] 2 KB 545. 
584  The Playa Larga [1975] 1 WLR 218. 
585  Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para 5.25. 
586  [1921] 3 KB 387 at 401.  
587  [1923] 2 KB 500. 
588  See, for example, the UK Law Reform Committee 12th Report. 1966. Transfer of Title to Chattels 
(Cmnd. 2958); Law Commission for England and Wales (1975) Law of Contract: Pecuniary 
Restitution on Breach of Contract (Working Paper No.65); Law Commission for England and Wales 
and Scottish Law Commission (1983) Sale and Supply of Goods (Working Paper No.85); and UK 
Department of Trade and Industry (1994) Transfer of Title: Sections 21 to 26 of the Sale of Goods 
Act 1979.   
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Wales and the Scottish Law Commission proposed that the buyer should be limited to 
an action for damages, or alternatively, an action for damages or the recovery of the 
monies paid under the contract subject to a deduction for the innocent party’s use and 
possession of the goods – whichever would yield the greater sum.  It has been argued 
conversely that there would be difficulties and hence uncertainty in assessing the 
value of such use. More fundamental perhaps is the argument questioning the right of 
a seller who has breached section 12 to be paid by a buyer for the use of another 
party’s goods. In the event, the Law Commissions in the UK recommended that 
section 12 should not be amended to address the Rowland v Divall judgement.589 On 
balance, and in the light of the lack of statutory reform elsewhere and the judicial 
approval of Rowland v Divall in Ireland and the UK, the case for maintaining the 
status quo appears stronger than the case for reform.590 Similarly, in relation to the 
minor issues identified above, there have been no specific proposals made for reform, 




7.11. While section 12 of the 1893 Act gives rise to a number of issues, a review of 
its provisions and the options for reform favours, on balance, the maintenance of 




SECTIONS 21-23 & 25-26 1893 ACT: THE NEMO DAT RULE AND ITS 
EXCEPTIONS  
 
7.12. It is a fundamental rule of property law that no one can transfer a better title than 
he himself has - nemo dat quod non habet – thereby protecting security of 
ownership.591  In relation to goods, the basic rule is restated as follows in section 21 of 
the 1893 Act:  
    Subject to the provisions of this Act, where goods are sold by a person who is not  
                                                 
589 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  Sale and Supply of Goods, op. cit., 
paras. 6.1-6.5.  
590  For a discussion of the lack of change to section 12 in other common law jurisdictions, see Annex 
IV, section 8.2.11.  
591  This, or a similar, basic rule applies to sales of goods, land, and to other forms of property, to gifts, 
and to bailments, such as contracts of hire and hire-purchase. 
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    the owner thereof, … the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller  
    had … 
 
Over a long period of time, a number of common law and statutory exceptions to the 
basic rule have been developed in order to protect bona fide purchasers and thereby 
encourage commercial activity by reinforcing the security of sale transactions.  As 
Denning LJ observed in Bishopsgate Motor Finance Corp. Ltd v Transport Brakes 
Ltd:592 
    In the development of our law, two principles have striven for mastery.  The first is  
    for the protection of property: no one can give a better title than he possesses.  The  
    second is for the protection of commercial transactions: the person who takes in  
    good faith and for value without notice should get a good title.  The first principle  
    has held sway for a long time, but it has been modified by the common law itself  
    and by statute so as to meet the need of our own times.   
 
As these remarks indicate, the nemo dat rule and the related exceptions seek to strike 
a balance between the rights of two ‘innocent’ parties (the original owner and the 
third party purchaser in good faith) where the conduct of a dishonest intermediary 
results in a conflict of title.  The matter at issue is whether these rules, as they now 
operate, strike the correct balance in present-day economic and social conditions, and, 
whether the legal framework in this area is in need of reform. 
 
7.13.  Sections 21-23 & 25 of the 1893 Act contain seven separate exceptions to the 
nemo dat rule. Further exceptions can be found in the Factors Act 1889 and the 
Consumer Credit Act 1995, amongst others.  It is important to note that there is a 
degree of overlap between these exceptions and that this overlapping is not always 
consistent. The tangled interrelations between the exceptions has led to a more 
general criticism that the exceptions are overly technical and, in some cases, devoid of 
a coherent rationale.  Apart from the repeal of section 24 on the revesting of property 
in stolen goods on conviction of the offender by the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud 
Offences) Act 2001, these sections of the 1893 Act have gone unchanged in Ireland 
since the Act’s enactment.   
 
First Exception:  Unauthorised Agency  
7.14.  Section 21(1) provides: 
                                                 
592 [1949] 1 K.B. 322 at 336-37.  
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    … where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does  
    not sell them under the authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer  
    acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had … [our italics] 
 
The effect of the subsection is that, if goods are not sold with the authority or consent 
of the owner, the buyer acquires no title to them. The provision must be read, 
however, in conjunction with section 61 of the Act which preserves the common law 
rules of agency. In accordance with those rules, an owner will be bound by any 
disposition of his goods by an agent acting with his authority or consent.   
 
Second Exception: Apparent Authority and Apparent Ownership  
7.15.  Further to the above exception, section 21(1) goes on to state: 
… where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, …, the buyer acquires no 
better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from 
denying the seller’s authority to sell. [our italics]. 
 
This exception may apply in two different types of case:  
1) where the owner represents that the seller is the owner’s agent, as in cases of 
apparent authority; and 
2) where the owner represents that the seller is the owner of the goods, 
sometimes referred to as ‘apparent ownership’.  
 
In each of these cases the owner will be prevented from recovering the goods, and the 
buyer will acquire title to them, provided that the seller’s dealing in the goods is 
consistent with the appearance created by the owner’s conduct. Although section 21 
refers only to the owner’s ‘conduct’ it is clear that in both such cases the owner’s 
representation may be by words or conduct.  Common to all estoppels, the 
representation must be one of fact; it must be unambiguous; and it must be acted 
upon.  However, based on English case law, this estoppel exception has generally 
been narrowly interpreted.593  For instance, it has been held that the owner’s 
representation must be voluntary.594 Mere parting with possession is insufficient.,595 
rather a positive representation that the seller has the right to sell is required.596  In 
theory, estoppel may be based on an owner’s negligence. But, under English law at 
                                                 
593 For example, Shaw v MPC [1987] 1 WLR 1332. 
594 Debs v Sibec Developments Ltd [1990] RTR 91. 
595 Farqharson Bros & Co v King & Co [1902] AC 325.  Note, this case is effectively reversed where 
the person in possession is a mercantile agent under s.2 of the Factors Act 1889; and where the person 
in possession has contracted to buy goods under s.9 of the 1889 Act and s.25(2) of the 1893 Act. 
596 Central Newbury Car Auctions Ltd v Unity Finance Ltd [1957] 1 QB 371.  See also Mercantile 
Bank of India v Central Bank of India [1938] AC 287. 
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least, it seems that it will very rarely be possible for a buyer to establish a title to 
goods on the basis of estoppel by negligence.597   
 
Third Exception: Market Overt  
7.16. By a long established exception to the nemo dat rule, derived from the lex 
mercatoria,598 section 22(1) of the 1893 Act provides: 
    Where goods are sold in market overt, according to the usage of the market, the  
     buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith and  
     without notice of any defect or want of title on the part of the seller. 
 
Accordingly, the sale must take place in an open, public, and legally constituted 
market, established by Royal Charter, statute or custom.  Though Irish case law on the 
point is scant, it has been held that the old Prussia Street cattle market in Dublin was a 
market overt.599 A list of such markets overt does not exist for consultation; the 
question as to whether a particular market qualifies or not can be addressed 
accordingly only in the context of a dispute in relation to a sale in that market.   
 
Fourth Exception: Voidable Title  
7.17.  Section 23 of the 1893 Act provides: 
    When the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but his title has not been  
    avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods,  
    provided he buys them in good faith and without notice of the seller’s defect in  
    title. 
 
This section applies only where the seller’s title is voidable, as opposed to void.600  
Moreover, the section only applies where the title has not been avoided at the time of 
the sale. An original owner should take immediate steps therefore to rescind the 
contract with the seller.  He may do so without court proceedings merely by notifying 
the seller of his intention to avoid the contract between them or by retaking possession 
of the goods.  Further, where the seller is untraceable, it was held in Car and 
Universal Finance Co Ltd v Caldwell
601 that the original owner may be able to rescind 
the contract by taking other steps to recover his property, such as notifying the police.  
                                                 
597  Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v Twitchings [1977] AC 890, [1976] 3 WLR 66. 
598 Scrutton J. in Clayton v Le Roy [1911] 2 QB 1031, at 1038-9.  The lex mercatoria was the 
customary mercantile law that developed from medieval times on the basis of the trade practices and 
usages in operation in transactions between merchants.   
599  Ganly v Ledwidge (1876) IR 10 CL 33; and Delaney v Wallis (1883) 14 LR Ir 31. 
600  Cundy v Lindsay (1878) 3 App Cas 459;  Anderson v Ryan [1967] IR 34 at 38. 
601  [1965] 1 QB 525. 
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In this case, the owner of a car had been induced to part with it by a fraudulent 
misrepresentation in circumstances such that the contract was voidable.  The English 
Court of Appeal held that he had done all that was necessary to rescind the contract by 
bringing the fraud to the attention of the police and to that of the Automobile 
Association who notified their patrols. A buyer who subsequently purchased the 
vehicle in good faith acquired no title to it as a result.  As with the other nemo dat 
exceptions, the buyer in such cases must act in good faith and without notice of the 
seller’s title defect. However, the burden of proof under section 23 is different from th 
applying to the other exceptions. It has been held that, under section 23, it is for the 
original owner to prove that the purchaser did not act in good faith.602   
 
Fifth Exception: Seller in Possession  
7.18.  Section 25 of the 1893 Act, which mirrors sections 8 and 9 of the Factors Act 
1889, is designed to protect persons who deal with sellers or buyers in possession of 
goods who no longer, or do not yet, own the goods.  Section 25(1) states: 
    Where a person having sold goods continues or is in possession of the goods, or of  
    the documents of title to the goods, the delivery or transfer by that person, or by a  
    mercantile agent acting for him, of the goods or documents of title under any sale,  
    pledge or other disposition thereof, to any person receiving the same in good faith  
    and without notice of the previous sale, shall have the same effect as if the person  
    making the delivery or transfer were expressly authorised by the owner of the  
    goods to make the same. 
 
This provision covers the situation where a seller who has contracted to sell goods 
retains possession of them after the contract of sale and thus appears to own the 
goods, even if property in them has in fact already passed to the buyer.  Other people 
may therefore deal with the seller as if he were still the owner of the goods - for 
instance, by agreeing to buy the same goods, or to take security over them.  Section 
25(1) may protect such a subsequent purchaser who deals with a seller who remains in 
possession of goods after selling them.  A related provision at section 48(2) of the 
1893 Act which applies where an unpaid seller exercises a right of lien or of stoppage 
of transit is discussed in Chapter 10. 
 
7.19. Four main requirements must be met in order for the provision at section 25(1) 
to operate.  First, there must be a sale, within the Act’s definition, from the seller to 
                                                 
602 Whitehorn Bros v Davison [1911] 1 KB 463. 
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the first buyer – an agreement to sell is insufficient.  Secondly, after the sale, the seller 
must ‘continue or be in possession’ of the goods. It now seems clear that the provision 
applies regardless of the capacity in which the seller remains in possession of the 
goods.603 Moreover, section 25(1) applies where the seller continues or is in 
possession of them.  However, there is authority that, where possession is lost by the 
seller and later regained by him, the provision will not apply.604  Thirdly, the seller 
must deliver or transfer the goods to a second buyer under a sale, pledge or other 
disposition. Although there is conflicting case law, it appears that constructive 
delivery is sufficient in this regard.605 A similar broader provision in the Factors Act 
1889 protects such a second buyer even though he receives possession of the goods 
under an agreement for sale, pledge or other disposition.606 Lastly, the second buyer 
in such a case must receive the goods in good faith and without notice. 
 
Sixth Exception: Buyer in Possession  
7.20. Section 25(2) of the 1893 Act states: 
     Where a person having bought or agreed to buy goods obtains, with the consent of  
     the seller, possession of the goods or the documents of title to the goods, the  
     delivery or transfer by that person, or by a mercantile agent acting for him, of the  
     goods or documents of title, under any sale pledge or other disposition thereof, to  
     any person receiving the same in good faith and without notice of any lien, or other  
     right of the original seller in respect of the goods, shall have the same effect as if  
     the person making the delivery or transfer were a mercantile agent in possession of  
     the goods or documents of title with the consent of the owner. 
 
This provision covers the situation where a person who has agreed to buy goods takes 
possession of them before title passes to him and, by being in possession of the goods, 
gives the appearance of being their owner. If he resells or otherwise disposes of the 
goods before property passes to him, a title or priority dispute may then arise between 
the person who sold the goods to this buyer and the person to whom this buyer 
subsequently transferred them.   
 
                                                 
603 Worcester Works Finance Ltd v Cooden Engineering Ltd  [1972] 1 QB 210 approved in Hanley v 
ICC Finance [1996] ILRM 463. 
604
 Mitchell v Jones (1905) NZLR 932; Worcester Works Finance Ltd v Cooden Engineering Ltd. 
[1972] 1 QB 210, approved in Hanley v ICC Finance [1996] ILRM 463. 
605 Nicholson v Harper [1895] 2 Ch 415; cf. Gamer’s Motor Centre (Newcastle) Pty Ltd v Natwest 
Wholesale Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 236: approved in The Saetta [1994] 1 All ER 851.  
606  See also the Factors Act 1889, s.8. 
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7.21. There are four main requirements for section 25(2) to apply.  First, the initial 
buyer must have bought or agreed to buy goods.  It thus applies to sales subject to a 
reservation of title pending payment,607 and to sales contracts which are voidable at 
the option of the seller even where the contract has been avoided.608  But, it does not 
apply where the initial  buyer acquired the goods under a hire purchase contract;609 an 
agency agreement;610 a sale or return agreement;611 or a contract for work and 
materials.612  Secondly, the initial buyer must be in possession (actual or constructive) 
of the goods, or of documents of title, with the consent of the seller.  Thirdly, the 
initial buyer must deliver or transfer the goods under a sale, pledge or other 
disposition. As noted at paragraph 7.19, a related provision in the Factors Act 1889  
protects the second buyer even though he receives possession of the goods under an 
agreement for sale, pledge or other disposition. Lastly, the second buyer must receive 
the goods in good faith and without notice. 
 
7.22. Where the requirements of section 25(2) are satisfied, the disposition by the 
initial buyer to a subsequent buyer has the same effect as if that initial buyer ‘were a 
mercantile agent in possession of the goods with the consent of the owner’. These 
words have been interpreted in England and Northern Ireland as requiring that the 
initial buyer must act in the way in which a mercantile agent acting in the ordinary 
course of business would act in disposing of the goods, although this is not expressly 
stated in the legislation.613 It has also been held in England that, since a disposition by 
a mercantile agent is only binding on the owner of goods if the agent is in possession 
of them with the consent of the owner, section 25(2) only applies where the initial 





                                                 
607  For an example of conditional sale see Lee v Butler [1893] 2 QB 318. 
608  Newtons of Wembley Ltd v Williams [1965] 1 QB 560. 
609  Helby v Matthews [1895] AC 471; cf. Lee v Butler [1893] 2 QB 318. 
610 Shaw v MPC [1987] 1 WLR 1332; see further Thornely, ‘Thieves, Rogues, Innocent Purchasers, 
and Legislative Tangles’, (1988) C.L.J. 15. 
611  Weiner v Harris [1910] 1 KB 285. 
612  Dawber Williamason Roofing v Humberside CC (1979) 14 BLR 70. 
613  Newtons of Wembley Ltd v Williams [1965] 1 QB 560, and RF Martin Ltd v Duffy [1985] NI 417. 
614  National Employers Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd v Jones [1990] 1 AC 24. 
 248
Seventh Exception:  Special common law or statutory power of sale 
7.23. Section 21(2)(b) of the 1893 Act provides that nothing in the Act shall affect the 
validity of any contract of sale under any special common law or statutory power of 
sale or under the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.   
 
Other Miscellaneous Exceptions 
7.24.  Section 2(1) of the Factors Act 1889 Act provides: 
     Where a mercantile agent is, with the consent of the owner, in possession of goods  
      or of documents of title to goods, any sale, pledge, or disposition of the goods  
      made by him when acting in the ordinary course of business of a mercantile agent,  
      shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be valid as if he were expressly  
      authorised by the owner of goods to make the same; provided that the person  
      taking under the disposition acts in good faith, and has not at the time of the  
      disposition notice that the person making the disposition has not authority to make  
      the same. 
 
Therefore, where a mercantile agent (as defined in the 1889 Act)615 is in possession of 
goods (constructive possession will suffice) or a document of title (also defined in the 
legislation),616 with the consent of the owner, and, as mercantile agent, sells the goods 
in the ordinary course of business, the buyer will receive good title, provided he buys 
in good faith and without notice of any defect in title.   
 
7.25. Section 70 of the Consumer Credit Act provides a further exception in the case 
of goods let under a hire-purchase agreement to a dealer who deals in goods of that 
class or description.  If the dealer sells the goods when ostensibly acting in the 
ordinary course of his business, the sale shall be valid as if the dealer were expressly 
authorised by the owner to make the sale, provided that the consumer buyer acts in 
good faith and without notice.     
 
Issues Arising  
7.26. While the nemo dat rule itself is clear and simple to apply, the same cannot be 
said of the exceptions to it. The problems that have arisen in relation to the exceptions 
to the  rule can be classified as general or specific in character. As regards the specific 
problems, these derive both from the statutory provisions themselves and from the 
applicable case law. 
                                                 
615  Factors Act 1889, s.1(1). 
616  Ibid., s.1(4). 
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General Issues  
7.27. As is apparent from the foregoing analysis, one of the main general criticisms 
levelled at these sections of the 1893 Act is that the exceptions to the nemo dat rule 
are over-complicated, lack an underlying and unifying rationale, and overlap in ways 
that are inconsistent and incoherent. Atiyah, for example, describes the statutory 
provisions in this area as ‘complex and confused’.617  This line of criticism has led to 
the suggestion that the nemo dat rule and the various exceptions to it should be 
repealed and replaced by a single more coherent principle.618 A second general 
criticism relates to the ‘all or nothing’ nature of the rule and exceptions.  Either the 
original owner will retain title under the nemo dat principle, or the innocent third 
party purchaser will get good title under one or more of the exceptions.  There will 
always be one ‘winner’ and one ‘loser’ even though both parties are ‘innocent’.  It has 
been suggested that it might be possible to apportion the loss which occurs when an 
innocent owner and an equally innocent bona fide purchaser are left in a conflict of 
title.  In Ingram v Little, Devlin L.J. observed that619: 
    For the doing of justice the relevant question in this sort of case is not whether the  
    contract was void or voidable, but which of the two innocent parties shall suffer for  
    the fraud of a third.  The plain answer is that the loss should be divided between  
    them in such circumstances. If it be pure misfortune, the loss should be borne  
    equally; if the fault or imprudence of either party has caused or contributed to the  
    loss, it should be borne by that party in the whole or in the greater part.  
 
Specific Issues Raised by the Statutory Framework 
7.28. Bridge is critical of the fact that a series of provisions dealing with conflicts of 
title is located within a statutory framework that addresses the bilateral relationship of 
seller and buyer and suggests that a separate statute dealing with title matters would 
be more appropriate.620 Looking at the specific exceptions, the market overt exception 
in section 22 is the oldest of the nemo dat exceptions and has been criticised as being 
archaic and anomalous in its application and as inappropriate in a modern commercial 
context.621  It has been further suggested that it operates as a ‘thieves’ charter’ in that 
                                                 
617 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 401; see also Kelly, C.  ‘Losing Nemo? Reform of the Nemo 
Dat Rule in Ireland’, in Shannon, G and O’Dell, E. (eds.). 2008. Law and Practice: Essays on 
Reform (Dublin: Clarus Press). 
618 For example, Diamond. 1989. Review of Security Interests in Property, (UK Department of Trade 
and Industry).  
619  Ingram v Little [1961] 1 QB 31 at 73-74.  
620  Bridge, ‘Do we need a new Sale of Goods Act?’, op. cit., para 2.27. 
621  Smith, ‘Valediction to Market Overt’, [1997] Am. J. Legal Hist. 225. 
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it is the only exception to the nemo dat rule which allows title in stolen goods to pass 
to an innocent third party purchaser.  Two main approaches to its reform can be 
distinguished.  First, by the extension of the rule to all retail sales as recommended in 
the 1960s by the UK’s Law Reform Committee.622 This proposal was not  
implemented in the UK, though the exception was extended in this way in Hong 
Kong.623  Secondly, by repeal of the rule.  This has been the dominant approach and 
has been followed in the UK, most of the Canadian provinces, New Zealand, a 
number of Australian states, and Singapore.624 Repeal has also been recommended in 
Hong Kong.625 
 
7.29. Another criticism of the statutory framework relates to the exact meaning of the 
‘good faith’ and ‘without notice’ requirements for the buyer under the various 
exceptions to the nemo dat rule.  Section 62(2) provides that a thing is deemed to be 
done in ‘good faith’ when it is in fact done honestly, whether it be done negligently or 
not.626  Therefore, good faith simply requires the buyer to act honestly, a subjective 
test.  It has been argued that the good faith requirement in this context has more to do 
with commercial convenience and expediency than with broader notions of justice, 
fairness, and reasonableness associated with the principle of good faith.  The question 
at issue therefore is whether the scope of good faith in the exceptions should be 
broadened.  Furthermore, ‘notice’ is not defined in the legislation.  But it is generally 
accepted that ‘constructive notice’ has no role in commercial transactions627, and that 
notice in this context means ‘actual notice’.628  However, the concept of actual notice 
is far from simple.  Actual notice is not the same as actual knowledge.  Actual notice 
is assessed objectively.  In deciding what facts a buyer has notice of, a court may 
draw inferences from the facts.  For instance, a buyer will be treated as having notice 
of facts to which it can be shown that he deliberately turned a blind eye.629 Moreover, 
a buyer will be treated as having actual notice of facts if he knows of circumstances 
                                                 
622  UK Law Reform Committee 12th Report, op. cit., paras. 30-35.  
623  Annex IV, section 6.1.   
624  Ibid., sections 2.5, 3.2, 4.1, 5.1 and 7.1. The repeal was effected in England by the Sale and Supply 
of Goods Act 1994.  The market overt rule  never applied in Scotland or Wales.   
625  Annex IV, section 6.3.    
626  This definition is taken from section 90 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882.   
627  See, in a different context, the statement by Lindley LJ in Manchester Trust v Furness [1895] 2 QB 
539 at 545.   
628  See Worcester Works Finance Ltd v Cooden [1972] 1 QB 210 at 218; [1971] 3 All ER 708 at 712; 
per Lord Denning.  
629  See London Joint Stock Bank v Simmons [1892] AC 20 regarding negotiable instruments. 
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which ‘must lead a reasonable man applying his mind to them, and judging from 
them, to the conclusion that the fact is so’.630  Again, the question is whether the 
concept of notice, as an objective concept, should be clarified in legislative form. 
 
7.30. A further criticism of the current statutory framework relates to the inclusion of 
section 26, which deals with the effects of a writ of execution.  It has been argued that  
this provision does not belong in a statute dealing with the sale of goods and would be 
more appropriate to some form of courts legislation. A final criticism of the statutory 
framework concerns the fact that similar, though not identical, exceptions to the nemo 
dat rule at section 25 of the 1893 Act co-exist in a separate statute, namely sections 8 
and 9 of the Factors Act 1889.  This duplication has been rightly questioned in our 
view, and there is a strong case for the consolidation of these overlapping rules in sale 
of goods legislation.631  
 
Specific Issues Raised by Case Law  
7.31. A number of other issues have arisen from case law.  One such issue is the 
narrow interpretation given to section 21(1) and the concept of agency based on 
estoppel, including estoppel by negligence. The matter at issue is whether this 
exception should be construed more broadly so as to favour innocent third party 
purchasers. A second issue relates to the burden of proof of good faith and lack of 
notice.  The nemo dat exceptions require that the buyer must act in good faith and 
without notice of the seller’s defect in title. However, the burden of proof under 
section 23 is different from the other exceptions.  It has been held in Whitehorn Bros v 
Davison that, under section 23, it is for the original owner to prove that the purchaser 
did not act in good faith and without notice.632  While this has led to academic and 
judicial criticism, the decision has not been overruled.633 Requiring an owner to prove 
a third party’s bad faith is clearly more difficult than requiring a third party to prove 
his own good faith: all the relevant evidence is in the hands of the third party. The UK 
Law Reform Committee recommended the reversal of this burden of proof, though its 
                                                 
630  Per Lord Tenderden in Evans v Truman (1830) 1 Mood & R 10 at 12. 
631 Their repeal was proposed in the Diamond Review of Security Interests in Property and has also 
been recommended by Bridge,  ‘Do we need a new Sale of Goods Act?’, op. cit., para. 2.27. See also 
Thorneley, J.  ‘Thieves, Rogues, Innocent Purchasers and Legislative Tangles’, [1988] C.L.J. 15.  
632  [1911] 1 KB 463. 
633  See, for example, Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para 7-029. 
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recommendation has never been implemented.634  A third problem arises in relation to 
section 23 and the difficulty that exists in determining whether a contract is void or 
voidable. The case law on this distinction has been and remains confused and overly 
technical.635 Abolition of the distinction was first proposed by UK Law Reform 
Committee in its 12th Report,636 though its recommendation has not been 
implemented.  The position in the US under the Uniform Commercial Code achieves 
a similar effect.637 Article 2-403 of the Code provides: 
    A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith  
    purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of  
    purchase the purchaser has such power even though  
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser … 
 
The policy which underlies this approach is based on a recognition that the original 
owner who deals with a rogue should bear the risk and that it is unfair accordingly 
that this risk can be transferred onto an innocent third party purchaser.638  
 
7.32. A further problem has arisen regarding the operation of section 23 under which 
a buyer will succeed in a conflict of title with an original owner where the seller has a 
voidable title and his title has not been avoided at the time of the sale.  Usually, the 
original owner can rescind the contract with the seller merely by notifying the seller 
of his intention to avoid the contract between them or by retaking possession of the 
goods. However, in the case of Car and Universal Finance Co Ltd v 
Caldwell
639discussed at paragraph 7.17. above, it was held that where the seller is 
untraceable, the original owner may be able to rescind the contract by taking other 
steps to recover his property, such as notifying the police. This decision has been 
criticised for limiting the protection afforded to innocent third party purchasers in a 
way that seriously undermines the objective of the statutory provision.640 The UK 
Law Reform Committee recommended that the matter be addressed by means of a 
statutory provision requiring that the rescission of a voidable contract would require 
                                                 
634 Twelfth Report of the Law Reform Committee, Transfer of Title to Chattels, Cmnd 2958 (1966), 
para 25. 
635 For more recent example of the difficulty in this regard see Shogun Finance v Hudson [2003] 
UKHL 62. 
636  Ibid. 
637  For a discussion see Thomas, ‘Mistake of Identity: A Comparative Analysis’ (2008) L.M.C.L.Q. 
188. 
638  Similar sentiments were expressed by Lord Denning in Lewis v Averay [1972] 1 QB 198 at 207.   
639  [1965] 1 QB 525. 
640  Twelfth Report of the Law Reform Committee, op. cit., para. 16. 
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communication with the fraudulent party.641 The Diamond Review on Security 
Interests in Property also called for the rule established in this case to be changed.642  
Clarification of this point in Irish law would be welcome.  A final issue that has 
caused difficulty concerns the operation of section 25(2) regarding cases where the 
buyer is in possession of the goods. Where the requirements of section 25(2) are 
satisfied, the disposition by the first buyer to the sub-buyer has the same effect as if 
the first buyer ‘were a mercantile agent in possession of the goods with the consent of 
the owner’. In Newtons of Wembley Ltd v Williams643, these words were interpreted as 
requiring that the first buyer must act in the way in which a mercantile agent acting in 
the ordinary course of business would act in disposing of the goods. The case 
concerned the sale of a car by the plaintiff, a car dealer, to a buyer subject to an 
agreement that it would remain their property until his cheque had cleared.  Though 
the cheque had not been honoured, the buyer was allowed to take the car away and 
went on to sell it in an established London street market which dealt in used cars.  
This second buyer then sold the car to the defendant. Though the Court of Appeal 
found that the plaintiff had taken the necessary steps to avoid the contract by 
informing the police in accordance with Car and Universal Finance Co. Ltd., it held 
nevertheless that the defendant had acquired a good title to the vehicle as the rogue 
seller had to be regarded as having acted in the same way as a mercantile agent in 
view of the fact that the sale had taken place in a recognized market.  However, this 
seems to read into the statute a meaning which is not there and it is not clear whether 
an Irish court would adopt such an interpretation.644  Indeed, the Australian courts 
have rejected this line of reasoning.645 The UK Law Reform Committee also 
recommended that the dicta in this case be reversed.646   
 
Options for Reform  
7.33. The above discussion illustrates the principal problems and sources of 
uncertainty in relation to sections 21-23 and 25-26 of the 1893 Act. The main 
                                                 
641  In line with Scots law: McLeod v Kerr [1965] SC 253. 
642  Diamond, Review of Security Interests in Property, op. cit., para 13.6.6. 
643  [1965] 1 QB 560.  A similar interpretation was taken in a subsequent Northern Ireland case, RF 
Martin Ltd v Duffy [1985] NI 417. 
644 As Atiyah has commented: ‘If a person is not a mercantile agent, how can he be said to act in the 
ordinary course of business of a mercantile agent?’  Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 396.   
645  Gamer’s Motor Centre(Newcastle) Pty Ltd  v Natwest Wholesale Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 
236. 
646 Twelfth Report of the Law Reform Committee, op. cit., paras. 21-23.  
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questions for consideration are whether the various matters at issue are best addressed 
through statutory reform or on a case-by-case basis and whether any statutory reform 
should be general and radical, or limited and specific, in character.   
 
General Reform  
7.34. The most radical reform option would be to repeal the existing rules and replace 
them with a single, clear-cut principle. While the current Irish (and UK) rules on 
conflict of title are characterised by striking a balance between original owners and 
innocent third party purchasers through the operation of the nemo dat rule and the 
various exceptions to it, other jurisdictions take what appears to be a more 
straightforward approach which favours the position of one party over the other.  The 
original common law position, as reflected in the nemo dat rule, clearly favoured the 
first owner’s position. Other jurisdictions, however, have opted to protect the innocent 
third party purchaser over the original owner.  This is not an unreasonable approach to 
take in view, first, of the general policy objective of encouraging commercial 
transactions and, second, of the fact that the original owner will have dealt with the 
‘rogue’ and so will have been in a better position than the innocent third party 
purchaser to make a judgment about his trustworthiness when handing over 
possession of his goods and hence should bear any subsequent loss. In German law, 
for example, Article 932 of the German Civil Code provides that a purchaser acting in 
good faith acquires title where he obtains possession from a seller who has no title.647 
The purchaser is not in good faith if he knew, or by reason of gross negligence did not 
know, that the goods did not belong to the seller.  In France, similarly, Article 2279 of 
the French Civil Code provides that a buyer in good faith acquires an overriding title 
provided that he takes possession: ‘possession is equivalent to title’.  Article 2280 of 
the Code further provides that, where the goods are lost by, or stolen from, an original 
owner, their purchase at a fair or market, a public sale, or from a merchant selling 
similar goods, allows the purchaser to retain them until he is reimbursed for the price 
by the original owner. The Draft Common Frame of Reference also adopts an 
approach which favours the good faith acquisition of ownership.  Accordingly, where 
the transferor has no right or authority to transfer ownership, the transferee acquires, 
and the former owner loses, ownership provided certain conditions are met, including 
                                                 
647  As part of their Law of Property; see also Art 366 of Commercial Code. 
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the general conditions for the transfer of ownership (e.g. the goods exist; are 
transferable; etc) and that the transferee acquires the goods for value and in good 
faith.648 Good faith acquisition cannot occur in relation to stolen goods unless the 
transferee acquired the goods from a transferor acting in the ordinary course of 
business, while good faith acquisition of stolen ‘cultural objects’ is impossible. 
 
7.35. In the United States, Article 2-403(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code protects 
‘a good faith purchaser for value’ if the transferor has a voidable title or even a void 
title by reason of mistake of identity.649 Article 2-403(2) provides that any entrusting 
of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power 
to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in the ordinary course of business. 
‘Entrusting’ in this context includes delivery and any acquiescence in retention of 
possession, even if conditional.650  A simplified scheme, inspired by the US system, 
within the context of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979, was proposed by the Diamond 
Review of Security Interests in Property.651  Its aim was to enhance the rights of 
innocent third party buyers and its main recommendation was that all security devices 
should be treated alike and that non-possessory securities should be registered under a 
single statutory framework. Linked to this proposal was a recognition that there 
should be a clear statement of the rights of innocent purchasers of goods subject to a 
security interest.  Accordingly, it was proposed that there should be a general 
principle in the law which would apply whenever the owner of goods had entrusted 
goods to, or acquiesced in their possession by, another person (including where 
possession was given based on a mistake of identity), so that any disposition of the 
goods by the possessor would confer good title on an innocent purchaser to the extent 
that the owner could have conferred title.652  This broad principle would cover many 
agency cases as well as section 23 on voidable title and section 25 on sellers and 
buyers in possession. However, these recommendations have not been implemented to 
date.653   
                                                 
648  Von Bar, C. et al. (eds), op. cit. VIII.- 3:101. 
649 Thomas, ‘Mistake of Identity: A Comparative Analysis’, op. cit.  
650  See also Article 9 on secured transactions. 
651 Diamond, Review of Security Interests in Property, op. cit. See also the tentative proposals from 
the Scottish Law Commission in Memorandum No. 27, Corporeal Moveables (1976).  
652  Diamond,  ibid., para. 13.6.3. 
653  See also UK Department of Trade and Industry, Consultation Document on Transfer of Title 
(1994); Law Commission of England and Wales, (2005) Report on Company Security Interests 
(Law Com. 296); De Lacy, J. ‘The evolution and regulation of security interests over property in 
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7.36. It is notable, despite numerous calls for reform of the nemo dat principle and the 
related exceptions to it, in particular in the UK, that relatively little reform has been 
achieved in practice.654  While there are several reasons for the lack of action in this 
area of the legislation, there is no doubt that the practical demand for reform (barring 
the repeal of the market overt rule) has been modest, while identifying a better 
alterative has all too often proved problematical.  Similar considerations would seem 
to apply in the Irish context. The replacement of the existing statutory provisions by a 
rule that favours one party, such as applies in France or Germany, would not offer an 
appropriate or balanced basis for reform in our view. While the reform agenda 
proposed by the Diamond Review of Security Interests in Property is more nuanced, 
its application raises a number of issues that require further consideration and 
consultation.  Though we would not rule out an approach to reform along these lines, 
we are reluctant to recommend it in the absence of strong evidence that there is both a 
need and demand for changes along these lines.    
 
7.37. An alternative radical option for reform focuses on the all-or-nothing nature of 
the current rules on conflict of title. As noted at paragraph 7.27 above, Devlin LJ 
suggested in Ingram v Little655 that it might be possible to apportion loss between an 
innocent owner and an innocent purchaser where there is a conflict of title resulting 
from the conduct of a dishonest middle party who has disappeared. Following this 
suggestion, the topic of conflict of title was referred to the Law Reform Committee 
which reported in 1966. The Committee rejected Devlin LJ’s suggestion of 
apportionment because they argued it was impractical and too complicated to 
implement, especially a string of transactions was involved.656 This conclusion 
remains valid in our view and, while we are sympathetic to the aims behind this 
approach to reform, we cannot endorse it.     
 
                                                                                                                                            
English law’ in De Lacy, J (ed.), The Reform of UK Personal Property Security Law: Comparative 
Perspectives, op. cit., pp. 3-82; and Gullifer, L.  ‘Exceptions to the nemo dat rule in relation to goods 
and the Law Commission’s proposals in the Consultative Report’ in De Lacy, J. (ed), ibid., pp. 188-
222.   
654 Annex IV, sections 2.7-2.8.    
655 [1961] 1 QB 31. 
656 Twelfth Report of the Law Reform Committee, op. cit., paras. 10-12. The principle of 
apportionment was accepted in the draft Canadian Uniform Sale of Goods Act, s.6(3), but like other 
provisions of that draft Act was never implemented.   
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7.38. Finally, a general reform of these sections of the 1893 Act could, as suggested 
by Bridge, take the form of their repeal and incorporation in a separate statute on title 
conflicts.  While there is a certain logic to this proposal, the likelihood of such a 
statute securing Government approval and Parliamentary time seems remote at 
present.  From the perspective of the parties to contracts of sale, there may also be 
practical advantages in having the rules on title transfers and conflicts in sale of goods 
legislation.   
 
7.39. Though we do not recommend the replacement of the provisions of the Sales of 
Goods Act 1893 on title transfers and conflicts by an alternative general framework, a 
number of specific amendments to these provisions are both practical and desirable. 
While no change is needed to section 21, we recommend that the following changes 
should be made to the provisions at sections 22-23 and 25-26 of the Act.     
 
7.40. Recommendations 
Repeal the market overt exception at section 22. Criticisms of the market overt 
exception as archaic and anomalous are well-founded and its abolition would mean 
that, where goods are stolen, title to them could not pass to an innocent third party 
purchaser. 
 
Harmonise the burden of proof for all of the exceptions to the nemo dat rule by 
stipulating that it rests with the seller under section 23. As noted above, the burden 
of proof under section 23 of the Act rests with the seller while, for all other exceptions 
to the nemo dat rule, it lies with the buyer. The burden of proof should apply on the 
same basis for all of the Act’s exceptions to the rule.    
 
Simplify section 23 by abolishing the distinction between void and voidable. As 
discussed above, the case law on this distinction is neither coherent nor consistent.  
The distinction can permit the risk of loss of title to be transferred unfairly to innocent 
third party purchasers and its abolition would ensure that the original owner who 
deals with a rogue would bear this risk.   
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Amend section 23 to address the ruling in Car & Universal Finance Co Ltd v 
Caldwell.657 The effect of the judgement in this case has been substantially to curtail 
the protection afforded to third parties under section 23.  Section 23 should be 
amended to provide that, unless the other contracting party is notified of the rescission 
of the contract, an innocent purchaser from this party should acquire a good title to the 
goods.   
 
Amend section 25 to address the ruling in Newtons of Wembley Ltd v 
Williams
658 by providing that subsection (2) be brought into line with subsection (1) 
so as to enable a good title to be acquired by an innocent purchaser regardless of 
whether or not the person with whom he was dealing appeared to be acting in the 
course of a business.   
 
Repeal section 26 (on effects of writ of execution) and transfer the provision to 
courts legislation. A similar reform was effected in the UK in the 1979 Sale of Goods 
Act and section 138 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. 
 
Repeal sections 2, 8 and 9 of the Factors Act 1889, and consolidate these 















                                                 
657  [1965] 1 QB 525. 
658  [1965] 1 QB 560; see also RF Martin Ltd v Duffy [1985] NI 417. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893:PERFORMANCE 
OF THE CONTRACT I – DELIVERY OF THE GOODS, 
SECTIONS 10, 27-33 & 37. 
 
8.1. This Chapter deals first with sections 27-28 of the 1893 Act on the general duties 
of the seller and the buyer in regard to delivery and payment and also with section 10 
of the Act on stipulations as to time in view of its close link with delivery and 
payment. The Chapter then considers the detailed rules regarding various aspects of 
delivery in sections 29-33 of the Act. Chapter 9 is devoted to the remaining provisions 
of Part III of the Act -  those at sections 33-37 on examination and acceptance - and to 
the related issues of the remedies for goods not in conformity with the contract, in 
particular the right to reject.   
 
I SECTIONS 27-28 SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893 
    Section 27 Duties of Seller and Buyer 
    It is the duty of the seller to deliver the goods, and of the buyer to accept and pay for them, in   
    accordance with the terms of the contract of sale. 
 
    Section 28 Payment and Delivery Are Concurrent Conditions 
    Unless otherwise agreed, delivery of the goods and payment of the price are concurrent  
    conditions, that is to say, the seller must be ready and willing to give possession of the goods  
    to the buyer in exchange for the price, and the buyer must be ready and willing to pay the price  
    in exchange for possession of the goods.   
 
These sections of the Act have remained unchanged since their enactment. The 
corresponding sections in the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 are also identical to those 
enacted in 1893.   
 
8.2. Section 27 sets out the core obligations of the parties under the contract of sale. 
The seller’s duty is to deliver the goods, and the buyer’s duty is to accept and pay for 
them. Where the contract is for the sale of specific goods, or if the property in the 
goods has passed to the buyer, the seller must deliver the specific goods that have 
been contracted for.  If the contract is for the sale of unascertained goods, the seller 
can deliver any goods that meet the contract description unless the goods to be sold 
have been unconditionally appropriated to the contract. ‘Delivery’ is defined at 
section 61(1) of the Act as the ‘voluntary transfer of possession from one person to 
another’. Its meaning under the Act differs therefore from its ordinary meaning where 
it connotes the dispatch or transport of goods from seller to buyer. A seller can, and 
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commonly will, fulfil his obligation to deliver goods simply by allowing the buyer to 
collect them.  
 
8.3. Despite the emphasis on the transfer of possession in the definition of delivery in 
the Act, delivery can take a number of forms, some of which do not involve a 
handover of the physical custody of the goods. As Benjamin observes,659 ‘the 
meaning of delivery is best ascertained from the various acts which have been 
recognised by the law as constituting an effective delivery of the goods to the buyer in 
a given situation.’  The main such forms are as follows:660 
1) The physical transfer of the goods to the buyer or the buyer’s agent; 
2) The physical transfer of the goods to a third party, such as a warehouse-
keeper; 
3) The transfer of the means of access to, and/or control over, the goods, for 
example the handover of the keys to a warehouse in which the goods are 
stored; 
4) The delivery of documents of title to the goods, such as a bill of lading for 
goods that are shipped;661 
5) The holding of the goods by the seller as the buyer’s bailee.  
Where the seller or a third party acknowledges that they hold the goods on the 
buyer’s, and not their own, behalf, the acknowledgement is referred to as attornment.   
 
8.4. Section 28 comprises a default rule which provides that the delivery of the goods 
and the payment of the price are concurrent conditions. It elaborates on this rule by 
stating that the seller must be ready and willing to give possession of the goods in 
exchange for the price while the buyer must be ready and willing to pay the price in 
exchange for the possession of the goods. The seller is not required to effect actual 
delivery of the goods before being entitled to sue for the price.662 Where it is clear that 
the buyer would have refused to pay the price or accept the goods, it is sufficient for 
                                                 
659  Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 8-002.   
660  Ibid., paras. 8-007-114.  Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., pp. 124-25.  Goode on Commercial 
Law, op. cit., pp. 289-93.  
661 Section 1(4) of the Factors Act 1889 defines a document of title as ‘any bill of lading, dock warrant, 
warehousekeeper’s certificate, and warrant or order for the delivery of goods, and any document used 
in the ordinary course of business as proof of the possession or control of goods, or authorising or 
purporting to authorise, either by endorsement or by delivery, the possessor of the documents to 
transfer or receive goods thereby represented.’  The most important type of document of title is the bill 
of lading, a document issued by the shipowner or his agent to the shipper of goods which constitutes a 
receipt for the goods, a contract for their carriage, and a document of title to them. Per Kennedy LJ in 
Biddell Bros Ltd v E Clemens Horst & Co. Ltd [1911] 1 KB 934 at 956-57, the bill of lading ‘in law 
and in fact represents the goods.’   
662 Levey & Co. Ltd v Goldberg [1922] 1 KB 688.  
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the seller to show that he had ‘not only the disposition but the capacity to perform the 
contract.’663 Similarly, a buyer is not required to have paid the price for the goods in 
order to be entitled to sue for non-delivery provided that he was willing and able to 
pay. The rules regarding anticipatory repudiation have received consideration in a 
number of cases, most recently Fercometal SARL v Mediterranean Shipping Co SA.664  
In this case, the charterers of a vessel were told by its owners that it would not in 
arrive in time to allow the charterer’s cargo to be loaded in accordance with the terms 
of the contract.  Despite the absence of a cancellation clause in the contract, the 
charterer then sought to cancel the contract. The ship’s owners refused to accept the 
cancellation and made a false claim that the vessel would now arrive in time. The 
charterers persisted in their repudiation of the contract and, when sued by the owners 
for breach of contract, responded that the latter had never been in a position to 
perform their obligations under the contract. The House of Lords accepted this 
defence. An anticipatory repudiation had either to be accepted or refused.  If accepted, 
the contract was terminated and the accepting party was freed from his obligations 
under the contract.  If the repudiation was rejected, however, the contract remained in 
force and the rejecting party must be in a position to discharge his duty to perform. 
Though the case did not involve a contract of sale, the reasoning in the judgement is 
of general application.     
 
Section 10 1893 Act  
Section 10 Stipulations as to Time  
    (1) Unless a different intention appears from the terms of the contract, stipulations as to time 
of payment are not deemed to be of the essence of a contract of sale. Whether any other 
stipulation as to time is of the essence of the contract or not depends on the terms of the 
contract. 
    (2)  In a contract of sale “month” means prima facie calendar month. 
 
8.5. Section 10 provides, first, that time of payment is presumptively not of the 
essence of the contract of sale and, second, that it is a matter for the construction of 
the contract whether any other stipulation as to time is of the essence. The section 
avoids the concepts of conditions and warranties that are central to other provisions of 
the Act, though terms that are of the essence of the contract can be equated with 
                                                 
663 Per Lord Abinger in De Medina v Norman (1842) 9 M & W 820 at 827.  British & Bennington Ltd v 
NW Cachar Tea Co. Ltd [1923] AC 48.   
664 [1989] AC 788.  See also Gill & Dufus SA v Berger & Co Inc [1984] AC 382.  Braithwaite v 
Foreign  Hardwood Co. Ltd [1905] 2 KB 543.  Taylor v Oakes Roncoroni & Co (1922) 38 TLR 349.   
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conditions, and terms that are not of the essence with warranties, for the purposes of 
the remedies available for breach. Where time is of the essence, late delivery 
constitutes a breach of condition and the buyer can reject the goods, terminate the 
contract and sue for damages.  In accordance with section 11(2) of the Act, a buyer 
can elect to treat the breach of condition as a breach of warranty and pursue only a 
claim for damages. Where time is not of the essence of the contract, the buyer’s only 
remedy is to sue for damages.   
 
8.6. As noted in Chapter 4, the courts have consistently held that, as stated by 
McCardie J in Hartley v Hymans,665 ‘in ordinary commercial contracts for the sale of 
goods the rule clearly is that time prima facie is of the essence with respect to 
delivery.’  This reflects the importance attached to certainty in commercial contracts, 
particularly in ‘string transactions’ involving a series of sales of the same goods, or 
transactions in which goods are bought for use as materials or components in the 
manufacture of other goods.666 As a failure to deliver on time is presumed to be a 
breach of a condition, the buyer is entitled, unless this presumption is rebutted, to 
repudiate the contract regardless of whether the breach has resulted in loss or damage.  
In Bowes v Shand,667 the seller agreed to ship a quantity of rice during the months of 
March and/or April. In the event, most of the rice was shipped at the end of February. 
Though the House of Lords acknowledged there was no material difference between 
the rice shipped in February and that which would have been shipped in March, it 
held that the buyers were entitled to reject the goods. Early delivery, accordingly, is 
no less a breach of contract than late delivery. The courts have taken a similar 
approach to the time of performance of other contractual obligations, such as the 
giving of notices, to that taken in respect of the time of delivery.668     
 
8.7. Though time of delivery is prima facie of the essence of the commercial contract 
of sale, it can be expressly or impliedly waived by the buyer. In Hartley v Hymans669, 
a contract for the sale of cotton stipulated that delivery was to be made in instalments 
by a specified date.  The buyer accepted a number of deliveries after this date, 
                                                 
665 [1920] 3 KB 475 at 484.   
666 White, Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 225.   
667 (1877) 2 App Cas 455.   
668 Bunge Corp v Tradax SA [1981] 1 WLR 711.   
669 [1920] 3 KB 475.  See also Westbrook Resources Ltd v Globe Metallurgical Inc [2009] EWCA Civ 
310.  
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however, and continued to press for performance for a subsequent period of four 
months, at which point he refused to accept any further deliveries. McCardie J held 
that, while time had originally been of the essence of the contract, the buyer’s conduct 
amounted to a waiver of this stipulation. It was not open to the buyer consequently to 
terminate the contract abruptly, though he would have been entitled to do so had he 
given the seller notice of his intentions. In Handelsgesellschaft Bremer v Vanden 
Avenne-Izegem,670 a case concerning the late submission of a notice extending the 
date of delivery, Lord Salmon confirmed that such a waiver did not need to be given 
expressly and that it was sufficient for the buyers to behave or write in such a way 
that reasonable sellers would be led to believe that the buyers were waiving any defect 
there might be in the notice.  
 
8.8. A waiver of the condition as to time of delivery can be reversed, however, if the 
buyer sets a new delivery deadline. In Rickards (Charles) Ltd v Oppenhaim,671 the 
plaintiff agreed to build and deliver a car for the defendant within six to seven 
months.  The defendant waived his right to terminate the contract by continuing to 
press for delivery after the delivery date had passed. He then specified a new deadline 
for delivery and, when delivery was not made by that date, cancelled the contract.  
The court upheld the defendant’s right to terminate the contract. The court also 
rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that notices making time of delivery of the essence of a 
contract applied only to a contract of sale and not to a contract for work and materials 
such as that at issue.  The court did not rule, however, on the question of whether a 
notice making time of delivery of the essence of the contract could subsequently be 
served in a contract where time had not originally been of the essence.672 
 
8.9. The rule that time of delivery is of the essence applies to ‘ordinary commercial 
contracts of sale’ but not, in the absence of an express or implied intention to the 
contrary, to consumer sales contracts. The European Communities (Protection of 
Consumers in Respect of Contracts Made by Means of Distance Communications) 
Regulations 2001 which give effect to Directive 97/7/EC contain a default rule 
requiring the performance of distance contracts within a period of thirty days from the 
                                                 
670 [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 109 at 126.   
671 [1950] 1 KB 616.  
672  Stannard, J.E. ‘In the Contractual Last Chance Saloon: Notices Making Time of the Essence’, 
(2004) L.Q.R 137 at 158.   
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day following the forwarding of the consumer’s order to the supplier.673 Where the 
supplier fails to perform his or her side of the distance contract on the grounds that the 
goods are unavailable, the consumer is entitled to a refund of any monies paid as soon 
as possible, and not later than thirty days, after being informed of the fact. The 
proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights published in October 2008 included a 
similar default rule which was to apply to contracts of sale generally.674 Though the 
text adopted by the Council subsequently restricted this rule to distance and off-
premises contracts, the final text agreed following discussions between the European 
Parliament and Council includes a provision applicable to all contracts of sale 
requiring the trader to deliver the goods without undue delay, but not later than 30 
days, from the conclusion of the contract.675 As we stated in our report on the 
proposed Directive, the extension of the thirty day default delivery rule to all contracts 
of sale was questionable in view of the evidence that problems of late delivery were 
most pronounced in the distance selling sector.676  Though we remain of the view that 
the modalities of delivery for non-distance contracts of sale are more appropriately 
regulated at national level, the Directive’s delivery provisions will have to be 
implemented in Irish law for consumer contracts of sale.   
 
8.10. Like stipulations as to time to delivery in consumer contracts, stipulations as to 
time of payment in commercial contracts are not deemed prima facie to be of the 
essence of a contract of sale.  As with time of delivery in consumer contracts, 
however, time of payment in commercial contracts is subject to regulation by 
legislation of European Union origin. The European Communities (Late Payment in 
Commercial Transactions) Regulations 2002 (S.I. No. 388 of 2002) which give effect 
to Directive 2002/35/EC677 imply a term into every commercial contract that, where 
the purchaser does not pay for the goods or services concerned by the relevant 
payment date, the supplier is entitled to late payment interest on the amount 
                                                 
673 S.I. No. 207 of 2001, Regulation 9.   
674 Commission of the European Communities.  2008.  Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights, 
Article 22.    
675 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights, Article 
22).  A provisional version of the final text of the Directive can be accessed at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/documents/activities/cont/201106/20110624ATT22578EN.pdf 
676 Sales Law Review Group.  2009.  Position Paper on Proposed Directive on Consumer Rights, 
para. 88. 
677 This Directive has recently been replaced by Directive 2011/7/EU on Combating Late Payment in 
Commercial Transactions which member states are required to bring into force by 16 March 2013.  The 
substance of the provisions regulating late payment remains broadly similar.   
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outstanding at a rate of interest specified in the Regulations.  ‘Relevant payment date’ 
is defined as the date or end of the period for payment specified in the contract or, 
where the contract does not specify this date or period, thirty days after the receipt of 
the invoice.  Where the date of receipt of the invoice is uncertain, or the invoice is 
received before the goods or services, the relevant payment date is thirty days after 
the date of receipt of the goods or services.    
 
Issues Arising 
8.11. It has been argued that sections 10 and 28 of the 1893 Act are at odds in that, 
notwithstanding the stipulation in section 28 that delivery and payment are concurrent 
conditions, section 10 provides that stipulations as to time of payment are not of the 
essence of the contract, while stipulations as to time of delivery in commercial 
contracts have been held by the courts to be of the essence. Though the buyer is under 
an obligation to pay the agreed price at the designated time, the effect of section 10 is 
to create a presumption that this obligation is not a condition of the contract. These 
rules have been subject to criticism on the ground that they permit the buyer to 
repudiate the contact when the seller is unpunctual, but do not allow the seller to do 
likewise when the buyer is at fault.678  The result, it is contended, is effectively to 
require the seller to extend compulsory credit to the buyer.  These concerns are more 
apparent than real in our view, however, and do not warrant any amendments or 
additions to the existing statutory provisions. First, commercial contracts commonly 
allow payment periods of thirty days or more, a norm recognised in the statutory 
provisions on late payment and, in practice therefore, do not treat delivery and 
payment as concurrent conditions. Second, the seller is free to decline to deliver the 
goods until the buyer pays the price. Section 41(1) of the Act expressly permits the 
seller to retain possession of the goods until payment or tender of the price where, as 
is the case in transactions to which the default rule in section 28 applies, the goods 
                                                 
678 Stoljar, S. ‘Untimely Performance in the Law of Contract (1955) 71 L.Q.R. 527 at 539-40.  Goode 
argues by contrast that, while the duties of delivery and payment are concurrent conditions, the two 
obligations are not necessarily of equal strength, and that the law recognises in various ways the 
distinction between the payment interest of the seller and the delivery interest of the buyer.  ‘The only 
consequence to the seller of non-payment of the price is that he is deprived of the use of money, a 
matter that can readily be compensated by an award of interest in addition to a contract sum.  But non-
delivery of goods in a commercial transaction may be disastrous.  If the goods are of an income-
producing kind bought for use in the buyer’s business, he may suffer a substantial loss of profit, not to 
mention damage to his commercial reputation and the possible loss of repeat orders.  If the goods are 
bought for resale and there is no available market, the seller’s default may place the buyer in breach of 
his contractual obligations to his own purchaser.’  Goode on Commercial Law, op. cit., p.441.  
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have been sold without any stipulation as to credit.  Third, section 48(3) provides that 
the buyer may re-sell the goods where the goods are perishable, or where the seller 
gives notice of his intention to re-sell the goods and the buyer does not pay within a 
reasonable time.    
 
8.12. Though no substantive changes are required to sections 10, 27 or 28, a minor 
change could beneficially be made to section 10.  The default rule in section 10(1) 
applies ‘unless a different intention appears from the terms of the contract’.  This is 
unduly restrictive in our opinion and it would be preferable if the formulation of the 
default rule in sections 17 and 18 of the 1893 Act were followed. The default rule 
would apply consequently unless a different intention appears while, for the purpose 
of ascertaining the intention of the parties, regard would be had to the terms of the 
contract, the conduct of the parties, and the circumstances of the case.   
 
8.13. Recommendation 
The default rule at section 10(1) of the 1893 Act should be reformulated in line 
with that at sections 17(2) and 18 of the Act to provide that, for the purpose of 
ascertaining the intention of the parties, regard shall be had to the terms of the 
contract, the conduct of the parties, and the circumstances of the case.      
 
8.14. The next part of the Chapter deals with the delivery provisions at sections 28-33 
of the 1893 Act.  It looks first at the rules on various aspects of the modalities of 
delivery at sections 29, 32 and 33 and then considers the rules on delivery of the 
wrong quantity and instalment deliveries at sections 30-31.   
 
II SECTIONS 28-33 SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893  
Section 29 Rules as to Delivery  
1) Whether it is for the buyer to take possession of the goods or for the seller to send them 
to the buyer is a question depending in each case on the contract, express or implied, 
between the parties.  Apart from any such contract, express or implied, the place of 
delivery is the seller’s place of business, if he have one, and if not, his residence.  
Provided that, if the contract be for the sale of specific goods, which to the knowledge 
of the parties when the contract is made are in some other place, then that place is the 
place of delivery. 
2) Where under the contract of sale the seller is bound to send the goods to the buyer, but 
no time for sending them is fixed, the seller is bound to send them within a reasonable 
time. 
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3) Where the goods at the time of sale are in the possession of a third person, there is no 
delivery by seller to buyer unless and until such person acknowledges to the buyer that 
he holds the goods on his behalf; provided that nothing in this section shall affect the 
operation of the issue or transfer of any document of title to goods. 
4) Demand or tender of delivery may be treated as ineffectual unless made at a reasonable 
hour.  What is a reasonable hour is a question of fact. 
5) Unless otherwise agreed, the expenses and incidental to putting the goods into a 
deliverable state must be borne by the seller. 
 
Section 32 Delivery to Carrier  
1) Where, in pursuance of a contract of sale, the seller is authorised or required to send the 
goods to the buyer, delivery of the goods to a carrier, whether named by the buyer or 
not, for the purpose of transmission to the buyer is prima facie deemed to be a delivery 
of goods to the buyer. 
2) Unless otherwise authorised by the buyer, the seller must make such contract with the 
carrier on behalf of the buyer as may be reasonable having regard to the nature of the 
goods and the other circumstances of the case.  If the seller omit so to do, and the goods 
are lost or damaged in course of transit, the buyer may decline to treat the carrier as a 
delivery to himself, or may hold the seller responsible in damages. 
3) Unless otherwise agreed, where goods are sent by the seller to the buyer by a route 
involving sea transit, under circumstances in which it is usual to insure, the seller must 
give such notice to the buyer as may enable him to insure them during their sea transit, 
and, if the seller fails to do so, the goods shall be held to be at his risk during such sea 
transit.   
 
Section 33 Risk Where Goods Are Delivered at Distant Place  
    Where the seller of goods agrees to deliver them at his own risk at a place other than that  
     where they are sold, the buyer must, nevertheless, unless otherwise agreed, take any risk of  
     deterioration in the goods necessarily incident to the course of transit.   
 
8.15. These sections of the Act have remained unchanged since their enactment.  The 
corresponding provisions at sections 29 and 33 of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 
also remain identical to those enacted in 1893.  Section 32 of the UK Act remains the 
same as that enacted in 1893 in respect of commercial contracts but, following an 
amendment made in 2002,679 now provides in subsection (4) that subsections (1) to 
(3) must be ignored where the buyer deals as consumer. The subsection further 
provides that, where the seller is authorised or required to send the goods to a 
consumer buyer, delivery of the goods to the carrier is not delivery of the goods to the 
buyer.   
 
8.16. The rules regarding the time, place and other aspects of delivery in sections 29 
and 32-33 are relatively straightforward and have given rise to little or no significant 
case law.  Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the place of delivery is the 
                                                 
679 The amendment was effected by the Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations 2002 (S.I. 
2002/3045), reg. 4(3) in tandem with the amendment made to section 20 of the 1979 Act, discussed in 
Chapter 5 above, which provides that goods remain at the seller’s risk until delivered to the consumer.   
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seller’s place of business if he has one and, if not, his residence. In the absence of an 
agreement to the contrary, therefore, there is no obligation on the seller to transport 
the goods to the buyer.  Many commercial contracts, however, contain express terms 
as to the place of delivery. In f.o.b. (free on board) contracts, for example, the place of 
delivery is the ship’s rail at the port of shipment. Where the contract is for the sale of 
specific goods known by the parties to be located somewhere other than the seller’s 
place of business or residence, that location is the presumptive place of delivery. In 
most contracts for the sale of specific goods, however, the goods are likely to be on 
the seller’s premises.  Where the contract of sale requires the seller to send the goods 
to the buyer, delivery to a carrier, whether named by the buyer or not, is deemed 
prima facie to be delivery of the goods to the buyer.  If, however, the carrier is the 
seller’s agent, delivery to the carrier does not constitute delivery to the buyer.  Unless 
otherwise authorised by the buyer, the seller is required to make a reasonable contract 
with the carrier on behalf of the buyer.  If the seller fails to do so and the goods are 
damaged in transit, the buyer may refuse to regard delivery to the carrier as delivery 
to himself and can take an action for damages against the seller.     
 
8.17. The seller is required to tender delivery of the goods at the time stipulated in the 
contract.  Where the contract of sale requires the seller to send the goods to the buyer 
but no time is fixed for their dispatch, the seller is required to send them within a 
reasonable time.  What is a reasonable time will depend on the circumstances of the 
case.  It will be influenced by the nature of the goods so that, for example, a shorter 
period will typically apply to perishable items. A demand for, or a tender of, delivery, 
is effective also only if made at a reasonable hour. What is a reasonable hour is a 
question of fact.  The delivery of goods to a building site outside working hours which 
resulted in their being left in an unlocked garage was held not to be delivery at a 
reasonable hour.680 Unless otherwise agreed, all expenses of, and incidental to, putting 
the goods in a deliverable state are borne by the seller.681  The Act does not deal with 
the expenses incurred by the seller in making delivery or by the buyer in taking 
delivery.  At common law, however, these expenses, unless otherwise agreed, fall on 
the seller and buyer respectively.   
                                                 
680 Ron Mead TV & Appliances v Legendary Homes 746 P 2d 1163 (1987) (Okl App). .    
681 Per section 62(4) of the 1893 Act, goods are in a ‘deliverable state’ when they are in such state that 
the buyer would under the contract be bound to take delivery of them.    
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8.18. Section 33 provides that where a seller agrees to deliver goods at a distant place 
at his own risk, the buyer shall, unless otherwise agreed, bear the risk of any 
deterioration in the goods necessarily incident to the course of transit.  According to 
Bridge,682 the section is based on a case, Bull v Robison,683 where a quantity of iron 
sent by canal rusted in transit. The court held that this was necessarily incident to 
canal transit and that the risk of deterioration had to be borne by the buyer.684 It is 
possible, however, that the courts would now take a narrower view of what was, and 
was not, a necessary consequence of the course of transit. In Mash and Murrell Ltd v 
Joseph I. Emmanuel Ltd,685 Diplock J. held that, where goods are sold under a 
contract which involves transit before use, there is an implied term in the contract that 
the goods should be despatched in such a condition that they can survive a normal 
journey so that they remain suitable, on delivery, for the usual purpose for which the 
goods are intended, and are of merchantable quality.  It followed that686: 
    … an extraordinary deterioration of the goods due to abnormal conditions  
    experienced during the transit [is one] … for which the buyer takes the risk.  A  
    necessary and inevitable deterioration during transit which will render them  
    unmerchantable on arrival is normally one for which the seller is liable.   
 
Though this rule was expressed in the context of a transaction where the seller’s duty 
was to despatch the goods under a c.i.f. (cost, insurance and freight) contract rather 
than under the specific circumstances covered by section 33, it may nevertheless 
influence the interpretation of the latter provision.687 
 
Issues Arising  
8.19. As noted earlier in the Chapter, the recently agreed Directive on Consumer 
Rights will contain a default rule applicable to all consumer contracts of sale requiring 
the trader to deliver the goods to the consumer by transferring the physical possession 
or control of the goods to the consumer without undue delay, but not later than thirty 
days, from the conclusion of the contract.  This will require the amendment, in the 
case of consumer contracts of sale, of the rule at section 29(2) of the 1893 Act 
                                                 
682 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 4.20.  
683 (1854) 10 Ex. 342.  
684  The vendor ‘must indeed stand the risk of any extraordinary or unusual deterioration; but the 
vendee is bound to accept the article if only deteriorated to the extent that it is necessarily subject to in 
the course of transit from one place to the other.’  Ibid. at 346.   
685 [1961] 1 W.L.R. 862. See also Beer v Walker (1877) 46 L.J.Q.B. 677.   
 
686 [1961] 1 W.L.R. 862 at 871.   
687 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit. para. 6-022.   
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requiring delivery within a reasonable time where the contract requires the goods to 
be sent to the buyer. There will also be a need in this event to amend the rule at 
section 32(1) of the Act which provides that delivery of the goods to a carrier, 
whether named by the buyer or not, for the purpose of transmission to the buyer is, 
prima facie, deemed to be a delivery of goods to the buyer. The effect of this 
provision is that the risk in principle passes to the buyer on delivery to the carrier.688 
An amendment to section 32(1) would be required in event case by our 
recommendation in Chapter 5 that risk should pass with delivery in consumer sales. If 
delivery, rather than the passing of property, is the determining event for the passing 
of risk, the delivery provisions must clearly be integrated with those on risk. The aim 
of our recommendation in Chapter 5 on the passing of risk in consumer sales is that 
risk would pass to the consumer only when he has actually received the goods, and 
this would not be consistent with a rule that delivery to a third party, whether named 
by the buyer or not, was deemed to be delivery to a consumer buyer. The recently 
agreed Consumer Rights Directive will also contain a provision applicable to all 
contracts of sale that the risk of loss of, or damage to, the goods will pass to the 
consumer when he, or a third party indicated by him and other than the carrier, has 
acquired the physical possession of the goods.  It will further provide that the risk will 
pass to the consumer upon delivery to the carrier if the carrier was commissioned to 
carry the goods by the consumer and that choice was not offered by the trader. The 
required changes to section 32 should be effected, as has been done in the UK Sale of 
Goods Act 1979, by providing that subsections (1) to (3) of the 1893 Act are not 
applicable to consumer contracts of sale. The amended provision should further 
provide that delivery of the goods to the carrier is not delivery of goods to the buyer 
in consumer contracts of sale unless the carrier has been commissioned by the 
consumer.       
 
8.20. The adoption of amendments to sections 29 and 32 along the lines set out above 
in the case of consumer contracts raises the question of whether similar changes 
should be recommended for commercial contracts of sale. Though, as stated 
elsewhere in this Report, our preference is for common rules to apply to consumer 
                                                 
688 If the contract is one for the sale of unascertained goods, however, the property will not normally 
pass to the buyer by delivery to the carrier unless and until the goods have been ascertained and, in 
consequence, the risk will not in principle pass until that time.   
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and commercial contracts, we do not favour the application of a thirty-day default 
delivery rule to commercial contracts. A very specific provision of this kind, even one 
of a presumptive nature, is unsuited to the diversity of circumstances and 
requirements found among delivery arrangements in commercial contracts. The 
existing rule at section 30(2) requiring delivery within a reasonable time where no 
time for sending the goods has been fixed by the parties should, therefore, continue to 
apply to commercial contracts of sale.   
 
8.21. We have recommended in Chapter 6 that section 20 of the 1893 Act should be 
replaced by a presumptive rule in commercial contracts that risk passes with delivery.  
The retention or replacement of the rule at section 32(1) of the Act that delivery of the 
goods to a carrier, whether named by the buyer or not, for the purpose of transmission 
to the buyer is prima facie deemed to be a delivery of goods to the buyer requires 
consideration in this context. The matter is less clear-cut than in the case of consumer 
contracts because of the range and complexity of the arrangements relating to delivery 
and insurance in commercial contracts. A default rule that risk passes with delivery 
could apply in the case of commercial contracts alongside a prima facie rule that 
delivery to a carrier is deemed to be delivery to the buyer. Provisions along these lines 
are to be found in the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods. Article 67 
of the Convention provides, among other things, that risk passes to the buyer when the 
goods are handed over to the first carrier for transmission to the buyer in accordance 
with the contract of sale. Article 69 provides among other things that, in cases not 
within Article 67, the risk passes to the buyer when he takes over the goods. We 
consider, on balance, that the existing prima facie rule at section 32(1) that delivery of 
the goods to a carrier for transmission to the buyer is deemed to be a delivery of 
goods to the buyer remains appropriate to commercial contracts of sale and should be 
retained.    
 
8.22. The default provision at section 33 of the 1893 Act requiring the buyer to take 
any risk of deterioration in the goods necessarily incident to the course of transit is 
incompatible with the rule in the recently agreed Consumer Right Directive that the 
risk of loss or damage will pass to the consumer only where he, or a third party 
indicated  by him, has acquired the physical possession of the goods. At a minimum, 
therefore, consumer contracts of sale will have to be exempt from this provision in the 
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future. While the provision could be retained as a default rule in commercial contracts 
of sale, we consider on balance there is no compelling requirement for a special 
statutory rule dealing with the specific circumstances where the seller agrees to 
deliver the goods at his own risk to a distant place. Risk in transit in commercial 
contracts of sale should be covered instead by the general presumptive rule, 
recommended in this Report, that risk passes with delivery.  
 
8.23. Recommendations  
The provision for a thirty-day default delivery rule in the recently agreed 
Consumer Rights Directive will, in the case of consumer contracts of sale, replace 
the rule at section 29(2) of the 1893 Act requiring delivery within a reasonable 
time where the seller is bound to send the goods to the buyer, but no time for 
sending the goods is fixed.  The existing ‘reasonable time’ rule should be retained 
for commercial contracts of sale.   
 
Section 32 of the 1893 Act on delivery to carrier should be amended to provide 
that subsections (1) to (3) are not applicable to consumer contracts of sale, and 
that delivery of the goods to the carrier is not delivery of goods to the buyer in 
consumer contracts of sale unless the carrier has been commissioned by the 
consumer.  
 
In the case of commercial contracts of sale, the existing rule at section 32(1) of 
the 1893 Act that delivery of the goods to a carrier, for the purpose of 
transmission to the buyer is deemed prima facie to be a delivery of the goods to 
the buyer should be retained.     
 
Section 33 of the 1893 Act on risk where goods are delivered at a distant place 
should be repealed.   
 
Section 30 Delivery of the Wrong Quantity  
1) Where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods less than he contracted to sell, 
the buyer may reject them, but if the buyer accepts the goods so delivered he must pay 
for them at the contract rate. 
2) Where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods larger than he contracted to 
sell, the buyer may accept the goods included in the contract and reject the rest, or he 
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may reject the whole.  If the buyer accepts the whole of the goods so delivered he must 
pay for them at the contract rate. 
3) Where the seller delivers to the buyer the goods he contracted to sell mixed with goods 
of a different description not included in the contract, the buyer may accept the goods 
which are in accordance with the contract and reject the rest, or he may reject the whole. 
4) The provisions of this section are subject to any usage of trade, special agreement, or 
course of dealing between the parties. 
 
Section 31 Instalment Deliveries 
 
1) Unless otherwise agreed, the buyer of goods is not bound to accept delivery thereof by 
instalments. 
2) Where there is a contract for the sale of goods to be delivered by stated instalments, 
which are to be separately paid for, and the seller makes defective deliveries in respect of 
one or more instalments, or the buyer neglects or refuses to take delivery of or to pay for 
one more instalments, it is a question in each case depending on the terms of the 
contract and the circumstances of the case, whether the breach of contract is a 
repudiation of the whole contract or whether it is a severable breach giving rise to a 
claim for compensation but not to a right to treat the whole contract as repudiated.   
 
These sections have remained unchanged since their enactment in 1893.  The 
equivalent provision at section 30 of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 has undergone 
significant  amendment, the substance of which is discussed below. The equivalent 
provision at section 31 of the UK Act remains the same as that enacted in 1893.   
 
8.24. Section 30 sets out the rules and remedies which apply when the seller delivers 
the wrong quantity of goods.  Subsections (1) to (3) cover the following scenarios:  
1) Where the seller delivers a lesser quantity than that contracted for, the buyer 
may either reject the delivery or accept and pay for it at the contract rate.  The 
buyer is also entitled to sue for damages for breach of contract.   
 
2) Where the seller delivers a greater quantity than that contracted for, the buyer 
may (i) accept the quantity contracted for and reject the rest, (ii) reject the 
whole delivery, or (iii) accept the whole delivery and pay for it at the contract 
rate.  He may also sue for damages for breach of contract if he exercises the 
first two of these options, but may be precluded from doing so if he accepts 
the excess delivery.689   
 
3) Where the seller delivers the goods contracted for mixed with goods of a 
different description, the buyer may either accept the goods which match the 
contract description and reject the rest, or reject the whole delivery.   
 
                                                 
689 In Gabriel Ward & English Ltd v Arcos Ltd  (1929) 34 LL LR 306, the court held that a buyer 
accepting an excess delivery had entered into a new contract and could not claim damages for breach of 
the original contract.  Bridge argues that acceptance of a shortfall in delivery also amounts to entry into 
a new contract, but should not estop the buyer from claiming damages for non-delivery under the 
original contract. Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 6.48.   
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Per subsection (4), the rules and remedies in subsections (1) to (3) are subject to any 
usage of trade, special agreement, or course of dealing between the parties.  The most 
common form of special agreement involves stating the quantity of goods in 
approximate terms by use of qualifying terms such as ‘about’ or ‘more or less’, or by 
fixing specific limits within which deviation from the contract quantity is permissible, 
such as ‘1,000 tons of wheat, 5 per cent more or less’.   
 
8.25. The effect of the provisions at sections 30(1) and (2) is that, where the seller 
fails to delivers the quantity of goods contracted for, the buyer can reject the goods. 
Behrend & Co v Produce Brokers Co
690
 concerned two contracts for the sale of 176 
and 400 tons of cotton seed to be delivered from the seller’s ship to the buyers’ ship in 
the port of London. As most of the cotton seed was stowed beneath other cargo that 
had to be delivered to Hull before the seed could be removed, the first delivery 
comprised only 15 tons and 22 tons of seed respectively. The ship returned to London 
two weeks later to discharge the remaining seed, but the buyers notified the sellers 
before its arrival that they would not accept the balance of the goods. The court held 
that the buyers were entitled to retain the first, and reject the second, delivery.  
Though the buyer can reject the goods where the seller delivers a wrong quantity, it 
appears to be accepted, though there is no court ruling to this effect, that the seller can 
subsequently deliver the correct quantity and that the buyer is bound to accept the 
delivery provided it was made within the time period stipulated in the contract.691  
There is no obligation on the buyer, however, to accept a subsequent correct delivery 
outside the contract period. 
 
8.26. The sole, if slight, mitigation of the rigours of the rules in sections 30(1) and (2) 
derives from the de minimis maxim.692 In Shipton Anderson & Co v Weil Bros,693 a 
surplus of 55 lbs of wheat over the contractually stipulated upper limit of 4,950 tons  - 
amounting to an excess of 0.0005 per cent – was held to be so slight as to override the 
buyer’s right to reject the goods. As Atiyah observes,694 if the de minimis maxim ‘had 
                                                 
690 [1920] 3 KB 530.  See also Gill & Duffus SA v Berger & Co Inc [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 622. 
691 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 8-052.  Bradgate, R. & White, F.  1995.  ‘Rejection and 
Termination in Contracts for the Sale of Goods’ in Birds, J. et al (eds).  Termination of Contracts 
(Chicester: Wiley), p. 66.  
692 De minimis non curat lex – the law does not concern itself with trifles.   
693 [1912] 1 KB 574.   
694 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 136.  
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not been applied in this case the rule would have lost all commercial importance.’  In 
Harland and Wolff Ltd v J Burstall & Co,695 the court held that the buyer was entitled 
to reject a delivery of 470 instead of the stipulated 500 loads of timber. The de 
minimis maxim is narrowly construed by the courts who, as Bridge comments,696 will 
tolerate ‘microscopic’ but not ‘minor’ deviations from the contractual amount.   
 
8.27. Section 30(3) which permits the seller to reject goods that do not match the 
contract description when mixed with goods matching that description constitutes an 
exception to the 1893 Act’s bar on partial rejection of defective goods.  This bar 
derives from the provision at section 11(3) of the 1893 Act which precludes rejection 
of the goods in non-severable contracts where all or part of the goods have been 
accepted by the buyer.697 Where only a part of the delivered goods are defective, 
therefore, the buyer must either accept or reject all of the goods. Section 30(3) allows 
a form of partial rejection in the specific case of deliveries that mix goods matching 
and not matching the contract description. This right is confined to breaches of 
description and does not extend to breaches of other terms, such as those relating to 
merchantable quality or fitness for purpose. In Ebrahim Dawood Ltd v Heath Ltd,698 
the sellers contracted to supply 50 tons of steel sheets in varying lengths, but 
delivered the entire quantity in six-foot lengths. The court held that the buyer could 
rely on section 30(3) to accept part of the goods and reject the rest.   
 
8.28. Section 31(1) provides that, unless otherwise agreed, the buyer is not bound to 
accept delivery by instalments. Taken in conjunction with section 30(1), this means 
that, in the absence of such an agreement, the seller cannot seek to make good a 
shortfall in delivery by undertaking to deliver the balance of the goods at a later time.  
Section 31(2) sets out the rules which apply where the parties have agreed to 
instalment deliveries that are to be paid for separately and either the seller makes 
defective deliveries in respect of one or more instalments, or the buyer neglects or 
refuses to take delivery of, or to pay for, one more instalments.  The sub-section 
                                                 
695 [1901] 84 LT 324.   
696 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 6.47.  
697 ‘Where a contract of sale is not severable, and the buyer has accepted the goods, or part thereof, the 
breach of any condition to be fulfilled by the seller can only be treated as a breach of warranty, and not 
as a ground for rejecting the goods and treating the contract as repudiated, unless there be a term of the 
contract, express or implied, to that effect.’  
698 [1961] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 512 
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provides that it is a question in each case depending on the terms of the contract and 
the circumstances of the case, whether the breach of contract is a repudiation of the 
whole contract or whether it is a severable breach giving rise to a claim for 
compensation but not to a right to treat the whole contract as repudiated. Where the 
breach in respect of one or more instalments is sufficiently serious, it may be held to 
amount to a repudiation of the entire contract and thus permit the buyer to 
terminate.699 Per Lord Hewart CJ in Maple Flock Co. Ltd v Universal Furniture 
Products (Wembley) Ltd:700 
    The main tests to be considered in applying the sub-section … are, first, the ratio  
    quantitatively which the breach bears to the contract as a whole and secondly, the  
    degree of probability or improbability that such a breach will be repeated.       
In this case, seller contracted to deliver one hundred tons of rag flock in thrice-weekly 
instalments of 1.5 tons each. The deliveries in the first fifteen weeks were satisfactory 
and were accepted by the buyers, but a consignment delivered in the sixteenth week 
was sub-standard. A further four satisfactory deliveries were tendered but rejected by 
the buyer who terminated the contract for breach in respect of the defective delivery. 
The court held that the buyer was not entitled to repudiate the contract as the breach 
affected only one consignment out of a total of over sixty and was unlikely to recur. 
In Regent OHG v Francesco of Jermyn Street,701 the parties agreed a contract for the 
sale of sixty two suits for delivery in instalments at the seller’s discretion over a three-
month period. The court held that a shortfall of one suit in the fourth of five 
instalment deliveries did not give the buyer the right to repudiate the whole 
contract.702 In Robt A Munroe & Co Ltd v Meyer703, however, Wright J held that the 
buyer was justified in terminating a contract for the delivery of 1,500 tons of 
bonemeal in weekly instalments of 125 tons after deliveries amounting to nearly half 
of the total quantity of goods were found to be contaminated, stating:    
    Where the breach is substantial and so serious as the breach in this case and has  
    continued so persistently, the buyer is entitled to say that he has the right to treat  
    the whole contract as repudiated.   
                                                 
699 Warinco AG v Samor SPA [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 450.  See also Millar’s Karri and Jarrah Co v 
Weddel,  Turner & Co [1908] LT 128 at 129 where the importance of the probability of a recurrence of 
the breach was emphasised.   
700 [1934] 1 KB 148 at 157.   
701 [1981] 3 All ER 327.   
702 If the contract had been for a single delivery regulated by section 30(1), rather than an instalment 
contract regulated by section 30(2), a shortfall of one suit in an order of sixty two would almost 
certainly have justified the buyer in rejecting all of the goods as a short delivery on this scale would not 
be within the de minimis rule.   
703 [1930] 2 KB 312 at 331.     
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8.29. The contracts covered by section 31(2) under which goods are to be delivered in 
separate instalments and paid for separately are an example of severable, as opposed 
to entire, contracts. A contract is severable if liability under it accrues from time to 
time as performance of a part or parts of the contract takes place, and is entire where 
the liability of one party to perform is dependent upon complete performance of his 
obligations by the other.704 The essence of a severable contract is that it is a single 
contract whose obligations are performed in a number of stages.705 Defective 
performance under one part or instalment of the contract can accordingly have legal 
consequences for the other parts or instalments and on the contract as a whole. Where 
a number of separate contracts exist, by contrast, defective performance under one 
contract will ordinarily have no legal consequences for the other contracts. As noted 
above, moreover, severable contracts form an exception to the bar on partial rejection 
that follows from section 11(3) of the Act. 
 
8.30. The courts have shown flexibility in interpreting the requirements governing 
severability under section 31(2).  In Jackson v Rotax Motor and Cycle Co,706 a 
contract for the sale of six hundred car horns of slightly different descriptions 
stipulated ‘delivery as required’.  The goods were delivered in nineteen cases over a 
period of two months.  The Court of Appeal held that the words ‘delivery as required’ 
indicated that the parties intended the goods to be delivered in instalments and not in a 
single consignment.  Though no specific provision was made in the contract for 
separate payment for the instalments, this was also held to be the intention of the 
parties.  The contract was severable consequently, with Farwell LJ stating that it was 
‘impossible to suppose that the parties intended this to be an entire contract of sale 
with all the consequences that would follow.’707  In Longbottom & Co Ltd v Bass 
                                                 
704 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit, para. 8-071. Bridge comments that, although instalment 
contracts are certainly severable contracts, the Sale of Goods Act ‘does not translate instalment 
contracts into the language of entire and severable contracts.’ There ‘may be severable contracts that 
are not instalment transactions’ and ‘entire contracts under which the goods are deliverable in 
instalments’.  Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit, para. 10.84 & fn. 304.   
705 Per Lord Hewart CJ in Maple Flock Co. Ltd v Universal Furniture Products (Wembley) Ltd[1934] 1 
KB 148 at 154: ‘A contract for the sale of goods by instalments is a single contract, not a complex of as 
many contracts as there are instalments under it.’   
706 [1910] 2 KB 937.   
707 Ibid., at 947.   
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Walker & Co Ltd,708 a contract for the sale of cloth was held to be severable where the 
cloth was to be delivered in instalments, though payment was not made separately for 
these instalments.  
 
Issues Arising  
8.31. The principal issues raised by sections 30-31 of the 1893 Act concern, first, the 
need for the retention of provisions relating to delivery of the wrong quantity; second, 
the strictness of the rules governing delivery of the wrong quantity; and, third, the 
limited scope for partial rejection permitted by these sections and section 11(3).  We 
will look at each of these questions in turn. 
 
The Need for Specific Provisions on Delivery of the Wrong Quantity  
8.32. Some commentators suggest that cases in which the wrong quantity of goods are 
delivered could be treated as breaches of the duty of the seller under section 13 of the 
1893 Act to supply goods that correspond to their description.  Atiyah, for example, is 
of the view that ‘the whole of s.30 is merely an application of the duty to deliver 
goods conforming to their description’, adding that ‘it is one of the peculiarities of the 
drafting of the Act that s.13 is dealt with under the heading ‘Conditions and 
Warranties’, while s.30 is dealt with under ‘Performance of the Contract’.’709 When 
this issue was examined as part of a recent consultation by the English and Scottish 
Law Commissions, however, most respondents disagreed that the two obligations 
could be equated in this way and considered instead that section 30 was ‘a reasonable, 
sensible, and logical set of rules to deal with the wrong quantity of goods being 
delivered.’710  Professor Roy Goode, for example, commented711: 
    I do not agree that delivery of the wrong quantity goes to description since this is  
    concerned with the identity of the subject matter of the description.   
We are of a similar view and, subject to the changes recommended below, are in 
favour of the retention of a provision along the lines of section 30.  
 
 
                                                 
708 [1922] WN 245. 
709 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 137.  
710 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  2009. Consumer Remedies for Faulty 
Goods (Law Com. No. 317, Scot. Law Com. No. 216), para. 3.127. 
711 Ibid., para. 3.128.   
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Strictness of the Rule on Delivery of the Wrong Quantity 
8.33. Where a wrong quantity is delivered to the buyer, section 30 gives him the right, 
in the absence of any usage of trade, special agreement or course of dealing to the 
contrary, to reject all of the goods regardless of how slight the shortfall or excess may 
be. It is arguable that this remedy is disproportionate and liable to be unfair to sellers.  
Recourse to the remedy is also likely to be influenced by market conditions.712 Where 
the seller delivers a lesser quantity than that contracted for and the price of the goods 
has fallen since the contract is made, the buyer has a clear incentive to reject the 
whole delivery and to buy substitute goods at the lower price. Where the price has 
risen, however, the buyer is likely to accept the short delivery and pay for it at the 
contract rate. These considerations led the Law Commission for England and Wales 
and the Scottish Law Commission to recommend that the right to reject for delivery of 
a wrong quantity should not apply where the excess or shortfall was so slight that it 
would be unreasonable to reject the whole of the goods.713  This recommendation was 
given effect by section 4(2) of the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994 which inserted 
new subsections 30(2)(a) and (b) as follows in the Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
    (2A) A buyer who does not deal as consumer may not –  
(a) where the seller delivers a quantity of goods less than he contracted to sell, reject the 
goods under subsection (1) above, or  
(b) where the seller delivers a quantity of goods larger than he contracted to sell, reject the 
whole under subsection (2) above,      
   if the shortfall or, as the case may be, the excess is so slight that it would be  
   unreasonable for him to do so.    
   (2B) It is for the seller to show that a shortfall or excess fell within subsection (2a)  
A similar amendment has been to the Sale of Goods Act 1893 in Singapore.   
 
8.34. The changes made to section 30 in the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 are sensible 
and balanced in our view. They represent a qualified relaxation of the stringency of 
the rules on delivery of the wrong quantity, but put the burden of establishing that an 
excess or shortfall is so slight that rejection would be unreasonable on the seller.  The 
restriction of the provisions to commercial contracts of sale is also correct in our 
opinion as this is not an issue likely to give rise to problems or abuses of a significant 
kind in consumer sales.  An amendment of this kind would also bring the right of 
rejection for breach of the quantity provisions of the Act into line with our 
                                                 
712 White, Commercial Law, op. cit., p.227.  
713 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  Sale and Supply of Goods, op. cit., 
paras. 6.20-6.21.   
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recommendation in Chapter 4 for the introduction of a statutory provision restricting 
the right of buyers in non-consumer sales to reject goods for slight breach of the 
implied terms as to quality and fitness for purpose and correspondence with 
description and sample.   
 
8.35. Recommendation  
The right of buyers to reject for delivery of a wrong quantity should not apply in 
commercial contracts of sale where the excess or shortfall is so slight that it 
would be unreasonable to reject the whole of the goods 
 
Partial Rejection  
8.36. The effect of section 11(3) of the 1893 Act is that, unless a contract of sale is 
severable, a buyer who accepts some of the contract goods will be treated as if he had 
accepted all of them.  He will not be able to reject the defective goods and keep the 
rest but must decide either to reject, or accept, all of the goods.  The sole exception to 
this rule under the Act is that at section 30(3) which permits partial rejection where 
the seller delivers goods that do not match the contract description mixed with goods 
that match it.  In this case, the buyer may accept the goods which are in accordance 
with the contract and reject the rest, or he may reject all of the goods. This exception 
applies only, however, where goods are of a different description to that contracted 
for and not where they are defective in quality or some other respect.    
 
8.37. We are not persuaded by the rationale for either the Act’s broad prohibition of a 
right of partial rejection or its single exception to in respect of goods of mixed 
description. At present, a buyer who has one hundred tons of wheat delivered to him, 
ten of which are of substandard quality, must choose between either accepting or 
rejecting the entire hundred tons. It would be more advantageous to both sellers and 
buyers in our opinion if he could also choose to retain the ninety tons that were 
unsatisfactory and to reject the ten tons that were defective. It is not uncommon in fact 
for commercial contracts to include a term to this effect.  Any such right of partial 
rejection would, it is important to make clear, apply only where the buyer was entitled 
to reject the whole of the goods in accordance with the provisions on acceptance 
under section 35 of the Act. Under all of the above scenarios, the buyer would also 
have the right to claim damages. The provision permitting partial rejection for goods 
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that do not conform to description is also open to question.  It is not clear to us why 
breaches relating to description merit different treatment to those relating to quality, 
particularly given the significant degree of overlap that often exists between these two 
aspects of the contract terms.    
 
8.38. The US Uniform Commercial Code has included from its outset a right of partial 
rejection.714  This provision influenced the recommendation of the English and 
Scottish Law Commission for the incorporation of a similar right in the UK Sale of 
Goods Act 1979.715  This recommendation led to the insertion by the Sale and Supply 
of Goods Act 1994 of a new right of partial rejection as follows at section 35A of the 
UK Sale of Goods Act 1979:  
    35A. (1) If the buyer –  
(a) has the right to reject the goods by reason of a breach on the part of the seller  
that affects some or all of them, but     
(b) accepts some of the goods, including, where there are any goods unaffected by                         
the breach, all such goods,  
            he does not by accepting them lose his right to reject the rest.   
            (2) In the case of a buyer having the right to reject an instalment of goods,  
     subsection (1) above applies as if references to the goods were references to the goods    
     comprised in the instalment.   
     (3) For the purposes of subsection (1) above, goods affected by a breach if by 
     reason of the breach they are not in conformity with the contract.    
     (4) This section applies unless a contrary intention appears in, or is to be implied     
     from, the contract.   
 
There is an important exception to the right of partial rejection in the UK Act for 
what, following the Uniform Commercial Code, are termed commercial units, that is 
goods whose division would materially impair the value of goods or the character of 
the unit.  This covers, for example, items that form part of an integrated whole such as 
a pair of shoes or a multi-volume set of encyclopaedias.716  A buyer is not permitted 
accordingly to accept one shoe of a pair or a single volume of an encyclopaedia set 
and reject the other part or parts of the unit. Related amendments to the UK Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 also repealed the exception to the right of partial rejection for 
deliveries of mixed description and clarified that the provision at section 11 
precluding rejection of the goods in non-severable contracts where all or part of the 
goods have been accepted by the buyer was subject to the new section 35A.   
                                                 
714 Uniform Commercial Code, section 2-601.   
715 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  Sale and Supply of Goods, op. cit.,   
paras. 6.6-6.11. 
716 Ibid., paras.  6.12-6.13.   
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8.39. Recommendation  
Future legislation should give buyers a right of partial rejection of goods not in 
conformity with the contract and which do not form part of a commercial unit.  
This general right of partial rejection should replace the limited right of partial 
rejection for goods of mixed description at section 30(3) of the 1893 Act.  Future 
legislation should also state that section 11(3) of the 1893 Act is subject to the 





























CHAPTER NINE  SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893 PERFORMANCE 
OF THE CONTRACT  II – EXAMINATION, ACCEPTANCE & 
REJECTION OF THE GOODS, SECTIONS 34-37. 
 
9.1. This Chapter first considers section 34 of the 1893 Act on the buyer’s right to 
examine goods prior to accepting them and section 35 on the rules governing 
acceptance by the buyer. As the buyer’s acceptance of the goods annuls his right to 
reject them, these provisions are pivotal to the remedies available to the buyer for 
goods not in conformity with the contract. The Chapter also considers the separate 
remedies regime for consumer contracts of sale under the European Communities 
(Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees) 
Regulations 2003.717 The co-existence for consumer sales of parallel remedies’ 
regimes of domestic and EU origin is one of the main issues in need of review. Lastly, 
the Chapter examines section 36 of the 1893 Act on the rules governing the return of 
rejected goods, and section 37 on the liability of the buyer for neglecting or refusing 
delivery of goods. 
 
I Sections 34 & 35 Sale of Goods Act 1893   
Section 34 Buyer’s Right of Examining the Goods 
 
1) Where goods are delivered to the buyer, which he has not previously examined, he is not 
deemed to have accepted them unless and until he has had a reasonable opportunity of 
examining them for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the 
contract. 
2) Unless otherwise agreed, when the seller tenders delivery of the goods to the buyer, he is 
bound, on request, to afford the buyer a reasonable opportunity of examining the goods 
for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the contract. 
 
Section 35 Acceptance 
 
    The buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods when he intimates to the seller that he has  
    accepted them, or subject to section 34 of this Act, when the goods have been delivered to 
    him and he does any act in relation to them which is inconsistent with the ownership of the  
    seller or when, without good and sufficient reason, he retains the goods without intimating to  
    the seller that he has rejected them. 
 
                                                 
717 S.I. No. 11 of  2003.  The Regulations give effect to Directive 199/44/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated 
Guarantees.   
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9.2. Section 34 has not been amended in Ireland since its enactment in 1893.718 
Section 35 has been subject to significant amendment, the substance of which is 
discussed later in the Chapter along with the changes to the corresponding provisions 
in UK legislation. As noted in Chapter 4, the provision at section 11(1)(c) of the 1893 
Act which, in the absence of an express or implied contract term to the contrary, 
removed the right to reject specific goods where the property in the goods had passed 
to the buyer was repealed by the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980.719 
The 1980 Act also inserted the following provision at section 53(2) & (3) of the 1893 
Act which gives consumer buyers the right to request ‘cure’, that is repair or 
replacement, of goods not in conformity with the contract: 
    (2) Where— 
(a) the buyer deals as consumer and there is a breach of a condition by the seller which, 
but for this subsection, the buyer would be compelled to treat as a breach of warranty, 
and 
(b) the buyer, promptly upon discovering the breach, makes a request to the seller that he 
either remedy the breach or replace any goods which are not in conformity with the 
condition, then, if the seller refuses to comply with the request or fails to do so within 
a reasonable time, the buyer is entitled: 
(i) to reject the goods and repudiate the contract, or 
                (ii) to have the defect constituting the breach remedied elsewhere and to  
                maintain an action against the seller for the cost thereby incurred by him. 
 
    (3) The onus of proving that the buyer acted with promptness under subsection (2)   
    shall lie on him. 
    
The Remedies Regime under the Sale of Goods Acts 1893 and 1980  
9.3. Per section 27 of the 1893 Act, the seller’s primary duty under the contract of sale 
is to deliver the goods in accordance with the terms of the contract.  Where the seller 
fails in this duty, he is in breach of the contract and the buyer is entitled to pursue the 
applicable remedies against him.  Such breach can take a number of forms as follows: 
 Goods sold by description which do not correspond with the description (s.13 
1893 Act); 
                                                 
718 Though it made no changes whatever to the original section, section 20 of the Sale of Goods and 
Supply of Services Act 1980 substituted a ‘new’ section 34 for that in the 1893 Act presumably 
because of the amendments made by the 1980 Act to section 35, and the reference in that section to 
section 34.     
719 The Minister for State at the Department of Industry, Commerce and Energy stated in the second 
stage speech on the Bill that: 
    … it has been held that injustice can arise for a buyer under section 11(1)(c) which provides that  
    once the the buyer has accepted specific goods, a breach of any condition which the seller should  
    have fulfilled can only be treated as a breach of warranty and not as a ground for rejecting the goods.   
    This seems to mean that the buyer loses his right to reject defective goods at the moment of  
    purchase… the Bill proposes to change the basis for such an obvious injustice.   
Dail Debates, Vol. 309, 16 November 1978 Sale of Goods and Supply of Service Bill 1978 Second 
Stage: cols. 1107-08.  
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 Goods which are not of merchantable quality (ss.14(2) & (3) 1893 Act); 
 Goods which are not fit for a particular purpose made known by the buyer to 
the seller (s.14(4) 1893 Act); 
 Goods sold by sample which do not correspond with the sample (s.15 1893 
Act); 
 Goods not delivered within a reasonable time, or goods delivered at an 
unreasonable hour (s.28 1893 Act);  
 Goods supplied in the wrong quantity (s.30 1893 Act); 
 Goods not in conformity with the implied warranty as to the availability of 
spare parts and an adequate after sale service (s.12 1980 Act).   
 Motor vehicles not in conformity with the implied condition of freedom from 
dangerous defects (s.13 1980 Act);  
 Goods not in conformity with another express term of the contract.   
 
9.4. The distinction made by the 1893 Act between ‘conditions’ and ‘warranties’ is 
critical for the purposes of the remedies for breach available to an injured party. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, section 62 of the 1893 Act provides that a breach of warranty 
gives rise to a claim for damages, but not to a right to reject the goods and treat the 
contract as repudiated. Per section 11(2) of the Act, breach of a condition, on the other 
hand, may give rise to a right to reject the goods and treat the contract as repudiated; 
the buyer may also claim damages for losses caused by the breach. In accordance with 
section 11(1) of the Act, the buyer may waive the condition or elect to treat the breach 
of a condition as a breach of warranty.  The focus of this Chapter is on the remedies 
of rejection and cure. Issues relating to the remedies of damages are considered in 
Chapter 11. 
 
9.5. We did not give detailed consideration in this context to the introduction of 
statutory provisions that would make manufacturers directly liable for defects in the 
quality of goods. There is no doubt that a case can be made in principle for direct 
producer liability of this kind. Manufacturers are already liable in tort for safety 
defects in their products under the Liability for Defective Products Act 1991.720  As 
the manufacturer undertakes or oversees the design and production of the goods, he 
clearly has a level of control over, and responsibility for, their quality that far exceeds 
that of the seller of the goods.  These arguments notwithstanding, we think that a 
change of this kind would not be of significant benefit to consumers in practice and 
could well operate to their detriment. Under the contract of sale between seller and 
                                                 
720 No. 28 of 1991.  The Act gives effect to Directive 85/374/EEC on Liability for Defective Products.   
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buyer, the seller’s liability for breaches of the express or implied terms of the contract 
is clear, is widely understood and accepted and, on the whole, affords a workable and 
effective form of redress to the buyer. We are not convinced that consumers would 
enjoy a similarly clear and effective source of redress if manufacturers were made 
liable for breaches of a contract to which they were not party. As manufacturers 
would have no or limited control over key aspects of the contract such as the price, 
some limitations would have to apply to their liability and the resultant need to 
apportion liability as between manufacturer and seller would present considerable 
practical difficulties. In a situation in which manufacturers and sellers were jointly 
liable for the conformity of goods with the contract, consumers could face uncertainty 
and difficulty in establishing where liability lay in specific instances. It is noteworthy 
in this context that direct producer liability only operates in a minority of EU Member 
States, albeit with differences in scope and substance.721 While proposals for the 
introduction of such liability have been put forward in the past by both the European 
Commission and the UK Government, they were not subsequently implemented.722   
 
Rejection and Termination  
9.6. The wording of sections 11 and 62 of the 1893 Act has created some uncertainty 
about the relation between the rejection of the goods and the termination of the 
contract.  Both sections refer to a right to reject the goods and treat the contract as 
repudiated.  The matter at issue consequently is whether rejection and termination are 
one and the same right, or are separate rights. Though rejection will commonly entail 
termination, it has been convincingly argued that the two rights are separate.723 A 
                                                 
721 France, Belgium, Portugal, Latvia, Lithuania, Spain and Slovenia.  Schulte-Nolke, H. et al (eds), EC 
Consumer Law Compendium: Comparative Analysis, op. cit., pp. 695-696.   
722 European Commission.  Green Paper on Guarantees for Consumer Goods and After-Sales 
Services, op. cit., para. 3.2. European Commission. Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer 
Acquis, op. cit, para. 5.9. UK Department of Trade and Industry.  1992.  Consumer Guarantees: A 
Consultation Document, paras. 15-16.    
723 Bradgate, R. & White, F.  1995.  ‘Rejection and Termination in Contracts for the Sale of Goods’ in 
Birds, J. et al (eds), Termination of Contracts (Chichester: Wiley), pp. 57-58.   See also Law 
Commission and Scottish Law Commission.  2008.  Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods: A Joint 
Consultation Paper, para. 2.10.  In Kwei Tek Chao v British Traders and Shippers Ltd [1954] 2 Q.B. 
459 at 469, however, Devlin J. treated rejection as equivalent to termination, stating that ‘a right to 






buyer, for example, may reject the goods but request cure by means of repair or 
replacement, thereby keeping the contract alive. Similarly, as we saw in Chapter 8, 
where the buyer rejects a wrong quantity of goods that has been delivered within the 
period stipulated for delivery, there appears to be a broad measure of agreement 
among commentators that the seller may tender a second delivery of the correct 
quantity within that period.724  It is less clear, though possibly also the case, that the 
seller can make a subsequent conforming tender in cases where the initial tender is 
rejected for breach of other implied or express conditions of the contract and there 
remains time to perform.725 For practical purposes, the key requirement is that the 
statutory rules governing the remedies available for breaches of contracts of sale make 
clear the circumstances in which rejection of the goods entails termination of the 
contract and those in which it does not. The next section of this Chapter examines a 
number of specific issues raised by the provisions on examination and acceptance at 
sections 34 and 35.   
 
The Buyer’s Right of Examining the Goods and Acceptance  
9.7. The provisions on examination of the goods at section 34 and on acceptance of 
the goods at section 35 are closely inter-related and need to be considered in tandem.  
Per section 35, a buyer loses his reject to reject the goods where he is deemed to have 
accepted them.  Per section 34(1), where goods are delivered to the buyer which he 
has not previously examined, he is not deemed to have accepted them unless and until 
he has had a reasonable opportunity of examining them for the purpose of 
ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the contract. Section 34(2) provides 
that the buyer should be given a reasonable opportunity to examine the goods where, 
first, he has asked to do so and, second, there is no agreement to the contrary. If the 
seller refuses the buyer the opportunity to examine the goods, the buyer is prima facie 
                                                                                                                                            
724 The obligation to deliver the correct quantity under section 30 of the 1893 Act is not, in the absence 
of an express or implied term to the contrary, a condition of the contract and differs in this respect from 
the implied undertakings under sections 12-15 of the Act.  
725 
Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 12-031 summarises the matter as follows: ‘There is a 
certain amount of authority relating to commercial contracts containing specific time limits, and most 
of it concerned with tender of documents, that a seller who has made a false tender can withdraw it and 
substitute a conforming tender before the relevant date, subject to paying any special expenditure or 
loss incurred by the buyer in connection with examining and rejecting the first tender.  On this basis, it 
can be said that the common law gives in a sense some measure of a right to cure defects.’  See also 
Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., paras. 10.130-135.  Ervine, W.C.H. ‘Cure and Retender Revisited’ 




not in breach if he refuses to take delivery of them.726  The Act does not define, or 
elaborate on, what constitutes a reasonable opportunity to examine the goods.  This 
will depend on the nature of the goods and the circumstances of the case.  It may 
extend, however, to a right to test the goods and view them in operation.727 Any such 
tests must be of a normal and reasonable kind, however, and be carried out within a 
reasonable time.728   
 
9.8. Section 35 provides that acceptance is deemed to occur in the following three 
ways:  
(1) When the buyer intimates to the seller that he has accepted the goods; 
(2) When the buyer does any act in relation to the goods that is inconsistent with 
the ownership of the seller; 
(3) When, without good and sufficient reason, the buyer retains the goods without 
intimating to the seller that he has rejected them. 
 
The substance of the first two heads of acceptance has remained unchanged since the 
enactment of the 1893 Act. The third head of acceptance was amended by the 1980 
Act by the substitution of ‘without good and sufficient reason’ for ‘after the lapse of a 
reasonable time’. Before looking at each of these modes of acceptance, we will 
consider the relation between examination and acceptance.   
 
The Relation Between Examination and Acceptance  
9.9. The 1893 Act did not deal with the question of the relations between the 
provisions on examination in section 34 and those on acceptance in section 35.  In 
particular, it was silent on the question of which section was to prevail in a situation 
in which the buyer had not had a reasonable opportunity to examine the goods in 
accordance with section 34, but was deemed to have accepted them in accordance 
with the rules governing acceptance in section 35.  Where, for example, a buyer 
performed an act inconsistent with the ownership of the seller before having an 
opportunity to examine the goods, he was deemed not to have accepted the goods 
under section 34, but to have accepted them under section 35.  These were the 
                                                 
726 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 12-039.   
727
Heilbutt v Hickson  (1872) LR 7 CP 438. Walter Potts & Co Ltd v Brown Macfarlane & Co. Ltd 
(1934) 30 Com. Cas 64.  Winnipeg Fish Co. v Whitman Fish Co. (1909) 41 S.C.R. 453.  Burroughs 
Business Machines Ltd v Feed-Rite Mills (1962) Ltd [1973] 42 D.L.R. (3rd) 303.   
728 Heilbut v Hickson (1872) LR 7 CP 438 at 451.  Truk (UK) Ltd v Takmakidis GmbH [2000] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 543.   
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circumstances at issue in Hardy & Co. Ltd v Hillerns & Fowler.729 The buyer 
contracted to purchase wheat that was to be shipped from South America.  Shortly 
after the wheat arrived in England, the buyer sold part of it and dispatched it to a sub-
buyer. Following the sub-sale, the buyer had his first opportunity to examine the 
wheat and discovered that it did not conform to the contract. When he sought to reject 
the wheat, however, the Court of Appeal held that, as the sub-sale constituted an act 
inconsistent with the seller’s ownership, the buyer had accepted the goods and 
forfeited the right to reject. The effect of the judgement was that section 35 was held 
to prevail over section 34 where the two were in conflict. In E. & S. Ruben Ltd v 
Faire Bros. & Co. Ltd,730 rubber sheeting was purchased by the buyer to be delivered 
direct by the seller to a sub-buyer. The court held that the buyer had taken 
constructive delivery of the goods at the seller’s premises and that the seller had acted 
as the buyer’s agent in shipping the goods to the sub-buyer. The buyer could not reject 
the goods consequently as the act of dispatching them to the sub-buyer’s premises 
was inconsistent with the seller’s ownership. A different conclusion was reached on 
broadly similar facts, however, by a New Zealand court in Hammer and Barrow v 
Coca-Cola.731 The plaintiff contracted to sell a quantity of yo-yos to the defendants 
under an agreement which provided that the goods would be delivered to the premises 
of a third party to whom the defendants had previously contracted to supply the items.  
The court held that, in dispatching the goods to the third party, the seller was acting as 
a seller making delivery in accordance with the contract of sale. The dispatch of the 
goods to the sub-buyer accordingly was not an act inconsistent with the seller’s 
ownership, and the buyer was entitled to reject the goods.  
 
9.10. As sub-sales by buyers are a routine occurrence in commercial life, section 
35(1) of the 1893 Act was amended in the UK by the Misrepresentation Act 1967 in 
order to reverse the ruling in Hardy.  The amendment took the form of the insertion of 
a reference in parenthesis to section 34 before the head of acceptance in section 35 
that dealt with acts inconsistent with the ownership of the seller.  The section as 
revised read: 
1) The buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods when he intimates to the 
seller that he has accepted them, or (except where section 34 above otherwise 
                                                 
729 [1923] 2 K.B. 490. 
730 [1949] 1 K.B. 254.   
731 [1962] N.Z.L.R. 723.   
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provides) when the goods have been delivered to him and he does any act in 
relation to them which is inconsistent with the ownership of the seller, or when 
after the lapse of a reasonable time he retains the goods without intimating to 
the seller that he has rejected them.  
 
The effect of the amendment was that the buyer could not be deemed to have accepted 
goods by virtue of doing an act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership of the goods 
until he had had a reasonable opportunity of examining them for the purpose of 
ascertaining their conformity with the contract. Drafting changes apart, the 
corresponding amendment to section 35 made by the Sale of Goods and Supply of 
Goods Act 1980 was similar in substance.  This states that:  
     The buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods when he intimates to the seller  
     that he has accepted them, or, subject to section 34 of this Act, when the goods  
     have been delivered to him and he does any act in relation to them which is  
     inconsistent with the ownership of the seller or when, without good and sufficient  
     reason, he retains the goods without intimating to the seller that he has rejected  
     them.   
 
9.11. Though the revised section 35 substituted by the 1980 Act sought to clarify the 
relation between sections 34 and 35, it left aspects of that relation unresolved.732  It 
appears clear that the first head of acceptance (intimation of acceptance by buyer) is 
not subject to section 34 and that the second head (doing of any act inconsistent with 
the seller’s ownership) is so subject. It is less clear, however, whether the third head 
of acceptance (retention of the goods without intimating rejection) is subject to the 
right of examination.733  Though not conclusive on the point, the Seanad Committee 
Stage debate on the legislation suggests that the intention was to subject only the 
second head of acceptance to this right. The then Minister of State at the Department 
of Industry, Commerce and Tourism stated that734: 
The courts have held that section 35 prevails over section 34 and a buyer is  
     deemed to have accepted the goods if he has carried out any act which is  
     inconsistent with ownership of the seller notwithstanding that he has not exercised  
     his right under section 34 to examine the goods before acceptance. One example of  
     a case which illustrates the existing precedence of section 35 over section 34 is that  
     of Harding (sic) & Company Ltd versus Hillar (sic) and Fowler where  
                                                 
732 White, Commercial Law, op. cit., pp. 296-97.   
733 The amendment effected by the Misrepresentation Act 1967 applied only to acceptance by an act 
inconsistent with the seller’s ownership. The text of the UK provision, unlike that of section 35 of the 
1980 Act, however, included a comma at the end of the clause dealing with this head of acceptance.    
734 Seanad Debates, Vol. 93 - 27 March 1980, Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Bill 1978: 
Committee Stage Resumed, cols. 1588-89.  See also. Grogan, V. et al.  Sale of Goods and Supply of 
Services: A Guide to the Legislation, op. cit., para. 66   
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     notwithstanding that the buyer had not had the opportunity of examining the  
     goods, a resale and delivery of the goods by the buyer, an act deemed to be  
     inconsistent with the ownership of the seller, deprived him of the right of rejection.   
     It is clearly unfair that the buyer should be robbed of his right to examine the  
     goods by the provisions of section 35 of the 1893 Act.  Accordingly the Bill  
     rectifies this situation and qualifies the application of section 35 in a transaction  
     involving the sale of goods with the provision of section 34.   
 
9.12. A second source of uncertainty concerns the extent to which the second head of 
acceptance under section 35 is subject to section 34. The reference to section 34 does 
not distinguish between subsections (1) and (2) of the section, thus suggesting that it 
is intended to apply to both.  It is clear that any heads of acceptance in section 35 not 
subject to section 34 should not be subject to section 34(1) as this deals with deemed 
acceptance. There seems no reason, however, why these forms of acceptance should 
also be excluded from the more general provision in section 34(2) obliging the seller, 
on request, to afford the buyer a reasonable opportunity of examining the goods.   
 
9.13. These uncertainties around section 35 have been clarified in a further 
amendment of the corresponding provisions in the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 
effected by the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994.735 Sections 35(1) and (2) of the 
1979 Act now read:  
1) The buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods subject to subsection (2) below –  
a) when he intimates to the seller that he has accepted them, or  
b) when the goods have been delivered to him and he does any act in relation to 
them which is inconsistent with the ownership of the seller. 
 
2) Where goods are delivered to the buyer, and he has not previously examined them, he is 
not deemed to have accepted them under subsection (1) above until he has had a 
reasonable opportunity of ascertaining them for the purpose-  
a) of ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the contract, and  
b) in the case of a contract for sale by sample, of comparing the bulk with the 
sample.                  
 
This way of framing the provisions makes clear, first, the specific heads of acceptance 
that are subject to the right of examination and, second, that it is only the provision on 
deemed non-acceptance in the absence of an opportunity to examine the goods, 
formerly at section 34(1) of the Act, that is applicable. The general obligation on the 
                                                 
735 The amendment followed a recommendation from the English and Scottish Law Commissions for 
the reorganisation of the structure of sections 34 and 35 in order to make the relationship between 
them.  The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission. Sale and Supply of Goods, op. cit.,  
Appendix A, pp. 74-75.   
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seller to afford, on request, a reasonable opportunity of examining the goods to the 
buyer remains as a free-standing provision in section 34. A similar change involving 
the transfer of section 34(1) to section 35 should be made in future Irish sale of goods 
legislation.    
 
9.14. Recommendation 
Future legislation should integrate the examination provision at section 34(1) of 
the 1893 Act with the acceptance provisions at section 35 of the Act in order to 
clarify the interrelation between the provisions on the examination and 
acceptance of goods.    
 
9.15. As discussed in Chapter 5, exemption clauses which sought to exclude or restrict 
the terms implied into contracts of sale by statute became a source of increasing 
concern from the third quarter of the last century.  In response, amendments to section 
55 of the 1893 Act made by the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 
provide that clauses excluding or restricting the implied undertakings under the 1893 
Act are void where the buyer deals as consumer and, in other cases, are - with the 
exception of the implied undertaking as to title which is void in all circumstances - 
enforceable only where shown to be fair and reasonable. The provisions at section 34 
and 35 which safeguard against deemed acceptance where the buyer has not had a 
reasonable opportunity of examining the goods are not afforded similar protections 
against exemption clauses. We consider that consumer buyers should enjoy such 
protections and note that this has been afforded them by section 35(3) of the UK Sale 
of Goods Act 1979.  This subsection states that, where the buyer deals as consumer, 
he cannot lose his right, by agreement, waiver or otherwise, to rely on section 35(2) – 
i.e. the provision precluding acceptance until the consumer has had a reasonable 
opportunity of examining the goods. In addition to exemption clauses, the sub-section 
covers loss of the right of examination by the application of common law rules such 
as waiver or estoppel.  A provision along these lines should be included in future Irish 
sale of goods legislation. We consider, however, that contracting out of this right of 





9.16. Recommendation  
Where acceptance by the buyer is subject to his having a reasonable opportunity 
of examining the goods for the purpose of examining their conformity with the 
contract, future legislation should provide that consumer buyers cannot lose this 
right by agreement, waiver or otherwise.   
 
9.17. As outlined at paragraph 9.13, section 35(2)(b) of the UK Sale of Goods Act 
1979 deals with the opportunity to be given to the buyer to examine the goods for the 
purpose of ascertaining the bulk with the sample.  As discussed in Chapter 4, this 
addition to section 35 of the UK Act followed from the new provision inserted at 
section 15A of that Act which removes the right to reject in commercial sales for 
slight breach of the implied terms under sections 13-15 of the Act.736  Because the 
slight breach rule could not readily be applied to the implied condition of reasonable 
opportunity to compare the bulk with the sample under section 15(2)(b), this sub-
section was deleted from section 15 and transferred in substance to section 35 of the 
1979 Act.  As we are proposing the introduction of a similar restriction on rejection 
for slight breach in commercial sales, we have recommended at paragraph 4.62 that a 
similar consequential amendment be made to section 35.    
 
First Head of Acceptance: Intimation to Seller 
9.18. This head of acceptance provides that the buyer loses the right to reject the 
goods when he intimates to the seller that he has accepted them. According to Bridge, 
its has its origin ‘in the practice of buyers examining goods at the seller’s premises, 
and acceding to the seller’s delivery of them under the contract’, a factor which 
accounts for ‘the rather vague word “intimation”’.737 Such intimation can be oral, 
written, or be implied by the buyer’s conduct, but must be clear. In Varley v Whipp,738 
a letter of complaint by the buyer about an unsatisfactory reaping machine stating that 
it was of no use to him and requesting a meeting with the seller was, despite the 
absence of any express statement of rejection, held not to constitute acceptance. In 
Clegg v Andersson,739 a case concerning a yacht with an overweight keel, the Court of 
                                                 
736 The amendments to sections 15 and 34 of the 1979 Act were effected by the Sale and Supply of 
Goods Act (1994 Chapter 35), ss. 3(1), 4(1), & 8(2).   
737 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para.  10.60.  
738 [1900] 1 Q.B. 513.   
739 [2003] EWCA Civ 320.   
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Appeal rejected the reasoning of the trial judge that a number of statements made by 
the buyer – that he liked the yacht despite the problem with the keel, that it was his 
decision whether remedial work should be carried out on the vessel, and that he 
intended to move it to Portugal – amounted to an intimation of acceptance. These 
statements were conditional on the buyer’s receiving a satisfactory response from the 
seller in respect of concerns expressed about defects affecting the vessel. The Court of 
Appeal also rejected the trial judge’s finding that the storage of personal possessions 
on the yacht by the buyer was an intimation of acceptance.     
 
Issues Arising  
9.19. The joint 1987 report of the English and Scottish Law Commissions on the Sale 
and Supply of Goods drew attention to the issue of ‘acceptance notes’, that is, notes 
signed by the buyer on the delivery of goods which go beyond a mere 
acknowledgement of delivery.740 Such notes might state, for example, that the goods 
were received in good condition or that the buyer ‘accepts’ the goods. As a note of 
this kind, or its verbal equivalent, could be held to amount to an intimation of 
acceptance for the purposes of section 35(1), a buyer who signed it, or made a similar 
verbal statement, could be denied the right to reject the goods even if the buyer had 
not had an opportunity to examine them. Like the equivalent provision in Irish 
legislation, section 35 of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 did not make this mode of 
acceptance subject to the buyer’s right to examine the goods under section 34. The 
Law Commissions recommended accordingly that, as in the case of acceptance by 
means of an act inconsistent with the ownership of the seller, the buyer should not be 
deemed to have accepted goods by means of intimation of acceptance unless he had 
had a reasonable opportunity of examining the goods for the purpose of ascertaining 
their conformity with the contract. This recommendation was given effect by means 
of an amendment to section 35 of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 made by the Sale 
and Supply of Goods Act 1994.741 Though there is no information available to us 
about the extent to which acceptance notes of this kind are used in practice, the risk of 
the loss of the right of rejection in such circumstances should be precluded by means 
of legislative provisions similar to those under the UK Act.       
                                                 
740 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission. Sale and Supply of Goods, op. cit.,  
paras. 5.20-5.22.  
741 Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994 (1994 Chapter 35), s. 2.   
 295
 
9.20. Though an amendment along these lines would enhance the position of both 
consumer and commercial buyers, we think that it can reasonably be asked whether 
this head of acceptance should apply at all to consumer sales. There may be 
circumstances in commercial sales where intimation of acceptance is part of the 
normal dealing between the parties. In the case of consumer sales, however, it is 
difficult to see a justification for a head of acceptance whose rationale is not readily 
apparent and which might frequently prove more restrictive than the main mode of 
acceptance under section 35 – retention of the goods, without good and sufficient 
reason, by the buyer without intimating rejection to the seller. As there may be 
grounds for the retention of intimation by acceptance of which we have taken 
insufficient account, our recommendation for its non-application to consumer sales is 
subject to review if convincing evidence can be produced that such a change would 
advantage consumers to an unreasonable degree.       
 
9.21 Recommendations 
The rules on acceptance in future legislation should be amended to provide that, 
in the case of commercial contracts of sale, the buyer would not be deemed to 
have accepted goods by means of intimation of acceptance to the seller unless he 
has had a reasonable opportunity of examining the goods for the purpose of 
ascertaining their conformity with the contract. 
  
In the case of consumer contracts of sale, intimation by acceptance should be 
excluded from the rules governing acceptance in consumer contracts of sale in 
future legislation.   
 
Second Head of Acceptance: Acts Inconsistent with the Ownership of the Seller  
9.22. This head of acceptance provides that the buyer loses the right to reject the 
goods when he does any act in relation to them which is inconsistent with the 
ownership of the seller. It is widely seen as the most problematical element of section 
35.742  Conceptually, the provision raises the question of how a buyer to whom the 
property in the goods has already passed can perform an act that is inconsistent with 
                                                 
742 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods Act, op. cit. p. 509. Bridge, The Sale of Goods Act, op. cit, para. 10.62.   
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the seller’s ownership.  As noted in Chapter 6, it is not uncommon for the property in 
the goods to pass before delivery. In the case of specific goods in a deliverable state, 
section 18 of the Act expressly provides that, unless otherwise agreed, the property 
passes when the contract is made regardless of the time of delivery and/or payment.  
In Kwei Tek Chao v British Traders and Shippers Ltd,743 Devlin J. suggested that 
where the property in the goods has passed in circumstances in which the buyer 
retains the right to reject: 
    [the buyer] gets only conditional property in the goods, the condition being a  
    condition subsequent… It follows, therefore, that there can be no dealing which is  
    inconsistent with the seller’s ownership unless he deals with something more than  
    the conditional property.  If the property passes altogether, not being subject to any  
    condition, there is no ownership left in the seller with which any inconsistent act  
    under s.35 could be committed.  If the property passes conditionally the only  
    ownership left in the seller is the reversionary interest in the property in the event  
    of the condition subsequent operating to restore it to him.  It is that reversionary  
    interest with which the buyer must not, save with the penalty of accepting the  
    goods, commit an inconsistent act.      
The buyer may still be entitled, therefore, to reject the goods in such circumstances 
and, if he does so, the property will revest in the seller, making him the owner of the 
goods once again.    
 
9.23. Section 35 offers no guidance as to what constitutes an act inconsistent with the 
seller’s ownership, and the case law has thrown up a range of situations that have 
been claimed or held to come under this heading.744 The main questions raised by this 
head of acceptance relate to (i) delivery of the goods to a third party by means of sub-
sales or other dealings; (ii) attempts at, or agreement to, repair of the goods, and (iii) 
the use of the goods in such a way that they cannot be restored to the seller in 
substantially the same condition as when they were delivered.  We will look at each of 
these issues in turn.  
 
 
                                                 
743  [1954] 2 Q.B. 459 at  487. 
744 In Armaghdown Motors Ltd  v Gray Motors Ltd [1963] NZLR 5, the registration of a motor car by 
the buyer in his own name was held to be an act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership, a ruling that 
in Bridge’s view was ‘surely wrong’. Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit, para. 10.62 fn. 234.  See also 
Goode on Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 379-80. White, Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 298.   
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Sub-Sale of Goods and Acceptance 
9.24. Sub-sale and delivery to a third party is generally regarded as the most common 
form of act inconsistent with the ownership of the seller and, as discussed in the 
previous section, the leading cases relating to this head of acceptance have involved 
this type of situation.745 In response to these cases, section 35 was amended by the 
1980 Act to provide that the buyer was not deemed to have accepted goods by virtue 
of doing an act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership of the goods until he had had a 
reasonable opportunity of examining them for the purpose of ascertaining their 
conformity with the contract. Though this amendment addressed some of the 
deficiencies in the existing provision, it did not go far enough. The sub-sale, gift or 
other disposition of goods by the buyer should not, in our opinion, automatically 
preclude the remedy of rejection. Under the current provision on this head of 
acceptance, a retailer who sells goods to a consumer who then rejects them can be 
denied the right to reject the goods and return them to the manufacturer or wholesaler. 
Section 35(6)(b) of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979, as amended in 1994, provides 
that the buyer is not deemed to have accepted the goods merely because the goods are 
delivered to another under a sub-sale or other disposition. A similar provision should 
be included in future Irish sale of goods legislation. 
 
Repair of Goods and Acceptance 
9.25. In their 1987 Report on Sale and Supply of Goods, the English and Scottish Law 
Commissions raised the possibility that a buyer who asked the seller to repair 
defective goods, or who agreed to the seller’s offer to repair them, could be held to be 
doing an act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership of the goods.746  The buyer’s 
consent to cure in such circumstances might also amount to acceptance by intimation. 
Though the Commissions thought that this outcome was unlikely,747 they 
recommended that, for the avoidance of doubt, section 35 should be amended to 
clarify that attempts at cure should not of themselves deprive the buyer of his right to 
reject the goods.  This recommendation was implemented by an amendment to section 
35 of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 made by the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 
                                                 
745 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 513.   
746 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  Sale and Supply of Goods, op. cit.,  
paras.5.27-5.29.  
747 Consent to cure by the buyer may be more likely perhaps to lead a loss of the right to reject on the 
ground that it results in the time limit for rejection being exceeded than on the ground that it amounts to 
an intimation of acceptance.  See Lee v York Coach and Marine [1977] RTR 35.   
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1994. Section 35(6)(a) of the 1979 Act provides that the buyer is not deemed to have 
accepted the goods merely because he asks for, or agrees to, their repair, by or under 
an arrangement with the seller. A provision along the lines would be a useful 
clarifying measure in our opinion and should be included in future Irish sale of goods 
legislation. It should be noted that, though consent to cure of itself is not regarded as 
entailing acceptance under the UK provision, it could, in all the circumstances of a 
case, be one of a number of factors that might cumulatively be found to amount to 
acceptance.748 As the subsection, moreover, only covers agreements with the seller for 
the repair of the goods, repair arrangements made by the buyer with a third party, 
such as the manufacturer, will not afford protection against a claim that consent to 
cure entails acceptance.   
 
Use of Goods and Acceptance     
9.26. Though there is little direct authority on the point, there is broad agreement 
among commentators that the use of goods more than is necessary to ascertain their 
conformity with the contract may constitute an act inconsistent with the seller’s 
ownership if it prevents the return of the goods in substantially the same condition as 
when they were delivered.749 The incorporation of goods in other goods or in a 
building might similarly be held to amount to an act inconsistent with the seller’s 
ownership.750  Though these types of scenario may appear relatively straightforward, 
there are considerable difficulties in establishing the scope and substance of this mode 
of acceptance.  First, the loss of the right of rejection on this ground is difficult to 
separate from its loss under the third head of acceptance, namely retention of the 
goods without good and sufficient reason for not intimating rejection to the seller.  
Secondly, it is difficult in many cases to test goods to the extent needed to ascertain 
their conformity without rendering their condition substantially different from that 
obtaining at the time of delivery. Unless returned more or less immediately, 
perishable items of their nature cannot be restored to the seller in the condition in 
which they were delivered. A boiler has to be installed before it can be established 
that it is working satisfactorily. Wallpaper may have to be hung in order to ascertain 
                                                 
748 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods: 
A Joint Consultation Paper, op. cit., para. 3.15.   
749 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p.515.  Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 12-047. 
Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 10.62.  Goode on Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 382.  
White, Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 298.   
750 Harnor v Groves (1855) 15 C.B. 667.     
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its conformity with the contract.  Food may have to be cooked to assess its quality. 
The limited case law shows an acknowledgement of these factors by the courts. In 
Heilbut v Hickson,751 rejection was permitted after shoes intended for the army were 
tested by breaking open the soles of, first, a small sample and, then, a larger quantity 
in order to ascertain their conformity with the contract. In Winnipeg Fish Co v 
Whitman Fish Co,752 the buyer was allowed to reject frozen fish that had to thaw 
before their conformity could be ascertained. Thirdly, other factors may over-ride the 
effect of the use of goods on acceptance. In Clegg v Andersson,753 the beneficial use 
of a yacht for six months did not preclude rejection as the buyer was in regular contact 
with the seller about remedying the problems with the vessel. In Fiat Auto Financial 
Services v Connelly,754 the use of a car as a taxi for ten months covering 40,000 miles 
was held not to be inconsistent with the seller’s ownership as the buyer had made 
frequent complaints to the seller over the period about the vehicle’s quality. Both 
cases were decided after the enactment of section 35(6)(a) of the UK Sale of Goods 
Act 1979 which provides that a buyer is not deemed to have accepted the goods 
merely because he asks for, or agrees to, their repair by or under arrangement with the 
seller.   
 
9.27. Our examination of this head of acceptance included the question of whether 
there was a case for its repeal in full, particularly for consumer sales. We noted in this 
connection that the English and Scottish Law Commissions came close to 
recommending its abolition in 1987, but decided ‘after long consideration and not 
without some regret’ to recommend its reform instead.755 Our recommendations that 
sub-sale and repair would no longer be regarded as acts inconsistent with the 
ownership of the seller would remove two of the main grounds of this head of 
acceptance. The main remaining act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership for the 
purpose of this head of acceptance is, therefore, that of excessive use of the goods for 
the purpose of ascertaining their conformity with the contract such that they cannot be 
restored to the seller in substantially their original condition. Though abolition of this 
head of acceptance would have the merit of further simplifying the rules on 
                                                 
751 (1872) LR 7 CP 438. 
752 (1909) 41 S.C.R. 453 
753 [2003] EWCA Civ 320. 
754 [2007] SLT (Sh Ct) 111.   
755 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  Sale and Supply of Goods, op. cit.,  
para. 5.37 & paras. 5.32-5.36 & 5.38.  
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acceptance, it has the potential to lead to abuses by buyers and we are reluctant for 
this reason to recommend it.        
 
9.28. Recommendations  
The rules governing acceptance by reason of acts inconsistent with the seller’s 
ownership of the goods should be amended in future legislation to provide that a 
buyer would not be deemed to have accepted the goods merely because:   
a) the goods have been delivered to a third party under a sub-sale, gift or 
other disposition. 
b) the buyer asks for, or agrees to, the repair of the goods.    
 
Third Head of Acceptance: Retention Without Intimating Rejection  
9.29. Under the third head of acceptance in section 35, the buyer is deemed to have 
accepted the goods – and hence to have lost the right of rejection – ‘when, without 
good and sufficient reason, he retains the goods without intimating to the seller that he 
has rejected them’. As noted earlier, the 1980 Act substituted the ‘without good and 
sufficient reason’ test for the original provision in the 1893 Act that the buyer was 
deemed to have accepted the goods ‘when after the lapse of a reasonable time’ he 
retained them without intimating rejection. The latter provision remains in force under 
section 35(4) of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979.  Before looking at the background to 
the change made by the 1980 Act, we will look at the operation of the ‘lapse of 
reasonable time’ rule prior to its repeal. 
 
9.30. Though the right to reject is widely seen as a long-established, readily available 
remedy, it was substantially circumscribed at common law and as originally included 
in the Sale of Goods Act 1893.  Under section 11(1)(c) of the 1893 Act prior to its 
amendment by the 1980 Act, the buyer did not have a right of rejection where the 
contract was for the sale of specific goods. Buyers were entitled to reject non-specific 
goods but, prior to the amendment of section 35 made by the 1980 Act, the time 
afforded them to do so was generally quite brief.  While section 56 of the 1893 Act 
provides that the question of what is a reasonable time is a question of fact, the 
interpretation put on this head of acceptance by the courts reflected the traditional 
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conception of rejection as a short-term remedy. In Perkins v Bell,756 the buyers took 
delivery of a quantity of barley at a railway station from where they dispatched it to a 
brewer who proceeded to reject it. The Court of Appeal held that the buyers should 
have inspected the goods at the station and that their failure to do so resulted in the 
loss of the right to reject.  In the Irish case of Gill v Thomas Heiton & Co. Ltd,757 the 
plaintiff wholesalers sold a barge-load of turf to the defendant retailers. Shortly after 
the unloading of the turf commenced, the buyers noted that it was defective in quality 
and unfit for resale, though they continued to unload it until the entire consignment 
had been removed from the barge. On the next day, the buyers informed the plaintiffs 
that they were rejecting the goods. The High Court held that the buyers had not 
exercised the right to reject with sufficient promptness and had acted in a manner 
inconsistent with the seller’s ownership of the goods. Though these cases concerned 
goods bought for resale by commercial buyers, the courts showed little inclination in 
this period to allow a longer time for rejection where goods were bought for use. In 
Flynn v Scott,758 the court held that the buyer could not reject a van three weeks after 
it had broken down, stating that this should have been done ‘within a very few days’. 
In Long v Lloyd,759 a misrepresentation case concerning the sale of a second-hand 
lorry, the court interpreted section 35 as providing that the right to rescind was lost 
after less than a week. 
 
9.31. Though the fact-centred character of this head of acceptance makes it difficult to 
discern a consistent trend in judicial interpretation, there is evidence from the mid-
twentieth century of a greater willingness on the part of the courts to countenance a 
longer period for the inspection and rejection of goods.760  This may have been linked 
in part to the fact that cases involving complex manufactured products featured 
somewhat more prominently when compared with the preponderance of cases 
involving the sale of raw materials and rudimentary manufactured goods in the earlier 
case law. In a Canadian case, Public Utilities Commission of City of Waterloo v 
                                                 
756 [1893] 1 Q.B. 193.  
757 [1943] Ir. Jur. Rep. 67.  
758 [1949] S.C. 442 at 446.   
759 [1958] All ER 402.  
760  The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  Consumer Remedies for Faulty 
Goods: A Joint Consultation Paper, op. cit., para. 3.23.   
 302
Burroughs Business Machines,761 for example, the court held that the buyers were 
entitled to reject a computer system fifteen months after its delivery as the goods were 
complex and novel and the buyers had striven throughout the period to make the 
system function properly. In Manifatture Tessile Laniera Wooltex v JB Ashley 
Limited,762 the buyers purchased cloth from the seller in a number of batches and sold 
it on to sub-buyers without examining it. Seven weeks after the first delivery, the 
buyers received the first complaints from the sub-buyers about the quality of the cloth 
and, following meetings with the sellers which culminated in threats that rejection 
would be treated as a breach of contract, they sought to reject the goods three-and-a-
half months after delivery. The Court of Appeal held that the ‘reasonable time’ 
allowed for rejection under the 1893 Act had not elapsed and that the buyers were 
entitled to reject the goods. In circumstances where the buyers were threatened that 
rejection would be treated as a breach of contract, it was legitimate for them to take 
particular care to examine the goods, including consultations with sub-buyers.  The 
readiness of the courts to extend the time period permitted for rejection, however, 
should not be overstated. The consumer cases that came before the courts mainly 
involved  contracts for the sale of motor vehicles. Atiyah has observed of the cases of 
this kind heard before the amendment of the rules on acceptance by the UK Sale and 
Supply of Goods Act 1994 that:763 
   There is no doubt that, in general, the tendency under the former provisions was to  
   hold that the right of rejection is lost speedily where goods were in daily use, and  
   this normally meant days rather than weeks or months.   
 
9.32. One such case which arose in 1977, Lee v York Coach and Marine Ltd,764 had a 
decisive impact on the amendment to section 35 of the 1893 Act made by the Sale of 
Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980.  The buyer of a defective motor car sought 
to reject it six months after delivery, during which time attempts had been made both 
to remedy the defects and to persuade the seller to acknowledge his obligations in this 
regard. The court held, however, that the reasonable time allowed for rejection had 
elapsed and that the buyer was not entitled to reject the vehicle.  Though the Sale of 
Goods and Supply of Services Bill 1978 as initiated had retained the ‘after a lapse of a 
                                                 
761 (1974) 52 D.L.R. 481.  Bridge suggests that, until recent years, Canadian courts were more likely 
than those in England to allow a longer time period for rejection.  Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., 
para. 10.58, fn. 215.   
762 [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 28.  
763 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 516.   
764 [1977] R.T.R. 35.  
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reasonable time’ wording from the 1893 Act,765 it was decided in the light of the Lee 
judgement to amend the section at the Bill’s Committee Stage in Dáil Éireann. The 
then Minister for State at the Department of Industry, Commerce and Tourism moved 
an amendment for the deletion of ‘after the lapse of a reasonable time’ and the 
substitution of ‘without good and sufficient reason’, stating:766   
   This section amends section 35 of the 1893 Act by extending the time-limit before a  
   buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods. A United Kingdom Appeal Court   
   decision Lee v York Coach and Marine – ruled that a consumer who had not  
   ‘rejected’ a defective motor car during the period of six months while attempts were  
   being made to have it mended or to persuade the seller to acknowledge their legal  
   obligations, meant that the consumer had ‘accepted’ the car.  She was, therefore,  
   unable to reject it and claim back her money.  She was entitled only to damages for  
   breach of warranty, the cost of making it roadworthy.  It is felt that this operates  
   against the interests of consumers and that it would improve the position if the text  
   were amended to refer to retaining the goods ‘without good and sufficient reason’  
   rather than ‘after the lapse of a reasonable time.’   
 
9.33. The lack of any reported case law since 1980 on the amended wording of 
section 35 makes it difficult to attempt an authoritative assessment of its effect. As the 
provision differs from that in the UK and other countries whose sales law is based on 
the 1893 Act, no guidance is to be had from case law in other common law 
jurisdictions. Though the amendment effected by the 1980 Act was presented as a 
way of extending the time limit for the rejection of goods, its significance would seem 
to go further in providing that time per se is no longer the guiding criterion for the 
purposes of this head of acceptance.767 The question that the Irish courts must 
consider is not whether the period for which the buyer retained the goods before 
intimating rejection was reasonable, but rather whether the buyer had good and 
sufficient reason for retaining the goods without intimating rejecting.  It is arguable 
that the amended wording of section 35 marks a break with the traditional view of the 
right to reject as a short-term remedy and would permit buyers to reject goods for 
latent defects that take some time to emerge. It has been suggested in this context that 
the position under section 35 is analogous to the common law principle of affirmation 
                                                 
765 Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Bill [No. 36 of 1978], s. 20.   
766 Dáil Debates, Vol.316, 14 November 1979 Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Bill 1978 
Committee Stage (Resumed): col. 1646.   
767 Grogan, V. et al., Sale of Goods and Supply of Services, op. cit., para. 66.   
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under which an innocent party cannot, as a general rule, be held to have affirmed the 
contract unless he had knowledge of the breach.768    
  
9.34. The corresponding criterion under this head of acceptance in UK legislation 
remains retention of the goods ‘after the lapse of a reasonable time’ without 
intimating rejection to the seller.  Section 35(5) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, which 
was inserted by the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994, further provides that ‘the 
questions that are material in determining’ whether a reasonable time has elapsed 
include whether the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity of examining the goods.  
The UK case law on this head of acceptance in the three decades since the 1980 
amendment to the corresponding provision in Irish legislation displays the diversity to 
be expected from a fact-based test. Compared with earlier case law, there is evidence, 
though not of a uniform nature, of a greater readiness to countenance a longer time 
period for rejection. This was influenced in some cases by the amendments to sections 
34 and 35 of the UK Sale of Goods made by the Sale and Supply of Goods 1994 
regarding the effect of repair and sub-sale on acceptance.   
 
9.35. The main cases concerning the time period permitted for rejection that have 
been decided by the UK courts in recent decades are as follows:  
 Bernstein v Pamson Motors Golders Green Limited:769 The court held that the 
buyer was not entitled to reject a new car which broke down on its first proper 
trip three weeks after purchase and after having been driven for just 140 miles. 
The reasonable time for acceptance had elapsed, even when allowance was 
made for the fact that the buyer had been ill for part of the period.770 
 Rogers v Parish (Scarborough) Limited:771 The Court of Appeal held that the 
purchaser of a car was entitled to reject it six months after delivery and after it 
had been driven for 5,500 miles during which time a number of inspections 
and failed repairs took place. The defendant seller attempted to argue on 
appeal that the period for rejection had passed but, as the matter had not been 
                                                 
768 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  2009. Consumer Remedies for Faulty 
Goods: A Summary of Responses to the Consultation, para. 2.27. For a discussion of affirmation as 
it applies to contracts for the supply of goods, see The Law Commission and the Scottish Law 
Commission.  Sale and Supply of Goods, op. cit., paras. 2.50-2.52.   
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the law now.’  [2003] EWCA Civ 320 at 63.  Goode has observed of the decision that it ‘is generally 
considered to be harsh, reflecting an extremely stringent approach to the need for finality in sales 
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770 Rougier J. stated that: ‘I discount the period when the plaintiff was ill because ‘reasonable’ seems to 
me to be referable to the individual buyer’s situation as well as to that of the seller.’ Ibid. at 230-31.  
771 [1987] 2 All ER 232.  
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raised in the initial proceedings, the Court of Appeal refused to allow it to be 
raised. 
 Clegg v Andersson:772 The Court of Appeal held that the buyer was entitled to 
reject a yacht with an overweight keel seven months after delivery. In the light 
of the amendment made to section 35(6) of the 1979 Act by the Sale and 
Supply of Goods Act 1994, the time period for rejection could include both the 
time needed to carry out repairs, including the time needed to ascertain what 
repairs needed to be made.773  
 Truk (UK) Limited v Tokmakidis GmbH:774 The court held that the defendant 
buyer was entitled to reject a vehicle chassis, with a body specially fitted by 
the claimant seller, nine months after delivery. The judgment stated, among 
other things, that the fact that the vehicle was bought for resale rather than the 
buyer’s own use justified an extended rejection period as defects could take 
longer to emerge in such cases. Where faults were likely to be latent, a longer 
time period during which faults might emerge might also be warranted.    
 Bowes v Richardson & Son Ltd:775 Rejection of a new car which suffered from 
a succession of faults that had not been remedied by attempted repairs was 
permitted seven months after purchase. The county court followed Clegg, 
holding among other things that, where goods were repaired, the buyer needed 
an adequate period of time in which to assess their effectiveness.  
 Jones v Gallagher:776 The Court of Appeal held that a buyer was not entitled 
to reject a fitted kitchen five months after its installation.777  The buyer had 
made complaints about the kitchen, including its colour, and some remedial 
work was done in response.  In holding that the buyer had accepted the 
kitchen, the Court placed considerable emphasis on the stipulation at section 
59 of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 that the question of what is a reasonable 
time is one of fact. Buxton LJ also denied that Clegg had laid down a rule that 
the time for rejection was suspended during the time in which the buyer was 
seeking repairs or repairs were being undertaken.778       
 Fiat Auto Financial Services v Connelly
779: The use of a car as a taxi for ten 
months covering 40,000 miles was held not to amount to acceptance of the 
goods as the buyer had made frequent complaints to the seller over the period 
about the poor quality of the vehicle. 
                                                 
772 [2003] EWCA Civ 301.  
773 Hale LJ noted that it followed from this amendment that ‘if a buyer is seeking information which 
the seller has agreed to supply which will enable the buyer to make a properly informed choice 
between acceptance, rejection or cure, and if cure in what way, he cannot have lost the right to reject.’ 
Ibid at 75.  
774 [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 594.  
  
775 28 January 2004 (unreported).  The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.   
Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods: A Joint Consultation Paper, op. cit., paras.3.42-43.. 
776 [2004] EWCA Civ 10. 
777 The decision has been criticised on the ground that, as the contract was for work and materials, the 
rules on acceptance in section 35 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 were not relevant and the case should 
instead have been decided on the basis of the common law rules on affirmation.  Bradgate, R.  
‘Remedying the Unfit Fitted Kitchen’  (2004) L.Q.R. (120) at 561-62.   
778 He stated, inter alia, that: ‘There is no absolute rule that a situation in which information was sought 
cannot involve the loss of a right to reject: because that would be inconsistent with the guiding 
principle that assessment of loss of right to reject is a matter of fact to be considered in all the 
circumstances.’ [2004] EWCA Civ at 36.   
779 [2007] SLT (Sh Ct) 111.   
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 J.H. Ritchie Limited v Lloyd Limited:780 The plaintiff buyer purchased a seed 
drill that revealed defects on its first use following which it was returned to the 
sellers for repair. The sellers discovered that the harrow was missing two key 
bearings but were able to repair it to what they described as ‘factory gate 
specification’. The buyer remained concerned that the absence of the bearings 
during the harrow’s initial operation might affect its subsequent working and 
refused to have it returned until they had seen the engineer’s report on the 
repairs.  When the seller refused to provide such a report, the buyers rejected 
the goods.  The House of Lords heard the case on appeal from the buyers 
against the decision of the Inner House of the Court of Session in Scotland, 
and held that the buyers had been entitled to reject the harrow.  Though the 
goods were in conformity with the contract at the time of rejection, the seller 
was in breach of an implied term in the ancillary repair contract which 
required him to inform the buyer as to the nature of the repairs that had been 
carried out.   
 
9.36. The English and Scottish Law Commissions have recently summarised as 
follows the state of the law in the UK regarding the time period allowed for 
acceptance and rejection under section 35:781 
   It seems that the courts would allow longer than the three week interpretation of a  
   ‘reasonable time’ in Bernstein.  Beyond this more general observation, it is difficult  
   to lay down clear rules.  Furthermore, the status of periods of negotiation and repair  
   is complicated by the tension between the decisions in Clegg and Jones… To  
   conclude, it is not possible to say with a sufficient degree of certainty how long the  
   reasonable period for examination is because it depends upon the facts of the case.   
   In a standard case, a consumer may have sought a number of repairs, and these may  
   have been unsuccessful.  The interplay between the repairs and the period for  
   rejection is difficult, and it means that a buyer attempting to exercise the right to  
   reject will face difficult judgements.    
 
The rules governing the time period for rejection are different in Irish law but, if 
anything, it is even more difficult to provide a clear statement of their application and 
effect because of the complete absence of case law. 
 
Issues Arising 
9.37. The chief issue that arises for review under this head of acceptance is clearly 
that of how the rule regarding the retention of goods without intimating rejection can 
                                                 
780 [2007] UKHL 9.  For critical discussions of the judgement, see Carr, D.  ‘Repairs, Refusals and 
Rejections’ (2007) C.L.J. 498.  Loi, K. ‘Sale of Goods in Scotland – Repairing Defects in the Law’ 
(2007) J.B.L. 807.  Low, K.  ‘Repair, Rejection and Rescission: An Uneasy Solution (2007) L.Q.R. 
(123) 536.  Mak, V. ‘The Seller’s Right to Cure Defective Performance – A Reappraisal’ [2007] 
L.M.C.L.Q. 409.   
781 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods: 
A Joint Consultation Paper, op. cit., paras. 3.56-3.58.  
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best be framed. Three possible options can be identified.  First, retention of the 
existing provision at section 35 of the 1893 Act that the buyer is deemed to have 
accepted the goods when, without good and sufficient reason, he retains the goods 
without intimating rejection. Second, restoration of the rule formerly at section 35 of 
the Act, and which remains at section 35(4) of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979, that 
the buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods when, after the lapse of a reasonable 
time, he retains them without intimating rejection. Third, stipulating a fixed time 
period such as thirty days, but with some element of flexibility, within which the right 
to reject goods can be exercised. We will look at each of these options in turn.  In 
assessing these options, we have been guided by two principal considerations.  First, 
the need for a rule that offers sellers and buyers, and in particular consumer buyers, as 
great a degree of clarity and certainty as possible about their rights and obligations.  
Second, the need for a rule that strikes a fair and workable balance between the 
interests of buyers and sellers, and consumers and businesses.    
    
Retention Without Good and Sufficient Reason 
9.38. The problem with the existing wording of section 35 is that it is formulated in 
such general terms that it offers little or no guidance to buyers and sellers as to when 
acceptance occurs and the right of rejection is lost. A provision that is critical to the 
availability or otherwise of the key remedy for buyers, particularly the buyers of 
consumer goods for whom going to court is seldom a feasible option, needs to be 
clearer and more definite as to the circumstances in which rejection can, and cannot, 
be exercised.  Insofar as the existing provision can be interpreted as providing a long-
term right to reject, moreover, we would have serious reservations about it on this 
ground. Though a longer-term right to reject is superficially attractive in principle, it 
would give rise to major issues and difficulties in practice.782 First, it would be 
necessary in this event to formulate rules dealing with the buyer’s obligation to give 
credit or compensation for the use of the goods during the months, or possibly even 
years, prior to rejection.  Rules of this kind would not be easy to devise and would 
almost certainly prove a cause of dispute in many cases.  More to the point perhaps, 
their application would take away much of the practical benefit to buyers of an 
extended right to reject.  Secondly, a long-term right to reject would be open to abuse 
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by buyers who could use the goods for a specific purpose or period before rejecting 
them and obtaining a full or substantial refund of the price. If such abuses occurred on 
an appreciable scale, the result would be an increase in costs and prices, an outcome 
that would not be in the interests of consumers generally. 
 
Retention for a Reasonable Time 
9.39. Like its counterpart in Irish legislation, the principal problem with the 
‘reasonable time’ provision in UK legislation is the uncertainty to which it gives rise.  
Both retailers and consumers have reported this to be a source of serious difficulty.783  
As the summary of the case law at paragraph 9.35 shows, it is far from easy to 
identify a consistent thread amid the diversity of circumstances evident in the 
relatively small number of reported cases.  The lack of clarity of the rule, and the 
complexity of the case law, makes it difficult in particular for consumers seeking to 
reject goods.  As Bridge has observed:784 
    A buyer, particularly one who is a consumer, requires a degree of nerve to exercise  
    rejection rights.  First of all, the uncertainty of the rejection period makes it difficult  
    to give advice on the subject.  Further, if the buyer has paid for the goods, they will  
    have to be put out of commission if the rejection is to pass the test of 
    unequivocality… If the buyer has inadvertently accepted the goods, a repudiation  
    of the contract will turn out to be unlawful and the buyer will be open to an action  
    by the seller.      
The right to reject is meant to be a relatively straightforward and certain remedy.  It is 
neither of these things, however, where the lapse of reasonable time test applies.  For 
this reason, we are not in favour of the restoration of a provision along these lines.    
 
Rejection Within a Standard Thirty Day Period 
9.40. In our deliberations on the remedies available for breach of the conditions of 
contracts of sale, we have had the benefit of the detailed review of consumer remedies 
for faulty goods undertaken by the English and Scottish Law Commissions in 2008-
09.785 After considering a range of options for the duration of the right of the reject, 
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the Commissions recommended that the normal period for the exercise of the right 
should be thirty days. A standard period of this duration would, in their view, afford 
sufficient time in most cases for the buyer to examine the goods and test them in use; 
would be in accord with the reasonable expectations of consumers and retailers; and, 
no less importantly, would be clearer and easier to publicise, understand and apply 
than the existing ‘reasonable time’ rule.  As the Commissions observed:786 
   We know that it is very rare for consumers to take disputes to court; it is also very 
   rare for consumers to employ lawyers to advise them.  It is therefore imperative that  
   the law is capable of being understood, remembered and asserted by consumers.  On  
   balance, and in practical terms, we think that the introduction of a 30-day normal  
   period for the right to reject will benefit the average consumer.  It will also assist  
   retailers by providing a simple standard for their staff.   
 
9.41 While a thirty day period would be appropriate in most cases, the Commissions 
concluded that some element of flexibility was necessary in order to make allowance 
for situations where a shorter or longer rejection period was justified. In the case of 
perishable items, for instance, a thirty day period would be incompatible with the 
nature of the goods.  In other cases, a period longer than thirty days would be required 
in order to afford the consumer a reasonable opportunity to examine and test the 
goods. A lawnmower purchased in November, for example, would typically remain 
unused for four to five months.  Seasonal items, such as skis, bought in the summer 
would also go unused for months in many cases. In order to take account of these 
factors, the Commissions recommended that: 
 It should be open to the seller to argue that the right to reject should be 
exercised in less than thirty days where the goods are of a kind that would be 
expected to perish within a shorter time. 
 
 It should be open to the consumer to argue that the right to reject should be 
exercisable for a period longer than thirty days where it is reasonably 
foreseeable by, or reasonably within the contemplation of, both parties that a 
longer period will be necessary to inspect the goods. The normal thirty day 
period should not be extended, however, by reason of the personal 
circumstances of the consumer as this would undermine the relative simplicity 
and objectivity of the proposed rule.   
 
9.42. In our view, the recommendations of the Law Commissions for a normal thirty 
day rejection period, with provision for a shorter or longer period in specified 
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circumstances, have considerable merit. Provisions along these lines would bring a 
substantial degree of clarity and a greater element of certainty to the operation of the 
remedies regime. As evidenced by the broadly, though not universally, positive 
response to the proposals from business and consumer interests in the UK, the 
proposed rules also strike a reasonable balance between the interests of consumers 
and businesses.787 Though the provisions governing the circumstances in which a 
shorter or longer rejection period would apply are likely to require further 
consideration and careful drafting, some element of flexibility along these lines is 
essential.  The main argument against a fixed time period for rejection is the fact that 
no single time limit could ever deal adequately with the wide diversity of 
circumstances found among sales transactions.788 Though the need for additional 
provisions of this kind takes away somewhat from the simplicity and certainty of the 
proposals, it is difficult to see how the provisions could function effectively without 
this element of flexibility.  
 
9.43. Though the Law Commissions’ recommendations were put forward in the 
context of a review of consumer remedies, we consider that, if applied as default 
rules, they could function no less advantageously in the context of commercial 
contracts of sale. This would also have the merit of maintaining broadly common 
rules for consumer and commercial sales. This recommendation should be reviewed, 
however, if evidence emerges that the proposed rule is unsuited to certain types of 
commercial contract. 
 
9.44. Recommendations   
The time period for the exercise of the right to reject goods not in conformity 
with the contract should normally be thirty days in the case of consumer 
contracts.    
 
                                                 
787 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods: 
A Summary of Responses to the Consultation, op. cit., paras. 2.32-2.55.  The Law Commission and 
the Scottish Law Commission.  Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods, op. cit., paras. 3.47-3.88.  
788 The English and Scottish Law Commissions recommended against a fixed period for rejection for 
this reason in a review of the issue undertaken in the 1980s.  The Law Commission and the Scottish 
Law Commission.  Sale and Supply of Goods, op. cit., paras. 5.14-5.19  
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Where the normal thirty-day period for rejection is incompatible with the nature 
of the goods, it should be open to the seller to argue for a rejection period shorter 
than thirty days. 
 
Where it is reasonably foreseeable by both parties to the contract of sale that a 
longer period will be needed to examine the goods, the consumer should be able 
to argue for a rejection period longer than thirty days.   
 
Except where the contract of sale provides otherwise, the time period in non-
consumer sales for the buyer’s right to reject goods not in conformity with the 
contract should normally be thirty days.  As in the case of consumer sales, the 
seller or buyer would be entitled to argue for a shorter or longer period where 
the nature of the goods made a shorter period more appropriate or it was 
reasonably foreseeable that the buyer would need a longer period of time in 
which to examine the goods. 
 
For the avoidance of doubt, any non-consumer contract of sale that stipulates a 
time limit within which the buyer must exercise a right to reject non-conforming 
goods should be subject to the statutory test of fairness and reasonableness.   
 
II REMEDIES UNDER DOMESTIC AND EU LEGISLATION  
9.45. Regulations 7 and 8 of the European Communities (Certain Aspects of the Sale 
of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees) Regulations 2003 (hereinafter the 
Consumer Sales and Guarantees Regulations) which give effect to the remedies’ 
provision at Article 4 of Directive 1999/44/EC (hereinafter the Consumer Sales and 
Guarantees Directive) provide as follows:   
    7.(1) The seller shall be liable to the consumer for any lack of conformity referred to in     
       Regulations  which exists at the time the goods were delivered. 
  (2) In the case of such a lack of conformity, the consumer shall, subject to, and in  
accordance with, this Regulation, be entitled to have –  
(a) the goods brought into conformity free of charge by repair or replacement, or 
(b) an appropriate reduction made in the price, or 
(c) the contract rescinded with regard to those goods. 
(3) In the first place, the consumer may require the seller to repair the goods or to replace  
them (in either case free of charge) unless this is impossible or disproportionate. 
     (4) Either of these remedies shall be deemed to be disproportionate if it imposes costs on the   
     seller which, in comparison with those of the other remedy or of any other remedy mentioned  
     in this Regulation, are unreasonable, taking into account –  
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(a) the value the goods would have if there were no lack of conformity 
(b) the significance of the lack of conformity, and 
(c) whether the alternative remedy could be completed without significant    
inconvenience to the consumer. 
(5) Where the remedy of repair or replacement is provided the repair or replacement shall be  
completed within a reasonable time and without any significant inconvenience to the 
consumer, taking account of the nature of the goods and the purpose for which the 
consumer required them. 
      (6) In paragraphs (2) and (3) ‘free of charge’ means free of the costs that must necessarily be  
      incurred to bring the goods into conformity, including the cost of carriage, postage, labour  
      and materials. 
      (7) The consumer may require an appropriate reduction of the price or have the contract 
     rescinded if –  
(a) the consumer is entitled to neither repair nor replacement, or  
(b) the seller has not completed the repair or replacement within a reasonable time, or  
(c) the seller has not completed the repair or replacement without significant   
inconvenience to the consumer. 
     (8) The consumer is not entitled to have the contract rescinded if the lack of conformity is  
     minor.   
     
8.  (1) Subject to paragraph (2), any lack of conformity which becomes apparent within  
     six months from the date of delivery of the goods shall, unless the contrary is  
     provided, be presumed to have existed at the time of delivery of the goods.  
     (2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply if, by reason of –  
(a) the nature of the goods concerned, or  
(b) the nature of the lack of conformity concerned,  
     it would not  be a reasonable inference that the lack of conformity existed at the time  
    of delivery.   
 
9.46. The main features of the remedial scheme under the Consumer Sales and 
Guarantees Regulations can be summarised as follows:   
 Where the seller has delivered goods which do not conform with the contract, 
the consumer may, in the first instance, require the seller to repair or replace 
them.  
 Where repair or replacement are impossible or disproportionate, or where 
either  remedy has not been completed within a reasonable time or without 
significant inconvenience to the consumer, the consumer may require an 
appropriate reduction of price, or if the lack of conformity is not minor, have 
the contract rescinded. 
 Unless proved otherwise, any lack of conformity which becomes apparent 
within six months of delivery is presumed to have existed at the time of 
delivery.  
 
Minor drafting differences aside, Regulations 7 and 8, like the other provisions of the 
2003 Regulations, adhere closely to the wording of the Consumer Sales and 
Guarantees Directive. The main substantive difference between the Directive and the 
transposing Regulations is that the latter omit the provision at Article 5(1) of the 
Directive restricting the liability of the seller for goods not in conformity with the 
contract to a period of two years from the date of delivery of the goods. As the 
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Consumer Sales and Guarantees Directive is a minimum harmonisation instrument, 
Member States are free to maintain or adopt national measures that exceed its 
protections. In this instance, Ireland opted to retain the existing general six-year time 
limit for contractual claims. Other provisions of the Directive with no counterpart in 
Irish sales law, such as the bar on rescission where the lack of conformity is minor, 
were given effect by the Regulations.  No such restriction applies, however, to the 
remedial scheme under the Sale of Goods Acts, an illustration of the inconsistency 
between the two sets of legislative provisions.     
 
9.47. The remedial framework for goods not in conformity with the contract under the 
Consumer Sales and Guarantees Directive involves a two-tier hierarchy of remedies. 
The first-tier remedies are repair or replacement of the goods. The second-tier 
remedies are reduction of the price or rescission of the contract, and can be invoked 
only where the consumer is not entitled to the first-tier remedies, or where the seller 
cannot perform these remedies within a reasonable time or without significance 
inconvenience to the consumer. By contrast, the remedial scheme under the Sale of 
Goods Acts 1893 and 1980 for breaches of the implied or express conditions of the 
contract gives primacy to the right to reject the goods and repudiate the contract. 
Where this right is lost through acceptance of the goods, the Acts afford a second-tier 
remedy of repair or replacement, with a restoration of the right of rejection and 
repudiation where the seller fails to provide the second-tier remedy within a 
reasonable time. Bradgate and Twigg-Flesner have observed as follows of the 
difference between the remedial scheme under the Consumer Sales and Guarantees 
Directive and that under UK sale of goods legislation789: 
    [The] primacy … given … to the remedies of repair or replacement …  is in sharp  
    contrast to the position in English law where the buyer’s principal remedies are  
    rejection of the goods and termination of the contract and/or a  claim for damages.   
    The Directive here betrays its civil law roots. In effect the consumer’s primary  
    remedies under the Directive are to have the contract properly performed by having  
    the goods repaired or replaced, with the right to escape the contract by rescinding it  
    available only as a long-stop option.  Rights of repair and replacement – rights of  
    ‘cure’ – are effectively forms of specific performance and specific performance is  
    the principal remedy for breach of contract in civilian systems, reflecting the  
                                                 
789 Bradgate, R. & Twigg-Flesner, C.  Blackstone’s Guide to Consumer Sales and Associated 
Guarantees, op. cit., p. 83.  Apart from the statutory right to cure for consumer contracts at section 
53(2)of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, the remedies for breach of contract in contracts of sale are similar 
under Irish and UK legislation.       
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    maxim pacta sunt servanda.790 In contrast in English law, whilst lip service is paid  
    to the notion of pacta sunt servanda, the principal remedy for a breach of contract  
    is an award of damages.   
 
9.48. Though the remedial framework in the proposed Directive on Consumer Rights 
published in October 2008, was broadly similar in substance to that in the Consumer 
Sales and Guarantees Directive, it differed in one fundamental respect in that, like the 
proposal’s other provisions, it was intended to apply on a full harmonisation basis.791 
Agreement was not reached, however, on the full harmonisation status of this and 
certain other provisions of the proposed Directive on consumer sales contracts.  As a 
result of the failure to reach agreement on these elements of the proposal, the 
provisions on consumer sales have, with the exception of the sections dealing with 
delivery and risk, been deleted from the final text of the Directive.  The operative EU 
law for consumer contracts of sale, other than for rules on delivery and risk, will 
continue to be based on the existing minimum harmonisation Consumer Sales and 
Guarantees Directive.   
 
9.49. We welcome the fact that the core provisions of EU legislation on consumer 
sales and remedies will not now apply on a full harmonisation basis. Had these 
provisions been adopted in fully harmonised form, Ireland, like other member states, 
would have had no little or no discretion about their implementation. Existing 
provisions under national legislation that went beyond the protections in the 
Consumer Rights Directive would have had to be repealed. As well as ensuring that 
important protections are maintained for consumers, this outcome will provide a fresh 
opportunity, without the constraints that full harmonisation would have imposed, to 
integrate the separate remedies regimes under the Sale of Goods Acts and the 
Consumer Sales and Guarantees Regulations. As we emphasised in Chapter 1, the 
current duplication of remedies under legislation of domestic and EU origin is a 
source of unnecessary and undesirable complexity and confusion. It flies in the face of 
all the tenets of good regulation to have two separate remedial schemes that serve the 
same purpose but are inconsistent, or in conflict, in important respects.      
 
                                                 
790 Agreements must be kept.   
791 Article 26(2) of the proposed Directive provided, however, that the choice between the first-tier 
remedies of repair and replacement would lie with the trader, while Article 3(3) of Directive 199/44/EC 
provides that the consumer may require the seller to repair the goods or to replace them.   
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Integration of the Remedial Frameworks in Domestic and EU Legislation 
9.50. The basic task of integrating the scheme of remedies under the Sale of Goods 
Acts and the Consumer Sales and Guarantees Regulations is relatively 
straightforward.792 In accordance with our recommendation on the right of rejection 
outlined in the preceding section, the following three remedies of first resort would be 
exercisable at the choice of the consumer for goods not in conformity with the 
contract: 
 termination of the contract and full refund of the price within a normal thirty-
day period or, in specified circumstances, a longer or shorter period; 
 replacement of the goods; 
 repair of the goods.  
Where the consumer opts in the first instance for the repair or replacement of the 
goods, he would be entitled to proceed to the remedies of termination and full refund 
or reduction of the price where: 
 The seller has not completed the repair or replacement within a reasonable 
time or without significant inconvenience to the consumer; or 
 The lack of conformity of the goods has not been remedied by the first repair 
or first replacement. 
 
The remedial framework proposed here would apply only to consumer contracts of 
sale.  In the case of commercial contracts of sale, the right to reject and the related 
rules on examination and acceptance would operate in tandem with the ‘cure’ 
provision for commercial contracts of sale outlined at paragraphs 11.31-11.33 below.   
 
9.51. Several other issues require consideration in the context of the integration of the 
remedial schemes under domestic and EU legislation. As noted above, the Consumer 
Sales and Guarantees Directive provides at Article 3(6) that ‘the consumer is not 
entitled to have the contract rescinded if the lack of conformity is minor’. Though this 
provision was included in the Consumer Sales and Guarantees Regulations which 
give effect to the Directive, there is no equivalent restriction on the right of rejection 
                                                 
792 The English and Scottish Law Commissions whose recommendations have influenced our thinking 
on this issue as on the reformulation of the right to reject have proposed that the three first-order 
remedies of termination plus refund, repair, and replacement should come under ‘the umbrella of the 
concept of rejection’.  The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  Consumer Remedies 
for Faulty Goods, op. cit., paras.3.111-3.113. ). In accordance with the view that rejection of the goods 
and termination of the contract are different concepts, all three remedies would be characterised as 
entailing the rejection of the goods.  While this offers a clever and coherent formula for the integration 
of the two remedial frameworks, it may cause confusion among buyers and sellers in view of the close 
connection historically between rejection and termination.   
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under the Sale of Goods Acts.  As we have recommended in Chapter 4 that rejection 
should be prohibited in commercial contracts of sale where the breach of contract is 
so slight that rejection would be unreasonable, this issue relates only to consumer 
sales.  In the case of these sales, we are not in favour of a restriction of the remedy of 
termination and refund proposed above to so-called non-minor defects.  The 
appearance and finish of consumer goods is often integral to their overall quality and 
a provision that limits the remedies available to consumers for defects of this nature 
would be unjustifiably detrimental to consumer interests.793 It would also create 
uncertainty and lead to disputes as to what was or was not a ‘minor’ defect. Our 
recommendation in Chapter 4 that the appearance and finish of goods and freedom 
from minor defects are in appropriate cases aspects of the quality of goods would 
permit the courts to distinguish between defects that are trivial or negligible and those 
that impair the standard of quality that a reasonable person would regard as 
satisfactory.794   
 
9.52. Regulation 8 of the Consumer Sales and Guarantees Regulations provides that 
any lack of conformity which becomes apparent within six months of the delivery 
will, unless such an inference would be unreasonable by virtue of the nature of the 
goods or of the lack of conformity, be presumed to have existed at the time of 
delivery.  No such reversal of the burden of the proof applies under the Sale of Goods 
Acts, nor would the Consumer Sales and Guarantees Directive require the application 
of this provision to the right of termination and refund as a remedy of first resort. The 
remedial scheme that we have proposed does not differentiate, however, between the 
three remedies that would be available where goods are not in conformity with the 
contract. The presumption regarding a lack of conformity arising within six months of 
delivery should apply, therefore, to the remedy of termination and refund in the same 
way as to the remedies of repair or replacement.  Where the remedy of repair is 
exercised, moreover, the six-month period for the reversal of the burden of proof 
                                                 
793 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  Sale and Supply of Goods, op. cit.,  
paras. 3.38-3.43.  The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  Consumer Remedies for 
Faulty Goods, op. cit., paras. 3.98-3.110.   
794 In Darren Egan v Motor Services (Bath) Ltd, Smith LJ stated that: ‘… it seems to me unlikely that a 
buyer will be entitled to reject goods simply because he can point to a minor defect.  He must also 
persuade the judge that a reasonable person would think that the minor defect was of sufficient 
consequence to make the goods unsatisfactory… The reasonable person may think that the minor 
defect is of no consequence.’  [2008] 1 All ER 1156 at 1166.   
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should be suspended while repairs are being carried out and should resume on the re-
delivery of the goods following their repair. Where the remedy of replacement is 
exercised, a further six-month period for the reversal of the burden of proof should 
commence on the delivery of the replacement goods.   
 
9.53. Recommendations  
The remedial frameworks for consumer contracts of sale under the Sale of 
Goods Acts and the Consumer Sales and Guarantees Regulations should be 
integrated by providing that the following would comprise  remedies of first 
resort, exercisable at the choice of the consumer, for goods not in conformity 
with the contract: 
 termination of the contract and full refund of the price within a normal 
thirty-day period or, in specified circumstances, a longer or shorter 
period; 
 replacement of the goods; 
 repair of the goods.  
 
Where the repair or replacement of the goods are the remedies of first resort, the 
consumer should be entitled to proceed to the remedies of termination and full 
refund or reduction of the price where: 
 The seller has not completed the repair or replacement within a 
reasonable time or without significant inconvenience to the consumer; or 
 The lack of conformity of the goods has not been remedied by the first 
repair or first replacement. 
 
The remedy of termination and refund should apply to ‘minor’ defects where 
such defects constitute a breach of the implied condition of satisfactory quality in 
consumer contracts of sale.   
 
The thirty day period for rejection of the goods not in conformity with the 
contract should, where applicable, be suspended while repairs or discussions 
about repairs take place. 
 
The presumption that a lack of conformity which becomes apparent within six 
months of the delivery of the goods existed at the time of delivery should apply  
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to the remedy of termination and refund in consumer contracts of sale in the 
same way as to the remedies of repair and replacement.  
 
The presumption that a lack of conformity which becomes apparent within six 
months of the delivery of the goods existed at the time of delivery should apply in 
consumer contracts of sale for a further period of six months where replacement 
goods are supplied as a remedy for goods not in conformity with the contract.   
 
In the case of commercial contracts of sale, the right to reject and the related 
rules on examination and acceptance should operate in tandem with the 
statutory ‘cure’ provision for commercial contracts of sale recommended at 
paragraph 11.36.    
   
Section 36 Buyer Not Bound to Return Rejected Goods 
Unless otherwise agreed, where goods are delivered to the buyer, and he refuses to accept them, 
having the right to do so, he is not bound to return them to the seller, but it is sufficient if he 
intimates to the seller that he refuses to accept them. 
 
Section 37 Liability of Buyer for Neglecting or Refusing Delivery of Goods 
When the seller is ready and willing to deliver the goods, and the buyer does not within a 
reasonable time after such request take delivery of the goods, he is liable to the seller for any loss 
occasioned by his neglect or refusal to take delivery, and also for a reasonable charge for the care 
and custody of the goods.  Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of the 
seller where the neglect or refusal of the buyer to take delivery amounts to a repudiation of the 
contract.  
 
9.54. Section 36 comprises a default rule to the effect that, where the goods have been 
delivered to the buyer and he refuses to accept them, he is not bound to return them to 
the seller. It is sufficient that he intimate to the seller that he refuses to accept 
delivery. It must be made clear, however, in this event that the goods are being 
rejected as the buyer may otherwise be deemed to have accepted the goods. Though 
the buyer is not obliged to return the goods, there is a requirement on him to take 
reasonable care of them. Section 37 provides that, where the seller is ready and 
willing to deliver the goods and the buyer does not take delivery within a reasonable 
time of a request to do so by the seller, the latter is liable to the seller for any loss 
occasioned by his refusal or neglect to take delivery.  These provisions have not given 
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rise to any significant issues or difficulties, and no changes of substance are required 










































CHAPTER TEN SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893: RIGHTS OF 




10.1. Per section 27 of the 1893 Act, the duty of the buyer under the contract of sale is 
to accept and pay for the goods in accordance with the contract of sale. Where the 
buyer defaults on these obligations, the Act affords the seller real and personal 
remedies against the buyer’s default. The personal remedies of an action for the price 
of the goods and of a claim for damages for non-acceptance are the subject of sections 
49 and 50 of the Act respectively, and are discussed in Chapter 11. The focus of this 
Chapter is on the real remedies - a lien on the goods, a right to stop the goods in 
transit, and a right to re-sell the goods – exercisable under sections 38-39 and 41-48 of 
the 1893 Act.795 As they apply against the goods, these remedies, unlike the personal 
remedies, are unaffected by the buyer’s insolvency and, as such, would seem to offer 
a potent source of redress for non-payment.796 Commercial and technological 
developments, however, have greatly reduced the utility of, and resort to, the remedies 
contained in this part of the Act.   
 
10.2. The Chapter looks first at the general statement of the rights of the unpaid seller 
in sections 38-39 of the 1893.  It then considers in turn the provisions specific to each 
of the remedies: sections 41-43 on the unpaid seller’s lien; sections 44-46 on the right 
of stoppage in transit; and sections 47-48 on the unpaid seller’s right of resale.   
 
I THE UNPAID SELLER AND HIS RIGHTS  
SECTION 38 UNPAID SELLER DEFINED 
(1) The seller of goods is deemed to be an “unpaid seller” within the meaning of this     
Act- 
(a) When the whole of the price has not been paid or tendered; 
(b) When a bill of exchange or other negotiable instrument has been received as 
conditional payment, and the condition on which it was received has not been 
fulfilled by reason of the dishonour of the instrument or otherwise.  
    (2) In this part of the Act the term “seller” includes any person who is in the position of  
                                                 
795 Section 40 of the 1893 Act applies only to Scotland.   
796 As Benjamin observes: ‘These remedies can be regarded as a type of self-help or extra-judicial 
remedy by which the seller gains better protection for his interests than he would by merely pursuing a 
claim for money: they reduce the risk of his being only an unsecured general creditor of the buyer, 
should the latter become bankrupt. By exercising these remedies, the unpaid seller in effect secures a 
form of preference over the general creditors of a bankrupt buyer.’  Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. 
cit., para. 15-001.   
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    a seller, as, for instance, an agent of the seller to whom the bill of lading has been  
    indorsed, or a consignor or agent who has himself paid, or is directly responsible for,  
    the price.   
 
SECTION 39 UNPAID SELLER’S RIGHTS  
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, and of any statute in that behalf,  
notwithstanding that the property in the goods may have passed to the buyer, the unpaid seller 
of goods, as such, has by implication of law- 
(a) a lien on the goods or right to retain them for the price while he is in possession of 
them; 
(b) in case of the insolvency of the buyer, a right of stopping the goods in transitu after he 
has parted with the possession of them; 
(c) a right of re-sale as limited by this Act. 
(2) Where the property in goods has not passed to the buyer, the unpaid seller has, in  
addition to his other remedies, a right of withholding delivery similar to and co-extensive with 
his rights of lien and stoppage in transitu where the property has passed to the buyer”.  
 
These sections of the Act have not been amended since their enactment.  Though the  
Sale of Goods Act 1979 modernised the wording of the corresponding sections in UK 
legislation, the substance of the provisions was left unchanged.   
 
10.3. The definition of ‘unpaid seller’ in section 38 establishes the general scope of 
the remedies set out in the subsequent sections. Per subsection (1), the seller is 
deemed to be unpaid where the whole of the price has not been paid or tendered, or 
where a bill of exchange or other negotiable instrument has been dishonoured or the 
condition on which it was received has not been fulfilled. Put more simply, a seller is 
unpaid until he has received full and unconditional payment.797 Subsection (2) defines 
‘seller’ so as to include an agent occupying the position of seller and gives two 
examples by way of illustration.  The first is that of an agent who endorses a bill of 
lading and is entitled accordingly to exercise the real rights of the seller as against the 
buyer.  The second example is that of an agent who has himself paid, or is directly 
responsible for, the price.  If the principal on whose behalf this agent has purchased 
the goods fails to pay him, therefore, the agent can exercise the rights of an unpaid 
seller.798 The definition of ‘unpaid seller’, however, does not cover a buyer who has 
rejected the goods and is seeking to recover the payment made for them.799 
 
10.4. Section 39(1) lists the three remedies which - subject to the provisions of the 
1893 Act and of ‘any statute in that behalf’- the unpaid seller has by ‘implication of 
                                                 
797 Goode on Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 443.   
798 Ireland v Livingstone (1872) LR 5 HL 395.    
799 J.J. Lyons & Co v May and Baker Ltd [1923] 1 KB 685.   
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law’ notwithstanding that the property in the goods may have passed to the buyer.  
We will look at the characteristics of each of the remedies and the conditions 
governing their exercise in later sections of the Chapter. As these remedies arise by 
implication of law, they can, in accordance with section 55 of the Act, be negatived or 
varied by express agreement, by the course of dealing between the parties, or by a 
usage binding on both parties. The reference in the sub-section to ‘any statute in that 
behalf’ applies in particular to the Factors Act 1889, a number of whose provisions 
recur in substantially the same form in the 1893 Act.800  The provisions of the Bills of 
Sale Act 1878 may also affect the exercise of the seller’s remedies against the goods.   
 
Issues Arising  
10.5. While section 39(1) is relatively straightforward, section 39(2) is somewhat 
more problematical. The sub-section states that, where the property in the goods has 
not passed to the buyer, the unpaid seller has, in addition to his other remedies, a right 
of withholding delivery similar to and co-extensive with his rights of lien and 
stoppage in transit where the property has passed to the buyer.  The rationale for the 
provision would appear to be that, as a lien refers to rights over another person’s 
property, it is applicable only where the property has passed to the buyer as the seller 
cannot exercise a lien over his own goods.801 Unlike section 39(1), however, section 
39(2) makes no reference to the seller’s right of resale. Atiyah has pointed out the 
problems created by this omission:802 
    The draftsman seems to have thought it necessary to put in the right of withholding  
    delivery, but not the power of resale, because the seller who is still owner does not  
    need a power of resale.  But this appears to be a confusion of the right and the  
    power. If s.39(2) only means to lay down certain powers, then it is totally  
    unnecessary because the owner of the goods has the power of withholding delivery  
    no less than the power of passing a good title to a third person.  On the other hand,  
    if s.39(2) is meant to confer a right to exercise the power, as one would have  
    thought, it follows that the right to resell the goods should have been included as  
    well.  The omission of this right might have the remarkable result that an unpaid  
    seller could, as against the buyer, resell the goods in accordance with the Act where  
                                                 
800 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 15-009.  As noted in Chapter 6, sections 24-25 of the 
1893 Act are broadly similar in substance and wording to sections 8-9 of the Factors Act 1889, and the 
repeal of the latter is recommended there for that reason.  Section 47(2) of the 1893 Act is also largely 
similar to section 10 of the Factors Act.  
801 Goode on Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 443.  Benjamin notes that, as a lien strictu sensu can arise 
only when the property held belongs to another, the right of withholding delivery exercised by the 
seller under s.39(2) over goods in which he still has the property, is ‘a quasi-lien’.  Benjamin’s Sale of 
Goods, op. cit., para. 15-029.   
802 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit, p. 449.   
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    the property had passed to the buyer, but could not do so where the property had  
    not passed.    
 
In RV Ward Ltd v Bignall,803 however, Diplock L.J. stated obiter that the right of 
resale granted by section 48(3) applied whether or not the property in the goods had 
passed to the buyer, adding that:804 
    The seller cannot have greater rights of resale if the property has already passed to  
    the buyer than those which he would have if the property had remained in him.    
 
10.6. Recommendation 
For the avoidance of doubt, the provision at section 39(2) of the 1893 Act should 
be amended in future legislation to provide that the buyer has a right of resale.     
 
10.7. The second issue raised by section 39(2) arises from the statement in the sub-
section that the unpaid seller’s right of withholding delivery where the property in the 
goods has not passed to the buyer is ‘similar to and co-extensive with’ the rights of 
lien and stoppage where the property has so passed.  In the case of an agreement to 
sell future or unascertained goods that have not been identified to the contract, 
however, the seller is not under an obligation to deliver any particular goods to the 
buyer. In such a case, the seller’s right to withhold delivery of goods that he may have 
planned to supply in performance of the contract is broader than under the right of 
lien. It is exercisable regardless of whether there has been any default by the buyer 
and gives rise to no breach of contract on the seller’s part. As section 39(2) is 
intended to confer rights on the unpaid seller, it should not, in Benjamin’s view, be 
interpreted so as to restrict rights arising under the common law – in this instance, 
those governing the seller’s obligations in respect of the delivery of future or 
unascertained goods.805 On this view, furthermore, the particular common law rights 
in question are ‘not inconsistent’ with section 39 within the meaning of section 61(2) 
of the Act.806   
                                                 
803 [1967] 1 Q.B. 534.   
804  Ibid. at 545.  
805 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 15-012.  In Atiyah’s view, ‘it is inconceivable that this 
section (i.e. s. 39(2)) should, by a side wind as it were, alter these fundamentals of the law of sale.’  
Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 449.    
806 Section 61(2) states: ‘The rules of the common law, including the law merchant, save in so far as 
they are inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, and in particular the rules relating to the 
law of principal and agent and the effect of fraud, misrepresentation, duress or coercion, mistake or 
other invalidating cause, shall continue to apply to contracts for the sale of goods.’   
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II UNPAID SELLER’S LIEN 
 
Section 41 Seller’s Lien 
    (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the unpaid seller of goods who is in possession of 
them is entitled to retain possession of them until payment or tender of the price in the following 
cases, namely: 
(a) Where the goods have been sold without any stipulation as to credit; 
(b) Where the goods have been sold on credit, but the term of credit has expired; 
(c) Where the buyer becomes insolvent. 
    (2)The seller may exercise his right of lien notwithstanding that he is in possession of the 
goods as agent or bailee or custodier for the buyer. 
 
Section 42 Part Delivery 
    Where an unpaid seller has made part delivery of the goods, he may exercise his right of lien or  
    retention on the remainder, unless such part delivery has been made under such circumstances  
    as to show an agreement to waive the lien or right of retention. 
 
Section 43-Termination of Lien 
    (1) The unpaid seller of goods loses his lien or right of retention thereon- 
        (a) When he delivers the goods to a carrier or other bailee or custodier for the purpose of    
        transmission to the buyer without reserving the right of disposal of the goods; 
        (b) When the buyer or his agent lawfully obtains possession of the goods; 
        (c) By waiver thereof. 
(2) The unpaid seller of goods, having a lien or right of retention thereon, does not lose his lien 
or right of retention by reason only that he has obtained judgment or decree for the price of the 
goods. 
 
These sections of the Act have not been amended since their enactment.  Minor 
drafting changes apart, the equivalent provisions in the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 
remain similar to those enacted in 1893.   
 
10.8. A lien is a right to retain possession of the goods until the price has been paid or 
tendered in full.  In Lord’s Trustee v Great Eastern Rly,807 Fletcher-Moulton LJ stated 
that a lien does not ‘strictly speaking give to the seller any property in the goods.’ As 
possession of the goods is the sine qua non of the lien, a lien is lost where possession 
is lost and does not entitle the seller to regain possession where he has surrendered 
it.808 The unpaid seller’s lien is a special lien and not a general lien for all debts due 
from the buyer to the seller. Unless the contract of sale provides for a right of lien, the 
remedy applies only in accordance with the Act’s provisions and the seller cannot rely 
on any separate equitable lien.809 While at common law a seller had a right of lien 
                                                 
807 [1908] 2 KB 54 at 63-64.   
808 Valpy v Gibson (1847) 4 CB 837.  Pennington v Motor Reliance Works Ltd [1923] 1 KB 127. 
Jeffcott v Andrew Motors Ltd [1960] N.Z.L.R. 721 NZCA.  An unpaid seller who exercises his right of 
stoppage in transit, however, is effectively restored to his former position and regains his lien.  Atiyah, 
The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 456.   
809 Transport & General Credit Corpn Ltd v Morgan [1939] 2 All ER 17 at 25.   
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only where he had possession of the goods qua seller, section 41(2) of the 1893 Act 
extended the right to encompass the situation where the seller holds the goods as 
agent or bailee of the buyer. Where the seller acts as agent or bailee of the buyer, 
however, he may be held to have waived his lien. By virtue of section 39(1)(a), and 
because the lien is for the price of the goods, it does not entitle the seller, in the 
absence of an express term in the contract, to claim for storage or other expenses.810  
Finally, the contract of sale remains in existence during the exercise of the lien. As 
discussed later in the Chapter, section 48(1) of the Act provides that a contract of sale 
is not rescinded by the mere exercise by the unpaid seller of his right of lien or 
stoppage in transit.       
 
When Lien Applies  
10.9. The seller’s lien arises where the following conditions apply: 
1) The seller is in possession of the goods or part of the goods (ss.41(1) & 42); 
and  
2) The seller is unpaid (ss.38(1) & 41(1)); and  
3) (a) The goods have been sold without any stipulation as to credit, or  
(b) The goods have been sold on credit but the term of credit has expired, or  
            (c) The buyer has become insolvent (s.41(1)(a)). 
In accordance with section 62(3) of the Act, a person ‘is deemed to be insolvent 
within the meaning of this Act who either has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary 
course of business, or cannot pay his debts as they become due, whether he has 
committed an act or bankruptcy or not, and whether he has become a notour811 
bankrupt or not.’ The seller’s right to a lien in the event of the buyer’s insolvency 
reflects the fact that insolvency or bankruptcy do not of themselves terminate the 
contract or entail its repudiation as the buyer’s obligations may still be performed by 
his trustee in bankruptcy.812 Where the buyer is insolvent, the unpaid seller’s right of 
lien applies regardless of whether any stipulated period of credit has expired. The 
                                                 
810 Re Southern Livestock Producers Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 801.   
811 ‘Notour bankrupt’ is a term in Scottish law that referred to a state of insolvency that had become 
‘notorious’.  The clauses relating to bankruptcy in the definition of ‘insolvent’ in s.62(4) of the UK 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 were repealed respectively by the Insolvency Act 1985, ss. 235, 236(2), Sch. 9 
para. 11, Sch. 10 Pt III, and the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, s.75(2) Sch. 8.  The latter Act also 
replaced the term ‘notour bankrupt’ in Scottish bankruptcy law generally by ‘apparent insolvency’, 
ibid. s.75(6).   
812 Re Edwards (1873) 8 Ch App 289. Ex parte Chalmers (1873) 8 Ch App 289.  Re Phoenix Bessemer 
Steel (1876) 4 Ch.D. 108.  Mess v Dufus (1901) 6 Com.Cas 165.   
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seller can retain the goods until the buyer or his trustee in bankruptcy pays the full 
price, thereby avoiding the need to claim for the price in the bankruptcy.813     
 
10.10. Where an unpaid seller has made a part delivery of the goods, he may, per 
section 42, exercise his lien or right of retention on the remainder of the goods unless 
such part delivery has been made under circumstances indicative of an agreement to 
waive the lien or right of retention.  The onus is on the buyer seeking to establish that 
the lien has been lost to show that it was the intention of the parties that delivery of 
part of the goods should constitute delivery in full.814 Where the contract is for the 
sale of goods by instalments, there is a presumption that the contract is indivisible so 
that the seller may exercise his lien over goods awaiting delivery if any part of the 
price is outstanding.815  If the contract is severable, however, insofar that it provides 
for separate delivery of, and payment for, individual instalments, each such delivery 
will be treated as if it were a separate contract for the purposes of the lien.816 In such a 
case, the lien can only be exercised in respect of goods forming part of an instalment 
for which payment has not been made.        
 
When Lien is Lost  
10.11. Section 43(1) provides that the unpaid seller loses his lien or right of retention 
in the following circumstances: 
(a) When he delivers the goods to a carrier or other bailee … for the purpose of 
transmission to the buyer without reserving the right of disposal of the goods; 
(b) When the buyer or his agent lawfully obtains possession of the goods; 
(c) By waiver of the lien or right. 
If the price for the goods is paid or tendered in full, the lien will also obviously be 
terminated as the seller will no longer be an unpaid seller within the meaning of 
section 38(1). Although the seller loses his lien on delivery to the carrier, he may still, 
as discussed in the next section, have the right to stop the goods in transit.  As 
possession is fundamental to the remedy of the lien, its loss necessarily follows when 
the buyer or his agent lawfully obtain possession of the goods. In Atiyah’s view, 
‘lawfully’ here means ‘with the consent of the seller’.817 Waiver of the lien can occur 
                                                 
813 Ex Parte Stapleton (1879) 10 Ch.D. 586.  Gunn v Bolckow, Vaughan & Co (1875) L.R. 10 Ch.App. 
491.   
814 Ex Parte Cooper (1879) 11 Ch.D 68.   
815 Ex Parte Chalmers (1873) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 299.  
816 Longbottom & Co. Ltd  v Bass, Walker & Co.  [1922] W.N. 245. 
817 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op.cit., p. 455.  
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in a number of ways.  If the seller deals with the goods, for example, in a manner 
inconsistent with the continuance of the lien, such as by their consumption or 
wrongful resale, the right will be lost.818  By virtue of section 43(2) of the Act, the lien 
does not cease by reason of the fact that the seller has obtained a judgment for the 
price. The buyer’s compliance with the judgment by making full payment of the price 
is required for termination of the lien.819  Under section 47(1) of the Act, the seller’s 
right of lien is not affected by a sub-sale or other disposition of the goods by the buyer 
unless the seller has given his assent to the transaction.  
 
Issues Arising 
10.12. The central issue regarding the unpaid seller’s lien is whether it retains any 
relevance or value in present-day commercial conditions.  As this question is equally, 
if not more, relevant to the right of stoppage in transit, we will return to it after we 
have considered the second real remedy afforded unpaid sellers by Part IV of the 1893 
Act.  
 
III RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSIT  
Section 44 Right of Stoppage in Transitu  
       Subject to the provisions of this Act, when the buyer of goods becomes insolvent, the  
       unpaid seller who has parted with the possession of the goods has the right of stopping  
       them in transitu, that is to say, he may resume possession of the goods as long as they are in  
       course of transit, and may retain them until payment or tender of the price. 
 
Section 45 Duration of Transit  
1) Goods are deemed to be in course of transit from the time when they are delivered to a 
carrier by land or water, or other bailee or custodier for the purpose of transmission to 
the buyer, until the buyer, or his agent in that behalf, takes delivery of them from such 
carrier or other bailee or custodier. 
2) If the buyer or his agent in that behalf obtains delivery of the goods before their arrival 
at the appointed destination, the transit is at an end. 
3) If, after the arrival of the goods at the appointed destination, the carrier or other bailee 
or custodier acknowledges to the buyer, or his agent, that he holds the goods on his 
behalf and continues in possession of them as bailee or custodier for the buyer, or his 
agent, the transit is at an end, and it is immaterial that a further destination for the goods 
may have been indicated by the buyer. 
4) If the goods are rejected by the buyer, and the carrier or other bailee or custodier 
continues in possession of them, the transit is not deemed to be at an end, even if the 
seller has refused to receive them back. 
5) When goods are delivered to a ship chartered by the buyer it is a question depending on 
the circumstances of the particular case, whether they are in the possession of the master 
as a carrier, or as agent to the buyer. 
                                                 
818 Gurr v Cuthbert (1843) 12 L.J.Ex 303.   
819 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 15-059.  
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6) Where the carrier or other bailee or custodier wrongfully refuses to deliver the goods to 
the buyer, or his agent in that behalf, the transit is deemed to be at an end. 
7) Where part delivery of the goods has been made to the buyer, or his agent in that behalf, 
the remainder of the goods may be stopped in transitu, unless such part delivery has 
been made under such circumstances as to show an agreement to give up possession of 
the whole of the goods. 
 
Section 46 How Stoppage in Transitu is Effected  
1) The unpaid seller may exercise his right of stoppage in transitu either by taking actual 
possession of the goods, or by giving notice of his claim to the carrier or other bailee or 
custodier in whose possession the goods are. Such notice may be given either to the 
person in actual possession of the goods or to his principal. In the latter case the notice, 
to be effectual, must be given at such time and under such circumstances that the 
principal, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, may communicate it to his servant or 
agent in time to prevent a delivery to the buyer. 
2) When notice of stoppage in transitu is given by the seller to the carrier, or other bailee or 
custodier in possession of the goods, he must re-deliver the goods to, or according to 
the directions of, the seller. The expenses of such re-delivery must be borne by the seller. 
 
These sections have remained unchanged since the enactment of the 1893 Act. Apart 
from drafting changes to modernise the language of the sections (including the 
substitution of ‘transit’ for the Latin ‘transitu’), the sole substantive change to the 
equivalent sections in the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 has been the deletion of the 
reference to delivery to a carrier ‘by land or water’ in section 45(1) in order to extend 
the provisions to transit by air.   
 
10.13. Section 44 sets out the right of the unpaid seller who has parted with the 
possession of goods to stop them in transit, that is to resume and retain possession of 
them until payment or tender of the price.  The right is not a revival of the lien and is 
not dependent on the seller having previously exercised a lien.820 Three conditions 
must be met before the right of stoppage can be exercised.  First, the seller must be 
unpaid; second, the buyer must be insolvent; and, third, the goods must be in transit. 
The right is more restricted therefore than the seller’s lien which, in addition to the 
buyer’s insolvency, can also be exercised where the goods have been sold without any 
stipulation as to credit and, if sold on credit, where the term of credit has expired.  
 
10.14. Section 45 comprises seven sub-sections which deal in some detail with the 
operation of the right of stoppage, and in particular with when the transit ends.  In 
                                                 
820 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 15-065.   
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Schotsmans v Lancs & Yorks Ry,821 the ‘essential feature’ of the right was expressed 
as follows: 
   … the goods should be at the time in the possession of a middleman, or of some  
   person intervening between the vendor who has parted with and the purchaser who  
  has not yet received them.   
 
The right of stoppage requires, therefore, that the carrier middleman cannot be the 
agent of either seller or buyer. If he acts for the seller, the goods remain in the 
possession of the latter and the right of stoppage does not arise.  If he acts for the 
buyer, the transit is at an end under the rules in section 45.  Notwithstanding section 
32(1) of the Act which states that delivery to the carrier is deemed prima facie to be 
delivery to the buyer, the right of stoppage is only terminated by an actual delivery to 
the buyer or his agent.822  Delivery to a carrier who is not the agent of the buyer is not 
delivery to the buyer for the purposes of the right. Once the goods have come into the 
possession of the buyer or his agent, the transit does not recommence if the goods are 
sent to another destination by the buyer.823  In accordance with section 46, the right of 
stoppage is exercised by means of repossession of the goods by the seller or by notice 
from the seller to the carrier. The seller’s notice must make plain his intention to 
retake possession of the goods. It must also clearly identify the goods to which the 
notice applies.824 As with the lien, the exercise of the right of stoppage does not of 
itself rescind the contract of sale.  
 
Issues Arising 
10.15. The retention of the remedy aside, the principal other issue to which the Act’s 
provisions on the right of stoppage give rise relates to the detailed rules on the 
termination of the right in section 45.  In Bridge’s view, it is open to question whether 
there is any need for this section ‘to run on for seven subsections’ when ‘all that is 
being said is that the transit is at an end when the buyer acquires possession of the 
goods, actual or constructive, or the right to immediate possession.’825 Atiyah, takes a 
more positive view of the section, however, stating that it ‘makes a determined and, 
                                                 
821 (1867) L.R. 2 Ch.App. 332 at 338.     
822 Ex Parte Rosevear China Clay Co. Ltd  (1879) 11 Ch D 560.  The fact that the carrier was appointed 
by one of the parties, however, does not of itself mean that he is acting as their agent and that the transit 
is at an end on delivery of the goods to him. Bethell v Clark (1888) 20 Q.B.D. 615.   
823 Kendal v Marshal Stevens & Co (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 356.   
824 Clementson v Grand Trunk Railway Co (1877) 42 UCQB 263.   
825 Bridge, ‘Do We Need a New Sale of Goods Act?’, op. cit., para. 2.26.  
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on the whole, successful attempt’ to reduce the ‘chaos’ of the pre-1893 common law 
‘to a number of definite rules.’826  
 
Retention or Repeal of the Unpaid Seller’s Lien and the Right of Stoppage   
10.16. There is no doubt that recourse to the unpaid seller’s lien has declined greatly 
since the inclusion of the remedy in the 1893 Act.  Changes in trading practices have 
made the right of lien both more impracticable and less necessary. As there is no 
entitlement to the remedy where goods are sold with a stipulation as to credit, the 
prevalence of credit terms in present-day contracts of sale means, on the one hand, 
that the lien is no longer an option for the unpaid seller in a great many cases. On the 
other hand, the seller’s need for protection from the risk of non-payment has been met 
in other ways, most notably through the widespread recourse to retention of title 
clauses.   
 
10.17. Though the relevance of the lien has declined, it has not entirely disappeared 
from commercial practice. Infrequent though such a situation may be, the lien remains 
a potentially useful remedy for the unpaid seller where goods to be paid for on open 
account are still in the seller’s possession when the buyer becomes insolvent.827  It 
may also serve a purpose in the case of a contract with provision for instalment 
deliveries in permitting the seller to withhold delivery of an instalment until earlier 
instalments have been paid for.828   
 
10.18. The case for the retention of the right of stoppage in transit is weaker in our 
view than that for the unpaid seller’s lien. As Bridge has noted, reported cases on the 
right of stoppage have been ‘exceedingly rare’ in this and the last century, reflecting 
the fact that the remedy was predicated upon the lengthy transit of goods shipped on 
credit terms.829 Rapid transit has made the right of stoppage both less usable and less 
useful. No less importantly, the development of the system of payments against 
documents and, more particularly, of payment by bankers’ commercial credits have 
greatly reduced the need for a right to stop goods in transit.830  According to Bridge, 
                                                 
826 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., pp.457-458.   
827 Goode on Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 443.  
828 White, Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 330.   
829 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 11.26.  
830 For an account of the operation of bankers’ commercial credits, see Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. 
cit., pp. 426-432.   
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the effect of these developments has been that ‘the right of stoppage is unlikely ever 
to be exercised.’831  Atiyah, however, while noting that there are virtually no modern 
cases on the subject, considers that ‘the  possibility of the right being needed must 
sometimes arise in the case of sales to buyers in other European Union countries 
where sales on open account are quite usual’.832 
 
10.19. The Group favours the repeal of the right of stoppage in transit. If there is 
evidence, however, that the right is actually used in twenty-first century commerce, 
we would hesitate to interfere with business practice.  Observations and submissions 
are invited accordingly on the issue from interested parties. The Group believes that 
the right of stoppage in its present form is unwieldy and, if it is to continue to be 
available to unpaid sellers, it should be revised and simplified as suggested by Bridge. 
 
Extension of the Unpaid Seller’s Lien  
10.20. The options regarding the remedy of a statutory lien are not confined to the 
repeal or retention of the lien in its present form under the 1893 Act.  The remedies in 
Part IV of the Act seek to stop the goods from going to the buyer where the buyer 
becomes insolvent or, additionally in the case of the lien, until payment or tender of 
the price where the goods are sold without a stipulation as to credit or the term 
allowed for credit has expired. The in-built limitations of the current remedies raise 
the question of whether there is a case for a more general statutory lien that would 
also offer a remedy to the unpaid seller where the goods had been delivered into the 
possession of the buyer. In addition to a right to retain possession of goods and to stop 
them in transit, a lien of this kind would permit the unpaid seller to reclaim goods 
identifiable under the contract of sale which were in the buyer’s possession.  As with 
the existing real remedies, a broader lien of this kind could be waived or varied by 
agreement between the parties.  While closer in some respects to a retention of title 
clause than to the existing possessory lien, a general lien along these lines would 
differ from such a clause in significant  respects. Whereas a retention of title clause 
withholds the property in the goods from the buyer until payment, a general lien 
would operate where the property had passed to the buyer. Furthermore, whereas a 
retention of title clause gives the seller a right to reclaim the goods as against a 
                                                 
831 Bridge, ‘Do We Need a New Sale of Goods Act?’, op. cit., para. 2.26.  
832 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 457. 
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subsequent buyer, the general lien would not do so by virtue of the fact that the first 
buyer’s property in the goods would enable him to pass good title to a subsequent 
purchaser.  
 
10.21. Though a general lien with this extended scope is an interesting concept and 
one that merits closer study, we were not in a position to give it the kind of detailed 
consideration that the idea requires. As we stated in Chapter 6, moreover, in our 
conclusions on the proposal for a mandatory lien for pre-paying consumer buyers, it is 
necessary to recognise that giving some buyers or sellers preferential status by means 
of this type of legal device raises issues of fairness vis-à-vis other categories of 
creditor. The matters at issue, and the conflicting interests involved, are more 
appropriately considered therefore in the context of the overall framework of personal 
property security law than in the narrower context of the rules governing the transfer 
of possession or property in contracts of sale. 
 
10.22  Recommendations 
The unpaid seller’s lien at sections 41-43 of the 1893 Act should be retained in 
future legislation.     
 
The right of stoppage in transit at sections 44-46 of the 1893 Act should be 
repealed.  If evidence is forthcoming from future consultations that the right 
retains some utility in present-day commercial practice, this recommendation 
should be reviewed. If the right is retained following such a review, the 
conditions governing its operation should be simplified.   
 
IV RE-SALE BY BUYER OR SELLER 
Section 47 Effect of Sub-Sale or Pledge by Buyer 
      Subject to the provisions of this Act, the unpaid seller’s right of lien or retention or stoppage  
      in transitu is not affected by any sale, or other disposition of the goods which the buyer may  
     have made, unless the seller has assented thereto. 
 
      Provided that where a document of title to goods has been lawfully transferred to any person  
      as buyer or owner of the goods, and that person transfers the document to a person who  
      takes the document in good faith and for valuable consideration, then, if such last-mentioned  
      transfer was by way of sale the unpaid seller’s right of lien or retention or stoppage in transitu  
      is defeated, and if such last-mentioned transfer was by way of pledge or other disposition for  
      value, the unpaid seller’s right of lien or retention or stoppage in transitu can only be  




Section 48 Sale Not Generally Rescinded by Lien or Stoppage in Transitu  
1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a contract of sale is not rescinded by the mere 
exercise by an unpaid seller of his right of lien or retention or stoppage in transitu. 
2) Where an unpaid seller who has exercised his right of lien or retention or stoppage in 
transitu re-sells the goods, the buyer acquires a good title thereto as against the original 
buyer. 
3) Where the goods are of a perishable nature, or where the unpaid seller gives notice to the 
buyer of his intention to resell, and the buyer does not within a reasonable time pay or 
tender the price, the unpaid seller may re-sell the goods and recover from the original 
buyer damages for any loss occasioned by his breach of contract. 
4) Where the seller expressly reserves a right of re-sale in case the buyer should make 
default, and on the buyer making default, re-sells the goods, the original contract of sale 
is thereby rescinded, but without prejudice to any claim the seller may have for damages. 
 
10.23. The statutory remedies of the lien and the right of stoppage in transit are a 
means to an end and not an end in themselves. As Benjamin observes, the unpaid 
seller who avails of these remedies is seeking in the first instance to enforce the 
contract by obtaining a form of security for the buyer’s performance of his duty to pay 
the price.833  The unpaid seller who does not expect the price to be paid, however, ‘is 
preparing the ground for the more radical remedies of termination of contract and 
resale.’ In practice, the right of lien is often exercised as a preliminary to resale.834  
The circumstances in which the seller can resell the goods and the effect of resale on 
both the passing of title to a second buyer and the contract of sale with the first buyer 
are the subject of section 48 of the Act. As the section’s provisions are complex, and 
in parts confusing, we will look separately at subsections (1) and (2) before 
considering subsections (3) and (4) in tandem.  The first two subsections relate to the 
exercise of the right of lien or stoppage in transit, while the final two subsections have 
no necessary connection with these rights.    
 
Section 48(1)  
10.24. Section 48 (1) deals with the effect of the exercise of the rights of lien and 
stoppage on the contract of sale and provides that it is not rescinded by the mere 
exercise of these rights. This reflects the fact that these remedies are exercisable 
where the property in the goods, though not the possession, has passed to the buyer. 
Where the property has passed to the buyer, the effect of section 48(1) is that the 
exercise of either the lien or the right of stoppage is not sufficient of itself to revest 
                                                 
833 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 15-101.   
834 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 451.   
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the property in the seller.835 As stated by  Diplock J. in RV Ward Ltd v Bignall836, the 
purpose of the sub-section is to ensure that, where the contract stipulates a fixed date 
for delivery, the seller’s failure to deliver by reason of his exercise of the rights of lien 
or stoppage does not relieve him of his obligation to deliver upon payment or tender 
of the price, or discharge the seller of his obligation to accept the goods and pay the 
price.   
 
Section 48(2)  
10.25. In circumstances where an unpaid seller resells goods the property in which 
remains with the first buyer, there is a need to afford protection to the second buyer.  
Section 48(2) provides accordingly that such a buyer acquires a good title as against 
the original buyer where the resale occurs after the seller exercises his right of lien or 
stoppage in transit.837 Resale by the seller in such circumstances is one of a number of 
situations in which the seller has the power to transfer a good title to a second buyer 
without thereby implying that he has the right as against the first buyer to resell the 
goods.  It is necessary to distinguish in this context between the seller’s power to sell 
and right to sell.838 Unless the seller has a right to resell at common law or, as 
discussed below, under sections 48(3) or (4) of the Act, resale involves a breach of his 
obligation to deliver the contract goods by reason of the fact that the exercise of the 
lien or the right of stoppage does not rescind the original contract. The seller may be 
liable to the original buyer accordingly for damages for breach of contract or the tort 
of conversion.   
 
10.26. Section 48(2) constitutes a further exception to the nemo dat rule discussed in 
Chapter 5 of this Report.  It can be compared in particular with section 25(1) of the 
1893 Act which provides that a seller who has transferred the property in the goods, 
but who remains in possession of them or the documents of title to them, can pass a 
good title to a third party.  The seller’s ability to pass a good title under section 25(1) 
                                                 
835 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 15-101. 
836 [1967] 1 Q.B. 534 at 549.   
837 As Benjamin notes, the subsection assumes that the seller who has exercised either right remains in 
possession of the goods up to the time of resale. He adds that, if between the valid exercise of the right 
of lien or stoppage, an event occurs which divests the seller of his right to retain possession (such as 
payment or tender of the price), it could not have been intended by the draftsman that section 48(2) 
should apply.  Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 15.102. 
838 Goode on Commercial Law, op. cit., p.446.  Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., pp. 447-48.  
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is subject to the following conditions, none of which are expressly required for the 
application of section 48(2):  
 The seller must continue or be in possession of the goods or the documents of 
title to the goods; 
 The transaction must involve the delivery or transfer of the goods or title 
documents to the second buyer; 
 The second buyer must receive the goods or title documents in good faith and 
without notice of the previous sale. 
 
Under section 48(2), by contrast, a seller who has exercised the right of stoppage may 
be able to pass a good title where he is not in actual possession of the goods but is 
entitled to immediate possession of them by virtue of the exercise of this right.839  The 
sub-section similarly does not make delivery or transfer to the buyer of the goods or 
title documents a pre-condition of a valid sale. Most importantly perhaps, the seller’s 
power to confer good title on a second buyer under section 48(2) is not dependent on 
the second buyer’s receipt of the goods or title documents in good faith and without 
notice of the original sale.  In Goode’s opinion, the freedom of the second buyer 
under section 48(2) from the good faith and notice requirements is questionable.840  
While the conditions that govern the passing of title under section 25(1) are absent 
from section 48(2), the latter provision, but not the former, is of course subject to the 
requirement that the seller be unpaid. Despite the differences between the two sets of 
provisions in respect of the conditions governing the passing of title, both are likely to 
overlap in many situations.841  
 
Sections 48(3) and 48(4)  
10.27. Section 48(3) confers a statutory right of resale on the unpaid seller in two 
instances.  First, where the goods are of a perishable nature and the buyer does not 
pay or tender the price within a reasonable time.  Secondly, where the unpaid seller 
gives notice of his intention to resell and the buyer does not pay or tender the price 
within a reasonable time. In both these cases, the seller may also recover damages 
from the buyer for any loss occasioned by his breach of contract. Section 48(4) 
provides that the seller has a right of resale if he has expressly reserved this right in 
the original contract in the event of default by the buyer. Where he resells the goods, 
                                                 
839 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 15-103 & 15-124.    
840 Goode on Commercial Law, op. cit., p.447. 
841 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 15-103.  
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the contract is rescinded without prejudice to any claim the seller may have for 
damages. These statutory provisions aside, the buyer will also have a right of resale if 
the buyer repudiates the contract or if the goods in question have not been 
appropriated to the contract.842 
 
Issues Arising 
10.28. Section 48, especially subsections (3) and (4), has been the subject of 
considerable critical comment. Goode has called the section ‘confusing and badly 
drafted’ because of its indiscriminate mixing of powers and rights of resale and its 
unsatisfactory treatment of the impact of resale upon the original contract.843  For 
Bridge, the section represents ‘the clearest example of a provision in the Act that does 
not correspond to modern legal understanding’844, and one that is a ‘mystery’ to 
‘anyone approaching it with the values and principles of contract law in the late 
twentieth century’.845  
 
10.29. There is no doubt that the provisions on the right of resale in particular give 
rise to a number of issues. While section 48(4) states that, where the seller resells in 
accordance with an express term of the contract, the original contract of sale is 
rescinded, section 48(3) makes no reference to rescission in the cases of the resale of 
perishable goods or resale after notice. In Gallagher v Shilcock,846 it was held that the 
absence of such a reference in section 48(3) meant that a resale under the subsection 
did not rescind the original contract. As the property in the goods had already passed 
to the buyer, the seller was therefore reselling the buyer’s goods in the capacity of 
pledgee rather than that of owner. The buyer remained liable for the price as a 
consequence, subject to a credit for the resale price, and would also be entitled to any 
profit accruing if the seller resold the goods for a price higher than that in the original 
contract.  The decision in Gallagher was overturned by the Court of Appeal in RV 
Ward Ltd v Bignall.847 This case concerned the sale by the plaintiffs of two used cars 
which the defendant refused to take delivery of, or pay for. The sellers informed the 
buyer that, as the property in the cars had passed to him, he was liable for the price, 
                                                 
842 Ibid., para. 15.105.  Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., pp. 463-64.   
843 Goode on Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 445.   
844 Bridge.  ‘Do We Need a New Sale of Goods Act?’, op. cit., para. 2.7. 
845 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 11.44.  
846 [1949] 2 KB 765.   
847 [1967] 1 QB 534.   
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and further served notice that, if payment was not made within five days, they would 
resell the vehicles. The defendant declined to pay and the buyers managed to sell only 
one of the cars, whereupon they sued for the price of the unsold car and for the loss 
incurred on the resale of the other vehicle. The Court of Appeal held that the sellers 
were not entitled to the price of the unsold car as the resale of the first car had 
rescinded the original contract. The buyer accordingly was liable only for damages for 
non-acceptance, assessed in accordance with the normal rule as the difference 
between the contract price and the market value of the unsold car. The Court reached 
this verdict despite the absence of any reference to rescission in section 48(3) which 
governs resale after notice. It held that, while the buyer’s failure to pay the price was 
not in itself a breach that justified repudiation of the contract, the seller’s subsequent 
notice for payment within five days made time of the essence of the contact.  Failure 
to pay within the stipulated time amounted consequently to repudiation which the 
seller accepted by reselling the goods. The resale thus constituted a rescission of the 
contract following which the property revested in the seller and the buyer was no 
longer liable for the price.848  
 
10.30. Bridge has observed that the decision in RV Ward Ltd V Bignall imposes the 
modern view of contractual termination upon statutory provisions that were actuated 
by a different philosophy.849  That modern view, as approved by the House of Lords 
in Johnson v Agnew850, draws a clear distinction between termination of the contract 
for breach and rescission of the contract ab initio. Lord Wilberforce stated that, 
although it was sometimes said, that breach of contract entitled the innocent party to 
rescind:  
    … this so-called rescission is quite different from rescission ab initio, such as may  
    arise, for example, in cases of mistake, fraud or lack of consent.  In those cases, the  
    contract is treated in law as never having come into existence.  In the case of an  
    accepted repudiatory breach the contract has come into existence but has been put  
                                                 
848 The Court of Appeal explained the inclusion of a reference to rescission of the contract in section 
48(4) and its absence in section 48(3) on what Atiyah has termed ‘somewhat ingenious grounds’ 
(Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 465.)  An express provision in section 48(4) was necessary as, 
where the contract contains an express provision for resale, any such resale would not necessarily 
amount to rescission were it not for the subsection.  Resale in such a case would be an exercise of a 
contractual right rather than an acceptance of repudiation.  It was necessary consequently to make 
express provision for a right of rescission in section 48(4). In the case of section 48(3), by contrast, the 
giving of notice made time of the essence and failure to pay on time a repudiation of the contact, thus 
obviating the need for any express provision regarding rescission.  Ibid. at 550-51.  
849 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 11.53.   
850 [1980] AC 367.  
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    to an end or discharged. 851   
 
Rescission is a remedy for breaches of obligations that fall outside the contract, 
generally matters to do with the circumstances surrounding its formation, and its 
effect is to restore the parties to their pre-contract position. Termination for breach, in 
contrast, applies prospectively.852 The parties are released from obligations that have 
yet to be performed, but remain liable for obligations that have already accrued. On 
this view, a failure to pay the price and a subsequent resale by the seller under section 
48(3) or (4) involves termination and not rescission.853 
 
10.31. We agree with the view expressed by Bridge and others that section 48 needs 
to be redrawn in order to make it reflect modern contract theory, particularly in 
respect of termination for breach.            
 
10.32  Recommendations  
Sections 48(3) and (4) should be amended in future legislation to clarify that:  
(1) The seller’s right of resale applies where: 
a) the goods have not been delivered to the buyer; 
b) the buyer’s breach of contract is a terminating breach; and  
c) the contract has been terminated. 
(2) Where the seller lawfully exercises a right of resale, any property in the goods 








                                                 
851 Ibid. at 393.  
852 Atiyah points out, however, that termination must have some retrospective effect in a contract of 
sale in that it normally involves the restoration of the property in the goods from buyer to seller where 
the property had already passed. Where the property has not yet passed when the contract is terminated, 
the seller’s duty to pass the property no longer applies despite having existed prior to the termination.  
Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p.466.   
853 Ibid., p.466.  
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CHAPTER ELEVEN SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893: ACTIONS 
FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT, SECTIONS 49-54  
 
11.1. Part VI of the 1893 Act which deals with actions for breach of contract contains 
provisions on sellers’ remedies at sections 49-50 and on buyer’s remedies at sections 
51-53. Section 54 deals with the right of buyers or sellers to recover interest or special 
damages. With the exception of a provision inserted by the 1980 Act in section 53 
which gives consumers a right to request cure of faulty goods, these sections of the 
Act have remained unchanged since its enactment.  The equivalent provisions in UK 
legislation have also gone untouched, as have those in other jurisdictions.854 While 
these sections of the Act have avoided amendment, they have not have escaped 
criticism. Bridge, for example, has commented that the provisions of sections 50 and 
51 on damages for non-acceptance and non-delivery respectively are ‘ill-suited to 
most sale of goods transactions and, as a whole, lack a coherent philosophy of 
purpose as the courts try to bend them towards principles of damages in the general 
law of contract’.855 
 
SECTION 49 ACTION FOR PRICE   
1) Where, under a contract of sale, the property in the goods has passed to the buyer, and 
the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay for the goods according to the terms of 
the contract, the seller may maintain an action against him for the price of the goods. 
2) Where, under a contract of sale, the price is payable on a day certain irrespective of 
delivery, and the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay such price, the seller may 
maintain an action for the price, although the property in the goods has not passed, and 
the goods have not been appropriated to the contract. 
 
11.2. The section provides the seller with an action for the price of the goods in two 
instances where the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay for the goods.  These 
are: 
 where the property in the goods has passed to the buyer and payment is 
not made in accordance with the contract (s. 49(1)); 
 
 where the price is payable ‘on a day certain’ irrespective of delivery 
although property has not passed and the goods have not been 
appropriated to the contract (s. 49(2)).   
 
                                                 
854 Annex IV, sections 8.2.19-8.2.20.  
855  Bridge, ‘Do We Need A New Sale of Goods Act?’, op. cit., para. 2.18.   
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The seller’s right to the price is based upon the action in debt.  As the buyer’s 
obligation is to pay the price, once property has passed or the time for payment under 
the contract has arrived, the debt falls due and the seller may maintain an action upon 
that debt.  An action in debt has significant advantages for the seller over and above 
an action in damages for non-acceptance.  The seller can recover the price and is not 
bound by any duty to mitigate any loss, nor is the action on the price subject to any 
rules of remoteness of damage.   
 
Issues Arising  
11.3. Notwithstanding the absence of amendments since 1893, there are a number of  
areas of doubt and uncertainty around section 49, some of which show the law to be 
irrational and inconsistent.  The main such areas are as follows:   
 Does section 49 represent two default rules which can be amended by the 
contract? 
 
 Section 49(1) depends upon property in the goods having passed.  It may be 
that the buyer has refused to accept the goods and, even if delivery has taken 
place, the action in debt is not available unless property has passed.  Whether 
property in the goods has passed may be a more difficult issue to determine 
than acceptance or delivery of goods. 
 
 The action for the price is lost if the seller accepts the breach and terminates 
the contract.  It can reasonably be asked if this is a rational position for the 
statute to maintain in the twenty first century. 
 
 Save in respect of section 49(2) cases, section 49(1) must be satisfied vis-à-vis 
the passing of property. If property is to pass on a stated event, the buyer may 
withhold participation in that event and prevent the passing of property from 
occurring.  There is no method by which property may be deemed to have 
passed, although a buyer may be estopped from denying that property has 
passed. 
 
 While section 49(2) allows an action for the price to be maintained 
irrespective of delivery, the price, in order to be recoverable must be due on ‘a 
day certain’.  There are conflicting views on what this term means.  
 
 Section 49(2), according to an analysis of one important English case,856 
seems to envisage the possibility that an action on the price may be maintained 
even if goods are never delivered, the seller exercising a right of cancellation 
for failure by the buyer to pay the price, or an instalment thereof, before the 
date of delivery. 
 
                                                 
856 Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. v. Papadopoulos [1980] 1 WLR 1129. 
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 It is not clear whether the seller or the buyer is under a duty to dispose of 
unwanted goods and whether the law should require the seller to be under that 
duty, being concomitant with the action upon the price, as a matter of policy. 
 
 It is also unclear whether there is judicial discretion to deny the seller a right 
to the price upon equitable grounds (if, for example, the buyer shows that the 
seller has suffered no loss).   
 
11.4. These issues suggest that actions for the price under section 49 do not rest upon 
entirely coherent or consistent grounds.857 From the vantage point of a seller, 
however, the action for the price is a reasonable claim for the seller to be able to 
make. The rationale behind section 49, which requires the buyer to pay the agreed 
price in full, turns upon the fact that the goods are the property of the buyer and the 
onus should be upon the buyer to dispose of the goods.  It would not be appropriate to 
relegate the seller to a claim in damages based upon the difference between the 
contract price and market value at breach, for example. The goods may have 
deteriorated and it would, accordingly, not be fair upon the seller to deny the seller a 
right to the agreed price.  The difficulty with this theory is that the critical event is the 
passing of property rather than, for example, acceptance by the buyer. The Group 
considers that section 49, rooted as it is in the old causes of action, needs to be 
restated in a more contemporary fashion and that reforms should seek to eliminate the 
anachronisms and accretions that disfigure the section 49 action.  There is a strong 
argument to be made for providing a simpler test under which it is to be made clear 
that the duty of disposing of goods will rest upon the shoulders of the buyer.  The 
Uniform Commercial Code opts for acceptance by the buyer rather than the passing of 
property as the most important factor in triggering the seller’s right to an action for 
the price, and the Ontario Law Reform Commission supported such a shift in 
emphasis.  However, the Canadian Uniform Sale of Goods Committee858 criticised the 
acceptance test, preferring delivery instead as the factor that should trigger the seller’s 
right to the price.  While conceding that, in practice, a close examination of the law 
reveals that the transfer of property ‘is generally associated with the transfer of 
possession’, the Canadian Institute of Law Research and Reform opted to provide 
‘functional solutions to particular problems’.  Its Report continues by arguing that 
                                                 
857 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., pp. 479-83. Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., paras. 16-021-
16-027. Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., paras. 11.60-11.70.   
858 Report No. 38, The Uniform Sale of Goods Act (1982). 
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particular difficulties are raised by using the passing of property rules in problems 
raised by bankruptcy:    
    If the existing rules on passing of property were certain and predictable, they would  
    have some practical merit.  But they are not; indeed, the only certain thing about  
    them is that in some cases courts will strive to break out of the statutory strait  
    jacket.  Because the present law provides neither functional relevance nor certainty,  
    the transfer of the invisible abstraction we call property is not a satisfactory test for  
    determining the rights and duties of the parties to a contract of sale…...  We believe  
    that the concept of property is being made to do too much and that, while it can  
    from time to time be bent to suit individual cases, this is not done on a consistent  
    basis.859 
 
11.5. The deliberations of the Group have been strongly influenced by the reviews 
undertaken in the United States and in Canada, especially in relation to section 49 to 
54.  Though there are other possible models such as section III-3: 301 of the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) or Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG), there are clear advantages to reform proposals 
that more accurately reflect the common law origins of section 49.  There have been 
no statutory adjustments to section 49 in the common law world, save for the 
provisions in the US Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Though its provisions were 
never implemented, the Uniform Sale of Goods Act drafted in Canada in 1981 and 
adopted in 1982 is also a source of possible guidance on the desirability or otherwise 
of continuing to measure the right to maintain an action for the price under section 
49(1) by reference to the passing of property.  However, the Group is conscious of the 
fact that, at paragraphs 6.17 and 6.18 above, we concluded that amending the general 
provisions in sections 16-20 of the 1893 Act to reflect the UCC would not be a 
proportionate response to problems caused thereby, nor would it solve all the 
problems that occur in this complex area of law.  In the context of reform of section 
49, other knock-on consequences would follow such as a possible adjustment to some 
provisions in Part IV of the 1893 Act.  Though we examine section 49 in the context 
of both the UCC and the Canadian reform proposals at this point in our Report, 
further consideration should be given to, and views sought on, the desirability and 
possible unintended consequences of a stand alone reform of the section.     
 
 
                                                 
859 Ibid p. 89. 
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Reform Option 1: Section 2-709 UCC.     
11.6. The seller’s right to the price under section 49(1) arises where property in the 
goods has passed to the buyer and the buyer wrongfully fails to pay for the goods in 
accordance with the contract. Under section 49(2) the right is similarly available when 
the price is payable on ‘a day certain’, even though the property in the goods has not 
passed and the goods have not been appropriated to the contract.  Both rights to the 
price, as we have seen, are based upon the action in debt at common law.  These 
features have been built upon in the Uniform Commercial Code, section 2-709(1) of 
which provides that: 
    When the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due the seller may recover,  
     together with any incidental damages under the next section the price 
a) of goods accepted or of conforming goods lost or damaged within a commercially 
reasonable time after risk of their loss has passed to the buyer; and 
b) of goods identified to the contract if the seller is unable after reasonable effort to resell 
them at a reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will 
be unavailing.   
 
11.7. It can be seen that the triggering events under subsection (a) do not include the 
passing of property, although risk may in practice coincide with the passing of 
property.  Rather, acceptance, which is normally constituted by delivery to the buyer, 
will determine the seller’s right to the price.860  However, US case law suggests that 
delivery may take place if the buyer fails to reject the goods following delivery or 
tender by the seller.861 Although this conclusion seems out of line with the rationale 
behind the action in debt itself insofar as deemed acceptance is concerned, White and 
Summers argue that it can be defended on pragmatic grounds.862   
 
11.8. The second part of Section 2-709(1)(a), where conforming goods have been lost 
or damaged after risk has passed to the buyer, is explained by White and Summers as 
turning upon the fact that post-sale events have undermined the economic efficiency 
argument, namely that the seller is best able to effect a resale.  In this situation: 
                                                 
860 Section 2-606(1) of the UCC states that acceptance of the goods occurs when the buyer: 
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to the seller that the goods are 
conforming or that the buyer will take or retain them in spite of their nonconformity; 
(b) fails to make an effective rejection under section 2-602(1), but such acceptance does not occur 
until the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect them; or  
(c) except as otherwise provided under section 2-608(4), does any act inconsistent with the 
seller’s ownership if the act is ratified by the seller.  
861 Unlaub Co. v. Sexton 568 F. 2d 72 (1977). Plateq Corp v. Machlett Labs Inc 189 Conn 433 (1983). 
862 White, J.J. & Summers, R.S.  2010.  Uniform Commercial Code (6th ed).  Section 9.2 contains a 
full examination of the acceptance cases.   
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    since the goods are at least damaged, often missing or destroyed, the seller’s  
    presumptively superior resale opportunity is diminished and may be nonexistent.863 
The case-law in the United States on this part of section 2-709(1)(a) tends to arise in 
cases where goods are shipped to a buyer, being then lost or damaged.864 Like section 
49(1) these cases required the US Courts to consider complex rules on the passing of 
property, but unlike section 49(1) the passing of property rules did not provide the 
only route under which a seller is entitled to the price.   
 
11.9. Where goods are not readily re-saleable then an action for the price may be 
available under section 2-709(1)(b) of the UCC. Such actions will typically involve 
specifically ordered goods that are delivered late. The seller will have to show that 
reasonable efforts would not produce a resale or that the case is one of res ipsa 
loquitur – for example, the late delivery of merchandise relating to the 2010 Football 
World Cup might raise issues in respect of products pertinent to Spain, the winners, 
but not so in the case of Italy.865 It is possible to discern why the UCC should give the 
seller the right to claim the price in cases where the goods have been appropriated to 
the contract but the goods have no reasonable commercial value. Section 2-709(1)(b) 
represents, however, the expansion of a right to the price, a right that is somewhat 
anomalous in a number of ways.  For this reason the Group has hesitated in regard to 
section 2-709(1)(b). As the seller retains the goods, we consider that the seller’s 
generally superior sales skills and business acumen (vis-à-vis those of the buyer) 
should come into play. The case for extending the seller’s right to the price, as distinct 
from damages, is by no means clear-cut.  Furthermore, the cases in the United States 
indicate that there are difficulties and inconsistent lines of authority on factors such as 
whether goods have been ‘identified to the contract’ and how unsuitability is to be 
proved.  Even the drafting of Section 2-709(1)(b) has attracted criticism.  White and 
Summers remark: 
    Elsewhere we have despaired of interpreting sentences which contain only one  
    ‘reasonable’.  Who can interpret a sentence with three ‘reasonables’?866   
On balance, the Group does not recommend that Article 2-709(1)(b) be adopted.  An 
action on the price should be maintainable because the goods have been identified to 
                                                 
863 Ibid., p. 344 
864 For example, Ninth Street East Ltd. v. Harrison 259 A. 2d772 (1968); Forest Nursery Co. v. IWS 
Inc. 534 NYS 2d 86 (1988)  
865 The 2006 holders who failed to get out of the Group Stage. 
866 White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, op. cit., p. 351 
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the contract and the seller has been unable to sell them. We note in this context that 
the Uniform Sale of Goods Act in Canada, section 9.11 provides a legislative template 
that better accords with the 1893 Act.   
 
11.10. In conclusion, section 2-709 and the statutory context within which it operates 
–  the complexity of the other parts of the Code that make section 2-709 work could 
not be readily transplanted into Irish law – make it an inappropriate basis for 
recommending an extension to section 49 in its present form. The UCC provision can 
provide a basis, however, for overcoming some of the problems that section 49 
currently creates.  We think this can be best achieved by considering the Canadian 
work on Section 49.     
 
Reform Option 2: The Canadian Draft Uniform of Sale of Goods Act  
11.11. As we have seen, the Sale of Goods Committee which drafted the Canadian 
Uniform Sales of Goods Act suggested that neither the passing of property rules under 
the 1893 Act, nor the acceptance provisions that formed the core of the UCC 
provisions, offered a satisfactory solution to the problem of identifying the key event 
that best crystallises the seller’s action for the price. In their view, ‘delivery’ 
constituted a clearer trigger for the seller’s right to sue for the price, and the Act’s 
provisions on the seller’s action were framed accordingly.867 While the Group 
considers that acceptance will include delivery in virtually every instance, it may be 
the case that the complex process of drafting a stand alone section on this point 
renders section 9.11 of the draft Canadian Act a more practicable proposition. Bridge 
is of the view  that, if the Sale of Goods Act were amended on this basis, the same 
result as to price entitlement would be reached in the majority of cases as under the 
passing of property rules and that ‘the actual legal position would change very 
little’.868  While a change from property to delivery as the controlling factor for the 
seller’s action for the price would offer a more coherent basis for the law, we agree 
that it might well not result in any very significant differences in the outcome of 
                                                 
867 Uniform Law Conference of Canada.  Draft Uniform Sale of Goods Act, section 106.  Whether this 
is the case, in the light of Article 2.606(1), definition of acceptance (see footnote 7 above) is by no 
means clear.  White and Summers, commenting on the action for the price when a seller retains goods 
write ‘[S]ince the seller possesses the goods the principal ground for recovering the price – for goods 
“accepted” – will not apply since a buyer who does not have possession will almost never have 
“accepted’: Uniform Commercial Code, op. cit., p.345 
868 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 11.70 
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commercial litigation. On the related question of responsibility for disposing of 
unwanted goods, the UCC869 takes the position, as did the Ontario Law Reform 
Commission,870 that, in an action for the price, the burden of disposing of goods 
wanted by neither seller or buyer should be placed on the seller on the basis that the 
seller is best placed to market such goods.  Where the goods are unsaleable, the seller 
would be able to recover the price, and, in the case of defective goods, damages 
would be available. This position was rejected, however, on the following grounds in 
the Uniform Sale of Goods Act:871    
    These arguments did not take full account of the real procedural advantages  
    which a debt action gave the seller over an action for unliquidated damages.  The  
    seller, after all, was not to blame for the contractual breakdown and had surely  
    earned his entitlement to the price in many cases before the buyer’s acceptance.   
    It was also felt that the seller should not have the burden of disposing of goods at  
    a distant place and that the tendency of our courts to prolong the right of  
    rejection by adopting a restrictive interpretation of acceptance would make it  
    difficult for a seller to know when he could sue for the price.  
The Group agrees with this analysis and recommends no abridgement of the rights of 
the seller in respect of the disposal of the goods and resale.   
 
11.12.  Recommendation on Section 49 
The Group favours the adoption of a provision linking an action for the price to 
delivery modelled on Section 9.11 of the Canadian Uniform Sale of Goods Act, as 
adopted in 1982.  This should replace Section 49 of the 1893 Act.  The relevant 
parts of Section 9.11 provide: 
    Seller’s Action for the price 
    (1) Where the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due, the seller may  
      recover the price due, 
 
(a) of goods that he has delivered [or buyer has accepted] unless the buyer has 
rightfully rejected the goods; 
 
(b) of conforming goods lost or damages while the risk of their loss is upon the 
buyer; 
 
(c) of goods identified to the contract if the seller, being entitled to do so, is unable 
after reasonable effort to resell them at a reasonable price or the circumstances 
indicate that such effort will be unavailing.   
 
    Seller’s obligation to hold goods 
                                                 
869 Uniform Commercial Code, section 2-709 
870 Ontario Law Reform Commission, op. cit., pp. 416-17.   
871 Uniform Sale of Goods Act Report No. 38 page 108. 
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     (3) Where the seller sues for the price he must hold for the buyer any goods  
     which have been identified to the contract and are still in his control, except  
     that if resale becomes possible he may resell them at any time prior to the  
     collection of the judgment, in which case the net proceeds of any such resale  
     must be credited to the buyer and payment of the judgment entitles him to  
     any goods not resold.   
 
 
SECTION 50: DAMAGES FOR NON-ACCEPTANCE 
1) Where the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to accept and pay for the goods, the 
seller may maintain an action against him for damages for non-acceptance. 
2) The measure of damages is the estimated loss directly and naturally resulting, in the 
ordinary course of events, from the buyer’s breach of contract. 
3) Where there is an available market for the goods in question the measure of damages is 
prima facie to be ascertained by the difference between the contract price and the market 
or current price at the time or times when the goods ought to have been accepted, or, if 
no time was fixed for acceptance, then at the time of the refusal to accept. 
 
11.13. Section 50 of the 1893 Act provides the seller with a right to damages in cases 
where the buyer wrongfully refuses to accept and pay for the goods.  Subsection (1) 
provides for an action for non-acceptance as distinct from an action for non-
conformity which is dealt with elsewhere in the statute. If property in the goods has 
passed, or the date for payment of the price or an instalment of the price has been 
fixed for ‘a day certain’ that has arrived, an action on the price is an alternative.  But 
in most cases of non-acceptance the sole remedy in damages is under section 50.  
Subsection (2) restates what is regarded as the ‘first limb’ in Hadley v. Baxendale872, 
namely that the measure of damages is the loss that directly and naturally results in 
the ordinary course of events from the buyer’s breach of contract. ‘Second limb’ 
damages are recoverable under section 54.  Subsection (3) sets out what the measure 
of damages is to be in cases where there is an available market.  This is a prima facie 
rule and can be displaced in certain instances by the courts, even where there is an 
available market.  Where there is no available market, the court must select some 
other measure of loss. In some circumstances the court may conclude that the seller 
has failed to show that non-acceptance resulted in any loss, in which case nominal 
damages are awarded.  This will most typically occur where the buyer fails to take 
delivery of goods on a rising market.   
 
 
                                                 
872 (1854) 9 Ex. 341.   
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Issues Arising  
11.14. English and Irish case law reveal a number of difficulties in relation to section 
50 (and, relatedly, section 51).  These include873: 
 Uncertainty regarding what is meant by an ‘available market’. 
 
 Difficulties in applying section 50(3) to lost volume sales.  While section 
50(3) has been side-stepped as being only a prima facie rule, the 
circumstances in which a seller may recover for lost volume sales require 
clarification. 
 
 There is no provision in section 50 that addresses late acceptance as distinct 
from non-acceptance. 
 
 The possibility that damages may be awarded by reference to the resale price 
actually effected by the seller. 
 
 The possibility that the value of the goods at the date of breach may not be 
used in favour of some other date such as the date of issuing proceedings or of 
the court judgment.   
 
11.15. The market value measure has much to commend it.  As the common law rule, 
it was relatively easy to estimate, especially in a localised environment where the 
seller, left with goods on his hands, would be expected to effect a prompt resale.  In 
most such cases, consequently, the resale price and the market value would be one 
and the same.  Sellers might have good reason, however, not to go into the market 
immediately in order to effect a prompt resale – for example, where they had a stock 
of identical goods and putting the unwanted consignment onto the market could have 
an adverse effect on the value of the entire stock. As an alternative to the market value 
measure, some jurisdictions favour the resale price test as the first measure of loss that 
a court should apply.   
 
Reform Options  
11.16. While general provisions relating to the award and assessment of damages can 
be found in the Draft Common Frame of Reference and the Principles of European 
Contract Law, they are framed at a level of generality that makes it difficult to tailor 
them to the specific circumstances addressed by section 50. The same is true of the 
CISG provisions. In view of the absence of compelling arguments for reform of 
                                                 
873  Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., pp. 484-94. Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., paras. 16-060-
16-079. Bridge,  M.  The Sale of Goods, op. cit., paras. 12.55-12.74. 
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section 50 from any of the common law jurisdictions in which it remains in force,874 it 
can be argued that the case for change is weak.  The Group is of the opinion, however, 
that a number of adjustments should be made to the existing rules.   
 
11.17. A first such change relates to the Act’s failure to define an ‘available market’. 
We  favour the adoption of a definition based upon Upjohn J’s obiter dicta in WL 
Thompson Ltd. v. Robinson Gunmakers Ltd.875 The case concerned the non-
acceptance of a new car, an item that did not readily fit within the established notion 
of an available market as a specific setting along the lines of a corn or cotton 
exchange where buyers and sellers meet on a regular basis.876 Upjohn J. suggested 
instead that:877  
    an available market merely means that the situation in the particular trade in the  
    particular area was such that the particular goods could be freely sold.   
 
11.18. The common law measure of damages, as reflected in section 50(3), has been 
criticised, secondly, for being inaccurate as a means of calculating the loss incurred 
by the seller. This formula has a tendency to lead to damages that over-or-under-
compensate the seller, depending on how the market price shifts, upward or 
downwards, in relation to any resale price that the seller may in fact achieve. Because 
of the difficulties experienced in estimating the market price in specific situations, 
other mechanisms for assessing damages have been explored in the United States. 
While section 60(1) of the Uniform Sales Act had given sellers limited rights of resale 
(for example, where goods were perishable or the right was expressly reserved), 
section 2-706 of the UCC which replaced it went further in providing that, as a 
general rule, the measure of damages is to be assessed by reference to the difference 
between the contract price and the resale price of the goods. This is an appropriate test 
in relation to manufactured goods where there is a ready market for those goods.  
Under section 2-706(1) of the Code, the seller is given the right to resell goods 
ordered by a defaulting buyer. Where the resale is effected in good faith and in a 
commercially reasonable manner, the seller may recoup any difference between the 
                                                 
874 White and Summers describe the UCC counterpart, section 2-708(1) as ‘among the least novel and 
least remarkable of the Code’s damages sections’: Uniform Commercial Code, op. cit., p. 359.   
875[1955] Ch 177. See also Charter v. Sullivan [1957] 2 QBI17 at 128, and Griffith C.J. in Francis v. 
Lyon [1907] 4 CLR 1023 (defaulting seller) 
876 Dunkirk Colliery Co. Ltd v Lever (1878) 9 Ch. D 20 at 25.   
877 WL Thompson Ltd. v. Robinson Gunmakers Ltd [1955] Ch 177 at 187.  
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contract price and the realised resale price, plus incidental expenses. Resales can be 
public, for example an auction, or private.  In the case of a private sale, section 2-
706(3) requires the seller to give the buyer reasonable notice of his intention to sell. 
Any failure to give the requisite notice (in the absence of other relevant factors such 
as a discussion between the parties intimating that a resale was agreed and involving a 
consideration of methods of effecting the resale878) will result in this method of 
assessment being unavailable to the seller.  The resale must take place promptly; this 
requirement has the advantage of allowing the court to presume that the resale has 
taken place at the market price, an important probative factor if difficulties arise.  
Promptness of a resale may depend upon the fungibility or otherwise of the goods and 
the volatility of the market.879 When used correctly by a seller, section 2-706 of the 
Code provides a very direct means of recovering the seller’s actual loss, avoiding in 
the process the difficulties raised by the common law formula enshrined in section 
50(3) of the 1893 Act.  Where the seller does not satisfy the requirements of article 2-
706, however, he must be prepared to satisfy the courts as to market value by 
reference to the common law test as set out at section 2-708(1) of the UCC.  
Similarly, Section 9.10 of the 1982 Canadian Uniform Sale of Goods Act could be 
called into play as a legislative template on the seller’s right to resell.   
 
11.19. It should be possible in our view to produce a version of section 2-706 that 
could be inserted into section 50 and which would allow the seller to select the resale 
measure of recovery as an alternative to the measure found in section 50(3).  
Alternatively, the court could be given discretion to consider whether it is appropriate 
to award damages under either head, depending upon the facts of the individual case. 
We favour giving the seller the right to select the appropriate method of calculating 
the seller’s loss. If the seller selects the resale measure, however, but fails to satisfy 
the requirements as to notice,880 the timeliness of the resale, or other qualifying 
factors, the court may utilise the market formula in s. 50(3).  Any award made under 
the latter measure should not exceed that initially sought by the seller under the resale 
measure.  Section 2-706(1) of the UCC may also prevent the seller from being able to 
                                                 
878 Gray v. West 608 SW2d 711 (1980).   
879 For example, oil.  See Apex Oil v. Belcher Co. 855 F 2d 977 (1988) 
880 Notice requirements in the UCC are imposed in order to give the party in breach the possibility to 
minimise damages and protect against Stale Claims.  See, for example, Adams v. Munster Oil Co. 98 
SW 3d 832 (2003) (a section 2-607 case). 
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select the market formula in section 50(3) in cases where the seller has effected a 
favourable resale.  This deals with cases where the actual resale price is ignored on 
the general principle that re-sales and sub-sales are not relevant under the market 
value formula. In Tesoro Petroleum Corp v. Holborn Oil Co.,881 the buyer repudiated 
a contract to buy oil for which the contract price had been set at $1.30 per gallon.  At 
the time of breach the market price had fallen to $0.80 per gallon. The seller 
nevertheless managed to effect a resale at $1.20 per gallon.  Faced with a seller who 
claimed that he had a right to chose between a remedy under section 2-706 (resale) 
and section 2-708 (market value at breach), it was held that no such choice exists 
where the result would be to overcompensate the plaintiff (in this case to the tune of 
$3 million).  It has been commented that this case decides that ‘a seller who has resold 
prior to trial must use section 2-706 since the contract/resale measure will most 
closely approximate to its actual loss.’882   
 
11.20. Thirdly, ‘lost volume’ sellers under the UCC also find that their claims are 
somewhat artificially regarded as being market value claims, even in cases where it is 
clear that non-acceptance has occurred and the seller has passed on the goods to a 
willing buyer at the same price as that agreed with the defendant buyer.  The problem 
here is that the seller has more buyers than the seller can satisfy, whether the seller 
has a supply of goods already in stock, or goods can be ordered and orders filled as 
stock comes in. Section 2-708(1) is qualified by section 2-708(2) which roughly 
paraphrased allows the court, in cases of under-compensation under section 2-708(1), 
to award lost volume sellers inter alia:883 
    The profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller would have made from  
    full performance by the buyer together with incidental damages making allowance  
    for costs incurred and resale proceeds.   
 
    It is accepted that this provision will be satisfied if the seller can show that: 
 
(a) the buyer at the resale would have been solicited for (an additional) sales 
contract if there had been no breach; 
(b) the solicitation would have been successful; and  
(c) the seller could have performed the (additional) sale.884 
                                                 
881 547 NYS 2d 1012 (1989).  See Henning, etc.   
882 Law of Sales under UCC, para 8.8   
883 Section 2-708(2) is also directed at manufacturers producing finished goods from component parts 
and manufactures from raw materials who discontinue production after breach. 
884 USX Corp. v. Union Pacific Resources Co. 753 SW 2d 845 (1988). Ragen v. Kearney & Trecker 
Corp 912 F 2d 619 (1990). 
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A statutory provision codifying these factors might be worthwhile.  However, Article 
2–708(2) in particular has been heavily criticised885 and, on balance, the Group does 
not want to import what is seen as a deeply flawed text into Irish law.   
 
11.21 Recommendations  
We recommend the retention of Section 50 in slightly amended form.   
1) ‘Available market’ should be defined in line with case law dicta as 
meaning that the situation in the particular trade in the particular area is 
such that the goods in question can be freely sold. 
2) Section 50 should incorporate provisions on the lines of those at section 
9.10 of the 1982 Canadian Uniform Sales law or section 2-706 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code on sellers’ right of resale. 
3) We do not recommend specific legislative provisions to deal with the 
problem of lost volume sellers.   
 
SECTION 51 DAMAGES FOR NON-DELIVERY 
1) Where the seller wrongfully neglects or refuses to deliver the goods to the buyer, 
the buyer may maintain an action against the seller for damages for non-delivery. 
2) The measure of damages is the estimated loss directly and naturally resulting, in 
the ordinary course of events, from the seller’s breach of contract. 
3) Where there is an available market for the goods in question the measure of 
damages is prima facie to be ascertained by the difference between the contract 
price and the market or current price of the goods at the time or times when 
they ought to have been delivered, or, if no time was fixed, then at the time of 
the refusal to deliver. 
 
11.22. Where the seller is in breach by wrongfully negotiating or by refusing to 
deliver the goods to the buyer, section 51(1) gives the buyer an action in damages for 
non-delivery.  Section 51(2) measures damages by reference to the ‘first limb’ in 
Hadley v. Baxendale.  ‘Second limb’ damages are available under section 54.  The 
‘available market’ value at the date of breach or refusal to deliver is selected as the 
prima facie measure of damages in section 51(3).  The buyer who finds that, in breach 
of contract, the seller has not delivered the goods, is under no obligation to enter the 
market and purchase replacement goods. In the case of a buyer who actually enters 
the market to buy goods at a higher or lower price than the market price at the 
relevant time, the rule requiring the disregard of sales that have been concluded, or are 
in contemplation, is applied very strictly.886 Other difficult decisions on section 51(3) 
                                                 
885 White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, op. cit., fn. at section 8.8 (pp. 366-67).   
886 Williams v. Agius [1914] AC 510. 
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often turn upon the specific nature of commercial transactions,887 and it is not entirely 
clear that the market value rule will prevail in cases where principles of remoteness of 
damage, or the special loss provisions in section 54, persuade a court that a beneficial 
sub-sale was in contemplation.   
 
Issues Arising 
11.23. English case-law on Section 51(3) is notoriously opaque, and general 
principles suggest that the subsection creates less of a difficulty in non-delivery cases 
than does the corresponding provision at section 50(3) in non-acceptance. The Group 
sees no compelling case for the adoption of either the CISG or DCFR provisions on 
buyer’s remedies.  While the Group proposes that the resale measure of damages in 
respect of a seller’s remedies in the UCC should be specifically added to section 50, a 
similar provision is not necessary in the case of section 51, nor indeed does the UCC 
contain such a provision.  Article 2-713 of the UCC selects a different measure of 
damages for non-delivery, namely the difference between the market price at the time 
when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price, plus incidental and 
consequential damages.   
 
11.24. Recommendation  
As section 51(3) comprises a prima facie rule, we recommend that no change be 
made to the sub-section, or indeed to the remainder of section 51.   
 
 
SECTION 52  SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
    In any action for breach of contract to deliver specific or ascertained goods the court may, if it  
    thinks fit, on the application of the plaintiff, by its judgment or decree direct that the contract  
    shall be performed specifically, without giving the defendant the option of retaining the goods  
    on payment of damages. The judgment or decree may be unconditional, or upon such terms  
    and conditions as to damages, payment of the price, and otherwise, as to the court may seem  
    just, and the application by the plaintiff may be made at any time before judgment or decree.  
 
Issues Arising  
11.25. While section 52 affords a court the discretion to award specific performance 
following upon breach of a contract for specific or ascertained goods, it is extremely 
                                                 
887 See, for example, R and H Hall Ltd and WH Pim (Jnr.) and Co’s Arbitration, (1928) 139 LT 50. 
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difficult to persuade a court that the discretion ought to be exercised in favour of a 
disappointed buyer. White suggests that there is only one Irish reported case in which 
such an order has been made.888 Only in the most compelling circumstances will a 
court hold that manufactured goods or raw materials are unique or incapable of being 
replaced by a buyer who, it is assumed, will be able to enter the market to purchase a 
substitute.  The increasing awareness by courts of the need to recognise and vindicate 
the buyer’s ‘performance interest’ should, if anything, lead the judiciary to recognise 
that specific performance of a contract affords an alternative to engaging in a difficult 
or arbitrary process of assessing damages. US law has tended towards a more liberal 
view of uniqueness, the leading case of Heidner v. Hewitt Chevrolet Co.889 holding 
that, in the light of shortages of motor vehicles after World War II, a motor dealer 
who defaulted on the delivery of a new car could be required to deliver a vehicle to 
the buyer.  Section 2-716 of the UCC enjoins courts to award specific performance, 
not only where goods are unique, but also in ‘other proper circumstances’.  Such 
‘other circumstances’ arise where the goods have tended to be commercially unique 
and the buyer has no realistic alternative remedy.  A ‘requirements’ contract for the 
supply of propane over a long period of time where the buyer had no realistic prospect 
of finding another supplier, has been held to justify a decree of specific 
performance.890 A buyer who has ordered goods that he has already sold on has also 
been held to be entitled to specific performance because of the poor prospect of 
obtaining substitute goods elsewhere, and the uncertain nature of the buyer’s exposure 
to his own sub-buyer.891   
 
Reform Options  
11.26. We consider that a number of adjustments should be made section 52 in order 
to ‘liberalise’ the provisions on specific performance.  The template in section 2-716 
of the UCC could be adapted for this purpose, specifically by the addition of a new 
second sentence as follows based on the UCC provision:     
    In particular, the court shall consider, in the case of goods that are physically or  
    commercially unique for that buyer, whether the circumstances make specific  
    performance an appropriate judgment or decree for the court.   
                                                 
888 Clark v. Reilly (1962) 96 ILTR 96.  White, Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 317, fn. 133.  See also 
Farrell, J.  1995. Irish Law of Specific Performance (Dublin: Butterworths), para. 1.25. 
889 116 Kan 11 (1948). 
890 Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co 522 F 2d 33 (1975) 
891 Ace Equipment Co. v. Agna Chem Inc. 73 Pa. D&C 2d 300 (1975) 
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We also favour the deletion of the words ‘specific or ascertained goods’ from the first 
sentence of section 52.   
 
11.27. Other more far-reaching reform options can be identified in respect of specific 
performance. The Draft Common Frame of Reference includes a right to specific 
performance at Book III, Article 3:302, though its formulation is rather terse in 
providing that a creator ‘is entitled to enforce specific performance of an obligation 
other than one to pay money’ and that specific performance includes remedying free 
of charge a contractual performance which is not in conformity with the contract 
terms regulating the obligation. Exceptions along the lines of the factors that generally 
persuade a common law court not to exercise the discretion are also set out.892 On 
balance, the Group favours the retention of specific performance as a discretionary 
remedy rather than converting it into a remedy of first resort, or one based on 
entitlement.  We return to this issue in relation to section 53.   
 
11.28. Recommendations  
The reference to ‘specific or ascertained goods’ should be deleted from the first 
sentence of section 52.   
 
A new second sentence as follows should be added to the section:  
    In particular, the court shall consider, in the case of goods that are physically  
    or commercially unique for that buyer, whether the circumstances make  
    specific performance an appropriate judgment or decree for the court.   
 
SECTION 53 REMEDY FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY 
    (1) Subject to subsection (2), where there is a breach of warranty by the seller, or  
    where the buyer elects, or is compelled, to treat any breach of a condition on the  
    part of the seller as a breach of warranty, the buyer is not by reason only of such  
    breach of warranty entitled to reject the goods, but he may— 
(a) set up against the seller the breach of warranty in diminution or extinction of the price, 
or 
(b) maintain an action against the seller for damages for the breach of warranty. 
    (2) Where— 
(a) the buyer deals as consumer and there is a breach of a condition by the seller  
      which, but for this subsection, the buyer would be compelled to treat as a    
      breach of warranty, and 
(b) the buyer, promptly upon discovering the breach, makes a request to the seller that he 
either remedy the breach or replace any goods which are not in conformity with the 
condition,  
                                                 
892 Where, for example, performance is burdensome, expensive or is of a personal character.   
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     then, if the seller refuses to comply with the request or fails to do so within a  
     reasonable time, the buyer is entitled: 
(i) to reject the goods and repudiate the contract, or 
(ii) to have the defect constituting the breach remedied elsewhere and to 
maintain an action against the seller for the cost thereby incurred by him. 
(3) The onus of proving that the buyer acted with promptness under subsection (2)  
shall lie on him.   
    (4) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the estimated loss directly  
    and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from the breach of  
    warranty.   
    (5) In the case of breach of warranty of quality such loss is prima facie the  
    difference between the value of the goods at the time of delivery to the buyer and  
    the value they would have had if they had answered to the warranty.   
    (6) The fact that the buyer has set up the breach of warranty in diminution or  
    extinction of the price or that the seller has replaced goods or remedied a breach  
    does not of itself prevent the buyer from maintaining an action for the same breach  
    of warranty if he has suffered further damage. 
 
11.29. Section 53 sets out the measure of damages available in respect of a breach of 
warranty, or of a breach of condition which the buyer has elected, or is obliged, to 
treat as a breach of warranty. Section 53(1)(a) provides that the buyer may set up the 
breach of warranty against the seller in diminution or extinction of the seller’s action 
on the price, while section 53(1)(b) gives the buyer a right of action in damages 
against the seller for breach of warranty. Section 53(2), as introduced by the 1980 
Act, gives a consumer buyer the right to request the seller either to remedy a breach or 
to replace goods not in conformity with the contract.  Section 53(3) is an ancillary 
provision which places the onus of proving promptness vis-à-vis a compliance request 
under section 53(2) upon the buyer. Section 53(4) provides that the measure of 
damages in respect of a breach of warranty are Hadley v. Baxendale ‘first limb’ 
damages. In relation to claims in respect of breach of warranty of quality, section 
53(5) provides that the prima facie measure of damages is the difference between 
their value at the time of delivery and the value of the goods had they answered to the 
warranty. Section 53(6) provides that, in relation to the ‘set off’ remedy in section 
53(1)(a), any additional losses may be recovered in damages.   
 
Issues Arising  
11.30. Neither the DCFR nor the CISG use the language of ‘condition’ and 
‘warranty’.  Most of the provisions relating to damages in both texts are concerned 
with general principles which have not been codified in Ireland or the United 
Kingdom. Article III –3:702 of the DCFR contains a statement of the general measure 
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of damages which  appears to be based on Robinson v. Harmon893.  There are two 
specific aspects of section 53 that the Group considers appropriate for adjustment: 
(1) the introduction of a cure remedy for commercial contracts; 
 
(2) an amendment to section 53(5) regarding the estimation of loss in the case of 
breach of warranty.     
 
A Broader Cure Remedy 
11.31. Section 53, as amended by section 21 of the 1980 Act, introduced a right to 
request cure for consumer buyers. This entitles the buyer, promptly on discovering a 
breach, to request the seller either to remedy it or to replace the goods.  If the buyer 
fails to do either within a reasonable time, the buyer can then either reject the goods 
or have them repaired elsewhere and claim the cost of the repair from the seller.  The 
application of this remedy in consumer cases in the context of the remedial scheme 
under Directive 1999/44/EEC has been considered in Chapter 9.  The issue to be 
considered here, therefore, is whether a right of cure should be extended in 
appropriate circumstances to commercial contracts. It is our view that that there 
should be afforded to buyers a general statutory right to repair or replacement and not 
one that applies only to consumer transactions. This right should sit alongside the 
specific performance provisions in section 52. The courts would thus retain the 
discretion to award specific performance, while a buyer could seek repair or 
replacement as a right where the conditions stipulated in the statutory provision were 
met.   
 
11.32. Article 46 of the CISG contains an appropriate legislative model for a cure 
regime applicable post-delivery to non-conforming goods in commercial contracts. 
This provides that:  
1) The buyer may require performance by the seller of his obligations unless the buyer has 
resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement.   
 
2) If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may require delivery of 
substitute goods only if the lack of conformity constitutes a fundamental breach of 
contract and a request for substitute goods is made [when notifying the seller that the 
goods are non-conforming] or within a reasonable time thereafter.   
 
3) If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may require the seller to 
remedy the lack of conformity by repair, unless this is unreasonable having regard to the 
circumstances.  A request for repair must be made either in conjunction with notice 
                                                 
893 (1848) 1 Exch. 850. 
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given under Article 39 (i.e. when notifying the seller that the goods are non-conforming) 
or within a reasonable time thereafter.   
 
11.33. Some commentators are sceptical of the value of a cure provision in the 
commercial context.  Bridge, for example, argues that cure ‘is inherently uncertain 
and produces a host of questions that cannot be answered in advance of litigation to 
test the limits of the relevant provisions’.894  This may be so, but the Group considers 
that Article 46 gives the buyer a substantial degree of control over the process. There 
is scope for difficulties under the CISG cure regime, however, in cases where the 
seller seeks to remedy non-conforming goods.  Article 48 gives the seller the 
possibility of remedying any failure to perform his obligations ‘if he can do so 
without unreasonable delay and without causing the buyer unreasonable 
inconvenience or uncertainty of reimbursement by the seller of expenses advanced by 
the buyer’. It sets out a ‘request’ mechanism and stipulates that the remedial option 
for the seller is without prejudice to the buyer’s right to claim damages and the 
buyer’s rights of avoidance under Article 49. We consider that the level of uncertainty 
surrounding Article 48 militates against giving a right to call for goods to be repaired 
or replaced to the seller as well as the buyer.  Article 48 does not deal adequately in 
our opinion with situations where the buyer’s experience with a particular seller is 
such as to leave him with no confidence in the seller. The seller in turn might use or 
abuse an Article 48 type provision vis-à-vis an uncertain or prevaricating buyer. On a 
practical level, Article 48 appears capable of being severed from Article 46.  We note 
that the Law Reform Commission also appear to have had reservations about Article 
48.895 Article 28 of the CISG allows the remedy of specific performance to sit 
alongside the Article 46 provisions. The Law Reform Commission, in its admirable 
summary of Article 46, saw no real objection to its provisions, although it is 
                                                 
894 Bridge,  M.  2007.  The International Sale of Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press), para. 
12.37.  The seller’s right to cure is found in CISG, articles 34, 37 and 48.  Summers and White, in 
discussing Article 2-508 of the UCC appear to support the seller’s right to cure provisions despite the 
fact that it:  
    offers many significant but unanswered questions.  Although it was a novel legal doctrine, it was not  
    new to business practice; it does no more than give legal recognition to a practical right that many  
   sellers have exercised over the years ….. it seems likely that 2-508 simply recognises a general  
   pattern or business behaviour and adds a legal sanction to those economic and non-legal sanctions  
   which the parties had and have.  
 Uniform Commercial Code, op. cit., p. 436.  Buyers have no cure rights under the U.C.C.   
895 Law Reform Commission.  1992.  Report on United Nations (Vienna) Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (LRC 42-1992), p.63. This states, among other things, that 
‘Article 48(1) sets out a fairly broad licence to remedy a failure to perform.  However, the power to 
remedy is subject to some limitations’.   
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unfortunate in our view that the Commission characterised the Article as specific 
performance.896   
 
Amendment of Section 53(5) 
11.34. Section 53(5) has produced one important recent English decision, Bence 
Graphics International Ltd v Fasson UK Ltd,897 in which the majority of the Court of 
Appeal looked to the actual events that followed the breach of warranty of quality.  
The sellers sold the buyers a large quantity of vinyl film for use in the manufacture of 
decals for shipping containers.  The film proved defective and unfit for the purpose 
for which it was to be intended, this purpose being known to the seller.  The poor 
quality of the decals attracted a large number of complaints from shipping companies 
who had attached them to their containers.  Though the buyers were not actually sued 
by any of the sub-buyers, they remained exposed to such claims and were at risk of 
reputational damage. Despite earlier authority that suggested the purchasers were 
entitled to the return of the purchase price,898 the majority of the Court of Appeal 
started from the general position in relation to the award of damages that it is for the 
plaintiff to prove a loss, the benefits of provisions like Section 53 being ignored.  
Section 53 saves the seller the difficulties of proving economic and reputational loss 
and favours shorter and speedy trails via the market value measure of loss and favours 
the performance interest in receiving goods that are, in damages terms, valued by 
reference to the value placed upon them by the parties as conforming goods.  
 
11.35. Bridge has expressed the view that, following the judgement in Bence 
Graphics, ‘the law of damages in the sale of Goods Act as a whole is now in an 
incoherent and unpredictable state’.899  We agree with this assessment.  Clearly Bence 
Graphics does not represent Irish law, but rather than leave this important point for a 
judicial decision one way or another, we would prefer to provide greater clarity in the 
way in which Irish statute law estimates damages in respect of non-conforming goods.  
Bence Graphics is not a case in which the majority of the Court of Appeal looked at 
resale measure; the sellers were able to benefit from the purchasers’ resale under their 
duty to mitigate loss. The judgement in the case suggests to us that section 53(5) 
                                                 
896 Ibid., p.62. 
897 [1997] 1 ALL ER 979. 
898 Slater v Hoyle Smith Ltd [1920] 2KBII.  See also Treitel’s Law of Contract, op. cit., para. 20-048.   
899 Bridge, ‘Do we need a New Sale of Goods Act?’ op. cit. para. 2.23. 
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needs to be amended in order to meet the market value standard where commercial 
practice and the expectations of the parties, viewed as at the date of breach, so require.  
This could be done by deleting the reference to ‘prima facie’ in the subsection. An 
alternative formation could also be selected from the CISG or DCFR.  In particular, 
article 74 of the CISG would more closely reflect the expectations of the parties 
viewed at the date of breach. On balance, however, we do not favour a change of this 
kind.   
 
11.36. Recommendations  
A statutory cure provision along the lines of that at Article 46 of the United 
Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods should be introduced for 
commercial contracts of sale. 
 
The words ‘prima facie’ should be deleted from section 53(5) on the estimation of 
loss in the case of breach of warranty of quality.   
 
SECTION 54: INTEREST AND SPECIAL DAMAGES 
    Nothing in this Act shall affect the right of the buyer or the seller to recover interest  
    or special damages in any case where by law interest or special damages may be  
    recoverable, or to recover money paid where the consideration for the payment of it  
    has failed. 
 
11.37. Section 54 allows for recovery and interest or special damages (Hadley v 
Baxendale ‘second limb’), or for the recovery of money for a total failure of 
consideration.  It has not been amended in the United Kingdom or Ireland and no 
changes are necessary to the section in our view.    
 
11.38. Recommendation  









CHAPTER TWELVE SALE OF GOODS AND SUPPLY OF 
SERVICES ACT 1980: MISREPRESENTATION, SECTIONS 43-46  
 
I MISREPRESENTATION: FORMS AND REMEDIES  
12.1. Parties engaged in pre-contractual discussions commonly make a range of 
statements intended to influence the outcome of those discussions.  The law identifies 
three broad categories of such statements: mere puffs, representations, and terms of 
the contract.900 Mere puffs are statements, typically sales hype of an exaggerated kind, 
that are not intended to have legal effect. A representation is a pre-contractual 
statement of fact that induces the other party to enter the contract, but is not a term of 
the contract. A term of the contract is a statement that is intended to have contractual 
effect and is thus binding on the parties to the contract. The classification of a 
statement as a puff, a representation, or a contract term depends on the intention of the 
parties as assessed by a court in the light of the facts of the case. If a pre-contractual 
statement that is factually untrue is held to be part of the contract, the injured party 
can sue for breach of contract. If such a statement is held not to be a term of the 
contract, it may amount to a misrepresentation which entitles the injured party to 
repudiate the contract or recover damages.  Misrepresentation is the subject of Part V 
of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 and the focus of this Chapter of 
the Report. Before we examine the statutory provisions, we will look in more detail at 
misrepresentation, the main forms that it takes (fraudulent, negligent and innocent), 
and the applicable legal remedies.901   
 
What is Misrepresentation?  
12.2. In general terms, a misrepresentation is an untrue statement of fact or law made 
by one party to another which induces the misrepresentee to enter the contract and 
thereby causes him loss. A misrepresentation of which a party to a contract has notice, 
but which was not made by him or by his agent, can also give rise to a claim. A mere 
statement of opinion, rather than of fact or law, which proves to be unfounded, will 
not be treated as a misrepresentation unless the opinion amounts to a statement of fact 
and it can be proved that the person who made it, did not hold it, or could not 
reasonably have held it, to be true. An action may also lie in tort for negligent 
                                                 
900 White, Commercial Law, op. cit., pp. 37-39.   
901 For an account, see Carey, G. ‘Misrepresentation and the Avoidance of Liability’, (2001) CLP 131 
at 132-134.  
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misstatement in relation to negligent advice. A mere statement of intention that was 
not subsequently acted upon is not a misrepresentation.  A misrepresentation can be 
implied or can be a representation by conduct if it involves a representation that there 
exists some state of facts different from the truth.902 
 
12.3. For a misrepresentation to be actionable, it must have induced the representee to 
enter into the contract. If the representee knew the statement was a misrepresentation 
but did not rely on it, he cannot claim that he was induced by it to enter into the 
contract. Reliance is a question of fact. The burden of proof lies on the defendant to 
the misrepresentation action. If the representee has the opportunity to discover the 
truth prior to the formation of the contract, this does not prevent the statement from 
being a misrepresentation.903 The applicable test is whether there is actual and 
reasonable reliance on the misrepresentation. By reference to principles of 
contributory negligence, damages for misrepresentation may be reduced if it is 
considered that the loss is partly the fault of the representee. The misrepresentation 
need not be the only matter which induces the other party to enter into the contract 
but, other than in cases of fraudulent misrepresentation, that party must be materially 
influenced by the misrepresentation. This means that the misrepresentation must 
either be such that it would affect the judgement of a reasonable person in deciding 
whether to enter into the contract and on what terms, or that it would induce the 
representee to enter into the contract without making inquiries that he would 
otherwise make.904 This requirement of material influence does not have to be met in 
cases of fraud, or where the contract warrants the truth of the pre-contractual 
statement. 
 
12.4. Silence does not of itself usually amount to a misrepresentation as there is no 
duty to disclose facts which, if known, would affect the other party’s decision to enter 
the contract.  This rule is subject to the following exceptions: 
1) Misrepresentation by conduct.  
 
                                                 
902 Spice Girls Limited v Aprilia World Service Bv [2002] EWCA Civ 15.  
903 Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch. D. 1. 
904 The English Court of Appeal has characterised ‘material’ as meaning relevant to the decision of the 
representee to enter into the contract (Morris v Jones [2002] EWCA Civ 1790). 
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2) Where a party makes a statement that is a half-truth - that is, a statement which 
may be true as to what is said, but which becomes a misrepresentation by 
virtue of what is left unsaid. This exception commonly arises in practice.  
 
3) Where a party makes a statement that is true when made, but circumstances 
change before the contract is concluded with the result that the statement is no 
longer true. The party who made the statement has a duty to tell the other party 
about the change. Failure to do so will amount to a misrepresentation.  
 
4) Where the contract is a contract of the utmost good faith (uberrimae fidei) or 
deals with certain other fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationships, for example, 
an integral family member contract.  
 
Fraudulent Misrepresentation  
12.5 An action for fraudulent misrepresentation is founded in the tort of deceit. It 
occurs where a false representation has been made knowingly, or without belief in its 
truth, or recklessly as to its truth.905 A claimant must establish:  
1) a misrepresentation of fact or law;  
 
2) that the defendant had no belief in the truth of the representation, or was 
reckless as to its truth;  
 
3) that the defendant intended the claimant to act on the representation; and; 
 
4) that the misrepresentation induced the claimant to enter into the contract.  
Damages for fraudulent misrepresentation are not limited by the rules of remoteness 
applicable in contract and tort. All losses that flow from the claimant’s reliance on the 
misrepresentation are recoverable, whether foreseeable or not. It is well established 
law that no contract cap is effective to limit liability for fraudulent misrepresentation.  
 
Negligent Misrepresentation 
12.6. A negligent misrepresentation occurs where a statement is made carelessly or 
without reasonable grounds for believing it to be true. This principle has its basis in 
the decision in Hedley Byrne v Heller906 which reversed the prior classification of all 
non-fraudulent misrepresentations as innocent misrepresentations. Before this 
judgment, a misrepresentation that was negligently made could not, in the absence of 
a contract, avail the injured party unless there was a fiduciary relationship. Following 
Hedley Byrne, a person making a statement without having reasonable grounds for 
                                                 
905 Derry v Peek [1889] App Case 337. 
906  [1964] A.C. 465.   
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believing in its truth was liable for negligent misstatement if a special relationship 
existed between the parties which gave rise to a duty of care. Hedley Byrne may be 
invoked by persons who are not even representees as long as reliance upon the 
representation could be reasonably expected. 907  
 
Innocent Misrepresentation 
12.7 Innocent misrepresentation denotes a misrepresentation made entirely without 
fault - that is, where the person making it can show that he had reasonable grounds for 
believing his statement to be true.  
 
Remedies 
12.8 The remedies for misrepresentation are rescission and/or damages. In certain 
instances of over-valuation, the price payable by the representee may be reduced or 
abated. It is necessary to ascertain whether the misrepresentation is fraudulent, 
negligent, or innocent in order to determine the remedies available.  
 
Rescission 
12.9 A misrepresentation makes a contract voidable by the innocent party. As the 
equitable remedy of rescission is available for all types of misrepresentation, the 
claimant has a choice to rescind or affirm the contract. Where the representee elects to 
rescind, he must notify the representor, although where this is not possible some act 
consistent with rescission will suffice. A consequence of rescission is that contract 
damages cannot be claimed because, as the contract is deemed to have been set aside 
for all purposes, there is no basis for any such claim.908 In contrast, where breach of a 
condition of a contract leads to termination, the parties are not released from 
obligations already accrued at the time of termination.  
 
12.10 The right to rescind may be lost as a result of any of the following equitable  
bars:  
1) Affirmation. As soon as the misrepresentation is discovered, the party to 
whom it is made can elect either to rescind or affirm the contract. Affirmation 
may be implied by an act inconsistent with the decision to rescind. However, 
                                                 
907 Wildgust v. Bank of Ireland [2006] ILRM, 28, applying Esso Petroleum v Mardon [1976] Q.B. 801. 
908 Although claims for tortious damages may be relevant.  
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acts done in ignorance of the true facts will not amount to affirmation and will 
not bar the right to rescind. 
 
2) Lapse of time. The doctrine of laches will prevent a claimant from obtaining 
the equitable remedy of rescission where there has been undue delay in 
bringing the claim.909 In the case of fraudulent misrepresentation, delay will 
not of itself bar rescission provided that the claimant, without fault, remains in 
ignorance of the fraud. However, once the claimant becomes aware of the 
fraud, time begins to run from the discovery of the truth. Where the 
misrepresentation is innocent or negligent, time begins to run from conclusion 
of the contract and not from the date of discovery of the misrepresentation.  
 
3) Where it is no longer possible for the parties to be restored to their pre-
contractual position. No precise rule has been formulated as to the point at 
which equity will regard restoration as no longer possible.  In historical terms, 
equitable jurisdiction was more flexible and imaginative than the common 
law. The degree of alteration in the subject matter of the contract will be 
relevant, as will the fault of the parties. Rescission is possible on the basis of 
substantial restoration.  
 
4) Where a bona fide third party has acquired rights under the contract.  
 
12.11 Rescission is only available against another contracting party.  In the case of 
fraudulent misrepresentation, there is no requirement that the misrepresentation is 
material. Case law suggests that, where the right to rescind has been lost as set out 
above, damages for innocent misrepresentation will not be available, absent liability 
in fraud, contract or via a fiduciary relationship.910  
 
Damages 
12.12. Damages are available for all types of misrepresentation, and the type of 
misrepresentation determines the availability of damages and the basis on which they 
are awarded. In most cases, damages are awarded on a tortious basis - that is, the 
restoration of the claimant to the position he would have been in had he not entered 
into the contract.  The damages sought may cover losses arising from the contract, 
provided they are not too remote and even the expenses of entering into the contract.  
Misrepresentation can also give rise to a claim for breach of contract where, for 
                                                 
 
 
909 In Leaf v International Galleries [1950] 2 KB 86, the plaintiff purchased a picture stated by the 
defendants to be by Constable.  Five years later, the plaintiff sought rescission of the contract on the 
ground of innocent misrepresentation, but the Court of Appeal held that, even if the remedy were 
available in the case, five years was too long a period for it to apply.   
910
Lecky v. Walter [1914] I.R. 378; Anderson v. Ryan [1967] I.R. 34.  
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example, the misrepresentation has been incorporated into the contract in the form of 
a warranty. In this case, damages are assessed on the contractual basis of putting the 
claimant into the position he would have been in had the representation been true.  
 
Damages for Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
12.13.  For fraudulent misrepresentation, the claimant has the right to rescind the 
contract, or to claim damages in the tort of deceit, or both, though he cannot claim 
under Section 45(2) of the 1980 Act. The object of the award of such damages is to 
put the claimant into the position he was in before the misrepresentation was made. 
However, the test of foreseeability does not apply in the context of the tort of deceit; 
all that is required is that the damages ‘flowed’ from the fraud.911  Damages may be 
awarded for all losses directly caused by the misrepresentation, even if those losses 
are unforeseen. This is a potentially significant distinction between the fraudulent 
measure of damages and the usual, less generous, tortious test of remoteness. The 
rationale for the distinction is that it is justifiable to impose greater liability in this 
way in order to deter fraud.912 Liability for unforeseen losses in the tort of deceit 
means that the defendant may bear the risk of the claimant's losses being increased by 
events subsequent to the fraud (such as a decline in the market value of the subject 
matter of the contract) and the consequential losses directly flowing from the 
fraudulent misrepresentation (such as wasted expenses).913 Mitigation of loss is also 
relevant. 
 
Damages for Negligent Misrepresentation 
12.14. Damages for negligent misstatement are considered on a standard tortious 
basis. Recovery is in respect of all losses which are reasonably foreseeable 
consequences of the misrepresentation.914 The 1980 Act introduced the possibility of 
recovery of damages for negligent misrepresentation. Where the maker of the 
misrepresentation is unable to show that he had reasonable grounds for believing, and 
did believe, that the statement at issue was true, the claimant is entitled to rescind the 
                                                 
911
Doyle v. Olby (Ironmonger) Limited [1969] 2 QB 158.  
 
912 Carey, ‘Misrepresentation and the Avoidance of Liability’, op. cit., at 136. 
 
913 Smith New Court Securities Limited v Scrimgeour Vickers (Asset Management) Limited and Others 
[1996] 4 All ER 769. 
914 The Wagon Mound (No.1) [1961] A.C. 388. 
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contract (subject to the court's discretion) and to claim damages under Section 45(1) 
of the 1980 Act. The claimant may also seek damages under Section 45(1) if the 
contract has been affirmed, that is, if the claimant does not seek rescission. The 
statutory route offers a number of advantages to the claimant. The test is an objective 
one. There is no requirement to establish fraud. Once the claimant proves that the 
statement at issue was false, it is for the defendant to prove that he reasonably 
believed in the truth of the statement. Further, there is no requirement for the claimant 
to establish the existence of a special relationship involving a duty of care. The 1980 
Act does not apply, however, where the representor is not the other party to the 
contract or his agent. Damages are awarded on a tortious basis, and the rule of 
remoteness used in this context is all direct, and not all foreseeable, losses. However, 
absent fraud, damages may be reduced to reflect the claimant's contributory 
negligence.915 
 
Damages for Innocent Misrepresentation 
12.15. Damages for innocent misrepresentation can be awarded in lieu of rescission 
under Section 45(2) of the 1980 Act, where the right to rescind exists.916 Arguably, 
there may also be a possibility of statutory damages under Section 45(1) of the 1980 
Act.  The burden of persuading the court to exercise its discretion to award damages is 
on the party seeking that it be exercised.  The court will consider the ‘nature of the 
misrepresentation’ and ‘the loss that would be caused by it if the contract was upheld, 
as well as the loss that rescission would cause to the other party’. Where there has 
been a breach of warranty and also misrepresentation, the Court would not have to 
take into account reduction of damages for contributory negligence and thus this 
would be a factor in considering whether rescission should or should not be granted.   
     A Court should hear evidence as to the proper measure of damages for  
                breach of warranty and misrepresentation and as to the loss which will be  
                suffered by the respondent if rescission were ordered.  Both those issues  
                require to be addressed by the Court under Section 2(2) [equivalent to  
                section 45(2) of the 1980 Act], when it is exercising its discretion whether  
                to award or refuse rescission. 917   
 
                                                 
915 Gran Gelato Ltd v Richcliff Group Ltd [1992] Ch 560. 
916 The latter point has been the subject of conflicting case law. Thomas Witter Ltd v TBP Industries 
Ltd [1996] 2 All ER 573.  Floods of Queensferry Ltd v Shand Construction Ltd (No 3) [2000] BLR 81. 
917 Odyssey Cinemas Limited v. Village Theatres Three Limited (Sheridan Millenium Limited, third 
party [2010] NICA 25.  
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The Court has a wide discretion; it is ‘a broad one, to do what is equitable’. 918 
 
II STATUTORY PROVISIONS  
12.16 The provisions at Sections 43 - 46 of the 1980 Act have their origin in the 
Misrepresentation Acts enacted in 1967 for England and Wales and for Northern 
Ireland respectively.919 Those provisions were based on recommendations made by 
the Law Reform Committee.920  The Committee considered that the law as it then 
stood provided inadequate remedies for misrepresentation and that damages should 
not be restricted to fraudulent misrepresentation, stating921:  
    ...where one of the parties was at fault in making the representation, the other ought  
    to be entitled to damages as of right.  We also think that the onus should be on the  
    representor to satisfy the court that he was not at fault… The fact that a person has  
    entered into a contract on the strength of a statement which is untrue ought by itself  
    to entitle him to compensation unless the representor can establish his innocence.  
 
The Report preceded the 1964 judgment in Hedley Byrne which went some way 
towards addressing the gap in liability identified by the Law Reform Committee.   
 
12.17 The English Misrepresentation Act of 1967 was based in large part on the 
recommendations of the Law Reform Committee. The principal aims of the 
legislation were three-fold.  First, to do away with the bars originating in earlier case 
law which precluded rescission for innocent misrepresentation where a contract had 
already been performed or the misrepresentation had become a term of the contract.  
Secondly, to extend the scope and strengthen the efficacy of the remedies for 
misrepresentation by providing that damages were payable for non-fraudulent 
misrepresentation and that the burden of proof was on the defendant to show that he 
had not been negligent. Prior to the Acts, damages were only available for 
misrepresentation where the false statement was made fraudulently or, following 
Hedley Byrne, negligently where a special relationship existed between the parties 
which gave rise to a duty of care. This extension of the remedies regime for 
misrepresentation was balanced, however, by the discretion that the Act gave the 
courts to award damages in lieu of the remedy of rescission previously available at 
                                                 
918 William Sindall plc v Cambridgeshire County Council [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1016 at 1036.  
919 Misrepresentation Act 1967 (1967 Ch.7.).  Misrepresentation Act (Northern Ireland) 1967. (1967 
Ch. 14. ) 
920 Law Reform Committee. 1962. Innocent Misrepresentation (Tenth Report, Cmnd. 1782).    
921 Ibid., paras. 17 & 22.  
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common law for all forms of misrepresentation. Thirdly, to render void contract terms 
excluding or restricting liability or remedies for misrepresentation unless reliance on 
such terms was ‘fair and reasonable in the circumstances of the case’. The last 
provision was of broader significance in that it represented the first general attempt at 
statutory control of exemption clauses.   
 
12.18 A number of drafting changes aside, the misrepresentation provisions in the 
1980 Act are very similar to those in the 1967 Act. In introducing the provisions in 
the Bill which became the 1980 Act, the then Minister for State at the Department of 
Industry, Commerce and Energy laid emphasis, first, on the right of action given for 
innocent and negligent misrepresentation; second, on the control of clauses excluding 
or restricting liability for misrepresentation; and third, on the discretion afforded the 
courts, in ‘the interests of equity’, to award damages for misrepresentation rather than 
to rescind the contract.922  Before considering the misrepresentation provisions of the 
1980 Act in more detail, reference should be made to the provisions of the Consumer 
Protection Act 2007 on misleading commercial practices. Section 42 of the Act states 
that traders shall not engage in misleading commercial practices and sections 43 to 46 
specify the various circumstances in which  a commercial practice is misleading, 
including the provision of false or misleading information in relation to a wide range 
of attributes of goods and services. While the Act provides for criminal sanctions for 
misleading commercial practices, section 74 also gives consumers aggrieved by a 
misleading commercial practice a right of action for relief by way of damages.  We 
will now examine each of the sections in Part V of the 1980 Act.  
 
    Section 43 “Contract” 
     In this Part "contract" means a contract of sale of goods, a hire-purchase agreement,  
     an agreement for the letting of goods to which section 38 applies or a contract for  
     the supply of a service. 
 
Issues Arising  
12.19 The Misrepresentation Acts enacted in England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
apply to contracts generally. There is no legislation of general application on 
misrepresentation in Ireland, however, and the restriction of the scope of the 
                                                 
922 Dáil Debates, Vol. 309, 16 November 1978. Sale of Goods and Supply of Service Bill 1978  
Second Stage: cols. 1105 & 1112. . 
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misrepresentation provisions of the 1980 Act to contracts for the sale or supply of 
goods and the supply of services is the main difference between the legislative 
regimes in Ireland and the UK. When the matter was raised in the course of the 
Committee Stage debate on the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Bill 1978, the 
then Minister for State at the Department of Industry, Commerce and Tourism 
indicated that this restriction was attributable to practical, rather than policy, 
considerations, stating923: 
    While it might be desirable to revise all the legal aspects of misrepresentation, it  
    would be far outside the ambit of this Bill and, in particular, of my Department.   
 
12.20 Though the matter is similarly outside our terms of reference, we would 
strongly advise that the scope of the existing legislative provisions on 
misrepresentation be broadened.  The main effect of the restricted scope of the current 
statutory provisions is the exclusion of contracts involving land and things in action 
(shares, securities etc). This exclusion is all the more difficult to justify as the 
development of an equitable remedy for misrepresentation arose mainly in cases 
involving these types of transaction.924 Cases concerning misrepresentation in 
contracts for real property and other transactions outside the scope of Part V of the 
1980, moreover, continue to come before the courts on a regular basis.925  
 
12.21 A further minor issue that needs to be addressed concerns the reference in 
Section 43 to ‘an agreement for the letting of goods to which section 38 applies’. 
Section 38 and the other sections of Part III of the 1980 Act were subsequently 
repealed by the Consumer Credit Act 1995, Parts VI and VII of which now regulate 
consumer hire-purchase and hire agreements. The 1995 Act, however, did not 
specifically address the consequences of the deletion of section 38 of the 1980 Act for 
the provisions on misrepresentation in sections 43-46 of the Act.  This omission 
should be rectified in future legislation.  On a more substantive note, the opportunity 
should also be taken to apply the misrepresentation provisions to hire agreements 
                                                 
923 Seanad Debates, Vol. 94, 16 April 1980.  Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Bill Committee 
Stage: cols. 23-24.  
924 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 10-008. Until a number of sale of goods cases in the mid-
twentieth century clarified the point, there was in fact a doubt as to whether the equitable remedy for 
misrepresentation applied to contracts for the sale of goods.   
925 Clark, Contract Law in Ireland, op. cit., pp. 325-40.  It should be noted that even where there is no 
statutory exclusion as in the case of the English Act of 1967, there may be a judicial aversion to use of 
the 1967 rules for policy reasons, as in reinsurance contracts: See Steyn J. in Highlands Insurance Co. 
v. Continental Insurance Co., [1967] 1 Lloyds Rep. 109 at 117-118. 
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generally and not just to consumer hire agreements.  The corresponding provisions on 
hire-purchase agreements are not restricted to consumer agreements.   
 
12.22 The provisions of the 1980 Act on misrepresentation are not, and were not 
intended to be, a comprehensive statement of the rules that apply in this area of the 
law.926  Their aim, as noted earlier, was to clarify some of the common law rules that 
had developed over time and to reverse others.  An action by a claimant may, 
therefore, be taken on a number of grounds: fraudulent misrepresentation; negligent 
misrepresentation; negligent misstatement; general negligence; innocent 
misrepresentation; the statutory right to damages conferred by the 1980 Act; and the 
statutory right to damages for misleading commercial practices affecting consumers 
granted by the Consumer Protection Act 2007. We think that it would be helpful 
consequently for future legislation to clarify that the statutory provisions on 
misrepresentation have the effect of supplementing the rules of the common law and 
equity and not of replacing them. 
   
12.23 Recommendations  
Serious consideration should be given to the introduction of statutory provisions 
on misrepresentation that would apply to contracts generally.   
 
The application of the statutory provisions on misrepresentation to consumer 
hire agreements should be clarified.  The provisions should also be extended to 
commercial hire agreements.    
 
A new definition of ‘contract’ as follows should be included for the purposes of 
the misrepresentation provisions in  future legislation:   
    ‘contract’ means a contract for a sale or supply of goods, a hire  
    purchase agreement, an agreement for the licensing or letting of goods  
    or a contract for the supply of services or any combination in whole or  
    in part of any of the aforesaid.   
 
Future legislation should provide that the statutory provisions on 
misrepresentation are a supplement to, and not a replacement for, the rules of 
the common law and equity.   
                                                 
926 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 2.34.  
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Section 44 Removal of Certain Bars to Rescission for Innocent Misrepresentation  
    Where a party has entered into a contract after a misrepresentation has been made to him, and  
(a) the misrepresentation has become a term of the contract, or,  
(b) the contract has been performed;  
    or both, then if otherwise he would be entitled to rescind the contract, he shall be so entitled  
    subject to the provisions of this Part, notwithstanding the matters mentioned in paragraphs (a)  
    and (b). 
 
Issues Arising 
12.24 As noted above, section 44 was enacted in order to remove certain bars to 
rescission for innocent misrepresentation.  The section remains necessary and justified 
in our view and should be retained in its existing form.  Future statutory provisions, 
however, should lay down clearer and more balanced rules on the circumstances in 
which rescission should be available for misrepresentation. There is considerable 
merit in our view in the rules at sections 7(4)(b) and (5) of the New Zealand 
Contractual Remedies Act 1979, and we would favour the incorporation of provisions 
along similar lines into Irish law.    
 
12.25 Recommendation  
In order to complement the existing provisions of section 44 of the 1980 Act, and to 
indicate where rescission can or cannot arise and to reflect current case law, the 
following new section is proposed:  
 
Rescinding Contract 
(1) Without prejudice to the generality of Section 44, a party to a contract may rescind 
a contract if he has been induced into it by a misrepresentation made to him by a party to 
that contract and if the effect of the misrepresentation is: 
(a) to substantially reduce the benefit of the contract to the rescinding party; 
or,  
(b) to substantially increase the burden on the rescinding party under the 
contract;   
(c) in relation to the rescinding party to make the benefit or burden of the 
contract substantially different from that represented or contracted for; 
 
(2) A party to a contract shall not be entitled to rescind the contract if with full 
knowledge of the misrepresentation he has affirmed the contract. 
 
 
Section 45 Damages for Misrepresentation  
1) Where a person has entered into a contract after a misrepresentation has been 
made to him by another party thereto and as a result thereof he has suffered 
loss, then, if the person making the misrepresentation would be liable to 
damages in respect thereof had the misrepresentation been made fraudulently, 
that person shall be so liable notwithstanding that the misrepresentation was 
 
 373
not made fraudulently, unless he proves that he had reasonable ground to 
believe and did believe up to the time the contract was made that the facts 
represented were true. 
2) Where a person has entered into a contract after a misrepresentation has 
been made to him otherwise than fraudulently, and he would be entitled, by 
reason of the misrepresentation, to rescind the contract, then, if it is claimed 
in any proceedings arising out of the contract that the contract ought to be or 
has been rescinded, the court may declare the contract subsisting and award 
damages in lieu of rescission, if of opinion that it would be equitable to do so, 
having regard to the nature of the misrepresentation and the loss that would 
be caused by it if the contract were upheld, as well as to the loss that 
rescission would cause to the other party. 
 
Issues Arising  
12.26 Section 45(1) reversed the historical pre Hedley Byrne common law rule that, 
as innocent misrepresentation was not actionable in tort, damages were unavailable as 
a remedy.  The primary remedy for an innocent misrepresentation in equity was 
rescission of a contract.  The provision allows the representor, however, to avoid 
liability if he can show that he believed in the truth of the facts that he represented and 
had reasonable grounds for doing so. The New Zealand Contractual Remedies Act 
1979 provides by contrast that a party to a contract is entitled to damages if he has 
been induced to enter into the contract by a misrepresentation, whether innocent or 
fraudulent, made to him by or on behalf of another party to the contract.  This Act 
equates a misrepresentation as if the representation were a term of the contract that 
has been broken and removes the common law and equitable remedies for 
misrepresentation.927  We think that the existing provision at section 45(1) should be 
retained in modified form to deal with interpretation problems, and should also 
include definitions of fraudulent, negligent and innocent misrepresentation.    
 
12.27 The principal other issue raised by section 45 relates to the measure of 
damages available for the cause of action under subsection (1). The current state of 
the law on the issue is far from clear. Bridge has observed of the corresponding 
provision in the Misrepresentation Act 1967 that, insofar as it sanctions damages 
awards, it ‘sits very badly within the scheme of rules governing damages awards in 
tort and contract.’928 As has been observed, the language of section 45(1) seems to 
point to the measure in the tort of deceit – ‘if the person making the misrepresentation 
would be liable to damages in respect thereof had the misrepresentation been made 
                                                 
927 Contractual Remedies Act 1979, Public Act No. 11 of 1979, s. 6(1).   
928 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 8.38.  
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fraudulently, that person shall be so liable notwithstanding that the misrepresentation 
was not made fraudulently’ (our emphasis).929 This was certainly the view of 
commentators at the time of the introduction of the 1967 Act.930   
 
12.28 There is no conclusive Irish case law on the issue.  English case law has 
generally held that damages should be calculated according to the rules for damages 
in tort.931  A claimant may thus recover the damages he sustained by entering into the 
contract, but not the profit he hoped to make from the bargain, or the value of the 
good or service as represented. The main uncertainty has been over whether the 
measure of damages for actions under the statutory cause of action includes 
compensation for loss of bargain. While Watt v Spence932 indicated that such damages 
could be available, a different view was taken in Sharneyford Supplies Ltd v Edge.933  
The matter appears to have been resolved for the present at least by the decision of the 
Court of Appeal in Royscott Trust v Rogerson that:934 
    In view of the wording of the subsection it is difficult to see how the  
    measure of damages under it could be other than the tortious measure and  
    that is now generally accepted. 
  
Balcombe LJ then dealt as follows with the question of which tortious measure was 
appropriate to the statutory cause of action:935 
    The first main issue before us was: accepting that the tortious measure is  
    the right measure, is it the measure where the tort is that of fraudulent  
    misrepresentation, or is it the measure where the tort is negligence at  
    common law?  The difference is that in cases of fraud a plaintiff is entitled  
    to any loss which flowed from the defendant’s fraud, even if the loss could not     
    have been foreseen. In my judgement the wording of the subsection936 is  
    clear: the person making the innocent misrepresentation shall be ‘so  
                                                 
929 Clark, Contract Law in Ireland, op. cit., p. 334.   
930 Atiyah and  Treietel stated, for example, that the ‘measure of damages in the statutory action will 
apparently be that in an action of deceit.’  Atiyah, P.S. & Treitel, G.H. ‘The Misrepresentation Act 
1967’ (1967) MLR 369 at 373.    
931 F&H Entertainments v Leisure Enterprises [1976] 120 S.J. 331.  Sharneyford Supplies Ltd v Edge 
[1986] 1 All E.R. 588.  In the latter case, however, Mervyn Davies J. kept open the question of whether 
damages for loss of bargain were available, stating: ‘I do not decide whether or not such damages for 
innocent misrepresentation embrace any element for loss of bargain.’  Clark, ibid., p. 334.    
932 [1976] Ch. 165.  Dicta by Lord Denning in two cases in the Court of Appeal - Gosling v Anderson 
[1972] E.G.D. 709 and Jarvis v Swan Tours [1973] Q.B. 233 – also appeared to suggest that the 
contractual measure was the appropriate one.   
933 [1986] 1 All E.R. 588.  
934 [1991] 2 QB 297 552 at 556.  See also William Sindall Plc v Cambridgeshire County Council 
[1994] 1 WLR 1016.  
935 Royscott Trust v Rogerson, ibid., at 557.   
936 That is, section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 whose wording is identical to section 45(1) 
of the 1980 Act. 
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    liable’ i.e. liable to damages as if the representation had been made  
   fraudulently. 
 
12.29 Goode has noted that the Royscott decision remains controversial.937 In Smith 
New Court Securities v Scrimgeour Vickers (Asset Management) Ltd,
 938 the House of 
Lords expressed reservations about it, though it did not over-rule it.  In Bridge’s view, 
the rule permitting recovery of all losses flowing directly from the misrepresentation 
is ‘a stringent, even a punitive one’.939  We think that these criticisms have validity in 
the case of innocent and negligent misrepresentation.  It would be preferable, in our 
view, to apply the contract measure of damages to these forms of misrepresentation.  
For fraudulent misrepresentation, the applicable measure should remain damages in 
the tort of deceit, including for unforeseen loss and damage.  We note in this context 
that section 6 of the New Zealand Contract Remedies Act 1979 provides that damages 
may be awarded for misrepresentation ‘as if the representation were a term of the 
contract that had been broken.’  While this approach is appropriate to innocent and 
negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation should be treated on the 
same basis as other forms of fraud for the purpose of the assessment of damages.     
 
12.30  Recommendations 
Section 45 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 should be 
replaced by a statutory provision along the following lines: 
Damages for misrepresentation 
    (1) If a party to a contract has been induced to enter into it by a  
    misrepresentation made to him by another party to that contract and as a  
    result thereof that party has suffered loss and :  
 
(a) if the misrepresentation is an innocent misrepresentation, he shall be entitled to 
damages from that other party as if the representation were a term of the contract 
that has been broken, unless the other party proves that he had reasonable 
ground to believe and did believe up to the time the contract was made that the 
facts represented were true;  
(b) if the misrepresentation is a negligent misrepresentation, he shall be entitled to 
damages from that other party as if the representation were a term of the contract 
that has been broken; 
 
(c) if the representation is a fraudulent misrepresentation, he shall be entitled to 
damages in the tort of deceit and awarded for all loss and damage that flowed 
from the fraud, even if the loss and damage are unforeseen. 
 
                                                 
937 Goode on Commercial Law, op. cit., p. 120 fn. 326.  
938 [1996] 4 All E.R. 769.  
939 Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 8.39.  
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    2. If a party to a contract has been induced to enter into it by an innocent  
    misrepresentation or a negligent misrepresentation and which would entitle  
    that party, by reason of the innocent misrepresentation or, as the case may be,  
    negligent misrepresentations to rescind the contract, then if it is so claimed in  
    any proceedings that the contract ought to be or has been rescinded, the Court  
    may declare the contract subsisting and award damages in lieu of rescission, if  
    the Court is of the opinion that it would be equitable to do so, having regard to  
    the nature of the innocent misrepresentation or, as the case may be, negligent  
    misrepresentation and the loss that would be caused by it, if the contract were  
    upheld, as well as to the loss that rescission would cause to the other party.     
As this provision, unlike its counterpart in the 1980 Act, distinguishes between 
innocent, negligent and fraudulent representation, it would be advisable to include 
definitions of these terms in the legislation.  We recommend that definitions along the 
following lines should be included in future legislation: 
    ‘misrepresentation’ means a fraudulent misrepresentation or a negligent  
    misrepresentation or an innocent misrepresentation. 
 
    ‘fraudulent misrepresentation’ means a representation of fact or law which a  
    party to a contract makes without belief in the knowledge or truth of the  
    representation or was reckless as to its truth and the party intended the other  
    party to act on the representation and the misrepresentation induced the other  
    party to enter into the contract;  
 
     ‘negligent misrepresentation’ means a representation of fact or law which a  
    party to a contract makes carelessly or without reasonable grounds for  
    believing it is true and which induces the other party to the contract to enter  
    into the contract.  
 
    ‘innocent misrepresentation’ means a representation of fact or law which a  
    party to the contract makes and has reasonable grounds to believe the  
    representation was true but which induced the other party to enter into the  
    contract; 
 
     
Section 46 Avoidance of Certain Legal Provisions Excluding Liability for 
Misrepresentation  
 
1) If any agreement (whether made before or after the commencement of this Act) Act) 
contains a provision which would exclude or restrict -  
(a) any liability to which a party to a contract may be subject by reason 
of any misrepresentation made by him before the contract was made, 
or  
(b) any remedy available to another party to the contract by reason of 
such a misrepresentation 
      that provision shall not be enforceable unless it is shown that it is fair and  
      reasonable. 
 




The Schedule to the 1980 Act on ‘fair and reasonable terms’ set out at paragraph 5.1 
above is applicable to the test of whether a term is ‘fair and reasonable’ for the 
purposes of Section 46.  
 
12.31 As noted earlier, statutory control of contract terms excluding or restricting 
liability for misrepresentation was first effected in England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland by the Misrepresentation Acts 1967.  As originally enacted, section 3 of the 
Act in force in England and Wales provided that such terms ‘shall be of no effect 
except to the extent (if any) that, in any proceedings arising out of the contract, the 
court or arbitrator may allow reliance on it as being fair and reasonable in the 
circumstances of the case.’  Section 3 was later substituted by section 8(1) of the UK 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and now provides that a term excluding or restricting 
liability for misrepresentation:  
    shall be of no effect except insofar as it satisfies the requirement of reasonableness  
    as stated in section 11(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977; and it is for those  
    claiming that the term satisfies that requirement to show that it does.   
 
It is relevant to note that, unlike other provisions of the UK Unfair Contract Terms 
Act which apply only where one of the parties ‘deals as consumer’ or on the other 
party’s written standard terms of business, section 3 subjects all contract terms, even 
those negotiated in full by the parties, to the ‘reasonableness test’ of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act.  In Ireland, by contrast, section 46, like the other provisions of 
Part V of the 1980 Act, applies only to contracts for the sale of goods, hire-purchase 
agreements, consumer hire agreements, and contracts for the supply of a service.   
 
Issues Arising 
12.32 Section 46 is of most relevance to non-fraudulent misrepresentation by virtue 
of the fact that the common law is generally held to prevent parties from excluding 
liability for their own fraud.940 As Lord Hobhouse commented in HIH v Chase 
Manhattan: 941 
    Fraud and negligence are different from each other in kind.  Commercial  
    men recognize the risk of want of care or skill; they do not contemplate  
                                                 
940 Pearson v Dublin Corporation [1907] A.C. 351.   
941 HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank [2003] UK HL 6, [2003] 
Lloyd’s Rep 61 at 122.  Bridge states that it is ‘at least very likely’ that liability for fraud may not be 
excluded at common law, noting that Lord Hobhouse endorsed the proposition with ‘some degree of 
caution’ in HIH v Chase Manhattan.  See also Zanzibar v British Aerospace [2000] 3 W.L.R  2333.  
Bridge, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 9.16.  
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    fraud in the making of the contract.   
  
In Thomas Witter Limited v TBP Industries Ltd,942 the court held that an exemption 
clause which sought to exempt liability for all forms of misrepresentation for all 
purposes was unreasonable and void, by virtue of its exclusion of fraud.    
 
12.33 The first English case to test the exemption clause provision at section 3 of the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967 was Cremdean Properties Ltd v Nash.943 The plaintiff 
contracted to buy property from the defendant and relied on representations from the 
latter’s agent about the square footage that had been approved for planning 
permission.  On discovering the true figure, the plaintiff sought rescission or damages 
for misrepresentation. The defendant sought to rely on a clause in the tender 
document which stated that, while the particulars given about the property were 
believed to be correct, they did not constitute part of the contract, their accuracy was 
not guaranteed and any errors they contained would not annul the sale. It added that 
intending buyers must satisfy themselves by inspection or otherwise as to the 
correctness of the statements made in the particulars. The plaintiff argued that the 
exclusion came within section 3 of the 1967 Act and was unreasonable. The Court of 
Appeal rejected the argument that the effect of the clause was to bring about a 
situation as if no representation had been made, with Bridge L.J. stating944: 
     I should not have thought that the courts would have been ready to allow  
                such ingenuity in forms of language to defeat the plain purpose at which  
                section 3 is aimed. 
 
12.34 While it is clear that standard exemption clauses must be assessed by reference 
to section 46 or the corresponding provision in English legislation, there is more 
uncertainty regarding the effect of entire agreement clauses. Though such clauses take 
a variety of forms, their relevant features in the context of liability for 
misrepresentation are, first, the clause itself to the effect that the terms of the contract 
represent the entire agreement between the parties and, second, a non-reliance clause 
to the effect that neither party has placed any reliance on any pre-contractual 
statements not expressly incorporated in the contract. The courts have shown a 
readiness to accept that, insofar as an entire agreement clause seeks to exclude 
                                                 
942 [1996] 2 All ER 573.   
943 [1977] 2 E.G. 547.  
944 Ibid. at 551.   
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representations rather than remedies, its effect is to define the scope of the contract 
rather than to exclude liability. In McGrath v Shah, Chadwick J. suggested that 
section 3 of the Misrepresentation Act ‘was not apt to cover a contractual provision 
which seeks to define where the contractual terms are actually to be found.’945  
Where, however, a claim concerning misrepresentation is brought in tort, rather than 
contract, an entire agreement clause will not affect the application of section 3.  As 
Cartwright has observed946: 
    The effect of an entire agreement clause in relation to pre-contractual       
    misrepresentations will normally be to limit the contractual force of such  
    misrepresentations to those which are provided in the contract. But such a  clause  
    has no impact on claims where the cause of action is based on a pre- 
    contractual misrepresentation, such as rescission, or damages under the  
    Misrepresentation Act 1967…Words such as ‘this contract comprises the entire  
    agreement between the parties’ do not themselves exclude misrepresentations. 
 
 
12.35 Non-reliance clauses have been considered by the English courts in a number of 
cases. In EA Grimstead & Son Ltd v McGarrigan, Chadwick LJ stated obiter that:947 
   An acknowledgement of non-reliance is capable of operating as an evidential  
   estoppel.  It is apt to prevent the party who has given the acknowledgement from  
   asserting in subsequent litigation against the party to whom it has been given that it  
   is not true. 
 
He proceeded to indicate the conditions that had to be met in order for the   
estoppel to be operative:948 
    It is, of course, not sufficient that the acknowledgement should be capable  
    of operating as an evidential estoppel.  In order to establish an estoppel it  
    was for Mr McGarrigan to plead and prove that the three requirements  
    identified by this court in Lowe v Lombank Ltd949 were satisfied – that is to  
    say, (i) that the statements in those clauses were clear and unequivocal, (ii)  
    that the purchaser had intended that Mr McGarrigan should act upon those  
    statements and (iii) that Mr McGarrigan had believed the statements to be  
    true and had acted upon them.     
 
In Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd950, the same judge stated that the 
third of these requirements: 
                                                 
945 [1989] 57 P&C.R. 452.  Inntrepreneur Pub Co. v East Crown Ltd [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611.  
946 Cartwright, J.  ‘Excluding Liability for Misrepresentation’ in Burrows, A. & Peel, E. (eds). 2007. 
Contract Terms (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 222.  
947 [1999] EWCA Civ 3029 at 20.  
948 Ibid. at 20-21.   
949 [1960] 1 WLR 196.  
950 [2001] EWCA Civ 317; [2001] All ER (Comm.) 696.   
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    … may present insuperable difficulties, not least because it may be impossible for a  
    party who has made representations which he intended should be relied upon to  
    satisfy the court that he entered into the contract in the belief that a statement by the  
    other party that he had not relied upon those representations.   
 
The willingness of the courts to treat a non-reliance clause as an estoppel will not of 
itself limit the protection afforded by section 46 in that a statutory protection which 
cannot be avoided by contract cannot be avoided by estoppel.951  More generally, the 
courts have shown a reluctance to permit the statutory provisions regulating 
exemption for misrepresentation to be bypassed. As Jack J. stated in Government of 
Zanzibar v British Aerospace(Lancaster House) Ltd:952 
    A term which negates a reliance which in fact existed is a term which excludes a  
    liability which the representor would otherwise be subject to by reason of the  
    representation.  If that were wrong, it would mean that section 3 could always be  
    defeated by including an appropriate non-reliance clause in the contract, however  
    unreasonable that might be. 
    
In conclusion, therefore, while entire agreement clauses may have an effect in 
excluding liability for pre-contractual misrepresentations, their efficacy in relation to 
misrepresentation claims is, as Goode has noted, ‘much more doubtful.’953 
 
12.36  Recommendations  
Future legislation should incorporate the common law prohibition on the 
exclusion of liability for fraudulent misrepresentation.   
 
Contract terms that exclude or limit liability for other forms of 
misrepresentation should be permissible where shown to be ‘fair and 
reasonable’. 
 
A provision along the lines of section 13(1) of the UK Unfair Contract Terms Act 
which elaborates on the ways in which exemption clauses may seek to exclude or 
restrict liability should be added to the statutory provisions on the exemption of 
liability for misrepresentation.  This would help to clarify the nature and type of 
clauses seeking to exclude or restrict liability for misrepresentation which come 
within the scope of the statutory provisions.  A similar recommendation has been 
                                                 
951 Keen v Holland [1984] 1 All ER 75.  Cartwright, op. cit., p. 225.  
952 [2000] 1 WLR 2333 at 2347-48.  
953 Goode on Commercial Law, op. cit., p.103 fn. 195.  
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made at paragraph 5.29 above in respect of clauses seeking to exempt liability for 










































CHAPTER THIRTEEN SALE OF GOODS AND SUPPLY OF 
SERVICES ACT 1980: GUARANTEES AND MISCELLANEOUS 
(UNSOLICITED GOODS, DIRECTORY ENTRIES, AND 
REGULATIONS) SECTIONS 15-19, 47-49 & 51-54 
 
I PRODUCT GUARANTEES 
13.1. Product guarantees typically involve the following elements:954  
(1) the guarantee pledge relating to defects in materials or manufacture which 
become apparent within a specified period after the purchase of the product; 
(2) the remedies available if that pledge is not fulfilled; 
(3) the terms and conditions on which the guarantee is provided.   
Though these elements are more or less common to all guarantees, there can be 
significant differences in the form and content of guarantees. Manufacturers’ 
guarantees, the most common form of product guarantee, are generally provided free 
of charge with the product. Their duration is typically one to two years, though longer 
guarantee periods apply in some cases, most notably motor vehicles. Other 
guarantees, often known as extended warranties, have to be paid for and are usually 
purchased separately from the product. These guarantees are commonly supplied by 
retailers and may be underwritten by an insurance company.  Guarantees of this kind 
typically apply for a longer period than manufacturers’ guarantees and/or cover 
defects caused by factors such as accidental damage or normal wear and tear that 
would not ordinarily be covered by standard manufacturers’ guarantees or by buyers’ 
legal rights. Though their operation is not without its issues, guarantees can offer 
consumers an informal means of redress without the uncertainty and difficulty that 
recourse to statutory remedies may entail.  As with other aspects of consumer sales 
law, guarantees are currently subject to dual regulation under the following 
enactments:  
(1) the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980; and  
(2) the European Communities (Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods 
and Associated Guarantees) Regulations (S.I. No. 11/2003) which gives effect 
to Directive 1999/44/EC.   
We will look at each of these in turn.   
 
                                                 
954 Twigg-Flesner, C.   2003.  Consumer Product Guarantees (Aldershot: Ashgate), p. 29.   
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The Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980  
13.2. Statutory regulation of guarantees in Ireland was first effected by sections 15-19 
of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980.  Unlike many of the Act’s 
other provisions, the sections dealing with guarantees were not modelled on United 
Kingdom legislation,955 but appear to have been influenced in part by American 
legislative provisions and proposals.956 The National Consumer Advisory Council’s   
1974 report which influenced many of the provisions of the 1980 Act included a 
recommendation on the introduction of legislative provisions on the enforceability 
and transferability of guarantees.957 Sections 15-19 of the Act do not impose a 
requirement on manufacturers or others to provide guarantees; their aim rather is to 
ensure that, where guarantees are supplied, they will be subject to rules designed to 
ensure that they are ‘meaningful, legally binding and easily understood by the buyer 
as to their promises and effects’.958 Their enactment reflected concerns over the legal 
status and enforceability of guarantees and the use of guarantees to exclude or restrict 
consumers’ legal rights.959   
 
13.3.  The main features of the guarantee provisions in the 1980 Act are as follows:  
 Section 15 defines ‘guarantee’ as ‘any document, notice, or other written 
statement, howsoever described, supplied by a manufacturer or other supplier, 
other than a retailer, in connection with the supply of any goods and indicating 
that the manufacturer or other supplier will service, repair or otherwise deal 
with the goods following purchase’.   
 
 Section 16 sets out the information requirements to be contained in a 
guarantee (name and address of guarantor, duration of guarantee, procedure 
                                                 
955 Prior to the implementation of Directive 1999/44/EC, UK legislation had very limited rules 
regulating guarantees.  Section 5 of the Unfair Contracts Terms Act 1977 prohibits provisions in 
guarantees that exclude or restrict liability for loss or damage to consumer goods caused by negligence 
during the manufacturing or distribution process. The Consumer Transactions (Restrictions on 
Statements) Order  1976 requires guarantees for consumer goods to carry a clear and conspicuous 
statement that the guarantee does not affect consumers’ statutory rights. The Supply of Extended 
Warranties on Domestic Electrical Goods Order 2005 provides for information and withdrawal rights 
for consumers who enter into warranty contracts for domestic electrical goods for monetary 
consideration.  
956 15 USC 2301.  The Whincup report on consumer protection law in other jurisdictions prepared for 
the National Prices Commission in 1972-73 drew attention to a 1971 Federal Bill which was a 
precursor of the provisions on guarantees in the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act 1975, and to 
legislation on guarantees in a number of US states.  National Prices Commission.  1973. Occasional 
Paper  No. 9.  Consumer Protection Law in America, Canada and Europe, pp. 108-116.   
957 National Consumer Advisory Council.  1974.  Submission to the Minister for Industry and 
Commerce on Proposals for Legislation to Assure the Consumers’ Interest, p. 17.   
958 Department of Industry and Commerce.  CP 627.  ‘Sale of Goods and Services Bill, 1977: Second 
Stage Brief’: 14 
959 Ibid: 14 
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for presenting a claim under the guarantee, undertakings in respect of goods 
covered by guarantee, and any charges to the buyer in respect of these 
undertakings); provides that the procedure for making a claim under the 
guarantee shall not be more difficult than ordinary or normal commercial 
procedure; and makes it an offence to supply a guarantee which does not 
comply with these requirements.  
 
 Section 17 provides that a seller of goods who delivers a guarantee to the 
buyer shall be liable for its terms unless he expressly indicates the contrary to 
the buyer at the time of delivery or, if he is a retail seller, gives the buyer a 
written undertaking that he will service, repair or otherwise deal with the 
goods after purchase. 
 
 Section 18 stipulates that rights under a guarantee shall not exclude or limit 
the buyer’s statutory or common law rights and any provision in a guarantee 
which imposes on the buyer obligations beyond those in the contract, or gives 
the seller or his agent sole power to decide whether or not goods are defective, 
is void. 
 
 Section 19 provides that a buyer may take proceedings for breach of guarantee 
as for breach of warranty, and that the Court may order fulfilment of the terms 
of the guarantee or damages and may allow the guarantor to fulfil his 
obligations on such terms as it deems just. ‘Buyer’ means any person who 
acquires title to the goods within the guarantee period.     
 
Unlike a number of other sections of the 1980 Act, the Act’s guarantee provisions are 
not limited to situations where the buyer ‘deals as consumer’ and thus cover 
commercial buyers of goods covered by a guarantee. The provisions are not restricted 
either to ‘free’ guarantees and apply equally to guarantees for which a charge is 
payable. Finally, the provisions depart from the doctrine of privity of contract in 
permitting subsequent purchasers of goods to invoke a guarantee within the guarantee 
period.   
 
Directive 99/44/EC on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Goods and Associated 
Guarantees  
13.4. The provisions on guarantees in Directive 1999/44/EC have their origins in the 
European Commission’s 1993 Green Paper on Guarantees for Consumer Goods and 
After-Sales Services.960 The Green Paper proposed a range of options including 
                                                 
960 Commission of the European Communities.  1993.  Green Paper on Guarantees for Consumer 
Goods and After-Sales Services.  Com (93) 509. The Green Paper referred to guarantees as 
‘commercial guarantees’ to distinguish them from ‘legal guarantees’, the consumer’s rights under the 
law governing the sale of goods.  This terminology was not retained in Directive 1999/44/EC, though 
the 2008 proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights reinstated the term ‘commercial guarantee’.  The 
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requirements for commercial guarantees to confer benefits additional to those 
provided by the consumer’s legal rights, and for all members of a distribution network 
set up by the same manufacturer to honour guarantees, as well as a proposal for an 
optional European Guarantee that would apply across the European Union.  In the 
event, the provisions adopted in Directive 1999/44/EC were more modest and focused 
principally on the legal status of guarantees and the information requirements 
applicable to them.961 While the Directive recognises that guarantees are ‘legitimate 
marketing tools’ which can stimulate competition, it provides that, in order to ensure 
that consumers are not misled, guarantees should contain certain information, 
including a statement that the guarantee does not affect the consumer’s legal rights.962   
 
13.5. Article 1(2)(e) of the Directive defines ‘guarantee’ as:  
    any undertaking by a seller or producer to the consumer, given without extra  
    charge, to reimburse the price paid or to replace, repair or handle consumer goods   
    in any way if they do not meet the specifications set out in the guarantee statement   
    or in the relevant advertising.   
Unlike the corresponding provisions of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 
1980, therefore, the Directive’s provisions do not cover either guarantees on goods 
sold to non-consumer buyers, or extended warranties or other guarantees for which a 
charge is payable.  The definition of ‘guarantee’ in the Directive is not limited to 
commitments made in a guarantee document that comes with the goods but can cover 
guarantees given in advertising.963 ‘Producer’ is defined by the Directive as ‘the 
manufacturer of consumer goods, the importer of consumer goods into the territory of 
the Community or any person purporting to be a producer by placing his name, trade 
mark or other distinctive sign on the consumer goods’ (Article 1(2)(d)). The Directive 
applies therefore to guarantees given by retailers or others who place their own name 
or brand on goods manufactured for them by others. As noted above, the definition in 
the 1980 Act covers guarantees provided by a manufacturer or supplier other than a 
                                                                                                                                            
Green Paper also cited the Irish provisions on guarantees as among the ‘most forward-looking national 
texts in this domain’.  
961 The Directive was given effect by the European Communities (Certain Aspects of the Sale of 
Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees) Regulations 2003 (S.I. No. 11 of 2003).  The provisions 
on guarantees are at Regulation 9 of the Regulations.   
962 Recital 21, Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Certain Aspects 
of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated guarantees.   
963 The definition in the 1980 Act does not contain an express provision about advertisements and it is 
unclear whether advertising in written form is covered by the stipulation that guarantee means ‘any 
document, notice or other written statement,  howsoever described, supplied by a manufacturer or other 
supplier … in connection with the supply of any goods …‘.  
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retailer, though retailers are liable for manufacturers’ guarantees if they have not 
expressly disclaimed responsibility for them, or given their own written undertaking 
to service or repair goods after purchase.   
 
13.6. Article 6(1) of the Directive provides that a guarantee ‘shall be legally binding 
on the offerer under the conditions laid down the guarantee statement and the 
associated advertising’.  It would appear that the ‘conditions’ referred to here include 
the actions the consumer (or in some cases the retailer) must take in order for the 
guarantee to take effect (such as a registration requirement) as well as the terms and 
conditions governing the application of the guarantee (the duration, claim procedure 
etc).964  The fact that the guarantee binds the offerer only on the conditions set out in 
the guarantee document and any associated advertising underlines the essentially 
modest aims of the Directive. Article 6(1) is silent on the question of whether 
guarantees are transferable to subsequent purchasers of goods.  Though it does not 
confine the benefit of the guarantee to the first buyer, it does not expressly state either 
that the guarantee is transferable.  Article 6(2) provides that the guarantee shall:  
 state that the consumer has legal rights under applicable national legislation 
and make clear that those rights are not affected by the guarantee;  
 
 set out in plain intelligible language the contents of the guarantee and the 
essential particulars for making claims under the guarantee, notably the 
duration and territorial scope of the guarantee as well as the name and address 
of the guarantor.  
 
Article 6(3) states that the consumer may request that the guarantee be made available 
in writing or another durable medium. Article 6(4) empowers Member States to 
provide that guarantees for goods marketed within their territory be drafted in one or 
more of the official languages of the European Community, in practice the language 
of the Member State implementing this provision.  This option was not exercised by 
eleven member states including Ireland.965  Finally, Article 6(5) provides that a failure 
to comply with the requirements of Article 6 does not affect the validity of the 
guarantee, and that consumers can still rely on it and require that it be honoured.  The 
                                                 
964 Bradgate, R & Twigg Flesner, C.  2003. Blackstone’s Guide to Consumer Sales and Associated 
Guarantees, op. cit.,  pp.175-176.   
965Schulte-Nolke, H. (ed).  2008.  EC Consumer Law Compendium: Comparative Analysis, p. 689.  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/docs/consumer_law_compendium_comparative_analysis_en_final
.pdf   
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Directive does not include any specific sanctions for breaches of its guarantee 
provisions. As the Directive comes within the scope of Directive 98/27/EC on 
injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests, however, national enforcement 
authorities can apply for an injunction where an infringement of the guarantee 
provisions is harmful to the collective interests of consumers.     
 
13.7. In summary, the 1980 Act and Directive 1999/44/EC are broadly similar in their 
focus on the enforceability of guarantees and the provision of information about them. 
Neither seeks to make guarantees mandatory or to regulate their substantive 
provisions to any significant extent. The provisions of the 1980 Act are broader in 
scope, however, in that they cover commercial as well as consumer buyers, extend the 
benefit of the guarantee to subsequent purchasers of goods, and may bind retailers as 
well as manufacturers and distributors in some circumstances.    
 
Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights  
13.8. As previously stated, Chapter IV of the proposed Directive on Consumer Rights 
was intended to replace Directive 1999/44/EC on the Sale of Consumer Goods and 
Associated Guarantees.966 In the event, the Directive that is to be adopted later in 
2011 will exclude the main provisions of the proposed Chapter, including those on 
guarantees, and the existing Consumer Sales and Guarantees Directive will remain in 
force. The aim and approach of the provisions on commercial guarantees at Article 29 
of the proposed Directive were broadly in line with the corresponding provisions in 
the present Directive. Though otherwise similar to the definition in that Directive, the 
definition of ‘commercial guarantee’ at Article 2(18) of the proposal was not 
restricted, however, to guarantees ‘given without extra charge’ and would thus have 
applied to extended warranties and other guarantees for which a charge is payable. 
Article 29(1) of the proposed Directive sought to clarify the relation between 
guarantee statements and associated advertising by stipulating that the guarantee 
would be binding on the conditions laid down in the statement. In the absence of the 
guarantee statement, however, the guarantee would be binding under the conditions 
laid down in the advertising on the commercial guarantee. Article 29(2)(c) sought, in 
tandem with the proposal’s provisions on unfair contract terms, to deal with the issue 
                                                 
966 Commission of the European Communities.  2008.  Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights.  COM (2008) 614.   
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of the transferability of guarantees. While guarantee statements were required to state, 
where applicable, that the guarantee could not be transferred to a subsequent buyer, 
Annex III.1(j) of the Directive provided that a contract term which restricted the 
consumer’s right to re-sell goods by limiting the transferability of a commercial 
guarantee was presumed to be unfair. Unlike the minimum harmonisation basis of 
Directive 1999/44/EC, the full harmonisation basis of the proposed Directive would 
have precluded member states from maintaining or introducing provisions on 
guarantees that exceeded those in the EU instrument.  This would have prevented, for 
example, retention of the provision at section 16(3) of the 1980 Act which provides 
that the procedure for presenting a claim under a guarantee must not be more difficult 
than ordinary or normal commercial procedure. The reversion to the minimum 
harmonisation Directive 1999/44/EC means, however, that Ireland will remain free to 
maintain or introduce statutory provisions on guarantees that go beyond the 
protections conferred by the Directive.    
 
Issues Arising   
13.9. The Group is broadly in agreement with the approach to the regulation of 
guarantees in the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 and Directive 
1999/44/EC. It is correct in our view that the regulation of guarantees acknowledges 
their discretionary character and focuses on ensuring that consumers are given 
adequate information about guarantees, in particular that these do not affect the legal 
rights of purchasers, and that commitments made by guarantors are enforceable.  As 
we have stressed in other sections of this report, it is essential that an end be brought 
to the present dual regulation of consumer sales law by legislative provisions of 
domestic and EU origin. There should accordingly be a single set of rules governing 
product guarantees in sale of goods legislation.  As the rules in the 1980 Act are 
clearer and more detailed in our opinion than those in Directive 1999/44/EC, they 
should provide the basis for the future statutory provisions. Where the Directive 
contains provisions not directly covered by sections 15-19 of the 1980 Act, however, 
the proposed legislation must obviously incorporate those provisions. This would 
apply to the express recognition in the Directive that undertakings made in relevant 
advertising can form part of a guarantee, to the requirement to state the territorial 
scope of the guarantee, and to the stipulation that the guarantee be made available in 
writing or on another durable medium on request by the consumer.  Though not 
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exercised in the transposition of Directive 1999/44/EC, the regulatory option 
permitting member states to require that guarantees be drafted in an official language 
of the European Community, in our case English, should be availed of in future 
legislation.   
 
13.10  Recommendation  
There should be a single set of statutory rules on product guarantees in future  
legislation.  Those rules should be based on the provisions of sections 15-19 of the 
Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 along with the addition of those 
elements of the guarantee provisions of Directive 1999/44/EC not found in the 
Act, including the requirement that guarantees be expressed in English.   
 
Application of Guarantees’ Provisions to Non-Consumer Buyers 
13.11. As noted above, the guarantee provisions at sections 15-19 of the Sale of 
Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 apply both to consumer and commercial 
buyers of goods covered by guarantees. As Directive 1999/44/EC applies only to 
guarantees relating to a sales contract between a trader and a consumer, the provision 
of guarantees to commercial buyers falls outside its scope and is left to the legislative 
discretion of member states.  Whether Ireland should continue to continue to apply its 
statutory provisions on product guarantees to consumer and non-consumer buyers, 
however, is an issue that requires consideration in its own right.  The rationale for 
applying the protections of sections 15-19 of the 1980 Act to commercial purchasers 
of goods covered by guarantee was not set out in great detail in the Oireachtas debates 
on the proposed legislation.  It appears to have been based on a view that, as the 
guarantee went with the goods, the proposed statutory protections for the purchasers 
of goods under guarantee should not differentiate between different types of 
purchaser.  The fact that guarantees mainly apply to non-producer goods intended for 
everyday use may also have been a consideration. The then Minister for State at the 
Department of Industry, Commerce and Tourism stated in Seanad Éireann that967: 
   it is not really necessary to specify or imply target groups for whom a guarantee is  
   intended.  Anyone buying the goods and using them should have a claim under the  
                                                 
967 Seanad Debates. Vol. 93., 27 March 1980 Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Bill 1978 
Committee Stage (Resumed): col. 1572.  An opposition speaker suggested that the guarantee provisions 
should not apply to commercial purchasers or, failing that, that their exclusion should be permissible in 
commercial contracts where this was ‘fair and reasonable’, ibid: col. 1575.   
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   guarantee if something goes wrong and this would be a normal and reasonable  
   interpretation.   
 
13.12. The matter at issue, however, is not whether a non-consumer purchaser of 
goods covered by a guarantee should have a claim under the guarantee, but rather 
whether such a purchaser should be able to avail of additional statutory protections in 
respect of guarantees. It would arguably have been more consistent with the overall 
approach of the 1980 Act to have applied the guarantee provisions to transactions 
where the buyer ‘deals as consumer’ or to have permitted their exclusion from 
business-to-business contracts where this was ‘fair and reasonable’.  The restriction of 
statutory protections for product guarantees to consumer goods or sales would also 
accord more closely with the approach adopted in legislation outside Ireland. 
European Union legislation on commercial guarantees applies only to consumer sales 
as do the guarantees provisions in the Draft Common Frame of Reference.968  The 
provision on guarantees in the UK Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 are limited to 
goods ‘in consumer use’, that is ‘use other than exclusively for the purposes of a 
business’, while the Supply of Extended Warranties on Domestic Electrical Goods 
Order 2005 applies only to contracts entered into by consumers.   In Australia and 
New Zealand, the right of action in respect of the statutory provisions on guarantees is 
limited to the consumer and ‘a person who acquires the goods from, or derives title to 
the goods through or under the consumer’ (Australia), or ‘any person who acquires 
the goods from or through the consumer’ for purposes other than resupply in trade, 
use in production or manufacture, or use to repair or treat other goods or fixtures on 
land (New Zealand).969  In the United States, the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act 
1975 does not apply to guarantees on products sold for resale or commercial purposes 
and covers only guarantees on a ‘consumer product’, that is products normally used 
for personal, family or household purposes; the term ‘consumer’, however, includes 
any person to whom a consumer product is transferred during the duration of the 
guarantee.970   
                                                 
968 Von Bar, C. et al (eds).  2008.  Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private 
Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference, Interim Outline Edition (Munich: Sellier), Book IV.A., 
Chapter 6, pp. 204-207. 
969 Australia, Trade Practices Act 1974, Part VDivision 2A, section 74(G).  New Zealand, Consumer 
Guarantees Act 1973, sections 27 & 2(b).    
970 15 USC 2301.  See also Federal Trade Commission, A Businessperson’s Guide to Federal 
Warranty Law: http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/adv/bus01/shtm.  
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13.13. Though a case can be made for limiting the application of the statutory 
provisions on guarantees to consumer sales, we are not convinced that a restriction of 
this kind is necessary or desirable. As the guarantee is given by the manufacturer or 
distributor in respect of the goods, it would not be practical, for example, to apply the 
information provisions at section 16 of the 1980 Act only to cases where the goods 
were purchased by a consumer.  The protections and remedies afforded by sections 
17-19 of the Act, furthermore, are not such as to make their application to business 
buyers inherently inappropriate or unreasonable, particularly as product guarantees 
are largely restricted to consumer goods.   
 
13.14.  Recommendation  
The provisions regarding guarantees in future legislation should, like the existing 
statutory provisions, apply to all purchasers of goods covered by a guarantee.    
 
The Regulation of Extended Warranties 
13.15. As noted above, the UK enacted the Supply of Extended Warranties on 
Domestic Electrical Goods Order 2005 to regulate consumer contracts involving these 
products. Its enactment followed an Office of Fair Trading (OFT) investigation which 
found evidence of grounds for concern in the provision of such warranties, and a 
subsequent Competition Commission report.971  The main concerns revealed by the 
OFT investigation centred on pressure selling of extended warranties, inadequate 
information to consumers to allow them to assess alternatives to such warranties, an 
approach to the pricing of warranties that did not reflect the cost of the cover 
provided, and a lack of competition in the extended warranty market. The 2005 Order 
sought to address these concerns by imposing more extensive information 
requirements on the providers of extended warranties for domestic electrical goods,972 
and by giving consumers purchasing an extended warranty with an initial duration of 
more than one year a right to cancel it within a period of forty five days from the day 
                                                 
971  Office of Fair Trading.  2002.  Extended Warranties on Domestic Electrical Goods: A Report 
on an OFT Investigation, http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/markets-work/completed/warranties .  
Competition Commission.  2003.  Report on the Supply of Extended Warranties on Domestic 
Electric Goods Within the UK, http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2003/485xwars.htm.  
972 The information provisions include a requirement to state that extended warranties may be available 
from other providers, that household insurance may be relevant to the purchase of domestic electrical 
goods, and to indicate the nature of the financial protection available in the event of the provider going 
out of business.   
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of purchase.  A review of the Order undertaken for the Office of Fair Trading in 2008 
found that it had had a positive impact in a number of areas.973 The proportion of 
consumers purchasing extended warranties at the point of sale had declined from 82 
per cent to 68 per cent, and the number of consumers shopping around for warranties 
had shown a modest increase. An estimated 5 per cent of consumer purchasers of 
extended warranties had also availed of the cooling-off right provided for in the 
Order.   
 
13.16. No investigation has been undertaken in Ireland of the market for extended 
warranties for electrical goods.  In its Annual Report for 2008, however, the National 
Consumer Agency expressed concerns about ‘what could be regarded as pressure 
selling’ by furniture retailers to get consumer to take out extended warranties.974  It is 
unclear from the report whether the warranties in question applied to furniture, 
electrical goods, or both.  Given the overall similarities in the retail environment in 
both countries and the fact that a number of UK-based retailers in the electrical goods 
sector also operate here, there is a case for a more detailed investigation of extended 
warranties in Irish retailing to establish if there is evidence of consumer detriment of 
the kind found to exist in the UK. As an interim initiative, a consumer protection 
measure modelled on the UK 2005 Extended Warranties Order should be introduced 
for the electrical goods sector.  Extended warranties are a materially different product 
from traditional manufacturers’ guarantees and may require more extensive regulation 
than the relatively ‘light-touch’ provisions deemed appropriate for free-of-charge 
guarantees. 
 
13.17.  Recommendation  
An extensive review of Irish extended warranty documents and practices should 
be undertaken across all sectors in which extended warranties are commonly 
available.  As an interim measure, regulations based on the Supply of Extended 
Warranties on Domestic Electrical Goods Order 2005 should be introduced to 
regulate extended warranties in electrical retailing.   
                                                 
973 Office of Fair Trading.  2008.  Evaluating the Impact of the Supply of Extended Warranties on 
Domestic Electrical Goods Order 2005.  http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Evaluating-OFTs-
work/oft1024.pdf  
974 National Consumer Agency, Annual Report 2008, pp. 15-16.  
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II PART VI SALE OF GOODS AND SUPPLY OF SERVICES ACT 1980 
13.18. Part VI of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 is headed  
‘Miscellaneous’ and this accurately describes its contents.  Its main provisions deal 
with (i) unsolicited goods, (ii) directory entries, and (iii) Ministerial powers to make 
orders regulating the form and content of contracts for the supply of goods and 
services.  We will consider each of these in turn. 
 
Unsolicited Goods and Services  
Section 47 Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980:  
13.19. Section 47 sets out the circumstances in which a recipient of unsolicited goods 
may treat such goods as an unconditional gift, and makes it an offence to seek 
payment for them or to threaten legal proceedings or a collection procedure. The 
section is modelled on the provisions of the UK Unsolicited Goods and Services Act 
1971.  Its inclusion in the 1980 Act followed a recommendation from the National 
Consumer Advisory Council that the recipients of unsolicited goods should have the 
right to keep the goods under conditions similar to those laid down in the UK 
legislation.975   Though the Department of Industry and Commerce considered that the 
problem of unsolicited goods was not widespread at the time, it noted occasional 
reports of UK rogue traders dispatching unsolicited goods from Ireland in order to 
circumvent the legislation in force in their own jurisdiction.976  There were also claims 
of ‘high-handed and offensive’ demands for payment for goods sent without request 
to innocent parties.   
 
13.20. Section 47(1) first specifies that it applies to unsolicited goods sent to a person:    
(i) with a view to his acquiring them, and 
(ii) received by him, and  
(iii) which he has agreed neither to acquire nor to return.   
Its application is not restricted to consumers and covers unsolicited goods sent to 
businesses. The subsection further provides that the recipient may treat unsolicited 
goods as an unconditional gift and that any right of the sender to the goods shall be 
extinguished in either of two circumstances as follows:  
                                                 
975 National Consumer Advisory Council.  1974.  Submission to the Minister for Industry and 
Commerce on Proposals for Legislation to Assure the Consumers’ Interest, p. 18.   
976 Department of Industry and Commerce. CP 27.  Sale of Goods and Services Bill, 1977: Second 
Stage Brief, p. 27.   
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(1) during the period of six months from the date of receipt of the goods, the 
sender did not take possession of them and the recipient did not unreasonably 
refuse to permit him to do so; or  
 
(2) not less than 30 days before the end of that six month period, the recipient of 
the goods gave notice to the sender and, during the following 30 days, the 
sender did not take possession of them or and the recipient did not 
unreasonably refuse to permit him to do so.   
 
13.21. Section 47(2) of the Act specifies that the notice from the recipient of 
unsolicited goods to their sender must be in writing, give the recipient’s name and the 
address at which the sender can take possession of the goods, and state that the goods 
are unsolicited.  Section 47(3) provides that a person in the course of any business 
who, without reasonable cause to believe that there is a right to payment, makes a 
demand for, or asserts a present or prospective right to, payment for what he knows 
are unsolicited goods shall be guilty of an offence.  Any invoice or similar document 
indicating a sum of money as if it were due is, in accordance with section 49(1) of the 
Act, regarded as asserting a right to payment. Section 47(4) provides that a person 
shall be guilty of an offence who, without reasonable cause to believe that there is a 
right to payment in the course of any business, and with a view to obtaining payment 
for what he knows or ought to know are unsolicited goods –  
(a) threatens to bring any legal proceedings, 
(b) places or causes to be placed the name of any person on a list of defaulters or 
debtors or threatens to do so, or  
(c) invokes or causes to be invoked any other collection procedure or threatens to 
do so.   
 
By virtue of the application of these provisions to both consumer and business 
recipients, the National Consumer Agency which is now responsible for the 
enforcement of the 1980 Act is under an obligation to investigate and, where 
appropriate take enforcement action against, breaches of section 47 affecting 
businesses.   
 
European Union Legislation on Unsolicited Goods and Services  
13.22. The supply of unsolicited goods and services was first regulated under EU 
legislation by Article 9 (Inertia selling) of Directive 97/7/EC on the protection of 
consumers in respect of distance contracts.  This required Member States to take the 
measures necessary to: 
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- prohibit the supply of goods or services to a consumer without their being 
ordered by the consumer beforehand, where such supply involves a demand 
for payment; 
 
- exempt the consumer from the provision of any consideration in cases of 
unsolicited supply, the absence of a response not constituting consent.   
 
Despite its inclusion in a Directive on distance contracts, the prohibition of inertia 
selling was not restricted to inertia selling involving this type of contract. Article 7(3) 
of the Directive clarified that the provision of a substitute product or service in 
accordance with Article 7(3) of the Directive did not come within the prohibition of 
inertia selling.977   
 
13.23. Directive 97/7/EC was implemented in Ireland by the European Communities 
(Protection of Consumers in Respect of Contracts Made by Means of Distance 
Communication) Regulations 2001 (S.I. No. 207 of 2001).  As section 47 of the 1980 
Act was considered to give adequate effect to the Directive’s provisions in respect of 
unsolicited goods, the Regulations deal only with the supply of unsolicited services.  
Regulation 11 of the Regulations applies provisions identical to those at Sections 
47(3) and (4) of the 1980 Act to demands for payment and threats of legal 
proceedings or other action in respect of the supply of an unsolicited service.   Though 
the other provisions of the Regulations apply only to contracts between a supplier and 
a consumer, Regulation 11 is, like the corresponding provision on unsolicited goods 
in the Sale of Goods and Supply of Service Act 1980, of general application.  As with 
section 47 of the 1980 Act, this means that the National Consumer Agency may be 
obliged to investigate, and where appropriate, prosecute breaches of the Regulation 
affecting business recipients of unsolicited services.   
 
                                                 
977 Article 7 of Directive 97/7 states that, unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the supplier must 
execute the order for a distance contract within a maximum of thirty days from the day following the 
dispatch of the order by the consumer.  Where the supplier fails to perform his side of the contract 
because of the unavailability of goods or services, the consumer must be informed of the situation and 
be able to obtain a refund within thirty days of any sums he has paid.  Article 7(3) permits member 
states to provide that the supplier may provide the consumer with goods or services of equivalent 
quality and price provided that this possibility was provided for prior to the conclusion of the contract 
or in the contract and the consumer was informed of it in a clear and comprehensible manner.  Eighteen 
member states, including Ireland, gave effect to this regulatory option. The supply of goods and 
services in such circumstances is not to be deemed ‘inertia selling’ within the meaning of Article 9 of 
the Directive.    
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13.24.  Article 15 of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices (UCPD) 
substituted a new Article 9 of the Distance Selling Directive as follows:  
   Given the prohibition of inertia selling practices laid down in Directive 2005/29/EC  
   of 11 May 2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning unfair  
   business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market, Member States  
   shall take the measures necessary to exempt the consumer from the provision of any  
   consideration in cases of unsolicited supply, the absence of a response not  
   constituting consent.   
 
The prohibition of inertia selling in the UCPD referred to here is that in the ‘blacklist’ 
of aggressive commercial practices considered unfair in all circumstances at Annex I: 
of the Directive:  
    Demanding immediate or deferred payment for or the return or safekeeping of  
    products supplied by the trader, but not solicited by the consumer except where the  
    product is a substitute supplied in conformity with Article 7(3) of Directive  
    97/7/EC (inertia selling).    
 
The Directive defines ‘product’ as ‘any goods or service, including immovable 
property, rights and obligations’ (Article 2(c)).  The prohibition of inertia selling in 
the UCPD blacklist was given effect in Ireland by section 53(3)(f) of the Consumer 
Protection Act 2007 which provides that a trader shall not engage in the following 
practice: 
  In relation to any product that a consumer does not solicit, demanding that the  
  consumer –  
(i) make immediate or deferred payment for the product, or  
(ii) return or keep the product safe. 
 
13.25. The effect of the UCPD provision and the consequential amendment to the 
Distance Selling Directive has been to split the original provision on inertia selling 
into two distinct parts. The proscription of payment demands for unsolicited goods 
and services has become a prohibited aggressive commercial practice under the 
UCPD, breaches of which are punishable by criminal or administrative sanctions or 
can be the subject of an injunction. The requirement on Member States to take 
measures to exempt consumers from the provision of consideration for unsolicited 
goods or services remains part of the Distance Selling Directive. This is aimed at  
giving consumers a contractual remedy in respect of unsolicited goods and services. 
As the recently agreed Directive on Consumer Rights is set to incorporate the 
Distance Selling Directive, this provision will form part of the new Directive in the 
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future. Article 45 of the Directive essentially re-enacts Article 9 of the Distance 
Selling Directive and provides that:978      
    The consumer shall be exempted from the provision of any consideration in cases  
    of unsolicited supply of goods, water, gas, electricity, district heating or digital  
    content or unsolicited provision of a service, prohibited by Article 5(5) and point 29  
    of Annex I of Directive 2005/29/EC.  In such cases, the absence of a response from  
    the consumer following such an unsolicited supply shall not constitute consent.   
 
The rationale for the inclusion of this provision, according to recital 61 of the original 
proposal, is that, while the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive prohibits inertia 
selling, it provides no contractual remedy for consumers affected by the practice.979  It 
was considered necessary, therefore, ‘to introduce in this Directive the contractual 
remedy of exempting the consumer from the provision of any consideration for such 
unsolicited supplies.’   
 
Issues Arising  
13.26. The provisions on unsolicited goods and services do not give rise to major 
policy issues. The main matters for consideration concern the conditions governing 
the retention of unsolicited goods and the application of the provisions regarding 
unsolicited goods to businesses in receipt of such goods.   
 
Conditions Governing Retention of Unsolicited Goods 
13.27. As noted above, section 47(1) of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 
1980 provides that the recipient of unsolicited goods can treat them as an 
unconditional gift where (i) the sender did not take possession of them within six 
months of their receipt by the recipient and the recipient did not unreasonably refuse 
to permit the sender to do so, or (ii) not less than thirty days before the expiry of that 
six month period, the recipient gave written notice to the sender and the sender did not 
take possession of them during the following 30 days or the recipient unreasonably 
refuse to permit the sender to do so.  The question arises as to whether, in the case of 
unsolicited goods sent to a consumer, these conditions are in accordance with the 
provision on inertia selling at Article 9 of Directive 97/7EC on Distance Selling (and 
                                                 
978 Proposal for a Directive of the Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights. A provisional 
version of the text of the Directive can be accessed at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/documents/activities/cont/201106/20110624ATT22578EN.pdf 
979 European Commission.  2008.  Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights.  COM (2008) 614, 
recital 61. 
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with the similar provision in the recently agreed Consumer Rights Directive which is 
set to replace it). The provision in the existing Directive obliges member states to 
‘take the measures necessary to exempt the consumer from the provision of any 
consideration in cases of unsolicited supply, the absence of a reply not constituting 
consent’ (our emphasis).  It is arguable, however, that the conditions governing the 
retention of unsolicited goods at section 47(1) of the Sale of Goods and Supply of 
Services Act 1980 may constitute a form of consideration.980 A claim to this effect has 
been made in fact by academic commentators on EU consumer legislation.981  It is 
relevant to note in this context that the UK legislation which gave effect to the inertia 
selling provision of the Distance Selling Directive did away with the conditions 
governing the receipt of unsolicited goods under the UK Unsolicited Goods and 
Services Act 1971, conditions identical to those under section 47(1) of the Sale of 
Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980.982  The applicable statutory provisions in the 
UK now provide that:983 
    The recipient (of unsolicited goods) may, as between himself and the sender, use,  
    deal with or dispose of the goods as if they were an unconditional gift to him.      
    The rights of the sender to the goods are extinguished.    
Issues of compatibility with EU law aside, we see no good reason why restrictive 
conditions should attach to the retention of goods sent to persons without their 
consent. On purely practical grounds, moreover, the time limits specified in the Act 
may be unsuited to certain types of goods, such as perishable items.      
 
                                                 
980 ‘Consideration’ is a term to which a broad interpretation has traditionally been applied.  In the well-
known words of Lush J. in Currie v. Misa (1875) LR 10 Ex 353, (1875-76) LR 1 App Cas 564, ‘ a 
valuable consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit, or 
benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility, given, 
suffered or undertaken by the other.’     
981 Schulte-Nolke, H. (ed).  2008.  EC Consumer Law Compendium: Comparative Analysis, p. 572.  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/docs/consumer_law_compendium_comparative_analysis_en_final
.pdf 
982 The Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000, Regulation 22(2).   
983 Ibid., Regulation 24(2)-(3).  The British Columbia Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act 
2004 (section 12) imposes no legal obligation on consumers in respect of unsolicited goods or services 
(unless they have expressly acknowledged in writing their intention to accept them) and gives no cause 
of action to the supplier of unsolicited goods or services.  It further provides that goods or services 
previously supplied with the consumer’s consent are deemed to be unsolicited goods or services if there 
is a material change in the goods or services and the supplier is unable to establish that the consumer 
consented to this change.  A provision of this kind, however, would not be compatible with the 
maximum harmonisation status of the inertia selling provisions of the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive and the proposed Consumer Rights Directive. The Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 (Part 
V, Division 1, section 65) retains provisions broadly similar to those at section 47(1) of the 1980 Act, 
though unsolicited goods become the property of the recipient three months after the receipt of the 
goods, and not six months as in the 1980 Act.        
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13.28. Recommendation  
We recommend that the conditions governing the receipt of unsolicited goods 
under section 47(1) of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 should 
be repealed.  Persons receiving unsolicited goods should be entitled to treat them 
as an unconditional gift, and the rights of the sender to such goods should be 
extinguished without regard to such conditions. The provisions on unsolicited 
goods and services which are currently contained in separate pieces of legislation 
should also be brought together in future legislation.   
 
Scope of Provisions on Unsolicited Goods and Services  
13.29. The provisions at section 47(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1980 and Regulation 
11 of S.I. No. 207 of 2001 apply to business and consumer recipients of unsolicited 
goods and services alike.  The contractual consequences of supplying unsolicited 
goods should, in our view, be the same regardless of whether the recipients are 
businesses or consumers – that is, the rights of the sender should be extinguished and 
the recipient should be entitled to treat the goods as an unconditional gift.  The supply 
of unsolicited goods or services falls outside the type of legitimate business dealings 
in respect of which freedom from legislative intervention is appropriate. This practice 
warrants consequently the application of statutory provisions and protections to 
business-to-business transactions.  
 
13.30. Recommendation 
The supply of unsolicited goods or services to businesses should be regulated by 
provisions similar to those governing the supply of such goods and services to 
consumers under Directives 97/7/EC and 2005/29/EC.    
 
SECTIONS 48 AND 49 SALE OF GOODS AND SUPPLY OF SERVICES ACT 
1980 – DIRECTORY ENTRIES 
13.31. As with the provisions on unsolicited goods that directly precede them, 
sections 48 and 49 of the 1980 Act were introduced to address a business practice that 
was a cause of current concern, and were modelled on provisions in the UK 
Unsolicited Goods and Services Act 1971. The business practice at issue was the 
making of demands for payment for entries in business directories where the business 
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had not knowingly consented to such an entry or, in some cases, where the directory 
did not exist.984  The key provisions of sections 48 and 49 are as follows: 
 A person shall not be liable for any payment for the inclusion in a directory of 
an entry relating to him or his business, and shall be entitled to recover any 
such payment, unless the order for the entry has been made in accordance with 
the requirements of the Act (‘directory’ for this purpose excludes the 
alphabetical telephone directory issued by Telecom Eireann);  
 
 The main such requirement is that the order for the directory entry must be 
made by means of an order form or other stationery belonging to the person to 
whom, or to whose trade or business, the entry is to relate, and the note of a 
person’s agreement to a charge for such an entry must state the amount of the 
charge above the place of signature and provide other specified information 
about the directory, its price (if any), the number of copies to be available for 
sale or distribution, and also give reasonable particulars of the  entry in respect 
of which the charge would be payable;  
 
 A person shall be guilty of an offence if he demands payment, asserts a 
present or prospective right to payment, or takes any action in furtherance of a 
demand for payment in respect of a charge for a directory entry without 
knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the entry was ordered in 
accordance with the Act or that a proper note of agreement has been signed.   
 
13.32. The effect of these provisions is to impose two procedural requirements 
designed to protect businesses from payment demands for entries in business 
directories obtained by means of sharp or deceptive practices. An order for the 
directory entry must first be made on the order form or stationery of the business that 
is to be the subject of the entry, and the business’s agreement to a charge for the entry 
must be signed on a note which provides information about the directory and the cost 
of the entry. The provisions are targeted at abusive business-to-business practices and, 
though consumers have been approached for inclusion in these directories on 
occasion, have no significant consumer dimension. Responsibility for the enforcement 
of the provisions rests with the National Consumer Agency and thus requires the 
Agency to investigate, and where necessary take enforcement action on, complaints 
affecting businesses. 
 
                                                 
984 In the second stage speech on the Bill, the then Minister of State at the Department of Industry,  
Commerce and Tourism stated the Department had received ‘a good many complaints over the last 
year or two about firms soliciting payment for entries in a directory which does not seem to exist’.  
Dáil Debates, Vol. 309, 16 November 1978 Sale of Goods and Supply of Service Bill 1978 Second 
Stage: col. 1109.   
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13.33. The principal other legislative provisions of relevance to business practices of 
this kind985 are those of Directive 2006/114/EC concerning misleading and 
comparative advertising.986  This has been given effect in Ireland by the European 
Communities (Misleading and Comparative Marketing Communications) Regulations 
2007 (S.I No. 774/2007).  The Regulations, among other things, prohibit traders from 
engaging in a misleading marketing communication and provide that a marketing 
communication is misleading if:  
(a) in any way including its presentation) it deceives, or is likely to deceive, in 
relation to a range of specified matters regarding goods or services the trader to 
whom it is addressed or whom it reaches, and 
(b) by reason of its deceptive nature, is likely to affect the trader’s economic 
behaviour, or  
(c) for any reason specified in (a) or (b), injures or is likely to injure a competitor.     
The Regulations provide for no public enforcement mechanism.  Traders affected by a 
misleading marketing communication may apply to the Circuit or High Court for an 
order prohibiting such a communication.   
 
13.34. Though the original complaints about business directories date from the 
nineteen seventies, similar concerns have arisen in more recent years, though this time 
on a cross-border basis within the European Union.  The main, though not the sole 
focus, of such complaints has been a Spanish-based directory called the European 
City Guide.987  According to a report on misleading directory companies prepared for 
the European Parliament, the modus operandi of these enterprises involves 
approaches to small businesses and non-profit making organisations inviting them to 
submit a directory listing apparently free of charge.988 Businesses which agree to a 
listing later discover that they have unwittingly signed up to a contract binding them 
for three or more years at a typical yearly charge of €1,000.  Payment demands have 
                                                 
985 Some business practices regarding directories may involve fraud and be dealt with under the 
criminal law.   
986 Directive 206/114/EC is a consolidated version of the former Directive 84/450/EEC on misleading 
advertising.  With the enactment of Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair business-to-consumer practices, 
the scope of Directive 84/450/EEC was limited to misleading advertising affecting business and, in 
accordance with Community rules on legislative consolidation, it was repealed and its provisions and 
all the amendments to in codified in Directive 2006/114/EC.  
987 The European City Guide was originally based in Barcelona but, after the Catalan authorities fined 
it €300,000 in 2003 and ordered its closure for one year, it moved its operations to Valencia.  
European Parliament 8 September 2006: Answer to a Written Question – European City Guide 
and Misleading Advertising Scam.  A number of UK businesses set up a website, www:stopecg.org, 
to draw attention to the malpractices in which it was claimed that the company engaged.   
988 Committee on Petitions of the European Parliament.  Report on the Misleading Directories 
Companies report.  A6-0446/2008, 13.11.2008.    
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been aggressively pursued by the directory companies and, in some cases, by debt-
collection agencies acting on their behalf. According to the European Parliament 
report, ‘thousands of businesses’ across the EU have been affected by these practices, 
though it is not known how many of these businesses actually made payments to the 
to the directory companies. Payment demands, coupled with threats of legal action, 
are reported to have been made to a sizeable number of Irish companies and 
organisations, including at least twenty schools.989 More recently, two linked 
companies with offices in England and the Netherlands, Yellow Page Marketing BV 
and Yellow Publishing Limited, were fined a total of $2.7m. by the Federal Court of 
Australian for misleading and deceptive practices involving online business 
directories.990 The companies had invoiced thousands of Australian businesses for 
subscriptions to their online directories after seeking to mislead them into thinking 
that they were dealing with the operators of the established Yellow Pages Directory.   
 
13.35. Although section 47 of the 1980 Act affords businesses reasonable protection 
against rogue directory companies operating in Ireland, it cannot give the same degree 
of protection from the activities of directory companies based outside Ireland.  Under 
the rules of jurisdiction in force under the Brussels I Regulation, matters relating to 
the provision of services under a contract will, as a general rule, be dealt with by the 
courts in the Member State where, under the contract, the services were or should 
have been provided.991 As most EU Member States do not have provisions regulating 
directory entries along the lines of those in force in Ireland and the UK, a directory 
company in one of those Member States could obtain a judgement against an Irish 
company for non-payment for a directory entry in their national courts and then seek 
to have that judgement enforced in the Irish courts.  In accordance with the Brussels I 
rules, an application for the enforcement of a judgement given in another member 
state that is made to the Master of the High Court must be declared immediately 
enforceable on completion of the necessary formalities and without review with 
                                                 
989 Sunday Business Post, 30 January 2005: ‘European City Guide Scam Threatens Barber’.  Irish 
Independent, 13 April 2006: ‘Schools hoodwinked in Euro guide debt scam.’   
990 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Yellow Page Marketing BV (No 2) [2011] 
FFCA 352.  
991 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters.  The European Communities (Civil and Commercial 
Judgements) Regulations 2002  (S.I. No. 52 of 2002) set out the procedures applicable to the 
implementation of the Regulation.   
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respect to the provisions governing the unenforceability of judgements on the ground 
of conflict with public policy.  Though such an outcome is certainly possible, it is not 
necessarily likely.  As the European Parliament’s report on Misleading Directories 
Companies noted, businesses which refuse to pay the directory companies have 
seldom been pursued in the courts.992 If the activities of rogue directory companies 
operating on a cross-border basis within the European Union continue to be a 
problem, however, Ireland should actively support the adoption of appropriate 
measures at Community level to tackle the matter.   
 
Issues Arising  
13.36. The evidence of continued abuses involving business directories over the past 
decade shows the need for the retention of provisions along the lines of those at 
sections 48-49 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980.  Much of this 
activity appears to have been aimed at micro-businesses, sole traders, charities and 
other bodies particularly vulnerable to this form of malfeasance. Though the rationale 
for the statutory provisions on directory entries remains valid, these require to be 
updated and amended in a number of respects.  Sections 48 and 49 have gone 
unamended since their adoption, while the provisions of the UK Unsolicited Goods 
and Services Act 1971 on which they were based have undergone three separate 
revisions.993    
 
Electronic Communications and Directory Entries 
13.37. The provisions on directory entries in the Sale of Goods and Supply of 
Services Act 1980 were adopted before the changes in communications technologies 
that have transformed commercial life. There is a clear case accordingly for updating 
them to take account of modern commercial and communications practices. In the 
UK, the amendments made by the UK Unsolicited Goods and Services Act 1971 
(Electronic Communications) Order 2001 still require an order for a first directory 
entry to be made by means of an order form or other stationery belonging to the 
business which is to be the subject of the entry but, subject to specified conditions, 
                                                 
992 Committee on Petitions of the European Parliament, op. cit., p. 5.  
993 The Unsolicited Goods and Services (Amendment) Act 1975 (1975 c.13).  The Unsolicited Goods 
and Services Act 1971 (Electronic Communications) Order 2001, (S.I. No. 2778 of 2001).  The 
Regulatory Reform (Unsolicited Goods and Services Act 1971) (Directory Entries and Demands for 
Payment) Order 2005  (S.I. No. 55 of 2005).    
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permit agreement to the charge for the entry to be made by electronic communication. 
These conditions are, first, that information about the directory, its producer, sale and 
distribution, and the charge for an entry must be communicated to the business 
beforehand and, second, that the electronic communication must be capable of being 
readily produced and retained in a visible and legible form. The latter requirement is 
broadly similar to the ‘durable medium’ provision in several EU Directives.994 The 
UK provision on charges for directory entries strikes an appropriate balance in our 
view between ensuring that there are both effective safeguards and a reasonable level 
of flexibility, and should be adopted in future Irish legislation. 
 
13.38. The rules applying to orders for initial directory entries raise more complex 
issues.  It is now ten years since the relevant provision in the UK legislation was 
revised, and in this period electronic communications have become an even more 
central feature of commercial life. While the requirement that an order for a first-time 
directory entry must be submitted on an order form or other stationery belonging to 
the business to be covered by the entry is a potent safeguard, it is valid to ask if some 
means of protecting businesses from unscrupulous directory companies can be found 
that does not require orders to be submitted on paper. A requirement of this kind, 
moreover, is difficult prima facie to reconcile with the rationale behind the provisions 
on electronic contracts at section 19 of the Electronic Commerce Act 2000.995 The 
focus of the provisions on directory entries in the 1980 Act is rightly on the 
malpractices committed by a small number of rogue traders, but it is necessary also to 
keep in mind that there are well-established bona fide directories in which large 
numbers of businesses wish to be listed. While it is necessary to have regulations that 
protect vulnerable businesses from abuses, this should not be done in a manner that 
                                                 
994  Directive 2002/65/EC on the distance marketing of consumer financial services defines durable 
medium as ‘any instrument which enables the consumer to store information addressed personally to 
him in a way accessible for future reference for a period of time adequate for the purposes of the 
information and which allows the unchanged reproduction of the information stored’.  The term is 
defined similarly in Directive 2008/48/EC on consumer credit agreements and Directive 2008/122/EC 
on timeshare contracts and features also in the proposed Directive on Consumer Rights.    
995 19(1). An electronic contract shall not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability  
               solely on the grounds that it is wholly or partly in electronic form, or has been concluded  
               wholly or partly by way of electronic communication. 
(2). In the formation of a contract, an offer, acceptance of an offer or any related communication  
      (including any subsequent amendment, cancellation or revocation of the offer or acceptance  
      of the offer) may, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, be communicated by means of an  
      electronic communication.      
    Electronic Commerce Act 2000 (No. 27 of 2000).   
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imposes unnecessarily burdensome obligations on legitimate directory companies or 
on the businesses that wish to advertise in them. The existing rules almost certainly 
add to the operating costs of bona fide directory companies and may strike businesses 
wishing to subscribe to these directories as inconvenient and burdensome.   
 
13.39. Though we are of the view that the existing requirement that orders for a first-
time directory entry must be submitted on an order form or other business stationery 
should be replaced by a provision that would permit such orders to be made by 
electronic means, we do not propose to make a recommendation as to the detail of 
such a provision.  The form and content of such a provision is outside our competence 
and should be the subject of consultation with directory companies and business 
interests, particularly organisations representing small and medium businesses. Any 
such provision should ensure, however, that there are effective safeguards against the 
activities of rogue directory companies and take appropriate account of relevant e-
commerce legislation.   
 
Renewal and Extension of Directory Entries 
13.40. Though the reform of the provisions regarding first-time directory entries 
requires further consultation and consideration, the rules regulating the renewal or 
extension of such entries do not give rise to the same issues and should be simplified 
and streamlined. With appropriate safeguards, the risk of abuse is sufficiently lower  
in the case of contracts for renewed or extended entries to justify less onerous 
regulation. We have examined the corresponding provisions in UK legislation and 
think that these strike an appropriate balance between the need to ensure adequate 
protection and to avoid excessive regulation. The Regulatory Reform (Unsolicited 
Goods and Services Act 1971) (Directory Entries and Demands for Payment) Order 
2005 provides that contracts for renewed or extended directory entries automatically 
satisfy the requirements governing payment for directory entries if certain stipulated 
conditions are met.  The most important of these conditions are as follows: 
 the form, content and distribution of the new issue or version of the directory, 
and of the new entry, are materially the same as the entry relating to the same 
business in the earlier issue or version of the directory; 
 
 if it was a term of the contract for the entry in the earlier directory that the 
business renew or extend the contract, the publisher of the directory must 
notify the business of the renewal before the start of the new contract and 
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inform it that it has a period of twenty one days within which to withdraw its 
consent from the renewal or extension of the contract; 
 
 if the parties to the earlier and new contract are different, that they have either 
entered into a novation agreement in respect of the earlier contract or the 
publisher has informed the business which is the subject of the directory entry 
of the new party to the contract. 
 
If these and the other specified conditions are met, the requirements regarding order 
forms and notes of agreement to charges do not apply.   
 
Invoices and Demand for Payment 
13.41. Section 49(1) of the 1980 Act provides that, for the purposes of the provisions 
regulating unsolicited goods and directory entries, any invoice or similar document, 
indicating a sum of money as if it were due, shall be regarded as asserting a right to 
payment. Section 49(2) provides that the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and 
Innovation may by order require that any invoice or similar document shall bear a 
prescribed statement that no claim is made to the payment.  Section 49(3) provides 
that a person who issues an invoice or similar document which does not comply with 
the requirements of an order made under section 49(2) shall be guilty of an offence.   
No orders have been made under section 49(2), however, since the enactment of the 
provision.  While the corresponding UK legislation originally contained a similar 
provision empowering the relevant Minister to make orders regulating the content and 
form of invoices and similar documents, it has been replaced by a provision that sets 
out the conditions which invoices must satisfy if they are not be regarded as asserting 
a right to payment.  These conditions require the invoice or other document: 
(a) to be clear, legible and comprehensible; and 
(b) to contain a statement in a prescribed form that the invoice is not a demand for 
payment, that there is no obligation to pay it, and that it is not a bill. 
 
We think that a provision of this kind would afford useful guidance in the case of both 
directories and unsolicited goods and should apply to the statutory provisions in both 
these areas.  
 
13.42 Recommendations 
Section 48 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 should be 
amended to permit agreement to a charge for a first-time directory entry to be 
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made on a durable medium where there has been prior provision of prescribed 
information about the directory and the charge.   
 
The rules at Section 48 regulating orders for first-time directory entries should 
also be revised to permit such orders to be made by electronic means.  The 
content of the future rules should be the subject of consultation with directory 
companies and business groups in order to ensure that effective safeguards are 
maintained against the activities of rogue directory companies.        
 
Section 48 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 should be 
further amended to provide that the requirements relating to orders and 
payment for renewed or extended directory entries should be simplified along 
the lines set out in the UK Regulatory Reform (Unsolicited Goods and Services 
Act 1971) (Directory Entries and Demands for Payment) Order 2005.    
 
Section 49(2) of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 should be 
repealed and replaced by a provision indicating the conditions which an invoice 
or similar document must satisfy if it is not to be regarded as asserting a right to 
payment.  
 
Future legislative provisions on directory entries should take full account of e-
commerce legislation currently in force.   
 
SECTIONS 51-54 SALE OF GOODS AND SUPPLY OF SERVICES ACT 1980  
13.43. Sections 51-54 of the Sale of Goods Act deal with the powers of the Minister 
for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation to make orders in respect of the following matters 
relating to contracts:996 
 Section 51 provides that the Minister may, by order, following such 
consultation as he considers necessary, require that a seller of a specified class 
                                                 
996 Section 50 which gave the Minister the power, by order, to apply a right of withdrawal from 
contracts entered into at a place other than the place of business of the business party to the contract (or 
‘in other specified circumstances’) was repealed by the Consumer Credit Act 1995 (section 19 and 
schedule 2).  No regulations had been made under the section, and a broadly similar purpose had 
subsequently been met by the right of withdrawal from consumer off-premises contracts conferred by 
Directive 85/577/EEC on contracts negotiated away from business premises as given effect by the 
European Communities (Cancellation of Contracts Negotiated Away from Business Premises) 
Regulations 1989 (S.I. No.. 224/1989).   
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of goods or a supplier of a specified class of service shall include such 
particulars as are specified in the order in any specified class of contract or in 
any guarantee, notice or other writing in relation to such contract. 
 
 Section 52 provides that the Minister may by order require, in relation to any 
person acting in the course of a business who makes use of a standard form 
contract for the sale or letting of goods, the supply of a service, or a hire-
purchase agreement, that the person shall give such notice to the public as the 
order may specify as to his use of such standard form contract and as to 
whether he is or is not willing to contract on any other terms. 
 
 Section 53 provides that the Minister may by order prohibit, in relation to 
goods or services generally on in relation to any specified class of goods or 
services, any seller of such goods or supplier of such services in the course of 
a business from making use of any printed contract, guarantee or other 
specified class of document unless it is printed in type of at least such size as 
the order prescribes. 
 
 Section 54 provides that the Minister may by order provide, in relation to 
goods or services of a class described in the order, that a contract for the sale 
of goods, the supply of a service, or an agreement for a letting of goods (other 
than a hire-purchase agreement or a consumer hire agreement) shall, where the 
buyer, hirer or recipient deals as a consumer be in writing, and any such 
contract not in writing shall not be enforceable against the buyer, hirer or 
recipient. 
  
A person contravening an order made under any of these sections is guilty of an 
offence. 
 
Issues Arising   
13.44. The most salient fact about sections 51-54 of the 1980 Act is that, in the thirty 
years in which they have been in force, not a single order has been made under any of 
the sections. This fact notwithstanding, it is clearly necessary and desirable that the 
legislation to replace the 1980 Act should contain a provision empowering the 
Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation to make regulations relating to the form 
and/or substance of contracts for the supply of goods and services. Two specific 
issues that might be the subject of such regulations have been brought to our attention: 
(i) the use of small print in consumer contracts and (ii) the mandatory issuing of 





Small Print in Consumer Contracts 
13.45. There is no general statutory regulation of the form or presentation of 
consumer contracts in Ireland, in particular the size of the print used in such contracts.  
The provision at section 53 of the 1980 Act empowering the Minister for Jobs, 
Enterprise and Innovation to make either general or sector-specific regulations 
governing the size print in contracts and other documents has, as we have seen, not 
been utilised in the three decades since its enactment.  Some sectoral rules, however, 
contain provisions of this kind, notably the Consumer Protection Code issued by the 
Financial Regulator.997 In the case of distance contracts, the European Communities 
(Protection of Consumers in Respect of Contracts Made by Means of Distance 
Communications) Regulations 2001 provide that the information prescribed by the 
Regulations must be provided in a ‘clear and comprehensible manner which is 
appropriate to the means of distance communication used’.  If this requirement is not 
met, the contract is not enforceable by the supplier.  Regulation 5(1) of the European 
Communities (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) Regulations 1995 which give 
effect to the Directive 93/13/EEEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts provides 
that: 
   In the case of contracts where all or certain terms offered to the consumer are in  
   writing, the seller or supplier shall ensure that terms are drafted in plain, intelligible  
   language.       
Recital 20 of the Directive states that ‘consumers should actually be given an 
opportunity to examine all the terms’.  Though the Directive makes no reference to 
legibility, some interpretations of its provisions take the view that a legibility 
requirement follows from the stipulation that written terms be intelligible.998  
                                                 
997 Regulated financial services entities must ensure that all printed information they provide to 
consumers is of a print size that is clearly legible.  They must also ensure that warnings required by the 
Code are prominent - that is, they must be in a box, in bold type and of a font size larger than the 
normal font size used in the document or advertisement.  Where small print or footnotes are used in 
advertisements for regulated entities, they should be of sufficient size and prominence to be clearly 
legible.  Financial Regulator, August 2006, Consumer Protection Code, pp. 2 , 13 & 35.  Some US 
states regulate the legibility of insurance contracts in detail by stipulating minimum print sizes, while 
some Australian States and Territories do likewise for consumer credit and/or hire purchase contracts.   
Australian Law Reform Commission.  1982.  Insurance Contracts (ALRC 20), paras. 36-37   
998 The Office of Fair Trading guidance on the UK Regulations which gives effect to the Directive 
states as follows: ‘Intelligibility also depends on how contracts are presented and used.  Obviously, 
print must be legible.  This depends not only on the size of the print used but also its colour, that of the 
background and the quality of the paper used.’  Office of Fair Trading.  2008. Unfair Contract Terms 
Guidance: Guidance for the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations, para. 19.8  In The 
Office of Fair Trading and Foxtons Ltd [2009] EWHC 1681 (Ch), Mann. J. took note of the very small 
type face used in some of the contract terms between the defendants, an estate and letting agent, and 
the landlords who used their services. It is not clear, however, to what extent the smallness of the print 
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13.46. Though courts have sometimes criticised the use of excessively small print in 
contract documents,999 it is likely that that they would be slow to absolve a 
contracting party from liability solely on the ground that the size of type rendered the 
contract terms illegible.  In D & J Koskas v Standard Marine Insurance Co. Ltd1000, 
Sankey J. expressed the view that a clause presented in a very small print size should 
be ignored. The Court of Appeal disagreed, however, with the judge’s assessment of 
the legibility of the document,1001 and Scrutton LJ. commented more broadly as 
follows on the relation between the legibility and validity of contract terms:1002   
    I am rather afraid of the doctrine that you can get out of clauses by saying they are  
    difficult to read.  There may be extreme cases.  I have in mind the bill of a well- 
    known shipping company printed on red paper which was calculated to produce  
    blindness in anyone reading.  I am not saying that in no case can you get out of it  
    on the point of illegibility, but this case does not appear to me to be a case in which  
    that doctrine should be applied.   
 
13.47. The issue of small print in consumer contracts has been highlighted by a 
campaign on the issue undertaken by the Dublin radio station, Q102.1003  The Make 
Small Print Big Print campaign was launched in response to concerns expressed by 
listeners to the station, its principal demand being that Irish law should require 
consumer contracts to use a standardised ten-point font size in plain typeface against a 
contrasting background.  The campaign was backed by consumer and business groups 
and received the support of the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment. When we first considered this question, it appeared that the introduction 
of regulations of this kind would be precluded by the full harmonisation character of 
the proposed Directive on Consumer Rights. Article 31(1) of the original text of the 
proposed Directive provided that written contract terms must be legible, and recital 47 
stated that, subject to this legibility requirement, traders ‘should be free to choose the 
font type or size in which the contract terms are drafted’. As discussed previously, 
                                                                                                                                            
of itself was a factor in the Court’s judgment that the contract terms relating to renewal and sales 
commission were in breach of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999.   
999 Goldsbrough v Ford Credit (Aust) Ltd [1989] ASC 55-946 at 58-584.  George T. Collings (Aust) Pty 
Ltd v H.F. Stevenson [1991] ASC 56-051.  
1000 (1926) 25 Ll L Rep 363 at 368.   
1001 (1927) 27 Ll L Rep 59. 
1002 Ibid. at 62.  In a more recent South African case, Fourie v Hansen [2000] JOL 5993 (W), however, 
the court held that the small font size in a contract document was one of the factors that rendered an 
exemption clause unenforceable.   
1003  Joint Committee on Enterprise, Trade and Employment: Small Print Campaign – Discussion with 
Q102.  Parliamentary Debates 28 May 2008,  
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however, Chapter V of the proposal in which these provisions were located has been 
deleted from the final text of the Directive with the result that unfair terms in 
consumer contracts will continue to be regulated by Directive 93/13/EEC. As this 
Directive is a minimum harmonisation instrument, it does not prevent EU member 
states from maintaining or introducing national legislative provisions that exceed its 
protections. Though we agree that the use of small print in consumer contracts should 
be subject to regulation, we do not consider ourselves qualified to make a detailed 
recommendation on the content of such regulations. The proposal that such contracts 
should be in ten-point font size or above and in plain typeface against a contrasting 
background appears reasonable in our opinion, but this and possible other elements of 
future Regulations on the issue should be the subject of further consultation with 
consumer and business interests and with professional bodies and others with a 
technical expertise in matters relating to legibility.1004   
 
Mandatory Receipts for Consumer Contracts 
13.48. The National Consumer Agency supports the introduction of a mandatory legal 
requirement on traders to issue receipts for consumer transactions. In the Agency’s 
view, consumers require a record of the fact and date of a transaction in order to 
ensure the effective application of their legal rights.  There is no general requirement 
on businesses to provide a receipt at present, though sectoral rules to this effect apply 
in some cases. The Taxi Regulation Act 2003 (Small Public Service Vehicles) 
(Amendment and Licensing) Regulations 2007 (S.I. No. 710 of 2007) require taxi 
services to provide printed receipts, and hackney and limousines to provide written 
receipts, and also prescribe the information to be provided on receipts.  The Consumer 
Protection Code for financial services provides, among other things, that regulated 
entities must provide a consumer with a receipt for each negotiable or non-negotiable 
instrument presented by the consumer as payment for a financial product or service 
provided by that entity.1005 The obligations on businesses engaged in off-premises 
transactions of  €50.79 or more to provide a written cancellation notice, and on those 
engaged in distance contracts to provide specified information in writing on a durable 
                                                 
1004 For a brief discussion of the factors influencing the legibility of type, see Reynolds, L. ‘The 
Legibility of Type’, http://designweb.cc.uic.edu/zhan/class/research/Legibility/html .   See also 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Insurance Contracts, op. cit. para. 35.  
1005 Financial Regulator, op. cit., p. 13 
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medium, effectively meet some of the same needs as a requirement for mandatory 
receipts in that they constitute a record of the transaction for the consumer.1006   
 
13.49. There is little or no dispute over the principle of requiring businesses to 
provide consumers with a receipt.  This is something that the great majority of 
businesses do as a matter of course.  If the receipt is to be effective as a transaction 
record, it must of course be retained by the consumer. We do not support, however, 
the introduction of a general requirement in primary legislation for the issue of 
receipts.  This would be an inflexible mechanism in our opinion, and one that would 
be difficult to alter and update.  We favour instead a legislative provision empowering 
the Minister for Enterprise, Jobs and Innovation to make regulations requiring the 
provision of receipts and to determine the scope and manner of application of such a 
requirement.  A number of practical issues require further consideration and 
consultation in this context.  Is it feasible or desirable to require receipts for low-value 
transactions given the practical difficulties of enforcing such a requirement?  While a 
mandatory receipt requirement would present no difficulties for large and medium-
sized retailers with electronic point of sale systems, it would be more problematical 
for some small retailers and service providers.  If a receipt requirement is to apply to 
such businesses, what form should it take?  These and other matters require further 
consideration and consultation of a kind that we were not in a position to undertake.   
 
13.50. Recommendations 
Regulations governing print size and related presentational issues in consumer 
contracts should be introduced. The content of such Regulations should be 
determined after consultation with business and consumer interests.     
 
The Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation should be empowered to make 
regulations requiring the issue of a receipt in consumer transactions.  The scope 
and manner of application of such a requirement should be the subject of 
consultation with business and consumer interests.   
 
                                                 
1006 European Communities (Cancellation of Contracts Negotiated Away from Business Premises) 
Regulations 1989 (S.I. No. 224/1989), Regulation 4.  European Communities (Protection of Consumers 
in Respect of Contracts Made by Means of Distance Communications) 2001 (S.I. No. 207/2001), 
Regulations 4 & 5.    
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN I NON-SALE CONTRACTS FOR THE 
SUPPLY OF GOODS AND II SALE OF GOODS AND SUPPLY OF 
SERVICES ACT 1980: SUPPLY OF SERVICES, SECTIONS 39-42 
 
14.1. The focus of previous Chapters of this Report has been on the contract of sale, 
defined by section 2(1) of the 1893 Act as a contract whereby the seller transfers or 
agrees to transfer the property in the goods to a buyer for a money consideration, 
called the price. There are a range of related transactions, however, which fall outside 
the definition of a contract of sale, whether because there is no transfer of property or 
only an option for such a transfer (contracts of hire, hire-purchase agreements), no 
consideration (gift) or no money consideration (barter or exchange), or no goods 
(contracts for services, or work and materials contracts in which the goods element is 
incidental). This Chapter will consider these different forms of transaction and the 
legislative provisions that currently regulate them. Part I will look at a variety of 
contracts involving the transfer of goods, and will focus in particular on the 
application or otherwise to such contracts of the implied statutory terms regarding 
title, sale by description, quality and fitness for purpose, and sale by sample. Part II of 
the Chapter will consider services contracts with no, or a secondary, goods element. 
 
I Hire-Purchase, Hire, Gift and Barter 
Hire-Purchase and Hire Contracts 
14.2. A hire-purchase contract involves a hire or bailment of goods in return for a 
schedule of instalment payments over a prescribed period and with an option to 
purchase the goods at the end of that period.1007 Though the hirer is not legally 
obliged to purchase the goods, this is the usual outcome. The owner of the goods 
remains the owner until the final payment is made and, subject to specified 
conditions, can repossess the goods if the hirer defaults on his payments. The efficacy 
of hire-purchase agreements was upheld in two rulings made by the House of Lords in 
1895, shortly after the enactment of the Sale of Goods Act 1893. In McEntire v 
Crossley Bros,1008 it was held that a hire-purchase contract did not come within the 
Bills of Sales Acts and was thus not subject to the formalities and registration 
                                                 
1007 The main part of the definition of ‘hire-purchase agreement’ at section 2(1) of the Consumer Credit 
Act 1995 states that it ‘means an agreement for the bailment of goods under which the hirer may buy 
the goods or under which the property in the goods will, if the terms of the agreement are complied 
with, pass to the hirer in return for periodical payments.’   
1008 [1895] AC 457.   
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procedure prescribed by these Acts for documents recording the transfer of ownership 
in goods. In Helby v Matthews,1009 it was held that a person in possession of goods 
under a hire-purchase agreement had not bought or agreed to buy them within the 
meaning of section 25 of the 1893 Act.  As a result, the hirer could not pass title to the 
goods to a third party, thereby ensuring that the owner’s property interest in the goods 
was fully protected.  While these judgements were satisfactory from the point of view 
of the owners of goods and facilitated the growth of hire purchase arrangements in the 
first half of the twentieth century, their effect was to deprive hirers of the protections 
of the 1893 Act, a position confirmed by the Irish courts in B.P. v Smyth.1010 As we 
noted in Chapter 1, this gap was addressed by the Oireachtas in the Hire Purchase Act 
1946 which, inter alia, implied conditions and warranties into hire-purchase 
agreements regarding the hirer’s entitlement to quiet possession of the goods, the 
owner’s right to sell the goods, the merchantable quality of the goods, and their fitness 
for any particular purpose made known by the hirer. A provision in the hire-purchase 
agreement excluding or modifying these conditions and warranties could not be relied 
upon unless the owner could prove that, before the agreement was made, the relevant 
provision had been brought to the notice of the hirer and its effect made clear to 
him.1011  As section 55 of the 1893 Act then permitted exclusion clauses to operate 
without restriction in contracts of sale, hirers of goods under hire-purchase 
agreements thus enjoyed greater protections than buyers in this respect.    
 
14.3. Part III of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 updated and 
revised the provisions of the Hire-Purchase Act 1946 on implied statutory 
undertakings relating to goods and the exclusion of these implied undertakings.  Other 
aspects of hire-purchase agreements continued to be regulated by the Hire Purchase 
Acts 1946 and 1960. The effect of the amendments made by the 1980 Act was to put  
the implied undertakings applicable to hire-purchase agreements on the same basis as 
                                                 
1009 [1895] AC 471.  
1010 (1931) 65 I.L.T.R. 182.   
1011 In the second stage speech on the Bill, the then Minister for Industry and Commerce, Seán Lemass 
T.D., stated that: ‘Another source of abuse in regard to hire-purchase agreements is that the anxiety of 
persons in poorer circumstances to avail themselves of hire-purchase facilities provides an opportunity 
for owners to dispose of inferior quality goods to such persons who, when they find the goods are 
unsatisfactory, may also discover that the hire-purchase agreements into which they entered, precludes 
them from suing the owner of the goods for breach of warranty.’  He added that the effect of the Bill 
would be to provide ‘that the same conditions as to quality, warranty, and the like, will apply to hire-
purchase transactions as to ordinary commercial transactions.’ Dáil Debates, Vol. 100, 01 May 1946, 
Hire-Purchase Bill 1946 Second Stage: col. 2252.   
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those applicable to contracts of sale under the 1893 and 1980 Acts in respect of 
freedom from undisclosed charges or encumbrances and the right to quiet possession, 
correspondence with description and sample, quality and fitness for purpose, spare 
parts and after-sale service, the safety of motor vehicles, and statements purporting to 
restrict the rights of the hirer. The provisions regulating exclusion clauses in 
consumer and commercial hire-purchase agreements were also put on the same 
footing as those applying to contracts of sale following the 1980 Act’s amendment of 
section 55 of the 1893 Act, namely that such clauses were void in consumer sales 
contracts but, the implied undertakings as to title aside, enforceable in commercial 
sales contracts where shown to be fair and reasonable.  
 
14.4. Part III of the 1980 Act also extended conditions and warranties similar to those 
implied into hire-purchase agreements to goods let otherwise than under a hire 
purchase contract, thereby applying statutory protections of this kind to hire contracts 
for the first time.  A contract of hire is one in which the owner bails or agrees to bail 
goods to the hirer by way of hire without any intention for the property in the goods to 
pass.  Unlike the corresponding sections of the 1980 Act on hire-purchase agreements, 
however, the provisions on contracts of hire applied only where the hirer dealt as 
consumer, thereby leaving commercial hire contracts outside the scope of the Act.   
 
14.5. The provisions of Part III of the 1980 Act on hire-purchase and consumer hire 
agreements were repealed and re-enacted in substantially unchanged form in the 
Consumer Credit Act 1995. The main purpose of the 1995 Act was to give effect to 
Directive 87/102/EEC on consumer credit and a subsequent amending instrument, 
Directive 90/88/EEC.1012  Though the provisions on implied conditions and warranties 
were left broadly unchanged, the opportunity was taken to amend other parts of the 
legislation relating to hire-purchase and hire agreements and to repeal the Hire 
Purchase Acts 1946 and 1960. Unlike the 1980 Act and the Hire Purchase Acts 1946 
& 1960, however, the scope of the provisions on hire-purchase agreements in the 
1995 Act is restricted to transactions where the hirer is a consumer.1013  The 1995 Act 
                                                 
1012 These Directives have since been repealed and replaced by Directive 2008/122/EC on consumer 
credit agreements.  The latter Directive was given effect by the European Communities (Consumer 
Credit Agreements) Regulations 2010 (S.I.No. 281 of 2010).   
1013 Section 3(1) provides that the Act applies to credit, hire-purchase and consumer-hire agreements  
‘to which a consumer is a party’, this last clause having been inserted at Committee stage in Seanad 
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requires hire-purchase agreements and consumer hire agreements to contain a 
statement that the hirer has a right to withdraw from the agreement without penalty on 
submission of a written notice to this effect within ten days of receipt of a copy of the 
agreement.1014 Part VII of the Act also introduced new provisions on the content and 
enforceability of consumer hire agreements, defined as agreements of more than three 
months’ duration for the bailment of goods to a hirer under which the property in the 
goods remains with the owner. It further places an obligation on the hirer to take 
reasonable care of the goods let to him under a consumer hire agreement. It left 
unchanged, however, the exclusion of commercial hire agreements from the scope of 
the statutory provisions.  This issue arose for consideration in Flynn v Dermot Kelly 
Ltd and New Holland Finance (Ireland) Ltd
1015 in which the plaintiff, a farmer, took 
out a four-year lease on a tractor with the second-named defendant, a finance and 
leasing company which had bought it from the first-named defendant, a seller of farm 
equipment, following an approach to the latter by the plaintiff. After the tractor was 
destroyed by fire, the plaintiff claimed damages on the ground that the vehicle was 
not of merchantable quality and was unfit for its intended purpose. O’Neill J. held 
that, as the leasing agreement was not a consumer hire contract, it did not come within 
the implied undertakings as to quality and fitness under the Consumer Credit Act 
1995. As the agreement was not a contract of sale, the implied conditions under the 
Sale of Goods Acts did not apply either. The court found, however, that the 
commercial reality of the transaction dictated the existence of a collateral contract 
between the plaintiff and the first-named defendant under which this defendant had 
agreed to sell the tractor to the leasing company in return for the plaintiff entering a 
leasing agreement. The conditions as to quality implied by the Acts were applicable to 
this contract, and their breach rendered the first-named defendant liable to the plaintiff 
in damages.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
Eireann in order, according to the Minister for State at the Department of Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment, to make it ‘clear beyond all doubt that the Bill applies only to agreements entered into by 
consumers and not to anybody else.’  (Seanad Debates, Vol. 144: Consumer Credit Bill 1994, 
Committee and Final Stages, col. 486).  The definition of ‘hirer’ at section 2(1) of the 1995 states that it 
‘means a consumer who takes, intends to take or has taken goods from an owner under a hire-purchase 
agreement or a consumer-hire agreement in return for periodical payments.’   
1014 Section 50 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 had contained a provision 
empowering the Minister for Industry, Commerce and Tourism to provide by order for a cooling-off 
period for contracts of sale, hire purchase agreements and letting agreements.  No such order was 
made, however, and the section was repealed by the Consumer Credit Act 1995.  
1015 [2007] IEHC 103.   
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Gift and Barter  
14.6. A gift is not a contract at common law by virtue of the absence of consideration.  
A person making a gift, therefore, owes no obligations to the beneficiary either at 
common law or under statute in respect of title, correspondence with description and 
sample, quality, and fitness for purpose. There is uncertainty, however, regarding 
goods supplied as ‘free’ offers or gifts under promotional schemes. The provision of 
such ‘free’ gifts is a common feature of modern retail and business practice, whether 
in return for the purchase of a particular item (‘buy one, get one free’), or a purchase 
above a specified threshold (‘free gift with purchases over €50’), or as part of loyalty 
schemes or similar arrangements. In Esso Petroleum Ltd v Customs and Excise 
Commissioners,1016 garages selling petrol advertised a ‘free’ gift of a coin bearing the 
likeness of a football player to be given to customers purchasing four or more gallons 
of petrol. The matter at issue was whether the coins were the subject of a contract of 
sale, in which case they would be liable for purchase tax. A majority of the House of 
Lords held that there was no sale, but divided on the question of whether the coins 
were the subject of a gift or of a collateral contract separate from the contract of sale.  
In a number of recent cases, however, the courts have been more prepared to take the 
view that goods ostensibly given for nothing under promotional campaigns have in 
fact been paid for under the contract for the sale of goods or the supply of services.  In 
Kuwait Petroleum v Customs & Excise Commissioners,1017 Laddie J. observed of ‘buy 
one get one free’ offers that: 
   There is a limit to the gullibility of ordinary members of the public.  A promotion of  
   that kind would not persuade most customers that they were really getting half of  
   their acquisitions free.  They would think that they were receiving each of the  
   products at half price and that they were paying for both.   
This analysis has been followed in subsequent cases.1018 As these cases have 
concerned the tax liability of businesses in respect of goods supplied in the course of 
promotional campaigns, however, it cannot necessarily be assumed that the same 
reasoning would be followed in cases concerning the application of implied quality 
and other conditions to the gratuitous supply of goods in such circumstances.      
 
                                                 
1016 [1976] 1 W.L.R. 1.   
1017 [2001] STC 62 at 74.  
1018 Tesco plc v Customs and Excise Commissioners [2003] EWCA Civ. 1367.  British Dental 
Association v Revenue Customs Commissioners [2010] SFTD 757.  
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14.7. The definition of contract of sale in the 1893 Act stipulates that the 
consideration tendered in return for the transfer of the property in the goods must be 
in money. This differentiates sales contracts from contracts of barter and exchange 
where goods are exchanged for other goods, for services rendered, or for other forms 
of non-monetary consideration. Where a monetary value is put on the goods to be 
exchanged, particularly where there is also part-payment in cash, the transaction is 
likely to be regarded as a contract of sale. In Aldridge v Johnson,1019 an agreement to 
exchange 52 bullocks valued at £192 plus £23 for 100 quarters of barley valued at 
£215 was treated by the court as a contract of sale.  In Flynn v Mackin & Mahon,1020  
a car was traded for another car plus £250. The court held that the transaction was a 
barter as no monetary value had been put on the cars.1021 As Atiyah notes,1022 there 
are differences of opinion about the approach to be taken to such transactions: 
    One view is that the answer depends upon whether the money or the goods is the  
    substantial consideration… However, the proper characterisation of a contract  
    depends, in the last resort, on the intention of the parties so long only as they do not  
    include provisions manifestly inconsistent with the intended nature of the  
    transaction.  So, it may well be that, if the parties envisage the transaction as a sale  
    and use terminology more appropriate to a sale, the contract would be held to be  
    such even if substantial consideration is supplied in goods rather than money.  In  
    the motor trade it is, of course, a common occurrence for a person to ‘trade in’ an  
    old car in part-exchange for a new one and, if the transaction relating to the new car  
    is treated by the parties as a sale, it is improbable that the courts would treat it as  
    anything else, even if the dealer’s allowance for the traded-in car does not fall far  
    short of the price of the new one.   
 
14.8. There is little or no statutory regulation of these types of non-sale transaction in 
Ireland. Section 8 of the Trading Stamps Act 1980 states that the provisions of the 
1893 and 1980 Acts shall apply in every case where the promoter of a trading stamp 
scheme offers goods or services in exchange for trading stamps. It further provides 
that, where a person other than a promoter of a trading stamp scheme offers goods or 
services in exchange for trading stamps, the provisions of the Acts shall apply in the 
same way as if that exchange were for a monetary consideration. The Act was framed 
with reference to the trading stamps schemes in operation in the 1960s and 1970s, 
                                                 
1019 [1857] 7 E & B 855.  
1020 [1974] I.R. 101. For a critical analysis of this judgement, see Canton, ‘Sale of Goods and Barter’, 
(1976) MLR  (38) 589.    
1021 In Chappell & Co. Ltd v Nestlé Co. Ltd [1960] A.C. 87, a gramophone record was offered in return 
for a sum of money and a number of chocolate wrappers. Lord Reid expressed doubts obiter whether 
the transaction could be considered a sale.   
1022 Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 10. 
 419
however, and is of limited relevance to the loyalty schemes that are their nearest   
present-day equivalent.1023 The fact that the Act made special provision for the 
implication in such transactions of the statutory undertakings applicable to contracts 
of sale suggests, however, that the exchange of trading stamps, vouchers or other 
coupons for goods was regarded as a barter and not a sale.    
 
Issues Arising 
14.9. The first issue raised by the various non-sale transactions discussed in the 
preceding paragraph concern the gaps in the statutory regulation of these transactions.  
The main such gaps are as follows: 
 While the terms implied into consumer hire-purchase and hire agreements and  
are similar to those implied into contracts of sale, commercial hire-purchase 
and hire agreements are not subject to any statutory regulation in respect of 
implied conditions and warranties.  The definition of consumer hire contract is 
also restrictive in that it covers only contracts of more than three months’ 
duration. 
 Contracts of ‘pure’ barter or exchange are outside the scope of the implied 
statutory undertakings.  While exchange contracts in which a monetary value 
is ascribed to the goods being exchanged may be covered by the implied 
undertakings, the matter remains to be settled conclusively.  
 There is some uncertainty in regard to free ‘gifts’ supplied by retailers or other 
businesses as part of promotional campaigns. The position of goods supplied 
for no direct monetary consideration under loyalty schemes is also uncertain 
and would not appear to be covered by the Trading Stamps Act 1980.  
 
The second issue relates to the fact that the implied undertakings regarding goods are 
set out in separate statutes for different types of transaction – the Sale of Goods Acts 
1893 for contracts of sale, the Sale of Good and Supply of Services Act 1980 for work 
and materials contracts,1024 the Consumer Credit Act 1995 for consumer hire-purchase 
and hire agreements, and the Trading Stamps Act 1980 for goods supplied in 
exchange for trading stamps. As these provisions are similar in their purpose and 
substance, regulatory simplification would be furthered by their consolidation. This 
would make the law clearer and more accessible for both businesses and consumers.   
 
                                                 
1023 The Act’s definition of ‘trading stamp’ excludes stamps, coupons, or similar devices redeemable 
only from the seller of the goods, or his supplier, or the person who provides the services.  Present-day 
loyalty schemes, however, are redeemable in many cases only from the seller of the goods or the 
supplier of the services.    
1024 Though as discussed at paragraph 14.39, the terms as to goods implied into contracts for work and 
materials under section 39 of the 1980 Act are more limited than the equivalent implied terms for 
goods supplied under contracts of sale and hire-purchase and consumer hire agreements.     
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14.10. The policy objectives in this area of sales law are clear-cut and straightforward 
in our view.  Other than where adjustments are required by virtue of the nature of the 
contract, such as the inapplicability to contracts of hire of the implied condition that 
the seller has the right to sell the goods, the implied conditions and warranties 
governing goods supplied under different kinds of transaction should be identical in 
substance and form. As well as making the law less complex, this would minimise the 
practical effects of differences in the classification of contracts. Though the courts 
have shown themselves willing to apply rules analogous to those applying to contracts 
of sale to related non-sale contracts,1025 it would be preferable in our view to address 
gaps in the current coverage of the statutory provisions through appropriate legislative 
changes.  As in other areas, a limited reform agenda and a more wide-ranging one can 
be identified. The limited reform agenda would tackle the most obvious gap in the 
existing  statutory framework – the absence of regulation of commercial hire-purchase 
and hire contracts and the restriction of consumer hire agreements to contracts of 
more than three months’ duration – and leave other questions (contracts for barter, the 
provision of ‘free’ gifts under promotional and loyalty schemes) to be determined by 
the courts on a case-by-case basis. Though this would be an improvement on the 
status quo, it would not represent a sufficient measure of reform in our opinion.   
 
14.11. Two possible models for a more comprehensive scheme of reform can be 
identified.  First, Part I of the UK Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 applies 
implied terms as to title, correspondence with description and sample, quality and 
fitness for purpose modelled on the statutory obligations of the sellers of goods to 
contracts for the hire of goods and to contracts for the transfer of goods.1026 A contract 
for the transfer of goods is defined as a contract under which one person transfers or 
agrees to transfer to another the property in goods, other than an excepted contract. 
An ‘excepted’ contract is a contract of sale; a hire-purchase agreement; a contract in 
which the property in goods is transferred in exchange for trading stamps; a transfer 
or agreement to transfer made by deed; and a contract intended to operate by way of 
mortgage, pledge, charge or other security.  Part I of the Act further provides that a 
                                                 
1025 In Young and Marten Ltd v McManus Childs Ltd [1969] 1 AC 454, the House of Lords referred to 
the undesirability of drawing unnecessary distinctions between different types of contract and treated a 
contact for work and materials like a contract of sale in respect of the implied undertakings as to goods. 
1026 The Act’s provisions were based on the recommendations of the 1979 report of the Law 
Commission  on Implied Terms in Contracts for the Supply of Goods (Law Com. No. 95). 
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contract is a contract for the transfer of goods whether or not services are also 
provided and, subject to exemptions of excepted contracts, whatever the nature of the 
consideration for the transfer. Its provisions apply, therefore, to contracts of hire, 
contracts of barter, and to the supply of goods under contracts for work and materials. 
Legislative provisions along these lines would, particularly if consolidated with the 
implied conditions and warranties applicable to contracts of sale, address the main 
issues raised by the current fragmented statutory framework. As a result of the 
requirement to adopt the definition of ‘sales contract’ in the proposed Consumer 
Rights Directive discussed at paragraphs 3.4 to 3.7, goods supplied under a consumer 
contract for work and materials would be treated on the same basis as goods supplied 
under a consumer contract of sale.    
 
14.12. The approach taken by the New Zealand Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 offers 
a not dissimilar reform option.  Part I of the Act contains a unified framework for 
goods transactions which, in a single set of provisions, applies a range of guarantees, 
including in respect of title, quality, compliance with description and sample, to 
contracts for the supply of goods by a person in trade to a consumer by way of gift, 
sale, exchange, lease, hire or hire purchase. Part 2 of the Act then sets out the right of 
redress against suppliers in respect of these various forms of supply of goods.  The 
Act covers only the supply of goods and services to consumers; commercial contracts 
of sale in New Zealand remain subject to the Sale of Goods 1908, an enactment that 
retains the structure and the main rules of the Sale of Goods Act 1893.  We would not 
favour a restriction of this kind, however, and consider that a unified comprehensive 
framework should apply to the implied statutory undertakings governing both 
commercial and consumer transactions involving the supply of goods.   
 
14.13. The approach followed in New Zealand raises the interesting question as to 
whether there is merit in having a separate statute for the core provisions applicable to 
consumer contracts. The New Zealand Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 deals 
essentially with the implied quality and other terms applicable to contracts for the 
supply of goods and services and with the remedies available to consumers for 
breaches of these implied terms.  Provisions relating to other aspects of consumer 
sales – transfer of property, transfer of title, the rights of unpaid sellers against the 
goods etc – continue to be dealt with, together with all of the provisions applicable to 
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commercial contracts of sale, in the Sale of Goods Act 1908. The advantage of this 
approach is that it brings together in a readily accessible form the statutory provisions 
that are of most practical significance for consumer contracts.  Though, as we have 
made clear throughout this Report, we favour the retention of a common legal basis 
for consumer and commercial contracts of sale, this would not preclude, nor be 
inconsistent with, the introduction of a separate statute governing the main aspects of 
consumer contract rights.  In  addition to the implied terms governing consumer 
contracts  for the sale and supply of goods and the supply of services and the remedies 
for breaches of those terms, such a statute could incorporate the provisions of the 
recently agreed Consumer Rights Directive which deal mainly with distance and off-
premises contracts as well as the provisions which give effect to Directive 93/13/EEC 
on Unfair Contract Terms. We think that there would be considerable benefit to both 
consumers and businesses in bringing together in this way the main statutory 
provisions applicable to consumer contract rights. The gains from doing so would, in 
our view, outweigh the disadvantages resulting from the fact that two Acts would be 
required rather than a single, larger Act dealing with all aspects of both commercial 
and consumer contracts for the sale and supply of goods and the supply of services.  
 
14.14. Recommendations 
The implied undertakings as to goods currently contained in separate statutes 
for different types of transaction (sale, hire-purchase, consumer hire, work and 
materials) or not covered by statutory provisions (commercial hire-purchase and 
hire agreements, barter/exchange) should be consolidated in future legislation.   
The concept of ‘contract for the transfer of goods’ in the UK Supply of Goods 
and Services Act 1982 offers a suitable framework for such consolidation.   
 
A separate Consumer Contract Rights Act should be enacted that would 
incorporate the main statutory provisions applicable to consumer contracts, 
including the provisions of the recently agreed Consumer Rights Directive and of 
Directive 93/13/EC on Unfair Contract Terms. Provisions relating to other non-
core aspects of consumer contracts of sale should be dealt with, together with all 
of the provisions applicable to commercial contracts, in a new Sale and Supply of 
Goods and Supply of Services Act.  
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The implied statutory undertakings as to goods applicable to consumer hire-
purchase and hire agreements under Parts VI and VII of the Consumer Credit 
Act 1995 should apply also to commercial hire-purchase and hire agreements in 
future legislation.  
 
The restriction of the definition of hire agreement in the Consumer Credit Act 
1995 to contracts of more than three months’ duration should not be retained in 
future legislation. There is no equivalent restriction in the corresponding 
legislation in other common law jurisdictions.  A hire of goods by a consumer or 
business for two weeks or two months should benefit from the same implied 
undertakings on quality, fitness for purpose and other matters as a hire of goods 
for four months.   
 
Future legislation should clarify that goods supplied ‘free’ or at a reduced price 
when bought in conjunction with other goods under promotional campaigns are 
subject to the same implied quality and other terms as goods purchased for a 
price.   
 
Future legislation should also clarify that goods supplied under loyalty schemes 
are subject to the same implied quality and other terms as goods supplied under 
a contract of sale.     
 
II PART IV SALE OF GOODS AND SUPPLY OF SERVICES ACT 1980 ACT: 
SUPPLY OF SERVICES  
14.15. Part IV of the 1980 Act, comprising sections 39-42, constituted the main 
innovation of the Act in that, almost a century after legislation of general application 
was first enacted to regulate the quality of goods, it introduced statutory standards 
governing the quality of services.  Prior to the enactment of these provisions, there 
was an implied term at common law in contracts for work and materials that the work 
was performed competently and that any materials used were reasonably fit for their 
intended purpose.1027 Unlike much of Irish law on the sale of goods and supply of 
services, moreover, Part IV of the 1980 Act was not modelled on prior UK 
                                                 
1027 Myers v Brent Cross Service Co [1934] 1 KB 46.   
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legislation.1028 The Whincup report on consumer protection law prepared for the 
National Prices Commission in 1973 had recommended that legislation should 
provide for an implied warranty of reasonable fitness of services for normal or 
specified purposes, though it also noted the very limited statutory regulation of 
consumer service contracts in other jurisdictions.1029 In introducing the provisions of 
this Part of the 1980 Act, the then Minister of State at the Department of Industry, 
Commerce and Energy stated that their aim was to bring the law regulating the quality 
of services into line with that regulating the quality of goods:1030 
    There is no reasonable basis on which suppliers of services should be exempt from  
    the implied conditions and warranties as to the quality of the service as are  
    obligatory on  a seller of goods.  Indeed, one could argue that the need for adequate  
    protection for a consumer is all the greater in the case of a service because in a sale  
    of goods the consumer can at least see and examine a given product.  However, this  
    is not generally the case with a service. When the latter is involved, the buyer may  
    well be purchasing an expertise about which he may know very little unless he  
    happens to have a degree of technical or specialised knowledge that the average  
    person does not have.   
 
14.16. The main provisions of Part IV of the 1980 Act are as follows: 
 Section 39 provides that, in every contract for the supply of a service, where 
the supplier is acting in the course of a business, the following terms are 
implied –  
           (a) that the supplier has the necessary skill to render the service, 
           (b) that he will supply the service with due skill, care and diligence,  
           (c) that, where materials are used, they will be sound and reasonably fit for   
           the purpose for which they are required, and  
           (d) that, where goods are supplied under the contract, they will be of  
           merchantable quality within the meaning of section 14(3) of the Sale of    
           Goods Act 1893.    
 
 Section 40 deals with the exclusion of the implied terms under section 39.  It 
provides that any contract term implied by virtue of that section may be 
negatived or varied by:   
          - an express term of the contract,   
          - the course of dealing between the parties, or  
          - by usage if the usage be such as to bind both parties to the contract. 
                                                 
1028  Equivalent provisions were not introduced in UK legislation until the Supply of Goods and 
Services Act 1982 
1029 National Prices Commission.  1973.  Occasional Paper No. 9. Consumer Protection Law in 
America, Canada and Europe, pp. 117-128.  
1030 Dáil Debates, Vol. 316, 14 November 1979 Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Bill Second 
State: cols. 1660-61. 
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      Where the recipient of the contract deals as consumer, however, it must be  
      shown that the exclusion clause is (i) fair and reasonable by reference to the  
      criteria in the Schedule to the Act and (ii) has been specifically brought to the  
      attention of the consumer.   
 
 Section 41 deals with statements purporting to restrict the rights of recipients 
of services and is a counterpart to the corresponding provision on goods at 
section 11 of the 1980 Act.  It makes it an offence for a person in the course of 
a business to make statements in various forms which are likely to be taken as 
indicating that a right or the exercise of a right conferred by, or a liability 
arising by virtue of section 39, is restricted or excluded other than as provided 
for in section 40.   
 
 Section 42 is a conflict of laws provision similar to that governing conflict of 
laws in sales contracts inserted in section 55A. of the 1893 Act by section 23 
of the 1980 Act.  
 
14.17. Section 39 has given rise to litigation in cases involving the supply of services 
to both consumers and businesses. The consumer cases have mainly involved package 
holiday contracts, presumably because these contracts are typically among the largest 
items of consumer expenditure on services.1031 In O’Flynn v Balkan Tours Ltd,1032  
the requirement on the tour operator to supply the service with due skill, care and 
diligence was held to encompass the provision of information about ski runs in a ski 
resort. In McKenna v Best Travel Ltd,1033 the plaintiff claimed a breach of the implied 
condition of due skill, care and diligence after a coach on which she was travelling in 
the course of a trip to Bethlehem organised by the defendants was hit by a rock during 
political disturbances, causing her serious injury. The High Court held that the tour 
company had exercised due care in accordance with section 39 and rejected the claim 
of breach of the implied condition, though it found that there had been a breach of the 
duty of care to the plaintiff in tort. In Irish Telephone Rentals v Irish Civil Service 
                                                 
1031 More recent cases have tended to be taken under the Package Holidays and Travel Trade Act 1995 
which gave effect to Directive 90/314/EEC on Package Travel, Package Holidays and Package Tours.   
See Scaife v Falcon Leisure Group [2007] IESC 57.  
1032 High Court, unreported 1 December 1995.  
1033 [1998] 3 IR 57.   
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Building Society Ltd,1034 the plaintiff contracted to install and maintain a telephone 
system in the defendant’s offices. While the system originally functioned 
satisfactorily, it subsequently proved unable to cope with increased levels of 
telephone traffic. The defendants terminated their contracts with the plaintiff and the 
latter sued for wrongful termination. Costello J. held that the defects in the telephone 
system amounted to a breach of the plaintiff’s express obligations under the contract 
and of the implied term under section 39 that goods supplied under a contract for the 
supply of a service should be of merchantable quality. A similar outcome would 
presumably have been reached had the implied terms applicable to consumer hire 
contracts also applied to commercial hire contracts, or had a corresponding common 
law duty been held to apply by the court.   
 
Issues Arising  
14.18. The provisions of Part IV of the 1980 Act on contracts for the supply of 
services give rise to a number of different issues. Some of these issues are 
symptomatic of the fact that the Act’s regulation of services is less detailed than that 
of goods under the 1893 and 1980 Acts. Though matters such as property and title 
which loom large in respect of goods have no equivalent in the case of services, it is 
revealing nevertheless that the statutory rules governing the sale of goods occupy over 
sixty sections of the 1893 and 1980 Acts compared with four sections for the supply 
of services. Part of the explanation for this divergence lies in the fact that, in the 
formative era of commercial statute law, services were a less important and developed 
component of economic activity than goods. This is no longer the case.  Services now 
account for close to two-thirds of gross domestic product in Ireland.1035  According to 
the most recent Household Budget Survey, thirty per cent of household income went 
on services and other expenditure, while there was also a substantial services element 
in some other expenditure categories such as transport and housing.1036 Queries and 
complaints about services also featured prominently among the approximately 40,000 
referrals to the National Consumer Agency in 2009 which related to the sale of goods 
and the supply of services; the sectors accounting for the largest number of referrals 
                                                 
1034 [1991] I.L.R.M. 880.    
1035 http://www.esri.ie/irish_economy  
1036 CSO.  2007. Household Budget Survey 204-05: Final Results, table .   
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were telecoms (5,465), travel/holidays (3,924) and house repairs (2,480).1037  There is 
no policy justification consequently for according a lower priority, or applying a 
lesser degree of stringency, to the regulation of services contracts.   
 
SCOPE OF PART IV 
14.19. Part IV of the 1980 Act on the supply of services was intended to be of general 
scope and application.  According to the second stage speech introducing the Bill:1038 
   These provisions apply to all suppliers of services in their contractual  
   relationships.  In other words, the term ‘services’ in this context extends to all  
   those areas in which the consumer today spends much of his disposable income on  
   travel, leisure, holidays, personal requisites, house repairs and so forth.   
Section 2(1) of the Act defines ‘service’ negatively, stating only that ‘it does not 
include meteorological or aviation services provided by the Minister for Transport or 
anything done under a contract of service’. Despite the intentions of the framers of the 
Act, a restrictive interpretation was given by the High Court to ‘contract for the 
supply of a service’ in Carroll  v. An Post National Lottery Co.1039  A Lotto agent 
authorised by the defendant had incorrectly entered the numbers requested by the 
plaintiff and, as a result of this error, the latter was denied a prize of £250,000.  The 
plaintiff argued, among other things, that the supply of the lottery ticket by the 
defendant was a contract for the supply of a service and that there had been a breach 
of the implied term of due skill, care and diligence under section 39 of the 1980 Act.  
Costello J. held  that section 39 did not apply to the contractual relation between the 
purchaser of a lottery ticket and the lottery company on the ground that the transaction 
was for the sale of ‘a  ticket which confers rights and obligations on the parties to the 
contract’ and not a contract for the supply of a service.  The curtailment of the scope 
of Part IV of the Act in this way is unsatisfactory in our view and should be addressed 
by the inclusion of a more detailed and expansive definition of services in future 
legislation. Other transactions involving the creation of rights and obligations, such as 
insurance contracts, would and should be regarded as services contracts. Examples of 
more comprehensive definitions of services can be found in the Consumer Protection 
Act 2007 and the New Zealand Consumer Guarantees Act 1993.  Section 2(1) of the 
first of these Acts states that ‘services’ means: 
                                                 
1037 National Consumer Agency.  Annual Report 2009, pp.   
1038 Dáil Debates, Vol. 316, 14 November 1979 Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Bill 1978 
Second Stage: cols. 1660-61. 
1039 1 IR 443.   
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    any service or facility provided for gain or reward or otherwise than free of charge,  
    including, without limitation -  
a) services or facilities for –  
(i) banking, insurance, grants, loans, credit or financing, 
(ii) amusement, cultural activities, entertainment, instruction,    
            recreation or refreshment, 
(iii) accommodation, transport, travel, parking, or storage, or  
(iv) the care of persons, animals or things,    
b) membership in a club or organisation or any service provided by the club or  
      organisation, and  
c) any rights, benefits, privileges, obligations or facilities that are, or are to be,  
      provided, granted or conferred in the course of services, 
    but does not include services provided under a contract of employment.   
 
14.20. The application of Part IV of the 1980 Act to various services currently or 
previously provided by State bodies remains subject to a number of exemptions:  
 As noted above, the definition of ‘service’ in section 2 of the Act excludes 
meteorological or aviation services provided by the Minister for Transport, 
Tourism and Sport. 
 
 Section 40(5) provides that nothing in section 40 shall invalidate a term of an 
agreement for the international carriage of passengers or goods by land, sea or 
air, including an agreement between parties whose places of business or 
residence are situated in the State.  
 
 Section 40(6) provides that Section 39 shall not apply to a contract for the 
carriage of passengers or goods by land, sea, air or inland waterway from one 
place to another within the State until such date, as the Minister for Enterprise, 
Jobs and Innovation, after consultation with the Minister for Transport, 
Tourism and Sport, by order provides whether in relation to such contracts 
generally or in relation to contracts of a class defined in the order in such 
manner and by reference to such matters as the Minister, after such 
consultation, thinks proper.  No such order has been made to date.   
 
Prior to its repeal by the Restrictive Practices (Amendment) Act 1987,1040 section 
40(5)(a) of the 1980 Act provided that nothing in section 40 of the Act ‘would 
invalidate a term of an agreement for the supply of electricity exempting the supplier 
from liability (arising otherwise than from negligence) for an interruption, variation or 
defect of supply’. Prior to its repeal by the Postal and Telecommunications Services 
(Amendment) Act 1999,1041 section 88(3) of the Postal and Telecommunications 
                                                 
1040 Restrictive Practices (Amendment) Act 1987 (No. 31 of 1987), s. 31. The then Minister for 
Industry and Commerce stated that the repeal of the provision relating to exemption clauses in 
electricity contracts was ‘in keeping with the policy of bringing regulated services within the scope of 
competition and consumer protection legislation.’  Dáil Debates. Vol. 374, 5 November 1987 
Restrictive Practices (Amendment) Bill 1987 Second Stage: col. 2492.   
1041 Postal and Telecommunications Services (Amendment) Act 1999 (No. 5 of 1999), s. 3 & First 
Schedule.  
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Services Act 1983 stated that section 39 would not apply to international 
telecommunications services provided by Bord Telecom Eireann and, until prescribed 
by Ministerial order, to telecommunications services provided by the company within 
the state. Prior to its repeal by the Communications Regulation (Postal Services) Act 
20111042, section 64(3) of the Postal and Telecommunications Act 1983 provided that 
section 39 would not apply to the provision of international postal services by An Post 
or, until prescribed by Ministerial order, to the provision of postal services within the 
state; no such order was made prior to the repeal of the section. The remaining 
restrictions on the scope of Part IV of the Act have no place in a competitive economy 
or in a modern regulatory system and should be repealed.  
 
14.21. Recommendations 
A broadly-based definition of ‘services’, modelled on the definition at section 2 of 
the Consumer Protection Act 2007, should be included in future legislation. This 
definition should remove the exclusion in the present definition of meteorological 
or transport services provided by the Minister for Transport. 
 
The present restrictions on the application of section 39, and on the applicability 
of exclusion clauses under section 40, to contracts for the carriage of passengers 
or goods should be removed.   
 
Contracts for Work and Materials 
14.22. No matter how detailed the definition of services in future legislation, however, 
some element of indeterminacy will almost certainly remain about what is, and is not, 
a contract for services. As discussed in Chapter 2 above, this applies in particular to 
what have traditionally been known as contracts for ‘work and materials’.  This term 
encompasses both contracts that result in the supply of goods (for example, a contract 
with a tailor to supply a suit) as well as those which, though involving the use of 
materials, do not result in the supply of goods (a contract with a housepainter to paint 
a house using paint that he supplies). Where such contracts involve the supply of  
goods, it is, as Benjamin has noted, ‘sometimes extremely difficult to decide whether 
a particular agreement is more properly described as a contract of sale of goods, or a 
                                                 
1042 Communications Regulation (Postal Services) Act 2011 (No. 21/2011), s.4 & Schedule 1.  
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contract for the performance of work or services to which the supply of materials or 
some other goods is incidental’.1043  Over time, the courts have devised various tests, 
not always consistent, for determining into which category a particular contract falls.  
The dominant approach involves an assessment of the ‘substance’ of the contract.  If 
this consists of the skill and labour of the supplier, the contract is one for services; if 
the substance of the contract is the end product, the goods to be supplied, it is a 
contract of sale. While this test has perhaps brought some clarity to the classification 
of this type of transaction, it has by no means resolved all of the matters at issue.1044 
 
14.23. As noted above, the terms implied into service contracts by virtue of section 39 
of the 1980 Act cover the skill and care exercised in the supply of the service, the 
soundness and fitness for purpose of any materials used, and the merchantable quality 
of any goods supplied.  This suggests a clear intention on the part of the legislature to 
treat contracts for work and materials as service contracts.1045 Matters are 
complicated, however, by the different approach to the categorisation of contracts for 
work and materials arguably taken by Directive 1999/44/EC on the Sale of Consumer 
Goods and Associated Guarantees. Article 1(4) of the Directive as given effect by the 
European Communities (Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and 
Associated Guarantees) Regulations 2003 provides that ‘contracts for the supply of 
consumer goods to be manufactured or produced shall be regarded as contracts of sale 
for the purpose of these Regulations’.1046 While a narrow reading of this provision 
might suggest that it refers simply to contracts for the sale of future goods, as is done 
at section 5(1) of the 1893 Act, it has been suggested that it covers contracts to 
produce and supply finished goods – in other words, contracts for work and 
materials.1047  This interpretation is supported by the use of the word ‘supply’ rather 
than ‘sale’ in Article 1(4) of the Directive and by the related provision at Article 2(3) 
that the seller is not liable for a lack of conformity originating in materials supplied by 
the consumer. The implication of the latter provision is that a contract in which a 
                                                 
1043 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, op. cit., para. 1-041. .  
1044 Ibid., pp. 41-43.  Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, op. cit., p. 26.   
1045 Grogan. V., et al.  Sale of Goods and Supply of Services: A Guide to the Legislation., op. cit.,   
pp. 86-87.   
1046  S.I. No. 11 of 2003, Regulation 2(4). 
1047 Bradgate, R. & Twigg-Flesner, Blackstone’s Guide to Consumer Sales and Associated 
Guarantees, op. cit.,  pp. 23-25.     
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supplier works on materials provided by a consumer to produce a finished good is a 
contract of sale within the meaning of the Directive.   
 
14.24. The divergent approach to the categorisation of contracts for works and 
materials taken by domestic Irish law and by Irish law implementing EU legislation is 
another example of the confusion that has resulted from the failure to date to integrate 
these two bodies of law.  Our recommendations in this Report are directed at bringing 
an end to this system of dual regulation. As stated previously, it is equally important 
to render the distinctions between different types of transaction as immaterial as 
practicable by minimising their consequences.  At present, the categorisation of a 
transaction as either a contract of sale or a contract for the supply of services can have 
significant consequences. Contracts of sale for sums in excess of €12.70 remain 
subject to the formalities requirements of section 4 of the 1893 Act while no such 
requirements apply to services contracts.  The provisions governing the exemption of 
the implied terms for services contracts are less restrictive than those applying to the 
implied terms for sales contracts. Our recommendations in both these areas would 
have the effect of putting sales and services contracts on a similar footing.   
 
Form and Content of the Implied Undertakings under Section 39  
14.25. Section 39 raises a number of issues: first, the status of the implied 
undertakings as ‘terms’ rather than conditions or warranties; second, the substance of 
the implied terms relating to the skill and care of the service supplier; and, third, the 
substance of the implied terms relating to the quality of materials used or goods 
supplied under a contract for the supply of a service.  We will look at each of these 
questions in turn.      
 
Form of the Implied Undertakings   
14.26. The implied undertakings in section 39 of the 1980 Act are expressly said to be 
terms of the contract. As discussed in Chapter 4, the equivalent undertakings in 
contracts of sale are classified by the 1893 and 1980 Acts as either conditions (breach 
of which may give rise to a right to treat the contract as repudiated) or warranties 
(breach of which may give rise to a right may give rise to a claim for damages, but not 
a right to reject the goods and treat the contract as repudiated).  Most of the main 
implied undertakings in contracts of sale – those relating to title, correspondence with 
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description, merchantable quality, fitness for particular purpose, and correspondence 
with sample – have the status of conditions.  Though the description of the implied 
undertakings in section 39 as terms might suggest a conscious intention to apply the 
category of innominate term first applied in Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd v. 
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd,1048 there is no firm evidence to this effect.1049  In Irish 
Telephone Rentals v. Irish Civil Service Building Society Ltd,1050 the issue arose as to 
whether the breach of the implied quality terms for goods supplied under a service 
contract caused by defects in a telephone system was such as to justify the repudiation 
of the contract.  Costello J. applied the test outlined in Hong Kong Fir as to whether 
the breach had the effect of depriving the injured party of substantially the whole of 
the benefit which it was envisaged that he would obtain from the contract and found 
against the plaintiffs’ claim for damages for breach of contract.   
 
14.27. In our discussion of section 11 of the 1893 Act, we concluded that the 
distinction between ‘conditions’ and ‘warranties’ still served an important purpose 
and recommended its retention.  If the classification of contract terms as conditions or 
warranties is to apply to sales contracts, however, the issue obviously arises as to 
whether or not it should also apply also to service contracts.  Though the existing 
provision in section 39 does not appear to have created significant practical 
difficulties to date, the logic of treating the implied undertakings for the two types of 
contract differently can be questioned, particularly where implied undertakings for 
service contracts include an undertaking as to the quality of any goods supplied, the 
counterpart of which has the status of a condition in a contract of sale.  It can also be 
argued that, the contract terms implied by virtue of section 39 touch on fundamental 
aspects of the contract and are of a kind that merits the status of conditions. On the 
other hand, giving the implied terms in section 39 the status of conditions would mean 
that breaches of those terms would give rise to a right to treat the contract as 
repudiated. This outcome is less straightforward and more problematical in the 
                                                 
1048 [1962] 1 QB 26.  As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, an innominate term is one whose 
consequences, specifically whether the injured party is entitled to repudiate the contract, depends on 
the gravity and effects of the breach.   
1049 The second stage speech on the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Bill cited above, for 
example, refers to the absence of a reasonable basis on which suppliers of services should be exempt 
from the implied ‘conditions and warranties’ as to the quality of the service which are obligatory on  a 
seller of goods. Dáil Debates, Vol. 316, 14 November 1979 Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Bill 
1978 Second Stage: cols. 1660-61 
1050 [1991] I.L.R.M. 880.  
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context of service contacts than in contracts of sales where the goods that are not in 
conformity with the contract can be returned to the seller.   
 
14.28. The options on the status of the implied undertakings as to services can be 
summarised as follows: 
1) Leave section 39 unchanged so that the implied undertakings are said simply 
to be ‘terms’. 
2) Retain the classification of the implied undertakings in section 39 as terms, but 
clarify expressly that they are innominate terms. 
3) Reclassify as conditions only the implied undertakings in section 39 which 
apply to goods supplied under the contract. 
4) Reclassify all of the implied undertakings in section 39 as ‘conditions’. 
Another approach might be to hold the implied terms in services contracts to be 
conditions and warranties.  In determining whether the term subject to breach was a 
condition or warranty, courts should take the same approach to interpretation as in 
cases concerning contracts of sale, with particular attention being paid to the need for 
consistency of approach and result in both sales and services contracts.   
 
14.29 Though there are arguments for and against all of these options, we favour, on 
balance, giving the implied statutory undertakings as to services the status of 
conditions. As we indicated in Chapter 4, it is entirely justified on grounds of both 
policy and practice for the law to acknowledge that some contract terms are more 
important than others and should attract more potent remedies. Classifying terms as 
innominate, the remedies for which would depend on the nature and effects of a 
breach, is a source of potential uncertainty and litigation. The approach taken in Hong 
Kong Fir has not been universally embraced and, in practice, cases have commonly 
been resolved by holding terms to be conditions. In insurance cases, for example, 
most judges have been hostile to the innominate term approach despite the perceived 
benefits of greater flexibility. The implied undertakings under section 39 relate, 
moreover, to quite fundamental aspects of the performance of contracts of service – 
the possession of the necessary skill by the supplier, the supply of the service with due 
skill, care and diligence, the soundness and reasonable fitness for purpose of any 
materials used, and the merchantable quality of the goods. In the case of the last-
named undertaking, treating the implied term as anything other than a condition 
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would perpetuate the existing inconsistency in the treatment of goods supplied under a 
contract of sale and goods supplied under a contract for work and materials.  The 
other implied undertakings, furthermore, have a measure of flexibility built into them 
as instanced by the references to ‘necessary’ skill’, ‘due’ skill, care and diligence, and 
‘reasonably’ fit for the purpose for which they are required.     
 
14.30. Recommendation  
The implied terms as to the quality of services should be classified as conditions 
of the contract in future legislation.    
 
Content of the Implied Undertakings: Skill, Care and Diligence   
14.31. Sections 39(a) and (b) stipulate, first, that the supplier should have the 
necessary skill to render the service and, second, that he should supply the service 
with due skill, care and diligence. While this provision is broadly similar in substance 
to the equivalent provisions in other common law jurisdictions,1051 the legislative 
provisions in those other jurisdictions expand and elaborate on the implied terms in 
ways not done in the 1980 Act. The legislation in force in the UK, Australia and New 
Zealand includes, first, an implied term that, where the time for the service to be 
carried out is not fixed by the contract, left to be fixed in a manner agreed by the 
contract or determined by the course of dealing between the parties, the supplier will 
carry out the service within a reasonable time.  The UK and New Zealand Acts, 
secondly, contain an implied term that, where the price or consideration for the 
service is not fixed by the contract, left to be fixed in a manner agreed by the contract 
or determined by the course of dealing between the parties, the price or charge will be 
reasonable.  The New Zealand legislation further provides that, where the trader fails 
to comply with this implied term, the consumer’s right of redress is to refuse to pay 
more than a reasonable price.  The implied terms about time of performance of 
services and the price in these jurisdictions mirror the provisions applicable to 
contracts of sale at sections 8 and 29 of the 1893 Act. Given that the stated aim of Part 
IV of the 1980 Act was to apply quality terms to service contracts comparable to 
                                                 
1051  The corresponding provision at section 13 of the UK Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 
provides that, in contracts for the supply of a service, there is an implied term that the supplier will 
carry out the service with reasonable skill and care.  The provisions under the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Act 2010 and the New Zealand Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 are more or less 
identical to the UK provision.   
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those in force for sales contracts, it is perhaps surprising that it did not include 
equivalent provisions about time and price.  This omission should be rectified in 
future legislation by the inclusion of provisions along the lines of those in force in the 
UK, Australia and New Zealand.   
 
14.32. A more fundamental issue concerns the basis of the implied terms governing 
contracts for the supply of a service. The requirement under section 39 that the 
supplier should supply the service with due skill, care and diligence is a negligence or 
fault-based standard.  Though the service provided may fail to achieve the desired 
result or even be defective, the supplier is liable only if he has failed to exercise due 
skill, care and diligence. This will normally be judged by reference to the degree of 
skill and care exercisable by a reasonably competent person in the same trade, 
business or profession.1052  The courts can, of course, imply a term entailing a higher 
level of liability in the circumstances of a particular case, or take the view that the 
generally accepted level of skill and care in a particular trade or profession is not an 
acceptable benchmark.1053  In Greaves & Co (Contractors) Ltd v. Baynham Meikle 
and Partners,1054 Lord Denning stated, in relation to a claim against consultant 
structural engineers arising from defects in the design of a building that the fact that 
other competent engineers might also have omitted to take adequate precautions 
against certain risks was not a defence of itself as ‘other designers might have fallen 
short too.’   
 
14.33. The fault-based standard which applies to services is in contrast to the strict 
liability or result-based standard applicable to goods.  In the case of a contract of sale, 
there are implied terms that goods will comply with description and sample, be of 
merchantable quality, and be reasonably fit for any particular purpose made known 
expressly or by implication to the seller.  The degree of skill and care shown by the 
seller is immaterial. What matters is whether or not the goods comply with the 
implied terms. As noted in Chapter 4, however, the strict liability nature of the 
implied terms is offset to some extent by the element of flexibility built into these 
                                                 
1052 Bolem v Friem Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582;  Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 
1 W.L.R. 246; Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority 1 W.L.R. 246; Sidaway v Board 
of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] A.C. 871.   
1053 Lloyds Bank Ltd v Savory and Co. [1933] A.C. 201; Cavanagh v Ulster Weaving Co. Ltd [1960] 
A.C. 145; Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232.   
1054 [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1095 at 1102.   
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terms.  Thus, per section 14(3) of the 1893 Act, goods are of merchantable quality if 
they are as fit for the purpose or purposes for which goods of that kind are commonly 
bought and as durable as it is reasonable to expect having regard to any description 
applied to them, the price (if relevant) and all the other relevant circumstances.  Per 
section 14(4), goods are required only to be reasonably fit for any particular purpose 
made known to the seller.    
 
14.34. The traditional rationale for the distinction between the fault-based standard 
applicable to services and the strict liability standard applicable to goods has been the 
fact that the more complex and less standardised nature of services makes it both 
unrealistic and unreasonable to apply a result-based standard to these transactions.  In 
Singer and Friedlander Ltd v John D Wood and Co, for example,1055 Watkins J. 
observed as follows of the advice given by property surveyors and valuers: 
    … the valuation of land by trained, competent and careful professional men is a  
    task which rarely, if ever, admits of a precise conclusion.  Often beyond certain  
    well-founded facts so many imponderables confront the valuer that he is obliged to  
    proceed on the basis of assumptions.  Therefore he cannot be faulted for achieving  
    a result which does not admit some degree of error.   
While this argument may have validity in respect of certain professional services,  
other services are relatively standardised in ways that are akin to goods, for example 
dry-cleaning, fast-food outlets, telecommunications and cable services, many 
transport and accommodation services, and some types of software. The courts have 
shown a willingness to differentiate between different types of service contract and to 
apply a higher standard of liability in certain circumstances, most notably cases 
involving contracts to design and supply a building or other structure in accordance 
with specifications furnished by the client.  In Greaves & Co (Contractors) Ltd v 
Baynham Meikle and Partners,1056 contractors were engaged by an oil company to 
build a warehouse to store barrels of oil, and they sub-contracted the design of the 
building, including the floors, to a firm of structural engineers.  Though the engineers 
were informed that stacker trucks carrying barrels of oil would be moving across the 
floors, cracks caused by the weight and vibrations of the truck appeared in the floors 
shortly after the warehouse was completed.  Lord Denning observed as follows: 
   The law does not usually imply a warrant that he [the professional man] will  
                                                 
1055 [1977] 243 Estates Gazette 212 at 213.   
1056 [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1095 at 1101-02; Stewart v Reavell’s Garage [1952] 2 QB 545; Independent 
Broadcasting Authority v EMI and BICC (1980) 14 BLR 1.   
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   achieve the desired result, but only that he will use reasonable care and skill. The  
   surgeon does not warrant that he will cure the patient.  Nor does the solicitor  
   warrant that he will win the case.  But when a dentist agrees to make a set of false  
   teeth for a patient, there is an implied warranty that they will fit his gums… What  
   then is the position when an architect or engineer is employed to design a house or a  
   bridge?  Is he under an implied warranty that, if the work is carried out to his  
   design, it will be reasonably fit for the purpose?  Or is he only under a duty to use  
   reasonable skill and care?  This question may require to be answered some day as  
   matter of law.  But in the present case I do not think that we need answer it.  For the  
   evidence shows that both parties were of one mind on the matter.  Their common  
   intention was that the engineer should design a warehouse which would be fit for  
   the purpose for which it was required.  That common intention gives rise to a term  
   implied in fact. In the light of that evidence it seems to me that there was implied in  
   fact a term that, if the work was completed in accordance with the design, it would  
   be reasonably fit for the use of loaded stacker trucks.  The engineers failed to make  
   such a design and are therefore liable.       
 
Though this case, and that of Independent Broadcasting Authority v EMI and BICC in 
which a similar approach was taken, occurred before the adoption of the statutory 
fault-based standard at section 13 of the UK Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, 
a ruling along these lines could still be upheld by the courts. Section 16(3) of the 1982 
Act expressly provides that the Act’s provisions do not prejudice any rule of law 
which imposes a duty stricter than that imposed by section 13.   
 
14.35. While the courts could imply a similar fitness for purpose term in cases 
involving other types of service, this seems unlikely, particularly in cases involving 
professional services such as medicine or law.  The question arises, consequently, as 
to whether a standard based on the result to be achieved by a contract for the supply 
of services, as well as one based on the skill and care to be shown by the supplier 
should be included in future legislation. A possible model for a provision along these 
lines can be found in the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR).  This states 
that:1057 
(1) The supplier of the service must achieve the specific result stated or envisaged  
by the client at the time of the conclusion of the contract, provided that in the case  
of a result envisaged but not stated: 
a) the result envisaged was one which the client could reasonably be expected to have 
envisaged; and  
b) the client had no reason to believe that there was a substantial risk that the  
      result would not be achieved by the service.  
 
                                                 
1057 Von Bar, C. et al (eds).  2009.  Draft Common Frame of Reference: Outline Edition , IV. C.-2: 
106. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/dcfr_outline_edition_en.pdf.  
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While a rule of this kind might reasonably be applied to certain services, it would be 
inappropriate to those services in which a range of variables and uncertainties are 
liable to intervene between intention and outcome.  It is necessary to keep in mind in 
this context the great range and heterogeneity of the activities that go to make up the 
services sector in modern economies. A single, all-purpose rule of the kind found in 
the DCFR is unsuited in our view to this diversity of circumstances and the flexibility 
that it requires.   
 
14.36. Though we are not in favour of the introduction of an inflexible result-based 
standard for services contracts, we think that there is scope for a measured reform of 
the purely fault-based standard at Part IV of the 1980 Act.  In addition to the implied 
guarantee at section 28 that the service will be carried out with reasonable care and 
skill, section 29 of the New Zealand Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 contains the 
following provision as to fitness for particular purpose: 
    … where services are supplied to a consumer there is a guarantee that the service,  
    and any product resulting from the service, will be -  
       (a) reasonably fit for any particular purpose; and  
       (b) of such a nature and quality that it can reasonably be expected to achieve any  
            particular result, -  
    that the consumer makes known to the supplier before or at the time of the making      
    of the contract for the supply of the service, as the particular purpose for which the  
    service is required or the result that the consumer desires to achieve, as the case  
    may be, except where the circumstances show that –  
       (c) The consumer does not rely on the supplier’s skill or judgement; or  
       (d) It is unreasonable for the consumer to rely on the supplier’s skill or judgment.   
There is no right of redress, however, in respect of a service, or any product resulting 
from a service, which fails to comply with a guarantee under this section of the Act 
because of (a) an act or default or omission of, or any representation made, by any 
person other than the supplier or a servant or agent of the supplier, or (b) a cause 
independent of human control. A broadly similar provision can be found at section 61, 
Part 3-2, Chapter 3 of the Australian Competition and Consumer Act 2010.     
 
14.37. Though the provisions in the New Zealand and Australian legislation take a 
significant step towards a result-based approach to the liability of the supplier of 
services, they do so in a nuanced and flexible way.  First, they apply only to an 
outcome that the consumer has made known to the supplier expressly or impliedly.  
Second, they do not stipulate that a particular result must be achieved, but provide 
instead that the services should be such that they might be reasonably be expected to 
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achieve the intended result. If the services provided would normally achieve this 
result, therefore, the supplier would not be liable because of a failure to achieve it in 
the circumstances specific to a particular transaction. A further degree of flexibility 
stems from the fact that the supplier’s obligation under the section arises only where 
there has been reasonable reliance on his skill and judgement.  If the supplier is of the 
view that he cannot supply a service that is reasonably fit for a particular purpose or 
can reasonably be expected to achieve a particular result, he can make this clear to the 
consumer. This gives the supplier a reasonable degree of control over his 
responsibilities and liabilities. Though these aspects of the provisions should help to 
allay some concerns about the proposed change, we recognise that a reform along 
these lines would represent a significant departure from the present approach to the 
regulation of services contracts. It is desirable in our view, therefore, that the 
introduction of such a provision, and the manner of its application, should be the 
subject of detailed consultation.   
 
14.38.  Recommendations  
Future legislation should include an implied term that, where the time of 
performance of a service is not fixed by the contract, it should be carried out 
within a reasonable time.  It should also include an implied term that, where the 
price for a service is not fixed by the contract, the recipient of the service should 
pay a reasonable price.   
 
Future legislation should also expressly provide that its provisions on implied 
terms in contracts for the supply of services are without prejudice to any rule of 
law that would impose stricter duties of skill and care.  
 
Future legislation should include a provision along the lines of section 29 of the 
New Zealand Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 that a service, and any product 
resulting from it, will be reasonably fit for any particular purpose, and of such a 
nature and quality that it can reasonably be expected to achieve any particular 
result, that the consumer makes known to the supplier as the particular purpose 
for which the service is required or the result that the consumer desires to 
achieve.  This provision should apply to both consumer and commercial 
contracts for the supply of services.   
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Substance of the Implied Terms: Fitness for Purpose of Materials and Quality of 
Goods  
14.39. Sections 39 (c) and (d) of the 1980 Act contain implied stipulations (i) that 
where materials are used in a contract for the supply of a service, they will be sound 
and reasonably fit for the purpose for which they are required, and (ii) that where, 
goods are supplied under the contract, they will be of merchantable quality within the 
meaning of section 14(3) of the 1893 Act.  As noted already, it is unclear why the 
implied terms as to goods in such cases exclude the terms relating to title, fitness for 
particular purpose, correspondence with description, and correspondence with sample 
at sections 12-15 of the 1893 Act and the implied terms at sections 12-13 of the 1980 
Act on spare parts and after-sale service and the safety of motor vehicles. By contrast, 
the terms implied into hire purchase and hire contracts under Parts VI and VII of the 
Consumer Credit Act 1995 cover, subject only to necessary modifications to the 
implied terms regarding title, all of the implied terms under the 1893 and 1980 Acts. 
Under the UK Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, goods supplied under a 
contract of hire or a contract for work and materials are subject similarly to the full 
range of implied terms governing contracts of sale. Under existing Irish law, however, 
the implied terms, other than that of merchantable quality, do not apply to service 
contracts in which goods are supplied and the property in those goods is transferred 
from seller to buyer.  This situation is clearly unsatisfactory and should be addressed 
in future legislation. As noted earlier,  our recommendation for the adoption of the 
definition of ‘sales contract’ in the proposed Consumer Rights Directive would mean 
that goods supplied under a consumer contract for work and materials would be 
treated on the same basis as goods supplied under a consumer contract of sale. 
Likewise, under our recommendation for a consolidated statutory framework for the 
implied terms in different contracts involving the supply of goods, goods supplied 
under a contract for services would be regulated on the same basis as goods supplied 
under other types of transaction.     
 
14.40.  Recommendation 
All of the implied terms applying to contracts of sale should apply to goods 
supplied under a contract of service in which the property in the goods is 
transferred from seller to buyer.   
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SECTION 40 EXCLUSION OF IMPLIED TERMS  
14.41. Section 40 of the 1980 Act provides that the implied undertakings as to quality 
of service under section 39 may be negatived or varied by an express term of the 
contract, by the course of dealing between the parties, or by usage that binds both 
parties to the contract. Where the recipient of the service deals as consumer, however, 
the implied undertakings may be negatived or varied only where the express term in 
question is fair and reasonable and has been specifically brought to the attention of the 
recipient.  In the case of contracts of sale, by contrast, any term exempting from any 
or all of the implied undertakings as to title under section 12 of the 1893 is void for 
both consumer and commercial contracts. Any term exempting from any or all of the 
implied undertakings regarding correspondence with description, quality and fitness 
for purpose, and correspondence with sample under sections 13-15 of the Act is void 
where the buyer deals as consumer and, in any other case, is not enforceable unless 
shown to be fair and reasonable. A term in a consumer contract which has not been 
individually negotiated and which seeks to exclude or restrict the implied 
undertakings under section 39 is also subject to the unfairness test under the European 
Communities (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) Regulations 1995 and 2000 
which give effect to Directive 93/13/EEC.  Under the Regulations, a contract term is 
regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant 
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations to the detriment of the consumer, 
taking into account the nature of the goods or services, all circumstances attending the 
conclusion of the contract, and all other terms of the contract.  Schedule 3 of the 
Regulations includes the following term among ‘an indicative and non-exhaustive list 
of terms which may be regarded as unfair’ pursuant to the unfairness test: 
    Terms which have the object or effect of:...     
    (b) inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis-à-vis  
    the seller or supplier or another party in the even of total or partial non-performance  
    or inadequate performance by the seller or supplier of any of the contractual  
    obligations, including the option of offsetting a debt owed to the seller or supplier     
    against any claim which the consumer may have against him.   
 
Though the ‘fair and reasonable test’ under the 1980 Act and the unfairness test under 
the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations are broadly similar, this is a 
further example of the undesirable and unnecessary duplication in Irish consumer law  
caused by the failure to integrate provisions of domestic and EU origin.   
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14.42. In the UK, liability for the implied term of ‘reasonable skill and care’ 
applicable to contracts for the supply of a service can be excluded or restricted in 
consumer and commercial contracts where the exclusion clause satisfies the 
reasonableness requirement under the Unfair Contracts Terms Act 1977. In the case 
of consumer contracts, exemption clauses of this kind are also subject to the 
unfairness test under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulation 1999 which 
give effect to Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Contract Terms. Section 11(5) of the 
UK Unfair Terms Act places the burden of showing the reasonableness of any such 
clause on the supplier of the service. Where a contract does not entirely exclude 
liability but restricts it to a specified sum of money, the court is directed by section 
11(4) of the Act to have regard, in particular, to (i) the resources which the party for 
whose benefit the term would operate ‘could expect to be available to him for the 
purpose of meeting the liability should it arise’ and (ii) how far it was ‘open to him to 
cover himself by insurance.’  The guidance for the application of the reasonableness 
test at Schedule 2 of the UK 1977 Act is confined, however, to exclusion clauses in 
non-consumer contracts for the supply of goods and, unlike the identical Schedule of 
‘fair and reasonable terms’ in the Irish 1980 Act, is not applicable to the assessment of 
contract terms which exclude or restrict the implied terms governing contracts for the 
supply of services.  The issue of whether contract terms which exclude liability for the 
implied term of reasonable skill and care in services contracts should be void in 
consumer contracts was considered by the Law Commission for England and Wales 
in a report published in 1986.1058  The Commission recommended against any change 
to the Unfair Contract Terms Act on the ground that its provisions were adequate to 
ensure that suppliers observed acceptable standards while also permitting a degree of 
flexibility. The Commission’s conclusions were also influenced by concerns 
expressed to it about the implications of an absolute prohibition of exclusion clauses 
in consumer services contracts for business costs generally and insurance costs in 
particular. The issue of exclusion clauses for consumer contracts for the supply of 
services has been re-examined recently in a report prepared by a group of academics 
for the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills.1059 The report 
recommends that exclusion or restriction of liability for defective services in such 
                                                 
1058 The Law Commission.  1986. Implied Terms in Contracts for the Supply of Services (Law 
Com. No. 156), paras. 3.1-3.24.   
1059 Howells, G. & Twigg-Flesner, C. (eds).  Consolidation and Simplification of UK Consumer 
Law, op. cit., paras. 4.96-4.113.   
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cases should be made wholly ineffective in line with the corresponding provisions in 
contracts for the supply of goods.  In both Australia and New Zealand, contracting out 
of the statutory guarantees implied into consumer contracts for the supply of services 
is prohibited.1060  
 
14.43. The differential treatment of exemption clauses in contracts of sale and 
contracts for the supply of a service is the legacy of a period when the regulation of 
services contracts was new and, as a result, was undertaken in a tentative and 
qualified way.  It is now time in our view to put exemption clauses pertaining to the 
implied terms in services contracts on the same footing as those for sales contracts, 
namely that they should be void in consumer contracts and enforceable in commercial 
contracts where shown to be fair and reasonable. It is likely that consumers assume 
that similar rules apply to goods and services, and this is a reasonable expectation on 
their part.  Unwarranted differences of this kind in the treatment of sales and services 
contracts only serve, moreover, to place an artificial importance on the classification 
of contracts.  As noted above, the implied terms governing the provision of services 
are currently fault-based and would largely remain so under our recommendations. It 
is difficult to see why implied terms which operate on a fault-based standard should 
be subject to more permissive rules on exclusion clauses than apply to the strict 
liability terms implied into contracts of sale. Though it may be argued that a 
prohibition on the exclusion of the implied terms in consumer services contracts 
would increase costs for businesses, it would also bring about greater legal certainty 
and should help consequently to reduce recourse to litigation. As discussed in Chapter 
5, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations are the most appropriate 
vehicle for the regulation of exclusion clauses in consumer contracts. Clauses of this 
kind in contracts for the supply of services to consumers should accordingly be 
deemed to be automatically unfair under the Regulations.   
 
14.44. Recommendations  
Contract terms which exclude the terms implied by statute into commercial 
contracts for services should be regulated on the same basis as exemption  
                                                 
1060 Competition and Consumer Act 2010, Chapter 3, Part 3-2, s. 63.  Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, 
s.43.  
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clauses in contracts of sale, namely that they are unenforceable unless shown to 
be fair and reasonable.   
 
Contract terms which exclude the terms implied by statute into consumer 
contracts for services should be automatically unfair in all circumstances under 
the European Communities (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) Regulations 
1995 and 2000. The 1995 Regulations should be amended in order to give effect 
to this recommendation.   
 
SECTION 41 STATEMENTS PURPORTING TO RESTRICT RIGHTS OF 
RECIPIENT OF SERVICE 
14.45. This provision is the equivalent of the provision at section 11 of the 1980 Act 
on statements purporting to restrict the rights of the buyers of goods which is 
discussed at paragraphs 5.30-5.34 above. It functions as a complement to the 
provisions of Section 40 on exclusion clauses by rendering it a criminal offence to 
make statements of various kinds that are likely to be taken as indicating that a right 
conferred by, or a liability arising under, section 39 is restricted or excluded otherwise 
than in accordance with section 40.  As we noted in our discussion of section 11, the 
provisions of section 43 of the Consumer Protection Act on false, misleading and 
deceptive information serve a similar function and are capable of providing adequate 
protection for consumers in this respect. Equivalent prohibitions apply to transactions 
involving businesses under the European Communities (Misleading and Comparative 
Marketing Communications) Regulations 2007 
 
14.46. Recommendation 
Section 41 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 on statements 
purporting to restrict the rights of recipients of services should be repealed in 
line with the recommended repeal of section 11 of the Act on statements 







CHAPTER FIFTEEN THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION  
ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 
15.1 The United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods [CISG], 1061 
commonly known as the Vienna Convention, comprises a set of uniform substantive 
rules for the regulation of contracts of sales involving parties with a place of business 
in states that have ratified the Convention (Contracting States). To date, 76 states have 
ratified the Convention, including most of the world’s main trading economies and all 
EU member states other than Ireland, the United Kingdom, Portugal and Malta..1062  
Consideration of the CISG involves two principal questions. First, should Ireland 
ratify the Convention and, secondly, if so, should it avail of any or all of the opt-outs 
permissible under it? Unlike virtually all of the issues considered in previous Chapters 
of this Report, these questions have previously been the subject of thorough and 
detailed review. A report on the CISG undertaken by the Law Reform Commission in 
1992 recommended that Ireland should accede to the Convention and should not 
exercise any  of the available derogations.1063 As the Commission’s analysis and 
conclusions remain valid in our view, we do not propose to go in detail over the 
ground covered comprehensively in its Report.  Before considering the main matters 
at issue, we will first briefly set out the background to, and main features of, the 
CISG.   
 
The CISG: Background and Main Features 
15.2. The CISG was adopted in 1980 and came into force in 1988 after securing the 
required number of ratifications.  Its adoption followed a number of attempts to 
establish a uniform substantive law for international contracts of sale that would prove 
capable of securing broad acceptance among trading nations. The two Hague 
Conventions of 19641064 on the international sale of goods came into force in 1972, 
                                                 
1061 The text of the Convention can be accessed at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/CISG/V1056996-CISG-e-book-pdf  
1062 All data cited on accessions to, and derogations from, the Convention is from UNCITRAL: Status 
1980 – United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
http://www.uncitral/org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG/status.html  
1063 Law Reform Commission.  1992.  Report on United Nations (Vienna) Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (LRC 42-1992).    
1064 Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods (ULIS), and Uniform Law on the Formation of 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULF).   
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but were ratified by just nine states.1065 The United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), which had been established in 1966, took the 
initiative in efforts to come up with a Convention capable of securing greater 
international acceptance. Following extensive discussions over a number of years, the 
final version of the CISG was agreed at a conference held in Vienna in 1980.   
 
15.3. The purpose of the CISG is to facilitate increased certainty and reduced 
transaction costs in international trade by the provision of uniform, even-handed rules 
governing the rights and obligations of parties to trans-national sales contracts.1066 It 
aims in particular to circumvent the potential difficulties and barriers to trade arising 
from choice of law rules that determine whether the law applicable to an international 
contact of sale is that of the seller’s or the buyer’s place of business.  Article 1(1) of 
the Convention provides that the Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods 
between parties whose places of business are in different States where: 
a) both parties are in Contracting States, or  
b) the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a 
Contracting State. 
 
Where a contract of sale involves a party from a Contracting State and a party from a 
state that has not ratified the Convention, the party from the non-CISG state may, by 
reason of Article 1(1)(b) find itself bound by the Convention if a court in the 
Contracting State determines on the basis of rules of private international law that its 
law (in this case, the CISG) is the law applicable to the contract. Article 95 of the 
Convention, however, permits a Contracting State to declare that it will not be bound 
by the second of these provisions and, to date, six such states have availed of this 
derogation.1067   
 
15.4. Article 2 of the Convention sets out a number of exclusions from its scope,  
including goods bought for personal, family or household use; ships, vessels, 
                                                 
1065 The United Kingdom, Belgium, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, San Marino, 
Israel and Gambia.   
1066 Article 4 of the Convention states that it governs only the formation of the contract of sale and the 
rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract and expressly excludes 
from its scope the validity of the contract or the effect of the contract on the property in the goods.   
1067 China, Czech Republic, St Vincent & the Grenadines, Singapore, Slovakia, and the United States.  
Though Germany did not derogate as such from the rule regarding application of the law of a 
Contracting State by reason of the rules of private international law, the terms of its ratification provide 
that it does not apply this provision in respect of any State that has availed of the derogation.   
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hovercraft or aircraft; and electricity.  Article 3 excludes from the scope of ‘sales’ (i) 
contracts for the supply of goods to be manufactured or produced where the party who 
orders the goods undertakes to supply a substantial part of the necessary materials and 
(ii) contracts in which the preponderant part of the obligations of the party who 
furnishes the goods consists in the supply of labour or other services. Article 4 
stipulates that the Convention governs only the formation of the contract and the 
rights and obligations of the parties to such a contract and, in particular, does not deal 
with either the validity of the contract or its effect on the property in the goods.   
 
15.5. The CISG incorporates elements from both common and civil law traditions, 
and shows the influence in particular of Article 2 of the US Uniform Commercial 
Code.1068 The main substantive provisions of the Convention are located in Part II 
which deals with the formation of the contract and Part III which deals with the 
obligations of the seller and buyer under the contract.  As outlined previously at 
paragraphs 3.59-3.61, Part II of the Convention contains rules governing offer and 
acceptance, including provisions on a receipt rule of acceptance and on qualified 
acceptance or the ‘battle of the forms’.  Part III on the obligations of the seller and 
buyer covers much the same ground as the Sale of Goods Acts, and includes 
provisions on delivery, conformity with the contract, examination, the buyer’s 
remedies, payment of the price, the seller’s remedies, and the passing of risk.1069  As 
party autonomy is a core principle of the CISG, Article 6 provides that the parties may 
exclude the application of the Convention or, with one exception, ‘derogate from or 
vary the effect of any of its provisions.’1070 The evidence suggests that this opt-out 
provision is widely exercised. The standard form contracts of many leading trade 
associations expressly exclude the CISG as do those of the large oil companies.1071  
                                                 
1068 Bridge, M.2007.  The International Sale of Goods: Law and Practice (2nd ed.) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), para. 11.09.  
1069 For a comparison between the CISG and the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979 that is also broadly 
applicable to Irish sales law, see ibid. paras. 12.01-12.65.  
1070 The exception applies where Contracting States derogate under Article 96 from the Convention’s 
provision that a contract need not be concluded in or evidenced, modified or terminated by writing.  
Where one or both parties have their place of business in a Contracting State which requires contracts 
of sale to be in writing, this requirement may not be derogated from or varied.  To date, 10 Contracting 
States have availed of this derogation: Argentina; Armenia; Chile; China; Hungary; Latvia; Lithuania; 
Paraguay; the Russian Federation; and the Ukraine.      
1071 For example, the Grain and Feed Trade Association, the Federation of Oils, Seeds and Fats 
Association, and the Refined Sugar Association.  Bridge, M.  The International Sale of Goods, op. 
cit., para. 11.42 & fn. 197.   
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Opt-out rates are reported to be in the region of 70 per cent in the US and 45-55 per 
cent in Austria and Germany.1072   
 
Should Ireland Ratify the CISG? 
15.6. In its 1992 Report, the Law Reform Commission examined a wide range of 
issues relevant to Ireland’s ratification of the CISG and concluded as follows:1073 
   Although there are arguments both for and against accession, … the former  
   appear to outweigh the latter.  Analysis of the provisions of the Convention and  
   of domestic and international considerations surrounding it lead us to conclude that,  
   on balance, it would be desirable for Ireland to become a party to the Convention.   
The Commission added that, ‘though not a perfect document’, the Convention1074:  
   … does represent the greatest level of compromise possible in the international  
   community at the present time. Above all, we must bear in mind that the principle of  
   party autonomy gives Irish traders the liberty to contract out of the Convention in its  
   entirety or to exclude the application of any individual provision, with one limited  
   exception, namely, the provision in Article 12 allowing a state to require that a  
   contract be in writing.  As a general rule, the freedom to contract out of the  
   Convention allows parties to use the Convention to the degree which they find  
   beneficial. 
 
15.7. In our view, the case for Ireland’s accession to the Convention is, if anything, 
stronger now than when the Law Reform Commission reported in 1992. At that time, 
thirty-four states had ratified the Convention compared with seventy-six states now. 
All of Ireland’s main trading partners,1075 with the exception of the United Kingdom, 
are parties to the Convention.  In view of Ireland’s position as one of the most open 
economies in the world, it is difficult in fact to understand why its accession has been 
so long delayed, particularly in the light of the conclusions and recommendations of 
the Law Reform Commission’s report. As matters stand, Irish companies engaged in 
contracts for the sale of goods with parties from Contracting States can find 
                                                 
1072 Howells, G. 2010.  ‘European Contract Law Reform and European Consumer Law – Two Related 
but Distinct Regimes’, p.11 & fn. 32.  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0052/contributions/188_en.pdf  
1073 Law Reform Commission, Report on United Nations (Vienna) Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, op. cit, p.85 
1074 Ibid., p. 84.  
1060 The top ten countries of destination for Irish exports in the first quarter of 2011 were as follows: (1) 
the USA;  (2) Belgium; (3) the UK; (4) Germany; (5) France; (6) Spain; (7) Switzerland; (8) the 
Netherlands; (9) Italy; and (10) China.  The top ten countries of origin for Irish imports in the same 
period were: (1) the UK; (2) the USA; (3) Germany; (4) China; (5) the Netherlands; (6) France; (7) 
Norway; (8) Belgium; (9) Japan; and (10) Denmark. CSO.  June 2011. External Trade, table 4. 
http://www/cso.ie/releasespublications/documents/external_trade/current/extrade.pdf   
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themselves inadvertently bound by the Convention for the reasons set out in 
paragraph 15.3. In addition to the positive benefits of accession, ratification would 
make it clearer to Irish businesses engaged in international sales with parties from 
another Contracting State that, unless expressly excluded or varied, their rights and 
obligations under the contract would be governed by the CISG’s provisions.  In 
considering the pros and cons of accession, a key factor to be borne in mind is, as the 
Law Reform Commission pointed out, the fact that the provisions of the Convention 
consist almost entirely of default rules.  We are mindful also that, as accession to the 
Convention will require the adoption of appropriate legislative provisions, the 
opportunity presented by the need for new legislation to give effect to our other 
recommendations should be utilised for this purpose. If the legislative provisions 
necessary in order to allow Ireland to become a party to the CISG are not introduced 
when new sale of goods legislation is being enacted, it is likely to be a long time 
before a suitable opportunity again presents itself.     
 
15.8. While a relevant background factor, the UK’s position in regard to the 
Convention should not carry any decisive weight in the consideration of the merits or 
otherwise of Irish accession.  All of the UK’s main trading partners,1076 with the 
exception of Ireland, are parties to the Convention, and there is nothing to suggest that 
this has impaired trade between those states and the UK.  There appears to be no 
prospect of UK accession in the immediate future. The last official statement on the 
issue from a Government source came in 2005 when a Minister from the UK 
Department of Trade and Industry stated in the House of Lords that:1077 
   … the UK intends to ratify the Convention, subject to the availability of   
   Parliamentary  time.   
No steps have since been taken, however, to ratify the Convention. In response to the 
question as to why the UK had not ratified the CISG, a UK civil servant observed 
that:1078 
                                                 
1076 The top ten countries of destination for UK exports in the first quarter of 2011 were: (1) the USA; 
(2) Germany; (3) France; (4) the Netherlands; (5) Ireland; (6) Belgium; (7) Italy; (8) Spain; (9) China; 
and (10) Sweden.  The top ten countries of origin for UK imports were: (1) Germany; (2) the USA; (3) 
the Netherlands;  (4) China; (5) Norway; (6) France; (7) Belgium; (8) Italy; (9) Ireland; and (10) Spain.  
HM Revenue and Customs. Overseas Trade Statistics,  
https://www.uktradeinfo.com/pagecontent/datapages/tables/cyts_1104.xls  
1077 669 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th series) (2005) WA86.   
1078 Moss, S. ‘Why the United Kingdom Has Not Ratified the CISG’.  (2005-06) J.L & Com 483 at 483.    
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    The short answer is that Ministers do not see the ratification of the Convention  
    as a legislative priority… The question, therefore, is why Ministers do not  
    consider it a priority.  One of the main reasons is that there seems to be  
    relatively little interest in the country to ratify the Convention.  
 
Others have suggested that that there is antipathy to the Convention, and opposition to 
the UK’s ratification of it, among influential elements of the English legal profession, 
as well as a concern that its adoption might adversely affect London’s position as a 
centre of international litigation and arbitration.1079   
    
15.9. Recommendation 
Ireland should accede to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods. The proposed new legislation on the sale and supply 
of goods and the supply of services should include the provisions necessary to 
give effect to the entry into force of the Convention in Ireland.    
 
Derogations from the Convention  
15.10. The CISG contains a number of provisions which permit a Contracting State to 
make a declaration limiting the application of specific provisions of the Convention in 
respect of that State. These declarations cover the following aspects of the 
Convention:   
 Article 92 permits Contracting States to preclude the application of Part II 
(Formation of the Contract) or Part III (Sale of Goods) of the Convention.  To 
date, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden have availed of the first of these 
derogations, while no Contracting State has exercised the second derogation. 
 
 Article 93 provides that a federal state may declare the Convention applicable 
to some, but not others, of its territorial units. While Canada initially exercised 
this option in respect of a number of its provinces and territories, it 
subsequently  extended the application of the Convention to the excluded 
territorial units.   
 
 Article 94 permits two or more Contracting States with the same or closely 
related legal rules on matters governed by the CISG to limit or exclude the 
application of the Convention in respect of contracts of sale between parties 
which have their place of business in those States. It also permits a 
Contracting State to make a similar declaration in respect of a non-Contracting 
State with which it has common or closely related legal rules. To date, 
                                                 
1079 Forte, A.  ‘The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: 
Reason or Unreason in the United Kingdom’.  (1997) U. Balt, L. Rev 51 at 54-56.  See also Hoffmann, 
N.  ‘Interpretation Rules and Good Faith as Obstacles to the UK’s Ratification of the CISG and to the 
Harmonization of Contract Law in Europe’, (2010) Pace Int’l L. Rev 145.   
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Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden have exercised this opt-out in 
respect of contracts of sale between parties based in the Scandinavian states.   
 
 Article 95 provides that a Contracting State may declare that it is not to be 
bound by Article 1(1)(b) of the CISG in respect of the applicability of the 
Convention on the basis of rules of private international law. The effect of 
such a declaration is to limit the application of the CISG to parties whose 
place of business is in States that are parties to the Convention. As noted 
above, six States have availed of this derogation to date. 
 
 Article 96 provides that a Contracting State may maintain requirements that 
contracts be concluded, evidenced, modified or termination in writing.  As 
noted above, ten States have exercised this option to date. 
 
Declarations under Articles 94 and 96 may be made at any time, while those under 
Articles 92 and 93 may be made at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance or 
approval.  If made at the time of signature, however, the latter declarations must be 
confirmed upon ratification, acceptance or approval.  A declaration under Article 95 
may be made at the time of the deposit of the instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession.   
 
15.11 As noted already, the Law Reform Commission recommended against the 
exercise of any of these derogations. It reached this conclusion both on the general 
ground that such derogations lessened the impact and standing of the Convention, and 
for reasons specific to the individual opt-outs.1080  We are in agreement with the 
general stance taken by the Commission on the issue. In the light of the generally low 
level of recourse to the derogations, this position would appear to be shared by the 
great majority of Contracting States.   
 
15.12 If we consider the individual derogations permissible under the Convention, the 
exercise of the Article 92 option to exclude the application of Part III of the CISG on 
the sale of goods would arguably defeat the main purpose of accession. While the 
same cannot be said of the exclusion of Part II on the formation of the contract, we are 
not in favour of a derogation from these provisions of the Convention. Though we 
decided in Chapter 3 against the incorporation of rules along these lines in Irish law, 
we see no reason to deny contracting parties the option to make use of some or all of 
                                                 
1080 Law Reform Commission, Report on United Nations (Vienna) Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, op. cit, pp. 85-88.   
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these provisions as they see fit. The Article 94 option for a derogation in the case of 
contracts involving parties from States with similar legal rules has obvious resonance 
for Ireland given the historically close connection between our sale of goods 
legislation and that in the UK and other common law countries. As the Law Reform 
Commission noted,1081 and as previous Chapters of this Report have shown, however, 
the differences between the Sale of Goods Acts in the various common law countries 
concerned are also significant. It is noteworthy in this connection, moreover, that 
none of the common law countries which are party to the CISG – Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada and Singapore – have chosen to avail of this opt-out either vis-à-vis 
one another or vis-à-vis the UK. The Article 95 derogation would exclude the 
application of the Convention where rules of private international law would lead to 
the application of the law of a Contracting State.  Recourse by Contracting States to 
this derogation would appear to reflect a concern to avoid the confusion and 
uncertainty that can result from the application of rules governing the conflict of laws.  
As the Law Reform Commission pointed out, however, a choice has to be made 
between domestic and foreign law in any event where Article 1(1)(b) of the 
Convention does not apply.1082 Where the Convention constitutes the applicable law, 
the difficulties associated with conflict of law rules may, if anything, be lessened. 
Finally, the Article 96 derogation for writing requirements in respect of contracts has 
some limited relevance to Ireland while section 4 of the 1893 Act remains in force.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, section 4 provides that a contract valued at €12.70 or more 
is not enforceable unless one of a number of specified conditions are met, among 
them the making and signature of a note or memorandum of the contract.  As this 
requirement has long outlived its usefulness and its repeal is recommended in Chapter 
3, there is no case consequently for an opt-out under Article 96.  Though we are of the 
view that none of the derogations permitted by the CISG should be exercised by 
Ireland, this recommendation should be reviewed if subsequent consultations show 
convincing grounds for availing of one or more of the opt-outs.     
 
15.12. Recommendation  
Ireland should not avail of the option of making a declaration under Articles 92-
96 of the Convention. This recommendation should be reviewed if consultations 
                                                 
1081 Ibid., p. 86.   
1082 Ibid., pp. 86-87.   
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provide evidence of convincing grounds for any or all of the derogations 














































ANNEX I  
LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
CHAPTER TWO SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893: INTERPRETATION OF 
TERMS, SECTION 62   
 
1. The definition of ‘consumer goods’ in Directive 1999/44/EC on Consumer Sales 
and Guarantees as ‘any tangible moveable item’ should be the basis of the general 
definition of ‘goods’ in future legislation. (para. 2.4)  
 
2.  The definition of ‘goods’ should not be amended to include computer software. A 
comprehensive consultative process on the issues of whether strict liability standards 
are suitable for software contracts and on whether there is a need for a specialised 
instrument dealing with software transactions should be undertaken in advance of any 
further consideration of legislative regulation in this area. (para. 2.29)  
 
3. Electricity and, unless supplied for sale in a limited volume or set quantity, gas and 
water, should be included in the definition of ‘services’ in future legislation. (para. 
2.35)  
 
4.  That part of the definition of ‘goods’ at section 62(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 
1893 which deals with matters relating to the demarcation between the sale of goods 
and the sale of land or interests in land should be simplified and updated. The term 
‘emblements’ should be replaced by more modern language which clarifies that it 
does not apply only to annual crops produced by cultivation. This would permit the 
deletion of the reference to ‘industrial growing crops’.  (para. 2.42)  
 
5. The definition of ‘goods’ in future legislation should include an undivided share in 
goods. (para. 2.45)  
 
6. Future legislation should include a definition of ‘unascertained goods’ and should 
also clarify the relations between the categories of future/existing and  
specific/unascertained goods. (para. 2.55)  
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7. The definition of ‘specific goods’ in future legislation should be extended to 
provide that an undivided share in specific goods which is specified as a fraction is 
itself specific goods.  (para. 2.55) 
 
CHAPTER THREE SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893: FORMATION OF THE 
CONTRACT, SECTIONS 1-9 & 58.           
 
8. While the definition of ‘contract of sale’ in the recently agreed Consumer Rights 
Directive will require the corresponding definition in future Irish legislation to include 
any consumer contract ‘having as its object both goods and services’, this part  of the 
definition should not apply to commercial contracts of sale. (para. 3.8)  
                                                                
9. The ‘necessaries’ rule in future legislation on the sale and supply of goods and the 
supply of services should be amended in line with the Law Reform Commission’s 
2006 Report on Vulnerable Adults and the Law to provide as follows:  
 A person who lacks capacity to enter a contract for the sale of goods would be 
obliged to pay a reasonable sum for necessaries supplied at his or her request.   
 ‘Necessaries’ would be defined as ‘goods or services which are suitable to the 
individual’s personal reasonable living circumstances at the time when the 
goods are supplied but excluding goods and services which could be classed as 
luxury in nature in all the circumstances’.   
The reference to ‘mental capacity’ should be excluded from the ‘necessaries’ 
provisions in future legislation on the sale and supply of goods and the supply of 
services if proposed legislation on mental capacity includes provisions on contractual 
capacity in relation to ‘necessaries’.  (para. 3.15) 
 
10. Section 4 of the 1893 Act should be repealed.  (para. 3.23)  
 
11. Future legislation should clarify that the term ‘perish’ is to be construed so as to 
cover situations where goods perish in a commercial as well as in a physical sense.  
(para. 3.29)     
 
12. Section 6 of the 1893 Act should be amended to enable the parties to a 
commercial contract, though not a consumer contract, to vary its operation. (para. 
3.32) 
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13. Section 9 of the 1893 Act should be amended to provide that, where the valuer 
cannot or does not make a valuation, the buyer should be required to pay a reasonable 
price for the goods. (para. 3.41)     
 
14.  Future legislation should provide that:  
 In a sale by auction without reserve, a lot cannot be withdrawn from the sale 
by the owner or auctioneer after the auctioneer has called for bids unless no 
bid is made within a reasonable period of time.   
 Where goods are stated to be sold at auction ‘without reserve’, that statement 
shall be binding upon the auctioneer once bidding commences. Without 
prejudice to the remedy of specific performance, the highest bona fide bidder 
at the time the hammer falls, or when the sale is stopped by the auctioneer, 
shall have a right to damages for the loss occasioned by the breach of the 
collateral contract. (para. 3.47)  
 
15.  Future legislation should provide that, where goods are purchased at auction by a 
person who has entered into agreement with others to abstain from bidding, the seller 
may avoid the contract. Where a contract is avoided in such circumstances and the 
purchaser has obtained possession of the goods without restitution therefor being 
made to the seller, the parties to the agreement to abstain from bidding should be 
jointly and severally liable to make good to the seller any loss he has sustained by 
reason of the agreement.  (para. 3.50) 
 
16. The provisions of section 58(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 regulating bids by 
sellers, or persons employed by sellers to bid, should apply to auctions conducted on 
online platforms as well as to conventional auctions. The recommendations at 
paragraph 3.50 on the right of the seller to avoid the contract where goods are 
purchased at auction by a person who has entered into an agreement with others to 
abstain from bidding, and the liability of the parties to any such agreement for any 
loss to the seller, should also apply to online auctions. Issues of definition and the 
application of the other provisions of section 58 of the 1893 Act to online auctions, or 
the introduction of rules specific to such auctions, should be the subject of 
consultation with industry and consumer interests.  (para. 3.55)  
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CHAPTER FOUR SALE OF GOODS ACTS 1893 & 1980: CONDITIONS AND 
WARRANTIES, SECTIONS 11 & 13-15 1893 ACT & SECTIONS 12-14 1980 
ACT.                                                                                 
 
17. Future legislation should retain the distinction between conditions and warranties. 
The legislation should clarify, however, that express contractual terms may be 
innominate in character where the ordinary principles of construction of the contract 
lead to such a conclusion.  (para. 4.17)  
 
18.  Future legislation should include a default provision restricting the right of buyers 
in non-consumer sales to reject goods for slight breach of the implied terms as to 
quality and fitness for purpose and correspondence with description and sample.  
(para. 4.17)  
 
19.  The provisions of section 13 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 on sale by description 
should be retained in their present form. (para. 4.27)  
 
20. ‘Satisfactory quality’ should replace ‘merchantable quality’ as the statutory 
standard for the purpose of the implied terms as to the quality of goods. (para. 4.43)   
 
21. Goods should be defined as being of ‘satisfactory quality’ if ‘they meet the 
standard that a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory taking account of any 
description of the goods, the price (if relevant) and all the other relevant 
circumstances’.  (para. 4.48)  
 
22. An indicative list of the following specific aspects of quality should apply 
alongside the general definition in appropriate cases: fitness for all the purposes for 
which goods of the kind in question are commonly supplied; appearance and finish; 
freedom from minor defects; safety; and durability.  (para. 4.48)  
 
23. The provisions of Article 2(2)(c) of Directive 1999/44/EC relating to public 
statements about the specific characteristics of goods should be incorporated in the 
provisions on implied quality terms in future legislation. (para. 4.50) 
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24. The definition of the quality of goods as including their state or condition now at 
section 62 of the 1893 Act should be incorporated in the provision on the specific 
aspects of the quality of goods in future legislation.  (para. 4.50)  
 
25. Section 14(1) of the 1893 Act should not be retained in future legislation. (para. 
4.50)  
 
26.  Section 15 of the 1893 Act should be retained in amended form in future 
legislation to provide for sale by model as well as sale by sample and for the other 
requirements of Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 1999/44/EC on Consumer Sales and 
Guarantees. (para. 4.57)  
 
27. Section 15(2)(c) of the 1893 Act which limits the implied condition as to quality 
in the case of sale by sample to defects which would not be apparent on reasonable 
examination of the sample should not apply to consumer contracts of sale. (para. 4.60)  
 
28. Under section 14(2)(b) of the 1893 Act, the implied general condition as to quality 
applies in the case of sale by sample where the buyer fails to examine the sample, 
while the implied condition as to quality specific to sale by sample under section 
15(2)(c) of the Act does not apply where the buyer fails to examine the goods and the 
defect is one that would have been apparent on a reasonable examination of the 
sample. Future legislation should address this inconsistency by providing that, in the 
case of commercial contracts of sale by sample, the implied general condition as to 
quality does not apply to any defect that would have been apparent on a reasonable 
examination of the sample. (para. 4.60)   
 
29. The implied condition at section 15(2)(b) of the 1893 Act that the buyer shall have 
a reasonable opportunity of comparing the bulk with the sample should be replaced by 
a substantively similar right of examination at section 34 of the Act.  (para. 4.62)  
 
30. The implied warranty as to the availability of spare parts and an adequate after-
sale service at section 12 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 
should in principle be retained in future legislation. The operation of the section, 
including the reasons for its under-utilisation, should be the subject of consultation 
with interested parties.  (para. 4.68)   
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31. A provision along the lines of section 13 of the 1980 Act on the implied condition 
of freedom from dangerous defects in motor vehicles should be retained in future  
legislation, and should be supplemented by a presumption that the defect existed in 
the vehicle at the time of the contract of sale.  The burden of proof should be on the 
seller to show either that the defect was drawn specifically to the attention of the 
buyer who undertook to repair it before use, or that the defect arose after the contract 
was concluded. (para. 4.73)           
 
32. Section 14 of the 1980 Act on the liability of finance houses should be retained in 
future legislation and extended to cover similar transactions involving the supply of 
services. (para. 4.77)  
 
CHAPTER FIVE SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893: EXCLUSION OF IMPLIED 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS, SECTION 55                       
 
33. The ‘fundamental breach’ of contract as a rule of law should not be applied in any 
Irish contract for the sale of goods or the supply of services, and the new legislation 
that will replace the 1893 and 1980 Acts should specifically abrogate that rule.  (para. 
5.10)  
 
34. Clauses exempting the implied statutory terms as to goods in consumer sales and 
related contracts should be automatically unfair in all circumstances under the  
European Communities (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) Regulations 1995 and 
2000.  The 1995 Regulations should be amended in order to give effect to  this 
recommendation.  (para. 5.16)  
 
35. Clauses exempting the implied statutory terms as to goods in commercial sales 
and related contracts should be unenforceable unless shown to be fair and reasonable. 
(para. 5.22)    
 
36. The ‘deals as consumer’ test at section 3 of the 1980 Act which governs the 
application of section 55 of the 1893 Act and a number of the provisions of the 1980 
Act should be repealed.  The definition of  ‘consumer’ for the purpose of the 
regulation of exemption and other clauses in future legislation should refer 
accordingly to a natural person acting for purposes unrelated to his or her business.  
(para. 5.22)  
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37. The provisions at sections 12(3) and 13(9) of the Sale of Goods and Supply of 
Services Act 1980 regarding contract terms which exempt any or all of the implied 
terms as to spare parts and after-sale service and the safety of motor vehicles should 
be amended in future legislation so that they apply on the same basis as the provisions 
governing the exemption of other terms implied by the 1893 Act.  (para. 5.25)  
 
38. The provisions regulating exemption clauses in future legislation should include a 
provision modelled on section 13(1) of the UK Unfair Terms Act 1977 that would 
specify, and prohibit, a number of the ways in which liability is excluded or restricted.  
(para. 5.29)   
 
39. Subsection (1) of section 55 of the 1893 Act is at odds with the remainder of the 
section and should not be retained in future legislation.  (para. 5.29)  
 
40. The restriction of section 55 of the 1893 Act and of a number of the provisions of 
the 1980 Act in their application to consumer sales to ‘goods or services of a type 
ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption’ and the exclusion of sales by 
competitive tender that results from the definition of ‘deals as consumer’ is not 
compatible with Directive 1999/44/EC and should not be retained in future 
legislation.  (para. 5.29)   
 
41. Section 11 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 on statements 
purporting to restrict the rights of buyers should be repealed as it duplicates the 
provisions of the Consumer Protection Act 2007 and the European Communities 
(Misleading and Comparative Marketing Communications) Regulations 2007.  (para. 
5.35)  
 
CHAPTER SIX SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893: TRANSFER OF PROPERTY                       
AS BETWEEN SELLER AND BUYER, SECTIONS 16-20  
 
42. Rule 1 of section 18 of the 1893 Act should be amended to make clear that the 
term ‘unconditional contract’ does not refer to conditions in the sense of essential 
terms of the contract.  (para. 6.5)  
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43. Provisions along the lines of those contained in the UK Sale of Goods 
(Amendment) Act 1995 should be introduced to deal with the issue of unascertained 
goods forming part of an identified bulk.  (para. 6.26.)  
 
44. No other changes are recommended to the provisions governing the passing of 
property in sections 16 to 18 of the 1893 Act.  (para. 6.33) 
 
45. Section 20 of the 1893 Act should be amended to provide that risk will pass with 
delivery. This provision should be mandatory for consumer contracts of sale, but a 
default rule for commercial contracts of sale.  (para. 6.56)   
 
CHAPTER SEVEN SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893: TRANSFER OF                   
TITLE, SECTIONS 12, 21-23 & 25-26  
 
46. The market overt exception to the nemo dat rule at section 22 of the 1893 Act 
should be repealed.  (para. 7.40)  
 
47. The burden of proof for all of the exceptions to the nemo dat rule should be 
harmonised by stipulating that it rests with the seller under section 23 of the 1893 Act. 
(para. 7.40)  
 
48. Section 23 of the 1893 Act should be simplified by abolishing the distinction 
between void and voidable. (para. 7.40)  
 
49. Section 23 of the 1893 Act should be amended to provide that, unless the other 
contracting party is notified of the rescission of the contract, an innocent purchaser 
from this party should acquire a good title to the goods. (para. 7.40)  
 
50. Section 25 of the 1893 Act should be amended by providing that subsection (2) be 
brought into line with subsection (1) so as to enable a good title to be acquired by an 
innocent purchaser regardless of whether or not the person with whom he was dealing 
appeared to be acting in the course of a business. (para. 7.40)   
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51. Section 26 of the 1893 Act on the effects of writs of execution should be repealed 
and transferred to courts legislation. (para. 7.40).   
 
52. Sections 2, 8 and 9 of the Factors Act 1889 should be repealed and consolidated  
in the new legislation that will replace the 1893 and 1980 Acts. (para. 7.40)  
 
CHAPTER EIGHT SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893: PERFORMANCE                
OF THE CONTRACT I – DELIVERY OF THE GOODS, SECTIONS 10, 27-33 
& 37.   
 
53. The default rule at section 10(1) of the 1893 Act should be reformulated in line 
with those at sections 17(2) and 18 of the Act to provide that, for the purpose of 
ascertaining the intention of the parties, regard shall be had to the terms of the 
contract, the conduct of the parties, and the circumstances of the case.  (para. 8.13)     
 
54. The provision for a thirty-day default delivery rule in the recently agreed  
Consumer Rights Directive will, in the case of consumer contracts of sale, replace the 
rule at section 29(2) of the 1893 Act requiring delivery within a reasonable time 
where the seller is bound to send the goods to the buyer, but no time for sending the 
goods is fixed. The existing ‘reasonable time’ rule should be retained for commercial 
contracts of sale.  (para. 8.23)  
 
55. Section 32 of the 1893 Act on delivery to carrier should be amended to provide 
that subsections (1) to (3) are not applicable to consumer contracts of sale and that 
delivery of the goods to the carrier is not delivery of goods to the buyer in consumer 
contracts of sale unless the carrier has been commissioned by the consumer. (para. 
8.23)  
 
56. In the case of commercial contracts of sale, the existing rule at section 32(1) of the 
1893 Act that delivery of the goods to a carrier for the purpose of transmission to the 
buyer is deemed prima facie to be a delivery of the goods to the buyer should be 
retained.  (para. 8.23)     
 
57. Section 33 of the 1893 Act on risk where goods are delivered at a distant place 
should be repealed.  (para. 8.23)  
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58. The right of buyers to reject for delivery of a wrong quantity should not apply in 
commercial contracts of sale where the excess or shortfall is so slight that it would be 
unreasonable to reject the whole of the goods.  (para. 8.35)  
 
59. Future legislation should give buyers a right of partial rejection of goods not in 
conformity with the contract and which do not form part of a commercial unit.  This 
general right of partial rejection should replace the limited right of partial rejection for 
goods of mixed description at section 30(3) of the 1893 Act.  Future legislation should 
also state that section 11(3) of the 1893 Act is subject to the provision on partial 
rejection. (para. 8.39)  
 
CHAPTER NINE SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893 PERFORMANCE  
OF THE CONTRACT II – EXAMINATION, ACCEPTANCE AND 
REJECTION OF THE GOODS, SECTIONS 34-37.                                                                                                      
 
60. Future legislation should integrate the examination provision at section 34(1) of 
the 1893 Act with the acceptance provisions at section 35 of the Act in order to clarify 
the interrelation between the provisions on the examination and acceptance of goods.  
(para. 9.14)  
 
61. Where acceptance by the buyer is subject to his having a reasonable opportunity 
of examining the goods for the purpose of ascertaining their conformity with the 
contract, future legislation should provide that consumer buyers cannot lose this right 
by agreement, waiver or otherwise.  (para. 9.16)  
 
62. The rules on acceptance in future legislation should be amended to provide that, in 
the case of commercial contracts of sale, the buyer would not be deemed to have 
accepted goods by means of intimation of acceptance to the seller unless he has had a 
reasonable opportunity of examining the goods for the purpose of ascertaining their 
conformity with the contract. (para. 9.21)  
  
63. In the case of consumer contracts of sale, intimation by acceptance should be 
excluded from the rules governing acceptance in future sale of goods legislation.  
(para. 9.21)  
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64. The rules governing acceptance by reason of acts inconsistent with the seller’s 
ownership of the goods should be amended in future legislation to provide that a 
buyer would not be deemed to have accepted the goods merely because:   
(a) the goods have been delivered to a third party under a sub-sale, gift or other 
disposition. 
(b) the buyer asks for, or agrees to, the repair of the goods.  (para. 9.28)   
 
65. The time period for the exercise of the right to reject goods not in conformity with 
the contract should normally be thirty days in the case of consumer contracts.  (9.44)  
 
66. Where the normal thirty-day period for rejection is incompatible with the nature of 
the goods, it should be open to the seller to argue for a rejection period shorter than 
thirty days.  (para. 9.44)  
 
67. Where it is reasonably foreseeable by both parties to the contract of sale that a 
longer period will be needed to examine the goods, the consumer should be able to 
argue for a rejection period longer than thirty days.  (para. 9.44)  
 
68. Except where the contract of sale provides otherwise, the time period in non-
consumer sales for the buyer’s right to reject goods not in conformity with the 
contract should normally be thirty days.  As in the case of consumer sales, the seller 
or buyer would be entitled to argue for a shorter or longer period where the nature of 
the goods made a shorter period more appropriate or it was reasonably foreseeable 
that the buyer would need a longer period of time in which to examine the goods. This 
recommendation should be reviewed if evidence emerges that the proposed rule is 
unsuited to certain types of commercial contract.  (para. 9.44)  
 
69. For the avoidance of doubt, any non-consumer contract of sale that stipulates a 
time limit within which the buyer must exercise a right to reject non-conforming 
goods should be subject to the statutory test of fairness and reasonableness.  (para. 
9.44)  
 
70. The remedial frameworks for consumer contracts of sale under the Sale of Goods 
Acts and the Consumer Sales and Guarantees Regulations should be integrated by 
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providing that the following would comprise  remedies of first resort, exercisable at 
the choice of the consumer, for goods not in conformity with the contract: 
 termination of the contract and full refund of the price within a normal thirty-
day period or, in specified circumstances, a longer or shorter period; 
 replacement of the goods; 
 repair of the goods.  (para. 9.53)  
 
71. Where the repair or replacement of the goods are the remedies of first resort, the 
consumer should be entitled to proceed to the remedies of termination and full refund 
or reduction of the price where: 
 The seller has not completed the repair or replacement within a reasonable 
time or without significant inconvenience to the consumer; or 
 The lack of conformity of the goods has not been remedied by the first repair 
or first replacement.  (para. 9.53)  
 
72. The remedy of termination and refund should apply to ‘minor’ defects where such 
defects constitute a breach of the implied condition of satisfactory quality in consumer 
contracts of sale.  (para. 9.53)  
 
73. The thirty day period for rejection of the goods not in conformity with the  
contract should, where applicable, be suspended while repairs or discussions about 
repairs take place.  (para. 9.53)  
 
74. The presumption that a lack of conformity which becomes apparent within six 
months of the delivery of the goods existed at the time of delivery should apply in 
consumer contracts of sale to the remedy of termination and refund in the same way 
as to the remedies of repair and replacement.  (para. 9.53)  
 
75. The presumption that a lack of conformity which becomes apparent within six 
months of the delivery of the goods existed at the time of delivery should apply in 
consumer contracts of sale for a further period of six months where replacement 
goods are supplied as a remedy for goods not in conformity with the contract.  (para. 
9.53)  
 
76.  In the case of commercial contracts of sale, the right to reject and the related rules 
on examination and acceptance would operate in tandem with the statutory ‘cure’ 
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provision for commercial contracts of sale recommended at paragraph 11.36. (para. 
9.53)    
 
CHAPTER TEN SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893: RIGHTS OF  
UNPAID SELLER AGAINST THE GOODS, SECTIONS 38-48.                        
 
77. For the avoidance of doubt, the provision at section 39(2) of the 1893 Act should 
be amended in future legislation to provide that the buyer has a right of resale. (para. 
10.6)     
 
78. The unpaid seller’s lien at sections 41-43 of the 1893 Act should be retained in 
future legislation.  (para. 10.22)  
 
79. The right of stoppage in transit at sections 44-46 of the 1893 Act should be 
repealed. If evidence is forthcoming from future consultations that the right retains 
some utility in present-day commercial practice, this recommendation should be 
reviewed.  If the right is retained following such a review, the conditions governing its 
operation should be simplified.  (para. 10.22)  
 
80. Sections 48(3) and (4) of the 1893 Act should be amended in future sale of goods 
legislation to clarify that:  
(1) The seller’s right of resale applies where: 
(a) the goods have not been delivered to the buyer; 
(b) the buyer’s breach of contract is a repudiatory breach; and  
(c) the contract has been terminated. 
(2) Where the seller lawfully exercises a right of resale, any property in the goods 
which has passed to the buyer revests in the seller.  (para. 10.32)  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
CHAPTER ELEVEN SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893: ACTIONS  
FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT, SECTIONS 49-54.                                           
 
81. The Group favours the adoption of a provision linking an action for the price to 
delivery modelled on Section 9.11 of the Canadian Uniform Sale of Goods Act, as 
adopted in 1982. This should replace Section 49 of the 1893 Act.  (para. 11.12)  
82. Section 50 of the 1893 Act should be retained in slightly amended form as 
follows: .  
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1) ‘Available market’ should be defined in line with case law dicta as meaning 
that the situation in the particular trade in the particular area is such that the 
goods in question can be freely sold. 
2) The section should incorporate provisions on the lines of those at section 9.10 
of the 1982 Canadian Uniform Sales law or section 2-706 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code on sellers’ right of resale.   
3) No specific legislative provisions are recommended in section 50 to deal with 
the problem of lost volume sellers. (para. 11.21)  
 
83. The reference to ‘specific or ascertained goods’ should be deleted from the first 
sentence of section 52.  A new second sentence as follows should also be added to the 
section:  
    In particular, the court shall consider, in the case of goods that are physically or  
   commercially unique for that buyer, whether the circumstances make specific  
   performance an appropriate judgment or decree for the court. (para. 11.28) 
 
84. A statutory cure provision along the lines of that at Article 46 of the United 
Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods should be introduced for 
commercial contracts of sale in future legislation. (para. 11.36)  
 
85. The words ‘prima facie’ should be deleted from section 53(5) on the estimation of 
loss in the case of breach of warranty of quality.  (para. 11.36)  
 
CHAPTER TWELVE: SALE OF GOODS AND SUPPLY OF  
SERVICES ACT 1980: MISREPRESENTATION, SECTIONS 43-46.                
 
86. Serious consideration should be given to the introduction of statutory provisions 
on misrepresentation that would apply to contracts generally. (para. 12.23)    
 
87. The application of the statutory provisions on misrepresentation to consumer hire 
agreements should be clarified. The provisions should also be extended to commercial 
hire agreements.  (para. 12.23)   
 
88.  A new definition of ‘contract’ as follows should be included for the purposes of 
the misrepresentation provisions in future legislation:   
    ‘contract’ means a contract for a sale or supply of goods, a hire  
    purchase agreement, an agreement for the licensing or letting of goods  
    or a contract for the supply of services or any combination in whole or  
    in part of any of the aforesaid.   (para. 12.23)  
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89. Future legislation should provide that the statutory provisions on 
misrepresentation are a supplement to, and not a replacement for, the rules of the 
common law and equity. (para. 12.23)   
 
90. Future legislation should include provisions setting out the conditions under which 
an innocent party can rescind a contract on grounds of misrepresentation.  The rules at 
sections 7(4)(b) and 5 of the New Zealand Contractual Remedies Act 1979 offer a 
useful model in this respect and provisions along similar lines should be incorporated 
into Irish law.  (para. 12.25)    
 
91.  Future legislation should include provisions setting out the basis for the 
determination of damages for innocent, negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation 
respectively. Definitions of the three forms of misrepresentation should be included 
accordingly in the legislation. (para. 12.30)   
 
92. Future legislation should incorporate the common law prohibition on the 
exclusion of liability for fraudulent misrepresentation.  (para. 12.36)  
 
93.  Contract terms that exclude or limit liability for other forms of misrepresentation 
should be permissible where shown to be ‘fair and reasonable’.  (para. 12.36)  
 
94.  A provision along the lines of section 13(1) of the UK Unfair Contract Terms Act 
which elaborates on the ways in which exemption clauses may seek to exclude or 
restrict liability should be added to the statutory provisions on the exemption of 
liability for misrepresentation.  This would help to clarify the nature and type of 
clauses seeking to exclude or restrict liability for misrepresentation which come 
within the scope of the statutory provisions.  A similar recommendation is made at 
paragraph 5.29 above in respect of clauses seeking to exempt liability for the implied 









CHAPTER THIRTEEN SALE OF GOODS AND SUPPLY OF SERVICES ACT  
1980: GUARANTEES AND MISCELLANEOUS (UNSOLICITED GOODS, 
DIRECTORY ENTRIES AND REGULATIONS), SECTIONS 15-19, 47-49 & 
51-54   
 
95.  There should be a single set of statutory rules on product guarantees in future 
legislation.  Those rules should be based on the provisions of sections 15-19 of the 
Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 along with the addition of those 
elements of the guarantee provisions of Directive 1999/44/EC not found in the Act, 
including the requirement that guarantees be expressed in English.  (para. 13.10)  
 
96. The provisions regarding guarantees in future legislation should, like the existing 
statutory provisions, apply to all purchasers of goods covered by guarantee.  (para. 
13.14)    
 
97. An extensive review of Irish extended warranty documents and practices should 
be undertaken across all sectors in which extended warranties are commonly 
available.  As an interim measure, regulations based on the UK Supply of Extended 
Warranties on Domestic Electrical Goods Order 2005 should be introduced to 
regulate extended warranties in electrical retailing.  (para. 13.17)  
 
98.  The conditions governing the receipt of unsolicited goods under section 47(1) of 
the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 should be repealed.  Persons 
receiving unsolicited goods should be entitled to treat them as an unconditional gift, 
and the rights of the sender to such goods should be extinguished, without regard to 
such conditions. The provisions on unsolicited goods and services which are currently 
contained in separate pieces of legislation should also be brought together in future 
legislation.  (para. 13.28)  
 
99. The supply of unsolicited goods or services to businesses should be regulated by 
provisions similar to those governing the supply of such goods and services to 
consumers under Directives 97/7/EC and 2005/29/EC.  (para. 13.30)   
 
100. Section 48 of the 1980 Act should be amended to permit agreement to a charge 
for a first-time directory entry to be made on a durable medium where there has been 
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prior provision of prescribed information about the directory and the charge. (para. 
13.42)  
 
101.  The rules at Section 48 of the 1980 Act regulating orders for first-time directory 
entries should also be revised to permit such orders to be made by electronic means. 
The content of the future rules on first-time orders should be the subject of 
consultation with directory companies and business groups in order to ensure that 
effective safeguards are maintained against the activities of rogue directory 
companies.  (para. 13.42)       
 
102. Section 48 of the 1980 Act should be further amended to provide that the 
requirements relating to orders and payment for renewed or extended directory entries 
are simplified along the lines set out in the UK Regulatory Reform (Unsolicited 
Goods and Services Act 1971) (Directory Entries and Demands for Payment) Order 
2005.   (para. 13.42)  
 
103. Section 49(2) of the 1980 Act should be repealed and replaced by a provision 
indicating the conditions which an invoice or similar document must satisfy if it is not 
to be regarded as asserting a right to payment.  (para. 13.42)  
 
104.  Future legislative provisions on directory entries should take full account of e-
commerce legislation currently in force.  (para. 13.42)  
 
105. Regulations governing print size and related presentational issues in consumer 
contracts should be introduced. The content of such Regulations should be determined 
after consultation with business and consumer interests.  (para. 13.50)    
 
106.  The Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation should be empowered to make 
regulations requiring the issue of a receipt in consumer transactions.  The scope and 
manner of application of such a requirement should be the subject of consultation 







CHAPTER FOURTEEN: I NON-SALE CONTRACTS FOR THE SUPPLY OF  
GOODS & II SALE OF GOODS AND SUPPLY OF SERVICES ACT 1980: 
SUPPLY OF SERVICES, SECTIONS 39-42  
 
107.  The implied undertakings as to goods currently contained in separate statutes for 
different types of transaction (sale, hire-purchase, consumer hire, work and materials) 
or not covered by statutory provisions (barter/exchange, commercial hire-purchase 
and hire agreements) should be consolidated in future legislation. The concept of 
‘contract for the transfer of goods’ in the UK Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 
offers a suitable framework for such consolidation.  (para. 14.14)  
 
108. A separate Consumer Contract Rights Act should be enacted that would 
incorporate the main statutory provisions applicable to consumer contracts, including 
the provisions of the recently agreed Consumer Rights Directive and of Directive 
93/13/EC on Unfair Contract Terms. Provisions relating to other non-core aspects of 
consumer contracts of sale should be dealt with, together with all of the provisions 
applicable to commercial contracts, in a new Sale and Supply of Goods and Supply of 
Services Act. (para. 14.14)  
 
109 The implied statutory undertakings as to goods applicable to consumer hire-
purchase and hire agreements under Parts VI and VII of the Consumer Credit Act 
1995 should apply also to commercial hire-purchase and hire agreements in future 
legislation on the sale and supply of goods and the supply of services. (para. 14.14)  
 
110. The restriction of the definition of ‘hire agreement’ in the Consumer Credit Act 
1995 to contracts of more than three months’ duration should not be retained in future 
legislation.  (para. 14.14)  
 
111. Future legislation should clarify that goods supplied ‘free’ or at a reduced price 
when bought in conjunction with other goods under promotional campaigns are 
subject to the same implied quality and other terms as goods purchased for a price.  
(para. 14.14)  
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112. Future legislation should also clarify that goods supplied under loyalty schemes 
are subject to the same implied quality and other terms as goods supplied under a 
contract of sale.  (para. 14.14)    
 
113. A broadly-based definition of ‘services’ modelled on the definition at section 
2(1) of the Consumer Protection Act 2007 should be included in future legislation. 
This definition should remove the exclusion in the present definition of 
meteorological or transport services provided by the Minister for Transport.  (para. 
14.21)  
 
114. The current restrictions on the application of section 39 of the 1980 Act, and on 
the applicability of exclusion clauses under section 40 of the Act, to contracts for the 
carriage of passengers or goods should be removed.  (para. 14.21)  
 
115. The implied terms as to the quality of services should be classified as conditions 
of the contract in future legislation.  (para. 14.30)  
 
116. Future legislation should include an implied term that, where the time of 
performance of a service is not fixed by the contract, it should be carried out within a 
reasonable time.  It should also include an implied term that, where the price for a 
service is not fixed by the contract, the recipient of the service should pay a 
reasonable price.  (para. 14.38)  
 
117. Future legislation should expressly provide that provisions on implied terms in 
contracts for the supply of services are without prejudice to any rule of law that would 
impose stricter duties of skill and care.  (para. 14.38)  
 
118. Future legislation should include a provision along the lines of section 29 of the 
New Zealand Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 that a service, and any product 
resulting from it, will be reasonably fit for any particular purpose, and of such a 
nature and quality that it can reasonably be expected to achieve any particular result, 
that the consumer makes known to the supplier as the particular purpose for which the 
service is required or the result that the consumer desires to achieve.  This provision 
should apply both to consumer and commercial contracts for services.  (para. 14.38)  
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119. All of the implied terms applying to contracts of sale should also apply to goods 
supplied under a contract of service in which the property in the goods is transferred 
from seller to buyer.  (para. 14.40)  
 
120. Contract terms which exclude the terms implied by statute into commercial 
contracts for services should be regulated on the same basis as exemption clauses in 
commercial contracts of sale, namely that they are unenforceable unless shown to be  
fair and reasonable.  (para. 14.44)  
 
121. Contract terms which exclude the terms implied by statute into consumer 
contracts for services should be automatically unfair in all circumstances under the 
European Communities (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) Regulations 1995 and 
2000. The 1995 Regulations should be amended in order to give effect to this 
recommendation. (para. 14.44)  
 
122. Section 41 of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 on statements 
purporting to restrict the rights of recipients of services should be repealed in line with 
the recommended of section 11 of the Act on statements purporting to restrict the 
rights of buyers. (para. 14.46)     
 
 
CHAPTER FIFTEEN: UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON  
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS  
 
123. Ireland should accede to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
Internatonal Sale of Goods. The new legislation that will replace the 1893 and 1980 
Acts should include the provisions necessary to give effect to the entry into force of 
the Convention in Ireland.  (para. 15.9) 
 
124. Ireland should not avail of the option of making a declaration under Articles 92-
96 of the Convention. This recommendation should be reviewed if consultations 
provide evidence of convincing grounds for any or all of the derogations provided for 
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1.1  The Remit of the Study  
This study reports upon amendments made in other common law jurisdictions to the 
provisions of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (or legislation based on that Act) which  
have relevance to, or lessons for, the reform of Irish legislation on the sale of goods 
and the supply of services. It deals also with proposals for reform by Law 
Commissions or similar bodies that were not adopted and the reasons for their non-
adoption.  The jurisdictions surveyed are: 
• The United Kingdom 
• Canada 
• New Zealand  
• Australia 
• Hong Kong 
• Singapore 
The report also has regard to relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the International Sale of Goods, and of the Draft Common Frame of Reference and 
the Principles of European Law (Sales) prepared by the Study Group on a European 
Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law.  As the remit of the study is 
broad, it can be difficult to draw the line between topics that are properly within, and 
those that are outside, its scope. Certain topics which impact indirectly on the law of 
sale of goods, such as reform of the doctrine of privity of contract and reform of the 
parol evidence rule, have been excluded from the study on the ground that they 
belong more properly to the general law of contract and the law of evidence.   
 
Developments in the law of sale of goods and supply of services and related proposals 
for law reform in each of the jurisdictions surveyed are discussed separately in 
Chapters 2-7.  Emphasis is placed on those reforms and proposals for reform that are 
significant in terms of the reform of Irish law on sale of goods and supply of services.  






The 1893 Act and the English Legal System 
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, a substantial body of sale of goods common law 
existed.  Furthermore, the case law was not easily reconciled.  To make sales law 
more accessible, there was a partial codification of this area, in the form of the Sale of 
Goods Act, 1893.1083  Hence, it is notable that the 1893 Act was itself not a reforming 
statute.  The Act is expressed to be: An Act for codifying the law relating to sale of 
goods, although, as noted above, it is not a complete code of the law of sale of 
goods.1084  Sir Mackenzie Chalmers, who drafted the legislation leading to the Bills of 
Exchange Act 1882, drafted the Sale of Goods Bill which was presented to Parliament 
in 1889.  The Bill lapsed and was re-introduced in 1891.  Following extensive 
amendments, the Bill emerged as the Sale of Goods Act 1893.1085  Although the Bill 
was intended not to alter the common law position at the time, it proved unsuccessful 
in this regard, in certain instances, due to details of drafting and parliamentary 
amendment.1086 
 
The 1893 Act has been amended on numerous occasions since its enactment in the 
UK.  A number of these amendments have been mirrored in the Irish legal system. 
For example, in the UK in 1973, in the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act (an Act 
mainly concerned with consumer transactions) rules which restricted the extent to 
which the seller could exclude liability for breach of the statutory implied terms were 
introduced; a new definition of merchantable quality was provided; and the legislation 
applied the same or similar statutory implied terms to other supply contracts, such as 
hire-purchase contracts.  In Ireland, the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 
                                                 
1083  Other areas of commercial law underwent similar treatment, including bills of sale (Bills of Sale 
(Ireland) Acts 1879 and 1883); bills of exchange (Bills of Exchange Act 1882); the operation of factors  
(Factors Act 1889); partnership (Partnership Act 1890); and marine insurance (Marine Insurance Act 
1906).  All this legislation continues in force in England (and indeed in Ireland) today. 
1084  See 1893 Act, s. 61(2) which states: “The rules of the common law, including the law merchant, 
save in so far as they are inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, and in particular the rules 
relating to the law of principal and agent and the effect of fraud, duress or coercion, mistake or other 
invalidating cause, shall continue to apply to contracts for the sale of goods”.  
1085  The 1893 Act came into operation on January 1, 1894: 1893 Act, s.63.  See further Bridge, ‘The 
evolution of modern sales law’, [1991] Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 52; Goode, 
Commercial Law, (London: Penguin, 3rd 2004) Ch.6; and the Introduction to the First Edition of 
Chalmer’s Sale of Goods Act 1893 (London: Butterworths, 18th ed., 1981). 
1086   E.g. the distinction between sales of specific goods and sales by description was not maintained, 
allowing the implication of implied terms to contracts for the sale of specific goods.   
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1980 sought to make similar (though not identical) amendments.   Following the 1973 
Act, further changes were made by the Unfair Contract Terms Act (UCTA) 1977 and 
the 1893 Act and its amending legislation was consolidated and re-enacted as the Sale 
of Goods Act 1979.  Therefore, much of this legislation will not be considered in 
detail further below.  Only amendments that are significant in terms of reforming Irish 
sale of goods law are explored further below, in chronological order.  Further, 
proposals for reform in relation to sale of goods which have not been implemented 
will be addressed. 
 
2.1  Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act 1954 - formalities. 
At common law, a contract for the sale of goods required no formalities.  The Sale of 
Goods Act 1893 contained two provisions on ‘formalities of the contract’: sections 3-
4.  This common law position was reflected in the opening lines of section 3, which 
stated: 
Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any statute in that behalf, a 
contract of sale may be made in writing (either with or without seal), by word 
of mouth, or partly in writing and partly by word of mouth, or may be implied 
from the conduct of the parties.1087   
But section 4(1) of the 1893 Act (which derived from section 17, Statute of Frauds 
1677) provided that a contract for the sale of goods of the value of £10 or more was 
not enforceable by action unless: 
(i) the buyer accepts, and actually receives, part of the goods sold;1088 or 
(ii) the buyer gives something in earnest to bind the contract;1089 or 
(iii)the buyer has made part payment;1090 or 
(iv) there is a note or memorandum in writing of the contract and signed by the 
party to be charged. 
 
• impetus for reform  
Criticism of the Statute of Frauds and section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 was 
widespread and consistent from the turn of the twentieth century.1091  The Law 
                                                 
1087  The provision further states that nothing in the section shall affect the law relating to corporations. 
1088  Hopton v McCarthy (1882) 10 LR (IR) 266; Tradax (Ireland) v Irish Grain Board [1984] IR 1. 
1089  Kirwan v Price [1958] Ir Jur 56. 
1090  Ibid. 
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Revision Committee (the fore-runner to today’s Law Reform Commission) first 
recommended that section 4 of the 1893 Act be repealed in 1937 but their report was 
not accepted.1092  The matter was remitted to the Law Revision Committee in 1952 
when repeal of section 4 of the 1893 Act was again recommended.  The proposals of 
the Committee were accepted this second time. 
 
• rationale   
(a) original rationale of Statute of Frauds (and hence s.4, 1893 Act) was 
widely recognised as obscure and any original raison d’être was no longer 
applicable;1093 
(b) financial limit of ‘£10 sterling’ was out of date in the twentieth century; as 
a result, the provision caught a whole range of transactions that were never 
intended to come within its scope;1094   
(c) the case law on the original section 17, 1677 and section 4, 1893 Act, was 
numerous and unreliable, as judges sought to navigate their way around 
statutory provisions in the interests of justice. 
 
• the nature of the reform  
Section 4 of the 1893 Act, in the United Kingdom, was repealed by section 1 of the 
Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act 1954. 
 
• critique   
There is no significant criticism of this repeal – other than it took so long to 
achieve!1095  Many jurisdictions have followed the lead of the UK in this regard.  
Where the provision remains, there are calls for its reform (e.g. increase financial 
limit) or, more often, its repeal.   
                                                                                                                                            
1091  See e.g. Pollock, 29 LQR 247; Holdsworth History of English Law, Vol. VI, p.396; Williams, The 
Statute of Frauds, Section IV, p.283. 
1092  Sixth Interim Report (1937), Cmnd. 5449; see further [1937] MLR 97. 
1093  Indeed, when drafting section 4 of the 1893 Act, it is noted that Sir MD Chalmers did so with 
‘obvious reluctance’, its inclusion being necessitated by the codifying nature of the statute: Chalmers, 
Sale of Goods Act (12th ed , 1945) p.26; Cheshire Fifoot & Furnston’s, Law of Contract (Oxford 
University Press, 15th ed., 2007) pp.259-262. 
1094  In the United States of America, the relevant figure in the Uniform Commercial Code was set at 
$500.  In its latest revision, this figure has been raised to $5,000:  see UCC 2-201. 
1095  See e.g. Cheshire Fifoot & Furnston’s, Law of Contract (Oxford University Press, 15th ed., 2007) 
p.263. 
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2.2  Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
As noted above, UCTA 1977 incorporated the rules on exclusion of liability for 
breach of the statutory implied terms in relation to contracts for the sale of goods, first 
introduced in the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973.  Again, as noted above, 
similar rules apply in Ireland in this regard.  But it is notable that UCTA does more 
than merely regulate exclusion clauses in the context of the statutory implied terms (in 
sections 6-7 in relation to sale of goods; supply of goods and services; and hire-
purchase agreements).  While UCTA does not impose a general test of fairness to all 
contract terms, it does, for example: 
• in section 2,  regulate contract terms and notices which exclude or restrict liability 
for loss caused by negligence; 
• in section 3, provide that where a person makes a contract on his own standard 
terms or with a consumer, he cannot by reference to any term in the contract: 
(a) exclude or restrict his liability for breach of contract, or  
(b) claim to be entitled  
(i) to render a contractual performance substantially different from 
that which was reasonably expected of him; or 
(ii) in respect of the whole or any part of his contractual obligation, to 
render no performance at all, 
unless the clause is a reasonable one to have included in the contract; 
• in section 5, provide that a term or notice in a manufacturers’ guarantee cannot 
exclude or restrict liability for any kind of loss or damage caused by goods of a 
type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption which prove defective 
whilst in consumer use as a result of negligence in manufacture or distribution; 
Moreover, UCTA applies not only to terms in the form of exclusion clauses but to 
other terms including terms which: 
• make a liability or its enforcement subject to restrictive or onerous conditions; 
• exclude or restrict any right or remedy; 




                                                 
1096 1977 Act, s.13. 
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2.3  Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 
The Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 did not reform the law of sale, as such, 
but extended some of the features of sale of goods legislation, to contracts for the 
supply of goods and/or services (a similar extension of the sale rules exists in sections 
8-11 of the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973, in relation to hire-purchase 
contracts; and section 16 of the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 as regards 
trading stamps.)   
 
Subject to a number of exceptions, the 1982 Act applies to all contracts for the supply 
of services, including those which involve the supply or bailment of goods.  ‘Contract 
for the supply of service’ is defined as a contract under which a person (‘the supplier’) 
agrees to carry out a service.  Although ‘services’ is not defined further, the 1982 Act 
does exclude contracts of apprenticeship or employment.  Further exemptions exist 
under secondary legislation (e.g. section 13 on provision of service with reasonable 
care does not apply to advocates, arbitrators, company directors etc.). 
 
Pursuant to Part I of the 1982 Act, where the contract involves the supply of goods 
(with or without services) but the contract is not a sale of goods, implied terms as to 
description, satisfactory quality, fitness for particular purpose and sample apply (e.g. 
contracts of exchange/barter, and hire).  Where the transferee does not deal as a 
consumer, his remedies are restricted where the breach is ‘minor’, as per sale of goods 
contracts.  Moreover, where the transferee deals as a consumer, his rights have been 
augmented pursuant to the EC Consumer Sales Directive 1999/44. 
 
Further, Part II of the 1982 Act applies to contracts for the supply of services alone 
and to the work element of ‘work and materials’ contracts.  Section 13 provides 
simply that where a service is provided in the course of a business there is an implied 
term (hence an innominate term) that the service will be provided with reasonable 
skill and care.  Liability for breach of this term can be excluded or limited, subject to 
restrictions imposed by section 2 of UCTA 1977 (cf. with sale of goods contracts, no 
exclusion or limitation of liability is permissible where the buyer deals as a 
consumer).  Section 14 contains a default rule as regards the time of performance of 
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the service in the course of a business: accordingly there is an implied term that the 
service will be performed within a reasonable time.  Lastly, section 15 provides 
another default rule about consideration:  there is an implied terms that the party 
contracting with the supplier will pay a reasonable charge.     
 
Like the original Sale of Goods Act 1893, the 1982 Act has acted as a model for other 
jurisdictions seeking to regulate the supply of services. 
 
2.4  Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994  
This legislation amended the Sale of Goods Act 1979, which specific reference to the 
implied terms as to quality and fitness and the remedies available to buyers under the 
legislation, including issues of examination, acceptance, and rejection.  It is notable 
for altering the core quality standard from merchantable to satisfactory quality.  It also 
introduced changes regarding examination (by extending the right of examination), 
acceptance (and the effect of requests for repair and sub-sales, for example) and 
rejection (by prohibiting rejection where the breach was minor in relation to 
commercial sales and by allowing partial rejection).   
 
• impetus for reform  
This reform was the result of a long gestation period.  Following the introduction and 
subsequent withdrawal, of a Private Member’s Bill which sought to alter the statutory 
definition of ‘merchantable quality’, the Law Commission was requested to review 
the provisions regarding implied terms as to quality and buyer’s remedies and to make 
recommendations, in 1979.  In 1983 a joint consultation document was issued.1097  
The Commissions issued the joint final report in 1987,1098 a less radical document 
than the earlier consultation documents.  This final report considered three closely 
related questions. 
(i) What terms as to quality of the goods should the law imply into supply 
contracts? 
                                                 
1097  Law Commission Working Paper No.85 and Scottish Law Commission Consultative 
Memorandum No.58. 
1098  Report on Sale and Supply of Goods, Law Commission No. 160 and Scottish Law Commission 
No. 104. 
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(ii) If the supplier is in breach of one of those terms, what should the 
customer’s rights be? 
(iii) Should the right to reject continue for a long time or be lost soon after 
delivery? 
The Commission made a total of 24 recommendations, including that the quality 
standard be changed from ‘merchantable quality’ to ‘acceptable quality’ to be defined 
by a general statement of principle followed by a list of aspects of quality, to include 
fitness; appearance and finish; freedom from  minor defects; safety; and durability 
(Recommendations 1-5).  (It was agreed that the other implied terms as to description, 
particular purpose, and sample were not in need of reform.)  The Commission also 
made recommendations concerning the rights of examination, rejection and 
termination (see further below).  Under the heading, ‘Miscellaneous Matters’, the 
Commission recommended that the decision in Rowland v Divall1099  not be reversed 
(see further below). 
 
There was no immediate legislative response to this joint Report from the Law 
Commissions.  The matter was resurrected by a DTI Consultation Paper on Consumer 
Guarantees (1992).  The main significance of this paper was that in it the Government 
accepted the Law Commissions’ proposals subject to one change:  the quality 
standard would be ‘satisfactory’ and not ‘acceptable’ quality.  
 
• rationale  
The above Law Commission reports sought to address two major aspects of sale of 
goods law: the implied terms as the quality and fitness (in particular s.14(2), 1979 on 
merchantable quality); and buyer’s remedies following breach of the statutory implied 
terms (sections 11, 34-35, in particular).  In relation to the former, there was a number 
of commonly held objections to the term ‘merchantable quality’ and its definition 
(which had been introduced in 1973).  In particular: 
• the word ‘merchantable’ itself was regarded as outmoded (it referred to 
transactions between merchants and it was not suitable for consumer transactions), 
and of uncertain meaning, based on case law; and  
                                                 
1099  [1923] 2 KB 500 (CA). 
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• the term concentrated too exclusively on fitness for purpose and did not take 
account of other important aspects of quality, such as appearance and finish, 
freedom from minor defects, durability and safety. 
 
As regards remedies, there was a view that the existing rules were inflexible (e.g. 
partly due to the rigid classifications of terms as conditions or warranties; and the ‘all 
or nothing’ nature of the rules on rejection) and that the rules needed to be 
modernised. 
 
• the nature of the reform  
Closely following the recommendations of the Law Commissions and the proposals in 
the DTI Consultation Paper, the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994 introduced major 
reforms in relation to the quality and fitness of goods supplied and buyer’s remedies, 
through a process of substitution.  The main changes are set out, in outline, below. 
(a) The requirement of merchantable was replaced by a requirement of 
satisfactory quality (still a condition) defined with reference to a general 
principle and a further list of aspects to quality to include fitness for all 
common purposes (reversing Aswan Engineer v Lupdine1100); appearance 
and finish; freedom from minor defects; safety; and durability (new 
s.14(2)); 
(b) Reference to the quality of the goods including their ‘state and condition’ 
(s. 62, 1893 Act; s.61, 1979 Act) was brought into the implied condition in 
section 14(2), 1979; 
(c) Right of examination (s.34, 1979) is extended such that where goods are 
delivered and the buyer has not previously examined them, he is not 
deemed to have accepted them (i) when he intimates acceptance, or (ii) 
when he does an act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership, until he has 
had a reasonable opportunity of examining them to assess conformity with 
the contract (new s.35(2), 1979); 
(d) Moreover, on the issue of acceptance following lapse of a reasonable time, 
the amending legislation makes clear that whether the buyer has had a 
reasonable opportunity of examining the goods is relevant or ‘material’ in 
                                                 
1100 [1987] 1 All ER 135. 
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determining whether the goods have been accepted or not (new s.35(4) and 
(5), 1979); 
(e) Further, a person is not deemed to have accepted the goods merely because 
(a) he asks for, or agrees to, their repair by or under an arrangement with 
the seller, or (b) the goods are delivered to another under a sub-sale or 
other disposition (new s.34(6), 1979); 
(f) A right of partial rejection is recognised (including partial rejection within 
an instalment) (s.35A, 1979) subject to ‘commercial unit’ proviso; 
(g) Section 30(4) which allowed partial rejection where goods did not match 
the contract description (but not on any other ground) was repealed; 
(h) The non-consumer buyer cannot reject the goods and terminate the 
contract where the breach of ss.13-15  is minor (s.15A(1), 1979); 
(i) Section 30 regarding delivery of wrong quantity is amended in relation to 
non-consumer sales, such that a buyer cannot reject the goods for a minor 
excess or shortfall (s.30(2)A-E, 1979); 
(j) Section 15(2)(b) concerning right of examination and sales by sample was 
repealed; 
(k) In Scotland, the implied terms were all classified as ‘terms’ (s.15B, 1979), 
with consequential amendments. 
 
• critique   
The reform introduced by the 1994 Act was broadly welcomed.  However, various 
aspects of the legislation have been the source of criticism.  For example,   
o again, there were criticisms from many sources concerning the delay in 
implementing the Law Commissions’ recommendations; 
o many criticised what they viewed as the ‘patch-work’ nature of reform (this 
was in fact recognised as a deficiency by the Law Commissions themselves in 
their 1987 Report); 
o some academics viewed the new quality standard as consumer oriented and 
more cosmetic than substantive in terms of altering the law.  In fact, 
subsequent case law provides broad support for this view (e.g. Clegg and 
another v Olle Andersson [2003] EWCA Civ 320; Albright & Wilson v 
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Biachem Ltd & ors [2000] All ER(D) 530 (successfully appealed to House of 
Lords on other grounds [2002] UKHL 37). 
o while the amendments around acceptance and rejection sought to bring 
clarification to certain matters, case law since the Sale and Supply of Goods 
Act 1994 evidences the continued uncertainty in the law in this area (e.g. 
Clegg and another v Olle Andersson [2003] EWCA Civ 320; Jones v 
Gallagher [2004] EWCA Civ 10; J&H Ritchie Ltd v Lloyd Ltd [2007] UKHL 
9). 
 
2.5  Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1994 – abolition of market overt exception 
This very short piece of legislation (two sections only) repealed section 22 of the Sale 
of Goods Act 1979 (formerly section 22 of the 1893 Act) and thereby abolished the 
market overt exception to the nemo dat rule.   
 
The fundamental rule of property law that no one can transfer a better title than he 
himself has - nemo dat quod non habet was restated in section 21 of the 1893 Act.  
Over time, a number of common law exceptions to this fundamental rule were 
developed, in order to protect innocent purchasers and thus encourage commercial 
activity by reinforcing the security of sale transactions.  These exceptions were set out 
in sections 21 - 26 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 and re-produced in sections 21-26 
of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979.1101  The exceptions relate to agency (section 21, 
1893); market overt (section 22, 1893); sale under voidable title (section 23, 1893); 
seller in possession after sale (section 25(1), 1893) and buyer in possession after sale 
(section 25(2), 1893).  In particular, section 22 provided that where goods are sold in 
market overt, according to the usage of the market, the buyer acquires a good title to 
the goods provided he buys them in good faith and without notice of any defect or 
want of title on the part of the seller. 
 
• impetus for reform  
The matter of title conflicts was considered on a number of occasions.  For example, 
the Law Reform Committee made a number of recommendations in a report published 
                                                 
1101  Other exceptions exist e.g. see Factors Act 1889, section 2, 8-9. 
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in April 1966 (Cmnd 2958).1102  In broad terms, these recommendations sought to 
simplify, and in some cases amend, the case law that had developed since the 1893 
Act, and, in the general interest of the innocent purchaser.  Notably, the Committee 
recommended an extension of the market overt exception, whereby if a person bought 
goods by normal retail sale or at a public auction he should acquire good title to these 
goods regardless of whether the seller had a good title.1103   
 
The matter was considered again by Professor Diamond in his Review of Security 
Interest in Goods (HMSO, 1989).1104  He also seems to have come down on the side 
of the innocent purchaser and proposed a general principle that where the owner of 
goods has entrusted to another person, or acquiesced in their possession by another 
person, then if that person disposes of the goods to an innocent purchaser in the 
ordinary course of business, the innocent purchaser would get good title. 
 
The immediate impetus for this reform came in early 1994, when the Department of 
Trade and Industry issued a Consultation Document, Transfer of Title: Sections 21-26 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 which, referring to the above reports, made three 
proposals for reform: 
• simplify the law, in favour of the innocent purchase by replacing the existing 
exceptions with one broad principle; 
• abolish the market overt exception; 
• extend the principle in Part 3 of the Hire Purchase Acts to all goods, and to goods 
on lease or covered by a bill of sale. 
 
There are no further details concerning the consultation process or its findings 
publicly available.  Ultimately, only one of the above proposals was given effect to in 
the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1994: the abolition of the market overt 
exception. 
 
The origins of and rationale for the DTI paper are unclear although without doubt 
there were representations for the abolition of the market overt exception (described 
                                                 
1102  See [1966] MLR 431; see further below. 
1103 Lord Donovan dissenting. 
1104  Aspects of this matter were also considered by the Law Commission in 1983 and 1987, as regards 
the reversal of Rowland v Divall. 
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as a ‘thieves’ charter’) from those in law enforcement and the fine arts and antique 
trade (e.g. Council for the Prevention of Art Theft).1105 
 
• rationale  
In relation to the abolition of the market overt exception, it was argued that the 
exception was archaic (dating from medieval times) and anomalous in its application 
(e.g. all sale from the ground floor within the City of London were included).  
Moreover, it was argued that it facilitated the laundering of stolen goods through as 
many as 20 such markets in the UK.    
 
• the nature of the reform  
The reform involved a simple repeal of one single provision: section 22 of the 1893 
Act (thereby leaving the remaining exceptions intact). In effect, this reform 
strengthens the nemo dat principle; accordingly, where goods are stolen, good title 
cannot pass to an innocent purchaser. 
   
• critique   
Although there was criticism of the 1994 DTI consultation process and proposals,1106 
there has been little or no criticism of the limited reform introduced by the Sale of 
Goods (Amendment) Act 1994.  The alternative to abolishing the market overt 
exception was its extension, along the lines proposed by the Law Reform Committee 
in 1966.  This proposal was criticised, at the time, as lacking a sound basis (no real 
empirical data was used to support the Committee’s proposals) and for giving 
insufficient weight to how the proposals would operate in practice.1107 
 
With regard to the wider proposals for reform, it may be that the consultation process 
found little support for such reform: we simply do not know.  Hence, these wider 




                                                 
1105 See e.g. The Times, 25th July p.5. 
1106 Davenport, “Consultation – how not to do it”, [1994] LQR 165; Miller, “Transfer of Title: a new 
legal regime in only three paragraphs”, [1994] LMCLQ 322. 
1107  Atiyah, “Law Reform Committee: Twelfth Report”, [1966] MLR 541. 
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2.6  Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995 – passing of property in bulk 
Sections 16-20 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (and subsequently ss.16-20 of the 1979 
Act) deal with the passing of property between seller and buyer under a sale of goods 
contact. Essentially, parties are free to agree when property will pass (s.17) but where 
it is not clear what their intention is, section 18 contains a series of rules of presumed 
intent for the passing of property in specific goods (Rules 1-3); goods on approval or 
on sale or return (Rule 4); and unascertained or future goods (Rule 5).  Overriding 
these rules in sections 17-18 is section 16 – a mandatory rule – which provides that no 
property can pass in unascertained goods until they are ascertained.  ‘Unascertained 
goods’ is not defined in the legislation but all goods which are not specific – defined 
as goods which are identified and agreed upon when the contract is made (s.62, 1893) 
– are unascertained.  A common example of unascertained goods is where the buyer 
purchases part of a larger bulk e.g. 500 tons of wheat from a named ship carrying 
1000 tons.  In the leading case on ascertainment re Wait1108 it was held that goods are 
ascertained when they are ‘identified in accordance with the agreement after [the] 
contract ... is made’.1109  The operation of this rule can result in situations quite 
contrary to modern day expectations, in particular where a buyer has purchased goods 
forming part of a larger bulk and paid for those goods, indeed he may have received a 
document purporting to be a document of title to the goods, nevertheless, he does not 
own the goods while they remain part of the larger bulk.  Hence in situations where 
the seller becomes insolvent before the goods are ascertained, the buyer has no 
property rights over the goods and is left with a personal action for non-delivery 
against the insolvent seller.  The Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995, by the 
insertion of two new provisions in the legislation (s.20A and s.20B, 1979 Act), and 
consequential amendments, sought to remedy the position of pre-paying buyers of 
goods in bulk by making them tenants-in-common of the bulk. 
 
• impetus for reform  
A long line of case law illustrated the precarious position of pre-paying buyers of 
goods in bulk but the issue was highlighted in more modern times by a case decided 
by the Commercial Court in Rotterdam in 1985 – The Gosforth.1110  The publicity of 
                                                 
1108  [1927] 1 Ch 606. 
1109  re Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606, per Atkin LJ at 630. 
1110  See Davenport, “Ownership of Bulk Cargos – The Gosforth”, [1986] LMCLQ 4.  
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this case caused concern among commodity traders and the Law Commission was 
approached by a leading international commodity trading association and asked to 
consider examining the law in this area.  Following a preliminary research 
programme, in 1989, the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission issued 
consultation papers on the law relating to rights to goods in bulk.1111  These papers not 
only consider the issues around bulk goods under the sale of goods legislation but also 
problems arising out of section 1 of the Bills of Lading Act 1855 and the rights of the 
buyer of goods to pursue an action against the carrier where goods were lost or 
damaged while at sea.  Two major pieces of law reform resulted from this initial 
consultation process.  The first was the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 19921112 which 
permitted the lawful holder of a bill of lading (and other transport documents) to sue 
on the bill of lading simply by virtue of being the holder, whether property in the 
goods had passed or not.  This legislation sought to remedy the deficiencies of section 
1 of the 1855 Act (still in force in Ireland) and the resulting common law and rises 
important question about the adequacy of Irish law.1113  The second piece of law 
reform relates to the relevant provision in the sale of goods legislation.  A further joint 
consultation was issued in relation to bulk goods and insolvency:  Sale of Goods 
Forming Part of a Bulk: Insolvency Aspects (1991).  A final joint report was issued in 
1993, Sale of Goods Forming Part of a Bulk,1114 the main recommendations of which 
were implemented in the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995. 
 
• rationale  
Following a thorough consultation process which was supported by empirical data, a 
number of deficiencies in the existing law were identified as in need of reform.  In 
particular, 
(a) section 16 operated in an anomalous way:  e.g. (i) it probably did not 
prevent property passing to a buyer who agrees to buy an undivided share 
in a bulk, expressed as a fraction of the whole (e.g. half the cargo from a 
named ship) but it did prevent property passing where a specified quantity 
                                                 
1111  Law Commission Working Paper No. 112, Rights to Goods in Bulk, (April 1989); Scottish Law 
Commission Discussion Paper No. 83, Bulk Goods: Section 16 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and 
Section 1 of the Bills of Lading Act 1855 (August 1989). 
1112  See further joint Commission reports on Rights of Suit in respect of Carriage of Goods by Sea , 
Law Commission No. 196 and Scottish Law Commission No. 130 (March 1991). 
1113 See generally Bradgate and White, “The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992” (1993) 56 MLR 188. 
1114 Law Commission No.215, Scottish Law Commission No.145. 
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from a larger bulk was bought (e.g. 500 tons from 1000 tons abroad a 
named ship); (ii) it did not prevent property passing where a buyer 
purchases the whole bulk under one contract, or where one buyer 
purchases the whole bulk but under several contracts.  However, if the 
whole bulk was purchased by different buyers under separate contracts 
none of them acquired any property in any goods; (iii) it seemed that if a 
buyer contracted to buy goods from a bulk and the contract quantity was 
momentarily separated and then returned to the bulk, the buyer became the  
co-owner, as tenant in common with the seller, of the new bulk. 
(b) the effect of section 16 was particularly harsh if the buyer paid the price 
but the seller became insolvent before the goods were ascertained.  The 
buyer was then left as an unsecured creditor and might see the goods re-
sold and the proceeds used to pay other creditors; 
(c) more generally, section 16 ran contrary to the principle of freedom of 
contract and reasonable expectations. 
 
The widely held view was that if the law was not amended, traders would alter the 
proper law of the sales contracts from English law and this would pose a threat to 
shipping and insurance, as well as legal, businesses in the UK.  Notably, although the 
reform was driven by commercial interests it applies to all sales whether commercial 
or consumer. 
 
• the nature of the reform  
Pursuant to the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995 where there is a contract for 
the sale of a specified quantity of unascertained goods forming part of an identified 
bulk, a buyer who has paid for some or all of the contract goods obtains an undivided 
share in the bulk and becomes a tenant in common of the whole.  This undivided 
share is a halfway house: when the buyer’s share of the bulk is separated out and 
ascertained, property in those goods passes to the buyer in accordance with the normal 
rules on passing of property found in sections 17-18.  This relatively simple proposal 
required provision to be made for a number of potential problems which recognition 
of the buyer’s interest might create - for instance, if some or all of the bulk is resold, 
or if there proves to be insufficient in the bulk to satisfy the buyer’s contract.   
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These amendments are to be made by inserting two new sections into the legislation.  
Section 20A provides for an undivided share in goods forming part of a bulk, while 
section 20B contains rules of deemed consent by co-owners to dealings in bulk goods.  
Consequential amendments were also made to section 16, section 18 (Rule 5), and the 
definition provision.   
 
• critique   
The reform was broadly welcomed by the commercial community and academics. 1115  
However, academic commentary has identified some omissions and criticisms of this 
reform.  In particular: 
o unlike e.g. the US UCC, the UK reform is limited to pre-paying buyers.  This 
arguably introduces an inconsistency in the law which otherwise does not take 
account of payment of the price in determining the passing of property.  So, 
for instance, by excluding the buyer who has not paid for goods the reform 
permits the seller’s insolvency officer to choose whether or not to perform the 
contract of sale and thus to take advantage of market price movements; 
o arguably there is an omission in the legislation in that, there is nothing in the 
amending legislation about the allocation of risk between seller and buyer 
where the goods deteriorate before the buyer takes delivery of his share of the 
goods.   
o questions remain as to additions to and withdraws from the identified bulk by 
a ‘rogue’ seller; 
o the effect of the amending legislation on concepts of possession, and 
constructive possession in particular, is unclear; 
o in more general terms, the reform has been criticised as being piece-meal 
resulting in lack of coherence in the overall statutory scheme. 
 
                                                 
1115  Bradgate & White, ‘Sale of Goods Forming Part of a Bulk: Proposals for Reform’, [1994]  
LMCLQ 315; Ulph, ‘The Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995: co-ownership and the rogue seller’, 
[1996] LMCLQ 93;  Burns, ‘Better Late than Never:  the reform of the law on sale of goods forming 
part of a bulk’, [1996] MLR 260; Gullifer, ‘Constructive Possession After the Sale of Goods 
(Amendment) Act 1995’, [199X] LMCLQ 93; Worthington, ‘Sorting Out Ownership Interest in a Bulk: 
Gifts, sales and Trusts’, [1999]  JBL 1; Crinion, ‘ “All that Glitters …” Re Wait, Section 16 and the 
Peril for the Pre-Paying Buyer: is it time for a fresh approach’, [2004] UCDLR 76. 
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There has been no case law exploring this reform reported in the UK or addressing 
some of the questions raised above re risk, rogue sellers etc.    This legislation has 
been exported to a number of other common law jurisdictions. 
 
2.7  Twelfth Report of the Law Reform Committee, Transfer of Title in Chattels 
(1966),
1116
 and Joint Law Commissions Report on Sale of Goods (1987).
1117   
With the exception of the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1994, which repealed 
section 22 of the 1979 Act on market overt, the legislative rules on conflicts of title 
have remained largely unchanged since the 1893 Act.  This is despite the fact that the 
topic has been considered, on a number of occasions, as in need of reform.  
 
In Ingram v Little1118 Devlin LJ suggested that it might be possible to apportion loss 
between an innocent owner and an innocent purchaser where there is a conflict of title 
resulting from the conduct of some dishonest middle party who has disappeared.  
Following this suggestion, the topic of conflict of title was referred to the Law 
Reform Committee which reported in 1966. 
 
The main recommendations of the Committee were as follows: 
• the Committee rejected Devlin LJ’s suggestion of apportionment because they 
argued it was impractical / too complicated to implement, especially where there 
is a string of transactions involved; 
• the Committee also rejected the suggestion that there be a fundamental change to 
the law in favour of the bona fide purchaser for value. 
Instead, the Committee made a number of detailed proposals for change which sought 
to simplify the law and reverse certain case law, in particular: 
• the Committee recommended the abolition of the distinction between 
contracts which are void and voidable (re section 23, 1893; see further Art 
2-403 of UCC); 
                                                 
1116  Cmnd 2958. 
1117  Report on Sale and Supply of Goods, Law Commission No. 160 and Scottish Law Commission 
No. 104. 
1118  [1961] 1 QB 31. 
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• the Committee recommended the reversal of the decision in Car and 
Universal Finance Co. Ltd v Caldwell1119 and hence that communication is 
necessary to avoid a contract under section 23, 1893; 
• the Committee recommended the reversal of the dicta in Newtons of 
Wembley Ltd v Williams1120 and that the legislation should be clarified to 
ensure that a buyer in possession can pass good title without the 
requirement to act as a mercantile agent; 
• the Committee criticised the market overt rule and recommended that it be 
broadened to apply to sales from retail premises. The Sale of Goods 
(Amendment) Act 1994, in fact, repealed the market overt exception under 
section 22, 1893. 
• The Committee recommended the reversal of the burden of proof 
regarding good faith etc. under section 23 which, unlike all the other 
exceptions, rests with the original owner.1121 
• The Committee also recommended the reversal of Rowland v Divall1122 
where it had been held that if a purchaser bought goods to which the seller 
had no title (in breach of s.12(1), 1893) then there was a total failure of 
consideration and the purchaser could recover the full purchase price from 
the seller irrespective of any benefit he may have had of the goods in the 
interim.  The effect of this decision could result in the unjust enrichment of 
the buyer in that he could have prolonged use of the goods without having 
to pay for them, given his right to claim a refund of the full price paid.  
This issue was addressed again, including in 1975, in the Law Commission 
Working Paper No. 65, where a number of proposals were made about the 
valuation of the unjust enrichment.  However, on consultation these 
proposals were thought too complex and the matter was reserved for 
consideration by the Law Commissions in 1979.  Accordingly, in 1983 a 
joint consultation document was issued which considered ways in which 
                                                 
1119  [1965] 1 QB 525. 
1120  [1965] 1 QB 560. 
1121  Whitehorn Bros v Davison [1911] 1 KB 463. 
1122  [1923] 2 KB 500 (CA).  Despite much criticism, see e.g. Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 7th ed., 2006) para 4-006; Goode, Commercial Law (London: Penguin, 3rd ed., 
2004) p.214-216; Atiyah’s Sale of Goods (Harlow: Pearson, 11th ed., 2005) pp.114-118, Rowland v 
Divall was more recently approved, by the Supreme Court in United Dominion Trust (Ireland) Ltd v 
Shannon Caravans Ltd [1976] IR 225, and by the Court of Appeal in Barber v NSW [1996] 1 All ER 
906. 
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the buyer’s rights could be modified to take account of any use / 
possession of the goods.1123  It was suggested that the buyer should not be 
automatically entitled to recover the full price.  Rather than using a 
valuation of the use and possession, it was suggested that the buyer should 
have an action for damages or an action for damages subject to a deduction 
for the innocent party’s use of the goods, whichever would yield the 
greater sum.  However, in the joint final report in 1987, the Commissions 
re-examined the proposals in the Consultation Document and finding that 
the proposals were too complex, recommended no change in the law.   
 
2.8  Security Interests in Personal Property and retention of title clauses 
(including issues of conflict of title) 
A number of reports have examined the issue of security interests in personal property 
in England and Scotland and in doing so have made recommendations for reform 
which would impact on the use of retention of title clauses in sale of goods contracts.  
These proposals (in part, inspired by the US UCC and Canadian law) have not been 
implemented to date. 
 
Sales contracts which incorporate retention of title clauses (e.g. ‘no property will pass 
from the seller to the buyer until the price is paid in full’) are in effect conditional sale 
arrangements, under section 19 of the 1979 Act, which have been judicially approved 
since the late 19th century.1124  Today, retention of title clauses impact most notably in 
insolvency situations.  Where a buyer who has not paid for the goods supplied under a 
sale contract, which includes a retention of title clause, becomes insolvent, the 
retention of title clause enables the unpaid seller to demand delivery of his goods, 
thereby reducing the pool of assets available to other creditors.  The standard 
argument against the operation of such clauses is that they involve more than a simple 
agreement between the parties about the passing of property.  Rather, in effect, they 
operate as a form of security for the unpaid seller.  Based on this analysis, the true 
construction of a sale contract subject to a retention of title clause, involves the 
property in the goods passing to the buyer and the buyer granting back to the seller a 
                                                 
1123  Law Commission Working Paper No.85 and Scottish Law Commission Consultative 
Memorandum No.58. 
1124  McEntire v Crossley [1895] AC 457. 
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mortgage or charge over the goods to the value of the debt.  Further, such mortgage or 
charge would be unenforceable if not registered under the relevant legislation 
(retention of title clauses are typically not registered).1125  In a long line of modern 
case law, since the 1970s, the courts would appear to have drawn a line in the sand 
and identified that certain types of retention of title clauses are effective (‘simple’ 
clauses - also recognised now under EC law1126 - and ‘all sums due’ clauses) whereas 
other types of clauses have been interpreted as creating a security interest and hence 
are unenforceable for lack of registration (claims to manufactured products, and 
perhaps, claims to proceeds to sale).  Despite a substantial body of case law and 
extensive academic literature surrounding retention of title clauses, many aspects of 
the law relating to retention of title clauses remain unclear and its impact on 
insolvency controversial.  In particular, the Cork Committee on Insolvency Law and 
Practice found that ‘the absence of any provisions requiring disclosure of retention of 
title clauses is unsatisfactory and should be remedied as soon as is possible’.1127 
 
The broad issue of security interests over goods (including the use of retention of title 
clauses) was addressed in 1971 by the Crowther Committee,1128 and in the Halliday 
Report, as regards Scotland.1129  The proposals in these reports were never 
implemented but were reviewed further in the DTI’s Review of Security Interests in 
Property (the Diamond Report, 1989).  All these reports recognised a variety of 
deficiencies in the existing fragmented framework and, based on a policy which 
emphasises function over form, proposed a single statutory framework for security 
interests over personal property.  In particular, the Diamond Report recommended: 
• that the existing law be replaced by new legislation containing a simpler and 
unified system with similar rules applying to all types of security interest 
created by agreement; 
• that the new legislation be based on Article 9 of the UCC and the Personal 
Property Security Acts introduced in the Canadian provinces; 
                                                 
1125  Bills of Sales (Ireland) Acts 1879 and 1883 or Companies Acts 1963-2009. 
1126  The EC Directive on combating late payment in commercial transactions, Directive EC/35/2000, 
[2000] OJ L 200/35, currently under review by European Commission. 
1127  (1982) Cmnd 8558, para 1639. 
1128  Report of the Committee on Consumer Credit,  Cmnd 4596, (1971). 
1129  Scottish Law Commission, March 1986. 
 499
• that conditional sale arrangements (and hire-purchase agreements) should be 
treated as creating security interests, without the need for further 
documentation, and that new legislation should spell this out; 
• however, simple and more complex retention of title clauses should be 
distinguished and treated differently by the law; accordingly, simple clauses, 
including claims to proceeds, should be treated as a ‘purchase money security 
interests’ and secure favourable treatment; but favourable treatment should not 
extend to claims to manufactured products and all monies clauses; 
• most security should be registered by filing a ‘financial statement’ in a central 
registry but as regards retention of title clauses such filing would not be linked 
to each actual security agreement but per customer; 
• given the impact of the topic on matters of title conflicts, Diamond also 
recommended the simplification and rationalisation of sections 23, 24 and 25 
of the Sale of Goods Act and section 2 of the Factors Act, and, the repeal of 
sections 8 and 9 of the Factor Act, thereby widening slightly the protection 
afforded to innocent purchasers. 
 
As noted above, the recommendations in the Diamond Report were not implemented.  
Professor Sir Roy Goode addressed the matter also in the wider context of a 
Commercial Code for the UK, along the lines of the US UCC, a significant part of 
which would have been a part dealing with personal property security interests.1130  
Despite initial interest in Professor Goode’s codification idea, including that 
expressed by the Department of Trade and Industry, it would appear that the proposal 
of a Commercial Code fell out of favour, not least, because of the large amount of 
Parliamentary time that would be required to pass a Commercial Code. 
 
Security interests over personal property returned to the agenda again in the late 
1990s when the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry launched a fundamental 
review of company law.  In 2000, the Company Law Review Steering Group 
published a consultation document which raised the possibility of a ‘radical option’ of 
changing the existing system of registration to one of ‘notice-filing’.  Following a 
positive response to this proposal, the final report, published in 2001, made such 
                                                 
1130  See (1988) 14 Monash LR 135. 
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proposal for reform.1131  However, the Steering Group noted that it did not have 
sufficient time to consider fully its proposals and in particular whether, as Crowther 
and Diamond had recommended, any new scheme should cover ‘quasi-security 
devices’ such as retention of title clauses.  Moreover, the creation and registration of 
security interests, other than by companies, was outside the remit of the Steering 
Group.  As a result the Steering Group recommended that the matter be referred to the 
Law Commissions.   
 
The Law Commission published a consultation paper in 2002.1132  The Paper 
provisionally proposed a notice-filing system, and associated priority rules, for 
company charges and this proposal applied to quasi-security devices including 
retention of title clauses.  The intention was to extend such a system to security 
devices created by unincorporated businesses as soon as possible (replacing the Bills 
of Sale legislation).  Particular attention was paid to security interests created by 
consumers.  Lastly, it was asked whether such a scheme should include a 
‘restatement’ of the rights and remedies of the parties to the security agreement.  
Response to the paper was mixed. 
 
In response to calls for more details in relation to the proposed scheme, the Law 
Commission published a ‘consultative report’ in 2004.1133  This report contained more 
details about the operation of the scheme (similar to the Western Canadian model), 
which would first apply to security interests created by companies and later be 
extended to unincorporated businesses. As regards retention of title devices the report 
was more guarded:  it did recommend that such devices be brought within the scheme 
but recognised that this proposal was controversial and so the report sought views 
about the costs and benefit of this proposal.  Responses to this report were again 
mixed.  In particular, there was little support for including retention of title devices in 
a companies-only scheme.   
 
The Law Commission published its final Report on Company Security Interests in 
2005 which proposed electronic notice filing, and associated rules, for security 
                                                 
1131  Final Report, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy, URN 01/942. 
1132  Consultation Paper No. 164, Registration of Security Interests: Company Charges over Property 
other than Land. 
1133  Consultation Paper No. 176, Company Security Interests: a Consultative Report.   
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interests created by companies.1134 As regards retention of title devices it was 
recommended that this matter should be deferred for further consideration after there 
was a review of the whole question of transfer of title to goods by non-owners, and 
then it should be considered for all debtors, and not just companies.  It has been 
argued that, in the UK context, the attractions of personal property security legislation 
as regards retention of titles clauses are questionable.1135  At common law, there is a 
significant degree of certainty surrounding the law on retention of title clauses; from 
the supplier’s perspective such a scheme, which would require registration, would 
make it harder to pursue certain claims e.g. to original goods; and while it would 
allow a supplier to create a security interest over ‘new goods’ (not effective at 
common law) it is not clear that this is a priority for suppliers.  While financiers were 
initially in favour of such a scheme, this attitude changed in the course of the Law 
Commission’s work, not least because of the relative degree of certainty in the law.      
 
2.9  Conclusions 
The above analysis illustrates that since the mid-twentieth century, the UK has been 
most active in terms of reviewing, recommending reform but less frequently 
amending sale of goods legislation in relation to a wide variety of topics from issues 
of contract formalities; to matters of quality standards and buyer’s remedies; to issues 
concerning the transfer of property and conflicts of title, and beyond.  Nevertheless, 
the reform agenda can be described as limited and cautious.  At no time has there 
been any attempt to move from the basic framework and principles which underlie the 
Sale of Goods Act 1893 (as in the US and Canada).  Instead, the reform process can 
be characterised as ad hoc; often focussed on single issues or restricted in scope; and 
driven by changes in the market and market operators (e.g. consumers; bulk traders; 
fine art dealers).  This patch-work development of the law of sale has been recognised 
as a deficiency in the law by the English Law Commission (1987) and the position 
has become exacerbated with the transposition of the EC Consumer Sales Directive, 
in the form of the Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations 2002 (SI 2002 
No, 3045) which amends further the Sale of Goods Act 1979.  Therefore, while the 
                                                 
1134  Law Comm No. 296. 
1135  Beale, “The Exportability of North American Chattel Securities Regimes: the fate of the English 
Law Commission’s Proposals”, (2006) 43 Canadian Business Law Journal 178. 
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skeleton of 1893 Act remains clearly visible it is not clear how long this position can 




The 1893 Act and Canada 
 
Canada is the only jurisdiction under review where a real attempt was made to re-cast 
sale of goods legislation in recent times, which would involve abandoning the 
framework and principles of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 as out-of-date and 
inappropriate to modern commercial conditions and putting in its place a Uniform 
Sale of Goods Act, inspired by Article 2 of the US UCC.  Ultimately, this process 
failed.  Instead, there remains a series of provincial Sale of Goods Acts, which closely 
reflect the original 1893 Act.  Amendments to this legislation have been modest, few 
in number and ad hoc in fashion.  Much of the focus of reform has been on providing 
further protection to consumers, including by prohibiting the exclusion of liability for 
breach of various statutory implied terms (akin to the terms implied by the sale of 
goods legislation) under a variety of Consumer Protection Acts.1136  The 
Saskatchewan Consumer Products Warranties Act is notable in this regard because it 
provides for further implied warranties in consumer contracts for the sale of goods 
(e.g. acceptable quality) and its scope extends beyond the immediate seller and buyer 
of goods.1137  Further consumer legislation deals with unfair or unconscionable 
practices.1138 
 
In this section the development, form and legacy of the Uniform Sale of Goods Act 
will be considered first and then a number of particular reforms, in relation to 
formalities, the nemo dat and market overt rules; the consumer buyer’s lien; personal 
property securities legislation, and the international sale of goods, will be examined.   
 
 
                                                 
1136  See e.g. Consumer Protection Act, RSBC, 1979; Consumer Protection Act, RSY, 1986; Consumer 
Protection Act, RSM, 1987; Consumer Protection Act, RSNWT, 1988; Consumer Protection Act, 
RSNS, 1989; Consumer Protection Act, RSO, 1990.  Much of this legislation has been updated, e.g. in 
Ontario, a new Consumer Protection Act 2002 repeals and replaces the pre-existing Consumer 
Protection Act 1990 and Business Practices Act 1990; see also Business Practices and Consumer 
Protection Act, SBC, 2004. 
1137  See further Romero “Jurisprudence on the Saskatchewan Consumer Product Warranties Act”, 
(1983-4) 8 Can Bus LJ  288.  See also Consumer Products Warranties Act, RSS, 1978; see also New 
Brunswick Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act, SNB 1978. 
1138  See e.g. Unfair Trade Practices Act, RSA, 1980; Trade Practice Act, RSBC, 1979; and Business 
Practices Act, RSO, 1990.  Again, much of this legislation has been updated e.g. Consumer Protection 
Act, RSO, 2002; Business Practice and Consumer Protection Act, SBC, 2004.  But see Ziegel, “Is 
Canadian Consumer Law Dead” (1994-5) 24 Can Bus LJ 417. 
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3.1  Draft Uniform Sale of Goods Act (1981) 
In Canada, all the common law provinces adopted, more or less verbatim, the Sale of 
Goods Act 1893.1139   Inspired by the US experience, discontent with the law on sale 
of goods was apparent from the mid-twentieth century onwards in Canada..1140  
However, it was not until the 1970s that the impetus for major reform manifested 
itself; in the work of the Ontario Law Reform Commission.  The Commission 
published a Report on Sale of Goods (1979) which proposed that a committee be 
appointed to consider the need for a new, revised, uniform sale of goods legislation.  
The Commission Report, and draft Bill, was to form the basis of this review.  A Sale 
of Goods Committee was established in 1979. Recognising the many changes that had 
occurred in Canada since the adoption of the 1893 Act, the Committee agreed with 
the Ontario Law Reform Commission for the need for a revised Sale of Goods Act 
tailored to meet Canadian conditions and perceptions and designed to maintain 
uniformity among the Provinces by the adoption of a Uniform Sale of Goods Act. 
 
Notable Features of the draft Uniform Act 
• Origins and Structure – The drafting of the Uniform Act was expressly based on 
Article 2 of the US UCC and the Ontario Law Reform Commission’s draft Bill, 
although the wording of the Uniform Act (as opposed to the UCC) is perhaps 
closer in style to Irish parliamentary drafting.  Like the UCC, the Uniform Act 
contains a useful text following each section, explaining the purpose and effect of 
each provision, including its source (e.g. UCC or Sale of Goods Act) and whether 
the provision is new or not.  The Uniform Act is sub-divided into ten parts, which 
follow the life-cycle of the contract of sale: Part 1 – Interpretation; Part 2 - Scope 
and Application; Part 3 – General Provisions; Part 4 – Formation, Adjustment and 
Assignment of Contracts; Part 5 – General Obligation and Construction of 
Contracts; Part 6 – Transfer of Title and Good Faith Buyers; Part 7 – 
                                                 
1139   The Sale of Goods Act 1893 was adopted what has been described as ‘an intermittent and 
haphazard manner in the various Canadian provinces: in 1896 in Manitoba, in 1897 in British 
Columbia, in 1898 in the Northwest Territories of Canada (formed into the Provinces of Alberta and 
Saskatchewan in 1905) and in 1910 in Nova Scotia.  Although the Sale of Goods Act 1893 was never 
formally adopted as a Uniform Act in Canada, one of the earliest initiatives of the Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada was to recommend to Provinces that had not 
already done so to adopt the Sale of Goods Act 1893.  Thereafter, the 1893 Act was adopted in New 
Brunswick and Prince Edward Island in 1919 and in Ontario in 1920. 
1140  See e.g. Sutton, “The Reform of the Law of Sales”, (1969) 7 Alberta Law Review 130. 
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Performance; Part 8 – Breach, Repudiation and Excuse; Part 9 – Remedies; and 
Part 10 – Miscellaneous. 
• Scope and Application – In broad terms, the scope of the draft Uniform Act is 
broader than the Sale of Goods Act 1893 and in defining its scope, in a series of 
more detailed provisions, the Act seeks to bring certainty to specific areas where 
the law is unclear.  For example, the relationship between sales legislation and the 
personal property security legislation is addressed using a test based on substance 
rather than form in section 2.2; in an optional provision, the Act can be applied to 
‘near sales’, as a means of encouraging courts to apply the sales legislation by 
analogy (s.2.2(4));  specific provisions address the sale of minerals and fixtures 
(s.2.5); the price is payable in money or otherwise, so barter comes within the 
scope of the legislation (s.2.6). 
• General Provisions – in a controversial provision, a general obligation of ‘good 
faith’ in the performance of duties under the contract (but not the enforcement of 
rights) is imposed (s.3.2).  
• Formation – It is notable that the draft Uniform Act covers a wider range of 
topics than the Sale of Goods Act.  In particular, and like the Vienna Convention, 
Part 4 deals with matters of contract formation, in 11 sections.  Some of these 
provisions merely restate the existing law from the Sale of Goods Act e.g. rules on 
capacity in (s.4.1).  Other provisions seek to bring greater clarity to the law e.g. 
detailed rules on delegation and assignment (s.4.11); while other provisions 
expressly amend the law with the introduction of a new provision.  Examples of 
such new provisions include: 
o  New rules, based on the Vienna Convention, re the mirror image rules 
(s.4.2(3)-(5)); 
o New rules, based on the UCC, dealing with the battle of the forms issue 
(s.4.3); 
o Changes to the doctrine of consideration including that offers may be 
irrevocable without consideration (s. 4.4), and variations may be binding 
without new consideration (s.4.10); 
o Abolition of the parol evidence rule (s.4.8). 
Importantly, there are no formal requirements under the Uniform Act (section 
4.2(1)). 
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• General Obligations – the basic obligations to delivery and pay are restated and 
expanded upon with more detail on the payment obligation, in particular (s.5.1 
and s.5.8).  Moreover, contrary to the common law, contracts may be concluded 
despite an ‘open price’ i.e. the price is not settled.  In a key normative provision 
section 5.2 confers an express power on courts to refuse enforcement of the 
contract if it was unconscionable at the time it was made.  This Part of the 
legislation addresses, in detail, specific types of sale contracts, including: output 
and requirement agreements; exclusive dealing agreements, various international 
sale contracts (fob; cif etc, s.5.19 – s.5.24) and sales on approval and return.  In a 
new provision, section 5.10 deals with liability for ‘statements’; addressing the 
distinction between contractual and non-contractual representations inducing the 
contract.  The implied condition on sale by description is deleted and absorbed in 
an express warranty (s.5.10), further express and implied warranties as to sample, 
title, merchantable quality and particular purpose are maintained, with minor 
amendments.  In addition, provision for the direct liability from the ‘prior 
merchant seller’ to a ‘subsequent buyer’, without privity of contract, is made in 
section 5.18. 
• Transfer of Title – In another key feature of the draft Uniform Act the concept of 
title/property is rejected as definitive regarding parties’ rights and obligations, e.g.  
as regards risk; right to sue for the price; and right to reject.  Retention of title 
clauses are recognised as creating ‘security interests’ only and in the absence of an 
express agreement to the contrary title passes at delivery (s.6.1).  This Part also 
maintains the basic structure of the nemo dat rule followed by the usual 
exceptions, sometimes altered and sometimes expanded.  For instance, there is a 
new provision on ‘negligent entrustment’; the concept of voidable title is 
expanded.  There is no market overt exception. 
• Performance – a new concept of ‘identification’ (replacing ascertainment) is used 
to resolve various issues (s.7.1); aspects of tender, delivery and shipment are 
clarified.  A seller’s right to cure is introduced in section 7.7.  Significantly, risk is 
linked to delivery (s.7.8) and the implication of reject and risk are clarified (s.7.9). 
• Breach, Repudiation and Excuse – includes provision for part-acceptance, and 
new grounds of acceptance (s.8.2).  Concepts of mistake and frustration are 
collapsed; the concept of perishing is replaced by ‘casualty’; and matters of partial 
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loss and theft are addressed in the legislation (s.8.11-8.14).  The resulting 
provision has been described as ‘complex and extremely detailed’ and it is 
questionable whether this reform proposal would lead to an improvement in the 
law.1141 
• Remedies – contains an exhaustive ‘index’ of seller’s and buyer’s remedies, 
clarified in a series of detailed provisions. 
 
As noted above, the draft Uniform Sale of Goods Act remains an academic exercise.  
In commenting on the failure of the Canadian common law provinces to adopt the 
Uniform Sales of Goods Act, one commentator stated in 1991: 
That they have not yet done so is proof of various things: the ability of 
merchants to work their way round an enactment that gives them freedom of 
movement; the fear of conforming to American cultural patterns; and the 
felling that international unification, as well as the existing intra-Canadian 
unification, should not lightly be sundered.1142 
 
3.2  Provincial Sale of Goods Acts 
As noted above, Canadian provincial statutes largely follow faithfully the structure 
and language of the 1893 Act.1143  That said, two matters - in relation to formalities 
and the continued application of the market overt rule  - are worthy of brief mention.  
 
• formalities 
There are no formal requirements in the draft Uniform Sale of Goods Act and the 
relevant provisions have been repealed in some Provinces including British 
Columbia;1144 Manitoba;1145 New Brunswick;1146 and Ontario.1147  In other Provinces, 
formal requirements remain, including in Alberta, Newfoundland, and Saskatchewan 
                                                 
1141  Fridman, Sale of Goods in Canada  (5th ed., 2004) . 
1142  Bridge, ‘The Evolution of Modern Sales Law’, [1991] LMCLQ 52 at 54. 
1143  See generally, Sale of Goods Act 1973, RSNB; Sale of Goods Act 1978, RSS; Sale of Goods Act, 
1986, RSY; Sale of Goods Act 1987, RSM; Sale of Goods Act, 1988, RSNWT; Sale of Goods, 1990, 
RSPEI; Sale of Goods Act 1989, RSNS; Sale of Goods Act 1990, RSO; Sale of Goods Act 1990, 
RSN; Sale of Goods Act 1996, RSBC; Sale of Goods Act, RSA, 2000.   
1144  RSBC, 1985, c.10, s.8. 
1145  SM, 1982-3-4, c.34,s.1. 
1146  SNB 1987, c.54. 
1147  SO 1994, c.27.s.54.  See further Ziegel, “Ontario repeals section 5 of the Sale of Goods Act”, 
(1995) 25 Can Bus LJ 478. 
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where under the relevant sales legislation, formalities apply to contracts of $50 or 
more.  In Nova Scotia, the relevant figure is $40.  
 
• nemo dat rule  and market overt exception 
Again, there is variation between the Provinces as regards the application of the 
market overt rule.  The rule has been repealed in all the Provinces, except it remains 
in its original form in British Columbia.  Moreover, in British Columbia a further Part 
(Part 7) was added to the Sale of Goods Act 1996 dealing with Disposition by Agents 
(incorporating provisions from the Factors Act).   
 
3.3  Pre-Paying Consumer Buyers and Insolvency - a buyer’s lien 
In the UK, the precarious position of pre-paying buyers of goods who did not take 
delivery of the goods but subsequently got caught up in the insolvency of the seller 
focussed on the position of commercial buyers of goods in bulk and lead to the 
enactment of the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995 which sought to remedy the 
position of pre-paying buyers of goods in bulk by making them tenants-in-common of 
the bulk.  In contrast, in British Columbia, the focus was placed on the position of 
pre-paying consumer buyers of goods, who through the operation of the rules on the 
passing of property (in particular as regard the purchase of unascertained or future 
goods) were left with no proprietary rights over the goods purchased and hence were 
treated as unsecured creditors in the seller’s insolvency and unlikely to receive any 
monies from the insolvency officer.  A proprietary claim to the goods by a buyer 
clearly provides better protection in an insolvency situation than a personal claim for 
non-delivery.  But, the basic difficulty for a buyer in such circumstances is that 
normally under the statutory rules, payment of the price is not linked to the passing of 
property (ss.21-23, B.C. Sale of Goods Act 1979 (or ss16-18, 1893 Act)).  Rather 
where ‘specific’ goods are sold property usually passed at the time the contract is 
concluded (irrespective of delivery and payment).  But where unascertained goods or 
future goods are sold, the rules are more demanding and required the goods to be 
‘ascertained and unconditionally appropriated’, or ‘unconditionally appropriated’, to 




• impetus for reform  
The Law Reform Commission of British Columbia examined and reported on this 
issue following reports of consumer complaints to a local newspaper, where 
consumers had paid some or part of the purchase price of goods without taking 
delivery of them. In each case the seller became insolvent before he could complete 
his part of the bargain and delivery of the goods to the consumer, leaving the 
consumer without an effective remedy in certain circumstances.  A Working Paper 
was published in 1986 and a final report in 1987.  The reports considered two basic 
questions:  first, as an issue of legal policy, should consumer buyers be singled out as 
a particular favoured group, when compared with non-consumer buyers or other 
classes of persons who may have claims on the seller?  A positive answer led to a 
second question.  Is it possible to enhance the legal position of the consumer buyer 
without significantly disrupting business practices or frustrating the legitimate 
expectations of other interested persons and groups? Ultimately, in its Report on the 
Buyer’s Lien: a new consumer remedy
1148 the British Columbia Law Commission 
recommended a new remedy, in the form of a lien, geared to this particular problem 
for consumers and not businesses on the basis that consumers were in greater need of 
protection.  This recommendation was implemented in the Consumer Protection 
Statutes Amendment Act SBC 1993.   
 
• rationale 
A number of arguments were put forward to support reform in favour of the consumer 
buyer.  In particular, the Law Commission found that:  
o the consumer buyer could be distinguished from others in a similar 
position, in particular commercial creditors, because the commercial 
creditor extends credit with a profit motive in mind; he is in a position to 
acquire accurate information and weigh his risks carefully; he is able to 
extract higher prices or interest rates to compensate for that risk; he is able 
to spread his losses efficiently among others with whom he does business, 
and he may be in a position to extract security to minimize his risk.  In 
contrast, such avenues are not practically open to the consumer buyer; 
                                                 
1148 LCR93 (1987). 
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o moreover, the consumer buyers rights to recover the goods purchased may 
depend on fortuitous circumstances over which he has no control, 
including, for example, internal stock control procedures of the seller, such 
as whether the buyer’s goods have been separated from the trading stock 
and identified with the buyer’s contact by labelling or other identifying 
system, for instance.  
 
• the nature of the reform  
In order to protect the consumer buyer, a statutory, non-possessory lien over all the 
seller’s goods matching the contract description and over any account in a savings 
institution in which the seller usually deposited proceeds of sale was brought into 
force by the Consumer Protection Statutes Amendment Act SBC 1993 which added a 
new Part 9 to the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (now Part 9 of the Sale of Goods Act 1996).  
These provisions are mandatory and cannot be contracted out of.  Accordingly, the 
buyer’s lien arises subject to the following pre-conditions: 
(i) if in the usual course of a seller's business the seller makes an agreement to 
sell goods, 
(ii) the buyer pays all or part of the price,  
(iii) the goods are unascertained or future goods, and 
(iv) the buyer is acquiring the goods in good faith for use primarily for 
personal, family or household purposes. 
The lien is for the amount the buyer has paid towards the purchase price of the goods 
and is against all goods in possession of the seller, that correspond with the contract 
description and the property in which has not passed to another buyer.  The lien can 
also apply to any account in a savings institution in which the seller usually deposits 
the proceeds of sales. 
The legislation contains further rules dealing with the termination of the lien (when 
property passes to buyer or where purchase price has been refunded, at the seller’s 
option); the lien’s priority over other security interests; proceeding to enforce the lien 
and matters of conflict where two or more liens exist over the same property ( e.g. any 
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shortfall is attributed to the buyers’ claims in the proportion that their respective 
claims bear to the sum of those claims). 
 
• critique 
The Commission’s proposals and subsequent legislation were largely welcome by the 
academic community as providing a ‘simple and workable scheme’ to protect 
consumer buyers in certain, thought not all, circumstances.1149 
 
This reform can usefully be compared with the UK reform under the Sale of Goods 
(Amendment) Act 1995. The Canadian reform is both wider and narrower in its 
scope.  It is wider because it applies to both unascertained and future goods whereas 
the UK reform only applies quasi-specified goods (i.e. unascertained goods from an 
identifiable source).  It is narrower in that the Canadian reform is limited to consumer 
buyers whereas the UK reform applies to consumers and non-consumers.  There are 
other points of contrast.  As against other buyers with liens, the interest operates akin 
to a tenancy in common when there is a shortfall with each buyer sharing 
proportionately in the shortfall.  Questions remain: the exact nature of the lien is 
unclear – is it legal, equitable or, perhaps mostly likely sui generis?  Also, where the 
lien applies to funds held by a savings institution, questions arise as to how the lien 
will be reconciled with a competing claim by the savings institution.    
 
An alternative means of protecting the consumer buyer would be to give him an 
enhanced status under insolvency legislation which could identify his claim as having 
preferred status over competing unsecured creditors, such as employees’ unpaid 
wages.  However, this option was rejected by the Law Reform Commission for a 
number of reasons.  In particular, matters of insolvency come within the jurisdiction 
of the federal authorities and hence are outside the scope of provincial law reform 
agencies.  More significantly, it was recognised that the law on insolvency had 
crystallized to a point where the introduction of a new concept would be difficult.  
Moreover, in many situations where consumer buyers were left unprotected, the 
provision of insolvency legislation were not invoked.  Other alternatives, using the 
                                                 
1149  See further Wood, ‘Law Reform Commission of British Columbia Report on the Buyer’s Lien: A 
new consumer remedy’, (1988) 14 CBLJ 118; Bridge, ‘The Prepaying Buyer and the Bankrupt Seller’, 
(1989) 3 BFLR 171; Close, ‘The British Columbia Buyer’s Lien - a new consumer remedy’, (1995) 25 
BCLJ 127.  
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‘trust’ vehicle, were also rejected as being impractical and placing an unreasonable 
burden on retail sellers. 
 
3.4  Personal Property Security Acts (PPSA)  
While a number of UK reports, notably the Diamond Report (1989), recommended a 
single statutory framework for security interests over personal property, including 
purchase money security interests (such a conditional sale arrangements i.e. sale 
contract subject to a retention of title clause) no such changes have been implemented 
in the UK.  Inspiration for these recommendations came in part from the Canadian 
experience and the Diamond Report recognised that the Canadian legislation provided 
useful models of the sort of enactment which could be introduced in the UK. 
 
Personal Property Security Acts, of a similar nature, although different in detail, have 
been enacted in many Provinces including Ontario in 1967 (though not effective until 
1976); in Manitoba in 1973; Saskatchewan in 1980; Yukon Territory in 1980; Alberta 
in 1990; British Columbia in 1990; New Brunswick in 1995 and Nova Scotia in 1995-
6.  A Uniform Personal Property Security Act had been adopted by the Canadian Bar 
Association and the Uniform Law Conference of Canada in 1982, replacing an earlier 
Uniform Act of 1971.1150  It is questionable however whether the desired uniformity 
has been achieved. 1151   
 
3.5  United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods  
Canada is also notable for the extent to which all the Canadian Provinces and 
Territories have now ratified and incorporated the UN Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG).1152  The CISG was adopted by a diplomatic 
conference in 1980.  It establishes a comprehensive code of legal rules governing the 
formation of contracts for the international sale of goods, the obligations of the buyer 
and seller, remedies for breach of contract and other aspects of the contract. The 
Convention entered into force on 1 January 1988. 
 
                                                 
1150 Ziegel, “The Uniform Personal Property Security Act 1982”, (1982-3) 7 Can Bus LJ 494. 
1151  Ziegel, “ Personal Property Security Legislative Activity 1986-88”, (1989) 15 Can Bus LJ 108; 
Canadian Perspectives on ‘How Far is Article 9 Exportable’”, (1996) 27 Can Bus LJ 226. 
1152  Ziegel, “Canada Prepares to Adopt the International Sales Convention”, (1991) 18 Can Bus LJ 1. 
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The CISG was adopted at federal level pursuant to the International Sale of Goods 
Contracts Convention Act 1991.  Upon accession in 1991, Canada declared that, in 
accordance with Article 93 of the Convention, the Convention would extend to  
o Alberta – International Conventions Implementation Act, 1991,  
o British Columbia – International Sale of Goods Act 1996,  
o Manitoba – International Sale of Goods Act 1989-90,  
o New Brunswick – International Sale of Goods Act 1989,  
o Newfoundland and Labrador – International Sale of Goods Act 1990,  
o Nova Scotia – International Sale of Goods Act 1988,  
o Ontario – International Sale of Goods Act 1990,  
o Prince Edward Island – International Sale of Goods Act 1988. 
o The Northwest Territories – International Sale of Goods Act 1988.  
 
In 1992, Canada extended the application of the Convention to  
o Quebec - An Act respecting the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods 1991 
o Saskatchewan – International Sale of Goods Act 1990-1.  
o the Yukon Territory – International Sale of Goods Act 1992.  
 
In 2003, Canada extended the application of the Convention to the Territory of 
Nunavut – International Sale of Goods Act 1988. 
 
Canada is now one of 74 states which have ratified the CISG.1153 
 
3.6  Conclusions 
While Canada is notable in terms of its adoption of personal property security 
legislation and the UN Convention, developments concerning domestic sale of goods, 
especially outside the consumer sphere, have been minimal.  Despite the best efforts 
of many to bring about reform the Sale of Goods Act 1893, its framework and 
principles remain largely unaffected by time.   
                                                 
1153  See further www.uncitral.org. 
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Chapter 4 
The 1893 Act and New Zealand 
 
The Sale of Goods Act 1893 was incorporated into New Zealand law in the Sale of 
Goods Act 1895.  The 1895 Act was subsequently replaced by the Sale of Goods Act 
1908 which was a consolidation of the 1895 Sale of Goods Act and sections 10-11 of 
the Mercantile Agents Act 1890 (an re-enactment of the Factors Act).  The 1908 Act, 
as amended, remains in force today. 
  
This 1908 Act has been amended a number of times.  For example, the Contractual 
Remedies Act 1979 made some amendments in relation to misrepresentation and 
remedies.1154  Other amendments / additions have been more consumer-orientated, 
including the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993.   New Zealand is also notable for 
enacting new personal property security legislation (following the examples of the US 
and Canada).   
 
Noteworthy features of the relevant sale of goods rules, as amended, are set-out below 
as well as an outline of the personal property security legislation.  Reform proposals 
in relation to e-commerce are also considered. 
 
4.1  Sale of Goods Act 1908 
The 1908 Act remains faithful to the structure and main rules of the 1893 Act.1155  
Notable features of the legislation, as amended, include: 
• The provision on capacity has been amended, by the Minors’ Contract Act 
1969, such that references to ‘infants and minors’ have been removed from 
section 4 of the 1908 Act on capacity and instead this aspect of the law is 
regulated by separate legislation.   
• In relation to formalities, the equivalent of section 4 of the 1893 Act was to be 
found in section 6 of the Sale of Goods Act 1895, which was itself replaced by 
section 6 of the Sale of Goods Act 1908 which applied to contracts in excess 
                                                 
1154  Burrows “The Contractual Remedies Act 1979”, (1980) 1 Canterbury Law Review 82. 
1155  Manyam, “Sale of Goods Contracts and the Requirement of Fitness for Purpose in the Sale of 
Goods Act 1908”,  [2003] Wko L Rev 4 
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of $20. Section 6 of the 1908 Act was repealed by the Contracts Enforcement 
Act 1956.  
• Pursuant to section 3 of the Sale of Goods Amendment Act 2003 (2003 No 
35), from 8 July 2003, the definition of goods has been extended to include 
computer software. 
• The phrase ‘merchantable quality’ is still utilised in section 16(b), without 
further definition. 
• The legislation, in particular the provisions on title conflicts, has been made 
subject to the Personal Property Securities Act 1999. 
• The market overt exception was repealed by section 2 of the Sale of Goods 
Amendment Act 1961 (1961 No 98). 
• The rules on examination and acceptance in sections 36 and 37 were modified 
by the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 to ensure that certain types of deemed 
acceptances were made subject to a right of examination. 
• Importantly, the main provisions of the Sale of Goods Act on implied terms 
and remedies (sections 10 (ascertainment of the price), 13-17 (statutory 
implied terms), 38 (buyer not bound to return rejected goods) and 54 (remedy 
for breach of warranty) do not apply to any supply of goods to which the 
Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 applies. 
 
Further to the last bullet point above, following criticism of the 1908 Act,1156 in 
particular as regards the consumer buyer, new legislation in the form of the Consumer 
Guarantees Act 1993 was introduced (cf. Saskatchewan Consumer Product 
Warranties Act, 1977).1157  This 1993 Act applies to the supply of goods and services 
(including electricity, gas, telecommunications signals, water and computer software) 
to consumers, and it sets out various rights (in the form of guarantees, in effect 
innominate terms, as opposed to conditions and warranties1158) and remedies against 
                                                 
1156  See e.g. the Vernon Report on An Outline for Post-Sale Consumer Legislation in New Zealand 
(1986).  See further Harland, “Post-Sale Consumer Legislation for New Zealand”, (1988) 3 Canterbury 
Law Review 410. 
1157  Hawes, “Consumer Law Reform: the Consumer Guarantees Bill”, (1992) 5 Canterbury Law 
Review 17.   
1158 As far back as 1977, the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee of the Department of 
Justice produced a Working Paper on Warranties in Sales of Consumer Goods which proposed that the 
distinction between conditions and warranties in contracts for the sale of goods should be abolished and 
replaced with a single concept of warranty, with an associated new regime of remedies. No legislation 
was enacted on the basis of the report, at the time. 
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business sellers and manufacturers (the remedies available depend on the seriousness 
of the breach).1159  Mirroring the sales of goods legislation, the various guarantees 
relate to title; acceptable quality (defined to include reference to fitness for all 
common purposes; appearance and finish; freedom from minor defects; safety and 
durability); fitness for particular purpose, description; sample, price, repairs and spare 
parts, and express guarantees.  Importantly, these guarantees cannot be contracted out 
of in relation to consumer purchases.  Remedies against the seller are outlined in Part 
2 of the Act (including rights of remedy and rejection) and remedies against a 
manufacturer (direct liability) are available under Part 3. Part 4 deals with the supply 
of services.  As well as including guarantees as to reasonable care and skill, the time 
for completion of a service and the price payable (cf. UK Supply of Goods and 
Services Act 1982) there is also a guarantee as to fitness for particular purpose of the 
service and any resultant product.  Further detailed rules relate to rights of redress 
against suppliers of services. 
 
4.2  Personal Property Securities Act 
Following a recommendation from the Law Commission in their Report, ‘A Personal 
Property Securities Act (PPSA) for New Zealand’,1160 a Personal Property Securities 
Act 1999 was enacted in place of the Chattels Transfer Act 1924, Part IV of the 
Companies Act 1955, Motor Vehicle Securities Act 1989, and the Industrial and 
Provident Societies Amendment Act 1952.1161  The PPSA reformed the law relating to 
security interests in personal property by providing for a new single regime dealing 
with the creation and enforceability of security interests in personal property; issues of 
priority between security interests and other types of interests; and, the establishment 
of an online register of security interests in personal property.  Like other similar 
regimes, under the PPSA, the emphasis is on the substance rather than form of the 
security agreement and conditional sale arrangements, such as retention of title 
clauses are treated as security interests under this legislation and afforded “super 
priority” in certain circumstances.  
                                                 
1159  See also Fair Trade Act 1986 (based on Division I of Part V of the Australian Trade Practices Act 
1974) which prohibits certain misleading and deceptive conduct, false representations and unfair 
practices, as well as regulating consumer information and issues of safety. 
1160  No. 8, (1989).  See further Farrar, “New Zealand Considers a Personal Property Security Act”, 
(1989-90) Can Bus LJ 328.  
1161  See further Webb, [2000] New Zealand Law Review 175, and [2002] New Zealand Law Review 
199. 
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4.3  United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods 
Following a recommendation from the Law Reform Commission in their 1992 
Report,1162 (based primarily on the growing acceptance of the Convention by New 
Zealand’s main trading partners and satisfaction with its substantive rules), the UN  
Convention was incorporated by the Sale of Goods (United Nations Convention) Act 
1994. 
 
4.4  E-Commerce  
In a three part report on E-Commerce,1163 the Law Reform Commission identified 
various questions concerning the impact of e-commerce on the domestic legal 
framework and, based on five key principles (the choice principle, the adaptation 
principle, the technology–neutral principle, the compatibility principle and  the private 
sector leadership principle), recommended the enactment of legislation, similar to 
Electronic Transactions legislation in Australia, and in line with the UNCITRAL 
Model Law,1164 to remove barriers to e-commerce and to facilitate its 
development.1165   
 
The purpose of the Electronic Transactions Act 2002 is stated to be to facilitate the 
use of electronic technology by reducing legal uncertainty concerning the effect of 
information and communications in electronic form and by providing that certain 
paper-based legal requirements may be met by using electronic technology that is 
functionally equivalent to those legal requirements.1166  Accordingly, the Electronic 
Transactions Act 2002 provides for the validity of information in electronic form and 
includes default rules regarding the time and place of despatch and receipt of 
electronic communications.  Part 3 addresses electronic transactions and various legal 
requirements of writing; signatures, retention of documents and information, and, 
production and access to documents and information, as well as originals.  
Interestingly, there is no express provision dealing with contracts – offer and 
acceptance – although clearly electronic contracts (in particular their formation and 
validity) come within the scope of the legislation.  Further, a provision on 
                                                 
1162  Report No. 23, ‘The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: 
New Zealand's Proposed Acceptance’.   
1163 Report No. 50 (1998), Report No. 58 (1999), and Report No. 68 (2000). 
1164  See further s.6. 
1165  See further Webb, [2001] New Zealand Law Review 171.   
1166  Section 3. 
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acknowledgement of receipt has also been omitted from the legislation, as 
unnecessary. 
 
4.5  Conclusions 
While the shadow of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 is still more than evident in New 
Zealand, a number of points can be made about developments in the law there, 
including, 
• The existence of separate though related regimes for commercial and 
consumer sales; 
• In relation to the Sale of Goods Act 1908, it is notable that: 
o The formalities requirements have been repealed; 
o The market overt rule has been repealed; and  
o goods have been re-defined to include computer software (this is also 
the case under the Consumer Guarantees Act, 1983). 
• The significance of external influences, in particular, from Australia 
(regarding e.g. fair trading legislation, and e-commerce legislation) and 
international harmonising bodies (e.g. UNCITRAL), although the Consumer 





The 1893 Act and Australia 
 
Sale of Goods Acts, based on the 1893 Act, were enacted in South Australia and 
Western Australia in 1895; in Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria in 1896; and in 
New South Wales in 1923.  Much of this legislation remains in force today, subject to 
amendment.  Layered upon this basis framework, at federal and state levels, is a raft 
of consumer protection legislation, most notably in the form of fair trading legislation 
which addresses the matters of conditions and warranties in consumer sales and direct 
producer liability.  This current legislative framework at federal and states levels will 
be considered further below, as well as a number of law reform initiatives at state 
level.  Australia has also enacted e-commerce legislation, as well as incorporating the 
Vienna Convention at state and territory levels.  These areas of the law will be 
outlined further below. 
 
5.1  Sale of Goods Acts 
The principle sales legislation in force today, at state/territory level, is as follows: 
• South Australia - Sale of Goods Act 1895  
• Western Australia - Sale of Goods Act 1895 
• Queensland - Sale of Goods Act 1896 
• Tasmania - Sale of Goods Act 1896 
• New South Wales - Sale of Goods Act 1923   
• Australian Capital Territory - Sale of Goods Act 1954 
• Victoria – Goods Act 1958  
• Northern Territory - Sale of Goods Act 1972  
 
The structure and substance of much of the 1893 Act remains in the above 
enactments, despite criticism of the legislation.1167  A number of features are worthy 
of further comment. 
 
 
                                                 
1167  See e.g. Sutton, “The Reform of the Law of Sale”, (1969) Alta L R 130; Lambiris, “Reform of the 
Law of Sale in Australia”, [1996] Melbourne University Law Review 690. 
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• formalities 
Originally, the sale legislation in all states and territories required that contracts in 
excess of $20 comply with formal requirements.  However, such requirements have 
been repealed in all states and territories except Western Australia and Tasmania.1168  
The Law Reform Commission of Western Australia has recommended repeal of these 
formal requirements. 
 
• merchantable quality 
The implied condition of merchantable quality remains undefined in statutory form as 
regards commercial sales and is also restricted to goods bought by description from a 
seller who deals in goods of that description (as in original 1893 Act). 
 
• sale of bulk goods   
More recently, a number of states have amended the rules on the passing of property 
in relation to bulk goods in line with the UK’s Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 
1995.1169 
 
• nemo dat rule & market overt exception 
The market overt exception to the nemo dat rule has been repealed in a number of 
states including New South Wales; Victoria, and Queensland.  It remains in force in 
the other states/territories, although the Law Reform Commission of Western 
Australia has recommended repeal of this exception also. 
 
Some Sale of Goods Acts have been amended with reference to the relevant personal 
property security legislation: e.g. New South Wales; and Southern Australia.1170 
• miscellaneous  
                                                 
1168  Qld, Statute of Frauds 1972, s.3; SA, Statutes Amendment (Enforcement of Contracts) Act 1982, 
s.4; ACT, Sale of Goods Act 1975, s.2; Vic, Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1987, s.9; NSW, 
Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1988; NT, Sale of Goods Amendment Act 1999, s.2. 
1169  NSW, Sale of Goods and Warehouseman’s Liens (Bulk Goods) Act 2006; SA, Statutes 
Amendment (Bulk Goods) Act 2008; Vic Fundraiser Appeals and Consumer Acts Amendment Act 
2009. 
1170  See generally, ACT, Sale of Motor Vehicles Act 1977, Part 4A; Tas, Motor  Vehicles Securities 
Act 1984;  NSW, Registration of Interests in Goods Act 1986; Qld, Motor Vehicle and Boat Securities 
Act 1986; SA, Goods Securities Act 1986; Vic, Chattel Securities Act 1987; WA, Chattel Securities 
Act 1987; NT, Registration of Interests in Motor Vehicles and Other Goods Act 1989. 
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o further inclusions - the Victoria Sale of Goods Act 1958 is notable for its 
inclusion of a new Part II which addresses the role of consignees and 
mercantile agents, and documents of title including, in particular, bills of 
lading, within its scope.   
 
o sheep’s wool and skins -  a number of the Sale of Goods Acts also include 
special provisions as regard the sale of sheep’s wool and skins which seek 
to prohibit deductions in relation to ‘draft allowances’.     
 
o innominate terms - the NSW Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1988 is 
notable for its introduction into statute of the concept of an intermediate 
term.  Section  4(5) of the Sale of Goods Act provides:  
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as excluding a right to treat a 
contract of sale as repudiated for a sufficiently serious breach of a 
stipulation that is neither a condition nor a warranty but is an 
intermediate stipulation. 
 
As noted above, layered on top of the sale of goods legislation, is a raft of consumer 
protection measures at both federal and state/territory levels.  In particular, the 
Commonwealth Trade Practices Act 1974, as well as addressing anti-competitive 
practices, provides consumers with a variety of forms of protection: Part V of which 
contains provisions dealing with the quality and fitness of goods supplied to 
‘consumers’; the direct liability of producers of defective goods; and remedies in the 
event of false representations being made in connection with the supply of goods.  
State legislation also provides protection in relation to consumer sales which 
generally mirrors the provisions of the Commonwealth Trade Practices Act 1974.1171 
 
As regards conditions and warranties in consumer contracts, Part V, Division 2 of the 
1974 Act implies into contracts for the supply of goods and services to consumers 
conditions as to title, description, merchantable quality (defined as in Irish Sale of 
Goods Act 1893, as substituted by 1980 Act) and fitness for purpose, akin to those in 
the sale of goods legislation although the application of the legislation differs and the 
                                                 
1171 See SA, Fair Trading Act 1987, Part 10 Div 2 and Consumer Transactions Act 1972; WA, Fair 
Trading Act 1987;  NSW, Fair Trading Act 1987, Parts 4&5; Qld, Fair Trading Act 1989, Part 3; Tas, 
Fair Trading Act 1990, Part 2; NT, Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Act, 1990, Part 5; ACT, Fair 
Trading Act 1992, Part 2; Vic, Fair Trading Act 1999, Parts 2 & 2A;  
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legislative phrases may have been interpreted differently, at times.  Moreover, these 
implied conditions are mandatory and cannot be excluded, restricted or modified.   
 
As regards the supply of services in the course of a business, it is interesting to note 
that, unlike the minimalist approach of the UK Supply of Goods and Services Act 
1982, there is a detailed definition of ‘services’ in section 4 of the 1974 Act: 
services includes any rights (including rights in relation to, and interests in, real or 
personal property), benefits, privileges or facilities that are, or are to be, provided, 
granted or conferred in trade or commerce, and without limiting the generality of the 
foregoing, includes the rights, benefits, privileges or facilities that are, or are to be, 
provided, granted or conferred under: 
(a) a contract for or in relation to:  
(i) the performance of work (including work of a professional 
nature), whether with or without the supply of goods; 
(ii) the provision of, or the use or enjoyment of facilities for, 
amusement, entertainment, recreation or instruction; or 
(iii) the conferring of rights, benefits or privileges for which 
remuneration is payable in the form of a royalty, tribute, levy or 
similar exaction; 
(b) a contract of insurance; 
(c) a contract between a banker and a customer of the banker entered into in 
the course of the carrying on by the banker of the business of banking; or 
(d) any contract for or in relation to the lending of moneys; 
but does not include rights or benefits being the supply of goods or the performance 
of work under a contract of service.  
 
Subject to certain exceptions, section 74 implies a number of warranties in relation to 
due care and skill of the service provider and fitness for purpose of materials; and 
fitness for particular purpose of service and materials.  In particular, section 74(1) 
requires that in contracts for work and materials any materials supplied in connection 
with those services will be reasonably fit for the purpose for which they are supplied. 
The English Law Commission in its 1979 Report on Implied Terms in Contracts for 
the Supply of Goods1172 criticised this section for omitting the qualification that there 
has to be reliance on the supplier's skill and judgment thereby rendering a supplier 
                                                 
1172   Law Com. No. 95. 
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liable for damages even where the customer insisted on using materials contrary to the 
supplier's advice. 
 
This latter implied warranty in section 74(2) is also of significance.  Under the UK 
Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 there is no implied obligation on the supplier 
that the promised services will produce the intended effect. In contrast, pursuant to 
section 74(2) of the Trade Practices Act there is an implied warranty that where the 
consumer makes known the purpose for which the services are required or the result 
that he wishes to achieve, the services will be reasonably fit for that purpose or are 
such that they might reasonably achieve that result, unless the consumer does not rely 
on the supplier's skill or judgment, or it is unreasonable for him to do so.  In its 1986 
report the English Law Commission considered the Australian provisions but thought 
it would be inappropriate to add them to the 1982 Act because they thought there was 
as yet no clear evidence of a positive need for an extension of the range of terms 
implied in the SGSA.   Such extension was also opposed by the Hong Kong Law 
Commission (1990) in part because of the belief that imposing such a statutory 
obligation could in fact decrease consumer protection because there would be no 
liability if the supplier could show that the consumer did not rely on his skill or 
judgment.   
 
The English Law Commission in its 1986 report also considered and rejected the term 
that the supplier should possess the necessary skill implied in the Irish Sale of Goods 
and Supply of Services Act. They thought it unnecessary because the customer would 
not sustain damage unless the supplier failed to exercise reasonable skill. Further, the 
term was implied at common law and since the SGSA does not affect any term 
implied by common law, the term would continue to be implied. 
 
In 2009, an Issues Paper, Consumer rights: statutory implied conditions and 
warranties was published.  Under its terms of reference the Commonwealth 
Consumer Affairs Advisory Council has been asked to review the relevant provisions 
in the Trade Practices Act 1974 and in particular to consider: 
• the adequacy of the current implied terms; 
• the need for any amendments; 
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• the need for ‘lemon laws’ to protect consumers who purchase goods that 
repeatedly fail to meet expected standards; 
• the existence of extended warranties in the marketplace and their interaction with 
the statutory implied terms. 
The outcome of this process is awaited. 
 
Manufacturer’s direct liability to consumers is addressed in Part V Division 2A of the 
1974 Act.  In effect, provided certain conditions are met, these provisions make a 
manufacturer/importer concurrently liable with the seller of goods to compensate the 
consumer for any loss or damage arising from: 
o the goods not being merchantable; 
o the goods not being fit for their particular purpose; 
o the goods not corresponding to description; and  
o the goods not corresponding to sample. 
Manufacturers may be additionally liable for failure to ensure that facilities to service 
and provide spare parts are available and in relation to guarantees and other express 
warranties. 
 
Moreover, a regime of strict liability of manufacturers for injury or property damage 
caused by a defective product is provided for in Part VA of the 1974 Act. 
The 1974 Act also contains prohibitions against engaging in unconscionable conduct 
(Part IVA).  Section 51AA codifies the common law by referring to the ‘unwritten 
law’ (i.e. the common law). Section 51AB bans unconscionable conduct when 
supplying goods or services to consumers, and lists a number of factors relevant to 
determining whether conduct is unconscionable or not, including  
(a) the relative strengths of the bargaining position of the supplier and the 
consumer; 
(b) whether, as a result of conduct engaged in by the supplier, the consumer was 
required to comply with unreasonable conditions; 
(c) whether the consumer was able to understand any document relating to the 
supply of goods or services; 
(d) whether any undue influence or pressure etc. was exerted on the consumer; 
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(e) the amount for which, and the circumstances under which the consumer could 
have acquired identical goods or services.   
Hence, the legislation seeks to clarify the application of unconscionability and 
circumstances where a consumer is at a “special disability”.  The inclusion of s51AC, 
added in 1998, extends unconscionability by, in effect, classing ‘small business’ as 
‘business consumers’.1173 
The Trade Practices Act contains other prohibitions in relation to misleading and 
deceptive conduct (s.52); false representations (s.53); and other unfair practices.    
 
5.2  Law Reform Commission of New South Wales – Sale of Goods Reports and 
Papers (1972, 1975, 1987 & 1988) 
The matter of sale of goods has come before the Law Reform Commission of New 
South Wales on a number of occasions in the form of working papers, issue papers, 
and reports.    
 
The matter of sale of goods law was referred to the Law Commission in 1966, with 
the following terms of reference: 
To review the law relating to the sale of goods and to review the liability of 
manufacturers, sellers and other persons having a connexion in the course of 
trade with goods to buyers, users and other persons suffering damage through 
defects in goods; and to consider proposing uniform legislation on these 
subjects throughout the Commonwealth. 
 
However, work on the above terms of reference was delayed for a number of reasons.  
In particular, the Commission was requested by the Attorney General to make an 
interim report on the significance of the English and Scottish Law Commission on 
exemption clauses in contracts for the sale of goods (Law Comm No.24; Scot. Law 
Comm. No.12).  No reform in this regard was ultimately proposed, in particular, the 
Law Commission of New South Wales stated: 
                                                 
1173  Legislation controlling unconscionable contracts has also been enacted at state / territory level, 
e.g. New South Wales Contracts Review Act 1980.   
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This Commission thinks that it is probable that the future law as to sale of 
goods will vary as between England and Australia. British entry into the 
European Economic Community is likely to lead to assimilation of its law to 
that of the Market countries. Australia will not necessarily wish to follow that 
course. There seems to be justification for proceeding to a general revision of 
the law relating to the sale of goods for Australian purposes without adopting 
for the time being reforms now being undertaken or considered in England. A 
general review of this area of law is likely to be more beneficial and easier of 
implementation than measures of interim relief. 
 
The above terms of reference were addressed in a Working Paper (1975) and, 
belatedly, in a Second Report on the Sale of Goods published in 1987.  The Report 
made relatively modest recommendations as regards innocent misrepresentation; 
innominate terms; formalities, passing of property in specific goods and the interplay 
between examination and acceptance.  In particular, the Commission recommended 
that: 
• the Sale of Goods Act 1923 should be amended to make it clear that it does not 
exclude the right to treat a contract of sale as repudiated for a sufficiently serious 
breach of an intermediate stipulation; 
• the formal requirements in section 9 of the Act should be repealed; 
• the passing of property in specific goods should no longer of itself bar rejection of 
the goods; 
• the description of acceptance in section 38 of the Act should be subject to section 
37 on right of examination  in the case of acceptance by an act of the buyer 
inconsistent with the ownership of the seller. 
This Second Report proved more fruitful and lead to the enactment of the Sale of 
Goods (Amendment) Act 1988. 
 
Further to the above terms of reference a more fullsome Issues Paper on Sale of 
Goods was produced in 1988.  The Issues Paper identified a number of areas for 
review and made tentative proposals for reform including that there should be 
separately reforming legislation dealing with commercial and consumer sales, 
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respectively.  In relation to commercial sales the Commission expressed the following 
views, or, sought views on the following matters. 
• The legislation was in need of review for the purpose of updating the Act but a 
new Sale of Goods Act was not warranted; 
• The Commission identified two types of issues – general contract issues and 
specific sale of goods matters; 
• General contract issues included: 
o misrepresentation aside, what was the appropriate role of equity in sale 
of goods contracts; 
o should more detailed rules on contract formation be included in the 
sale of goods legislation (see e.g. UCC and Vienna Convention); 
o should the doctrine of privity of contract be reformed in the context of 
sales legislation or a wider contract law context; 
o should the distinction between representations and terms be abolished 
in the context of sale of goods contracts; 
• Specific sale of goods issues included: 
o Legislative provision was needed to bring certainty as regard retention 
of title clauses and their impact on company charges and the need for 
registration; 
o Should international sale contracts (fob and cif) be addressed 
specifically in the sales legislation (see UCC) and should aspects of 
the Vienna Convention be incorporated into domestic law; 
o Should the legislation make clear the distinction between rejection and 
termination; 
o Are the implied terms satisfactory e.g. should merchantable quality be 
further defined or updated; 
o Should the concept of cure be introduced; 
o Should issues of mistake and frustration be covered within the sales 
legislation and if so, should the rules be amended to address gaps in 
the current legislative rules e.g. unascertained and future goods; partial 
perishing etc.   
o Should the legislation include rules on claims to damages for late 
delivery and late payment; 
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o  Should the legislation contain more detailed rules (based on common 
law) relating to damages claims e.g. regarding causation, remoteness, 
mitigation , definition of available market etc.; 
o Are the nemo date exceptions in need of reform; 
o Should a general duty of good faith, or an unconscionability provision 
be introduced; should either (or both) be limited to the terms of the 
contract themselves or extended to their enforcement; and should 
these matters come within the scope of the sale legislation or the wider 
law of contract.  
 
As regards consumer sales the following views were expressed / sought: 
• Separate legislation dealing with consumer sales was required.  Further 
matters for consideration included: 
o The definition of consumer and whether ‘small business operator’ 
should come within this definition/protection; 
o The relationship with other legislation; 
o Simplifying the implied terms and remedies regime for consumers; 
o The right to reject should lapse on the first business day one calendar 
month after purchase, except re perishable goods;  
 
Lastly, the Report considers matters of scope of the legislation (and related contracts 
of hire, hire-purchase, services etc).  The Report also states that there should be 
specific legislation dealing with contracts for computer software and the Commission 
identified two areas of particular concern: 
• The manner of creation and the scope of the obligations which should be 
imposed on the supplier of the software.  
• The relationship between such terms and copyright under the copyright 
legislation.   
 
However, no further reports or legislative action followed the Issues Paper and an end 
to this period of review of the law of sale of goods was marked by a withdrawal of the 
remainder of this reference by the AG at the request of the Law Commission in 1997.   
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5.3  Law Reform Commission of Western Australia – Sale of Goods Papers and 
Reports (1995 & 1998) 
In 1989, the Sale of Goods Act 1895 was referred to the Law Reform Commission for 
general review.  At the time of the reference the 1895 Act was virtually identical to 
the English Sale of Goods Act 1893 and hence the reference arose out of recognition 
of the need for reform following similar developments in other Australian 
jurisdictions, Britain and Canada.  
 
Two discussion papers were published in 1995. The first discussion paper dealt with 
implied terms in sections 12–15 of the Act together with a number of general issues 
such as the relationship between the Act and the Trade Practices Act 1974 and the 
distinction between conditions and warranties. The second discussion paper was 
confined to the issue whether section 59(2) could validly be interpreted as including 
principles of equity in a sale of goods context with particular reference to 
misrepresentation, duress, mistake, fraud and equitable interests and remedies.1174 
 
The final Report containing the Commission’s recommendations was delivered in 
June 1998.1175  The Report is notable for recommending only minimal reforms to the 
Act. These reforms were of an uncontroversial nature and reflected similar reforms in 
other Australian jurisdictions. In summary, the Commission recommended that: 
• The formal requirements in section 4 be abolished. 
• The market overt exception to the rule that no one can give better title than 
he possesses (section 22) be abolished. 
• The provisions in section 11 dealing with the passing of property in specific 
goods be repealed, because the interaction between this provision and the rules 
in section 18 dealing with when the property in such goods passes produces an 
unfair result for the buyer. 
• The provisions of section 35, dealing with acceptance be amended to give 
the buyer a realistic right of examination before he is deemed to have accepted 
the goods. 
                                                 
1174 Section 59(2) provides that ‘[t]he rules of common law, including the law merchant, save in so far 
as they are inconsistent with the express provisions of the Act … shall continue to apply to contracts 
for the sale of goods’. 
1175 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, The Sale of Goods Act 1895, Project No 89 (1998). 
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• Further provisions be inserted in sections 59 and 35 to make it clear that 
equitable principles, as well as those derived from common law, have a part to 
play in contracts for the sale of goods. 
 
However, to date, there has been no action to implement the Commission’s 
recommendations, despite the modest nature of the reforms proposed.   
 
5.4  Personal Property Security legislation 
Following various reports and consultations,1176 the Personal Property Security Act 
2009 and the Personal Property Securities (Consequential Amendments) Act 2009 
were enacted.  The new uniform scheme is expected to be operational in mid 2011. 
 
5.5  United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods  
The Standing Committee of Attorneys General decided in 1984 that Australia would 
ratify the Convention once all States and Territories passed legislation to give effect 
to the Convention.  Australia acceded to the Convention on 17 March 1988 and it took 
effect from 1 April 1989.  The Convention was given legal effect in the various 
states/territories, as follows: 
• Australian Capital Territory - Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1987 
• New South Wales - Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1986  
• Northern Territory - Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1987  
• Queensland - Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1986 
• South Australia – Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1986 
• Tasmania - Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1987 
• Western Australia - Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1986 
• Victoria - Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1987. 
 
5.6  E-Commerce  
The Commonwealth Electronic Transactions Act is based on the UNCITRAL Model 
Law.  In May 1999, the States and Territories agreed to exact parallel legislation 
based on the federal legislation and this has now been achieved.1177  The legislation 
                                                 
1176  See e.g. Law reform Commission Report No 64 Personal Property Securities (1993). 
1177  NSW Electronic Transactions Act 2000; Vic, Electronic Transactions (Victoria) Act 2000, SA, 
Electronic Transactions Act, 2000; Tas, Electronic Transactions Act 2000; NT, Electronic Transactions 
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provides for the legal equality between hard copy and digital copy in relation to 
writing; signatures; production of documents; and retention of information and 
documents.  It also contains rules on the time and place of dispatch and receipt of 
electronic communication and the attribution of electronic communications.  
However, there is not express provision dealing with electronic contracts and issues 
concerning the formation of contracts online and the incorporation of terms remain to 
be decided at common law. 
 
5.7  Conclusions 
Despite a number of papers and reports on reform of the law of sale of goods in some 
states, the sale of goods legislation in the various states and territories is still closely 
linked to 1893 Act (e.g. with merchantable quality remaining undefined in a 
commercial context).  Broadly speaking, any reforms which have been enacted are 
modest and uncontroversial including: 
• Repeal of formalities requirements in the majority of states/territories; 
• Repeal of market overt rules in some states. 
Reform of the law on bulk sales, where it has occurred, has followed UK legislation.  
More ambitious plans for reform at state/territory levels (e.g. see NSW Issues Paper 
1988) appear to have been shelved.  The reform agenda has largely been driven at 
federal level (see most recently the 2009, an Issues Paper, Consumer rights: statutory 
implied conditions and warranties ).    
 
Despite continued reference to the 1893 Act, in the form of the states legislation of 
sale of goods, there is some evidence of a move away from UK developments (except 
re bulk sales) and a move towards more regional harmonisation (with New Zealand) 
and more international driven harmonisation (e.g. UNCITRAL’s Model Law on E-
Commerce). 
                                                                                                                                            
(Northern Territory) Act, 2000; Qld, Electronic Transactions (Queensland) Act 2001; ACT, Electronic 
Transactions Act 2001; WA, Electronic Transactions Act 2003. 
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                                                          Chapter 6  
The 1893 Act and Hong Kong 
The Sale of Goods Act 1893 was originally adopted in Hong Kong in 1896.  Since 
then it has been amended a number of times.  With the establishment of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region in 1997, the Basic Law of the Region carried 
over all laws previously in force and compatible with the Basic Law. The current sale 
of goods legislation is to be found, in consolidated form, in the Sale of Goods 
Ordinance, Cap 26 of 1997.   
 
In this Chapter, the principle legislation on sale of goods is first considered, followed 
by a review of a number of Law Commission Reports relevant to the broad topic that 
is sale of goods. 
  
6.1  Sale of Goods Ordinance, Cap 26 
The principle legislation is the Sale of Goods Ordinance, Cap 26, which replicates 
closely the Sale of Goods Act 1893, subject to various amendments, inspired to a 
large extent by the UK experience.  The main features of note in the legislation 
include the following: 
• A definition of ‘dealing as a consumer’ based on the UK’s UCTA 1977 has 
been added (added 85 of 1994, s.3); 
• Section 6 on formalities was repealed (58 of 1977, s.3); 
• A more detailed definition of merchantable quality which includes reference to 
appearance and finish; freedom from minor defects; safety and durability 
(replaced 85 of 1994, s.2); 
• The basic principle of caveat emptor is not re-stated in section 16(1) (replaced 
85 of 1994, s.4); 
• The market overt exception has been extended to ‘goods sold openly in a shop 
or market in Hong Kong … ’ (66 of 2000, s.3); 
• Section 26 on revesting of property in stolen goods and section 28 on the 
effect of writs of execution were repealed (21 of 1970, s.35; 52 of 1987, s.45); 
• Rules on examination and acceptance revised in sections 36-7 (85 of 1994, 
ss.5-6); 
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• On exclusion clauses generally see Control of Exemption Clauses Ordinance 
Cap 71, 1989 (following the recommendation of the Law Commission Report 
on the Control of Exemption Clauses (1986), and inspired by the UK Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977).1178 
 
6.2  Law Commission Report on Sale of Goods and Supply of Services (1990) 
A number of the above amendments followed a Law Commission Report on Sale of 
Goods and Supply of Services in 1990.  The relevant terms of reference were to 
consider: 
1. Whether under the Sale of Goods Ordinance the obligations of a seller of 
goods to supply goods that are of merchantable quality and reasonably fit for 
their purpose should be reformulated. 
2. Whether in a contract for the sale of goods the remedies available to the 
buyer for breach of the seller’s obligations as to quality and fitness of the 
goods should be altered. 
3. Whether it would be desirable to introduce any statutory control over unfair 
terms in contracts for the sale of goods or supply of services. 
4. Whether in relation to contracts for the supply of services any statutory 
obligation should be imposed on the seller. 
 
Following analysis which included looking at developments in other common law 
jurisdictions, the Law Commission made a number of recommendations, many of 
which were designed to enhance consumer protection.  The reforms recommended in 
the 1990 report included: 
• that the phrase ‘merchantable quality’ be retained for commercial and 
consumer sales; 
• that the existing section 16 (or section 14 of the 1893 Act) should be redrafted 
in a positive form to emphasis the fact that there is a positive requirement for 
goods to comply with the quality standard;  
• that in relation to consumer sales the definition of merchantable quality be 
clarified further listing aspects of quality to which the court should have 
                                                 
1178  See Aitken, “The Control of Exemption Clauses Ordinance”, (1990) 20 HKLJ 382. 
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regard, including the appearance and finish of the goods and their safety and 
durability; 
• (it would seem reluctantly) that the distinction between condition and warranty 
be retained in all sale of goods contracts; 
• that cure provisions (i.e. a right to repair or replace) should not be introduced 
for either commercial or consumer sales; 
• that there should be legislative provision which makes it clear that the signing 
of an acceptance note, or other such document, does not result in the buyer’s 
loss of his right of rejection of the goods unless he has in fact had a reasonable 
opportunity to examine them; 
• that the inconsistent act rule be retained but that it be clarified that a buyer 
would be able to return defective goods even if he had sold them and that they 
had been rejected by the sub-buyers. 
On the obligations of a supplier of services, the report recommended adopting the 
English Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 which sets out the main common law 
obligations concerning the quality of the services, the time for performance and the 
consideration. Provisions should also be made to prohibit the exclusion or restriction 
of liability for breach of these obligations in consumer transactions. 
Moreover, the Law Commission recommended that legislation should go beyond 
limiting exemption clauses only, and that a provision such as section 52A of the 
Australian Trade Practices Act be included in the Ordinance to control harsh or 
unconscionable terms for consumer sale of goods and supply of services contracts 
(but not commercial transactions). 
A series of legislative enactments in 1994 implemented the report’s 
recommendations. These were the Sales of Goods (Amendment) Ordinance, the 
Supply of Services (Implied Terms) Ordinance, Cap 457, and the Unconscionable 
Contracts Ordinance, Cap 458. 
In relation to the supply of services, the Supply of Services (Implied Terms) 
Ordinance implies terms as to reasonable skill and care; time for performance; and the 
price, in line with the UK Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982.  However, as 
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against consumers, liability for breach of the statutory implied terms cannot be 
excluded or limited.  
 
As regards the Unconscionable Contracts Ordinance, 1994, Cap 458, section 6 states 
that in determining whether a contract or part of a contract was unconscionable in the 
circumstances relating to the contract at the time it was made, the court may have 
regard to (among other things): 
(a) the relative strengths of the bargaining positions of the consumer and the 
other party; 
(b) whether, as a result of conduct engaged in by the other party, the consumer 
was required to comply with conditions that were not reasonably necessary for 
the protection of the legitimate interests of the other party; 
(c) whether the consumer was able to understand any documents relating to 
the supply or possible supply of the goods or services; 
(d) whether any undue influence or pressure was exerted on, or any unfair 
tactics were used against, the consumer or a person acting on behalf of the 
consumer by the other party or a person acting on behalf of the other party in 
relation to the supply or possible supply of the goods or services; and 
(e) the amount for which, and the circumstances under which, the consumer 
could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or services from a person 
other than the other party. 
 
Moreover, in determining whether a contract was unconscionable the court shall not 
have regard to  
(a) any unconscionability arising from circumstances that were not reasonably 
foreseeable at the time the contract was made; and 
(b) conduct engaged in, or circumstances existing, before the commencement 
of this Ordinance. 
 
Section 5 provides that where one of the parties deals as consumer, and the court finds 
the contract or any part of it to have been unconscionable, the court may  
(a) refuse to enforce the contract; 
(b) enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable part; 
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(c) limit the application of, or revise or alter, any unconscionable part so as to 
avoid any unconscionable result. 
The burden of proof is on the person claiming that the contract or part of it is 
unconscionable. 
 
6.3  Law Commission Report on Contracts for the Supply of Goods (2002)  
This Report is notable for making a number of recommendations in relation to supply 
of goods, including in the context of a sale.  Following a consultation paper in 2000, 
and a final report in 2002, the Law Commission has recommended that in relation to 
contracts for the supply of goods (other than by sale), such as contracts of hire, hire-
purchase, and contracts for work and materials (regarding the materials), the law 
should be clarified and made more certain, by setting out, in new legislation, 
suppliers’ implied undertakings to customers in contracts for the supply of goods. The 
recommendation is that these undertakings should be consistent with those which 
apply at present in contracts for the sale of goods.  Hence, a supplier under a contract 
for the supply of goods would be implied to have made the following statutory 
undertakings: 
• that the supplier has the right to transfer or hire out (as the case may be) the 
goods, and the customer will enjoy quiet possession of the goods; 
• where the supply is by description, that the goods correspond with the 
description; 
• that the goods are of satisfactory quality, and are fit for the particular purpose 
for acquiring the goods which the customer has made known to the supplier; 
• where the supply is by sample, that the bulk corresponds with the sample in 
quality. 
 
The Commission also recommended that where a customer is a non-consumer, if the 
breach by the supplier is so slight that it would be unreasonable for the customer to 
repudiate the contract, the customer cannot reject the goods but can claim damages 
only.   
 
The Commission also reviewed the position in relation to the supply of computer 
software but did not reach a conclusive decision as to the way forward. 
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The Commission took the opportunity to make a number of proposals concerning sale 
of goods, also.  In particular, the Commission made the following recommendations: 
• where there is a sale of a specified quantity of unascertained goods forming 
part of an identified bulk and the buyer has paid for the goods, property in an 
undivided share in the bulk should pass to the buyer, unless otherwise agreed; 
• where the goods delivered under a contract are defective, the buyer should be 
able to reject the defective goods and accept those that conform; 
• repealing the market overt exception: at present, a buyer buying from a shop 
or market, without notice that the seller’s  title is defective, can still retain the 
goods even though the true owner claims them back;  
• where a buyer is a non-consumer, he should not be able to reject for delivery 
of a wrong quantity if the error is so slight that it would be unreasonable for 
him to do so; 
• clarifying that a buyer shall not be deemed to have accepted the goods merely 
because he asks for, or agrees to, their repair by or under an arrangement with 
the seller. 
 
These recommendations have yet to be acted upon. 
 
6.4  United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods 
The UN Convention has not been adopted in Hong Kong although it was approved by 
the People’s Republic of China, with reservations, in 1986 and where it entered into 
force in 1988.1179   
 
6.5  Bills of Lading and International Sales 
Inspired by the UK’s Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, the Bills of Lading and 
Analogous Shipping Documents Ordinance, Cap 440 (originally 85 of 1993) permits 
the lawful holder of a bill of lading (and other analogous shipping documents, such as 
sea waybills and ship’s delivery orders) to sue on the bill of lading simply by virtue of 
being the holder, whether property in the goods had passed or not, under the 
underlying sale of goods contract.  As well as addressing the transfer of rights the 
legislation also deals with the transfer of liabilities and other related matters.   
                                                 
1179  See further Bridge, “A Law for International Sale of Goods”, (2007) 37 HKLJ 17. 
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6.6  E-Commerce 
The Electronic Transactions Ordinance, Cap 553 (1 of 2000), subject to certain 
exceptions, provides for the equivalence of electronic records and digital signatures 
with paper based records and signatures; the regulation of certification authorities; 
duties of certification authorities and applicable codes of practice.  Section 17 deals 
specifically with the formation and validity of electronic contracts; and sections 18-19 
deal with the attribution and sending and receiving of electronic records (based on 
UNCITRAL Model Law).  But, like the UNCITRAL Model Law, key questions 
concerning when and where an e-contract is formed and issues concerning the 
incorporation of terms of contract are not addressed in the legislation.1180 
 
6.7  Class Actions 
The Law Reform Commission issued a consultation paper, in 2009, proposing that a 
mechanism for multi-party litigation should be adopted in Hong Kong (cf. European 
Commission Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, COM (2008) 794 final).  
The report is critical of the current restrictive rules on representative proceedings (see 
also Final report of Working Party on Civil Justice Reform, 2004). 
 
Aware of the risk that a class action regime might unduly encourage litigation the 
Paper recommends that in order to filter out cases that are clearly not suitable, class 
action proceedings should only be allowed to continue as collective proceedings if 
they have been certified by the Court.  In addition, any new regime should be 
introduced on a phased basis.  The Paper also recommends that the new class action 
regime should adopt an ‘opt-out’ approach, i.e. once the court certifies that a case is 
suitable for a class action, any member of the class, as defined in the order of court, 
will be automatically bound by the subsequent litigation, unless he ‘opts out’ of the 
class action within the time limits prescribed by the court order.  The consultation 
paper also seeks views on the funding models which allow plaintiffs with limited 




                                                 
1180  Pun et al, “Review of Electronic Transactions Ordinance”, (2002) 32 HKLJ  241. 
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6.8  Conclusions 
Based on the above analysis, notable features of the law of sale of goods in Hong 
Kong include the following. 
• In general, developments in Hong Kong mirror closely the UK experience, in 
relation to sale of goods; supply of services; unfair contract terms; and bills of 
lading and other shipping documents; 
• However, the enactment of legislation on unconscionable contracts with 
consumers (1994), is a significant exception to this general approach; 
• First, the extension (Cap 66, 2000, s.3), and now, recommended repeal, of the 
market overt rule (Law Commission Report, 2002); 
• The recommendation to amend the rules on passing of property re bulk goods 
along the lines of the UK Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995 (Law 
Commission Report 2002); 
• Others recommendations regarding acceptance and buyer’s remedies in the 
Law Commission Report 2002 (largely inspired by UK) yet to be 
implemented; and lastly,  
• The recent Law Commission consultation paper on ‘Class Actions’ (2009). 
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Chapter 7 
The 1893 Act and Singapore 
As a former British colony, English law, including the Sale of Goods Act 1893, was 
received into the colony’s legal system when enacted.  In particular, section 5 of the 
Civil Law Act (Cap 30), introduced in 1879, ensured that Singapore commercial law 
was at one with English commercial law.1181  Singapore sale of goods legislation has 
been amended a number of times since, most recently in 1996.  Broadly speaking, the 
effect of these amendments has been to update the law of sale of goods in Singapore, 
in line with developments in the UK.  The main features of this and related legislation 
will be outlined below in the context of a number of law reform proposals, concerning 
bills of sale and personal property security interests (including retention of title 
clauses), e-commerce, the parol evidence rule, and the international sale of goods. 
 
7.1  Sale of Goods Act, Cap 393. 
The principal legislation in relation to domestic sale is the Sale of Goods Act, Cap 
393 (amended most recently by the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1996).1182  This 
is, in effect, a re-enactment of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979, as amended 
(incorporating changes to the quality standard and buyer’s remedies; new rules on the 
passing of property in relation to bulk goods; and, a repeal of the market overt rule).  
Accordingly, sale of goods law in Singapore while derived from the 1893 Act, has 
been amended in line with UK experience and therefore includes the following 
noteworthy features: 
• Formal requirements based on the Statute of Frauds have been repealed; 
• A switch from merchantable quality to satisfactory quality with expanded list 
of factors, following UK Sale of Supply of Goods Act 1994 (43 of 1996); 
• Different remedies for commercial and consumer buyers exist e.g. re minor 
breach, in line with UK Sale of Supply of Goods Act 1994  (43 of 1996); 
• A new provision for co-ownership of goods in bulk, in line with the UK Sale 
of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995 (43 of 1996); 
• Repeal of the market overt rule (following the UK Sale of Goods 
(Amendment) Act 1994); 
                                                 
1181  See further Application of English Law Act 1993. 
1182  See Neo, “The Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1996”, (1997) 9 SA  J  362.   
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• Re-formulated rules on examination and acceptance, including a right to 
partial rejection, as with the UK Sale of Supply of Goods Act 1994 (43 of 
1996). 
  
Moreover, legislation in the form of the Supply of Goods Act, Cap 394 (44 of 1996) 
and the Unfair Contract Terms Act, Cap 396 (44 of 1996) adopted the UK Supply of 
Goods Act 1982 and UCTA 1977, respectively, into the law of Singapore. 
 
7.2  Security over Personal Property 
Bills of Sale Act, Cap 24, though amended on a number of occasions, remains faithful 
to the structure and principles of the original Bills of Sale Act 1886.  This legislation 
was the subject of a Report of the Law Reform Committee of the Singapore Law 
Academy in 1996.  Following a review of the legislation, and, in light of international 
developments, the Committee made a number of recommendations.  In particular: 
• The Bills of Sale Act represented a rigid, restrictive and archaic approach to 
personal property security and should be replaced by a comprehensive 
personal property security law applicable whether the property to be subject to 
a security interest is goods or a chose in action and whether the debtor is a 
corporate or non-corporate person. 
• This law should define the security interest as an interest in personal property 
created by a transaction which in substance secures payment or performance 
of an obligation. 
• This general definition of security interest should be amplified by a list of 
interests which are included or excluded as security interests. 
• This law should also lay down uniform requirements for the creation of a 
security interest, whether possessory or non-possessory in nature. 
• Where several security interests are created in the same property, their 
priorities should depend on whether, in the case of a possessory interest, the 
collateral has been taken into possession and in the case of a non-possessory 
interest, a financing statement describing the transaction creating it has been 
filed. 
• As a general rule, priority should be given to that interest in respect of which 
all the necessary steps for securing priority were first taken and completed. 
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• As a qualification to that general principle of priorities, purchase money 
security interests (including retention of title clauses) which inject new value 
to the debtor’s business should be accorded super-priority. 
• Security interests in consumer goods (including motor vehicles) of less than a 
specified value should be excluded. 
• To facilitate trade, purchasers of goods sold or leased in the ordinary course of 
the debtor's business should take free of any security interest in those goods. 
• Financing statements should be filed on a real time basis with a computerised 
Register of Personal Property Security. 
 
These proposals remain to be acted upon. 
 
7.3  E-Commerce and e-contracts 
The Electronic Transactions Act, Cap 88 (25 of 1998, amended by 54 of 2004) was 
inspired by the UNCITRAL Model Laws on e-commerce (1996) but like the Model 
Law is not exhaustive.1183  The Electronic Transactions Act was introduced to 
facilitate electronic communications; electronic commerce; the electronic filing of 
documents with government; and to minimise forgery and fraud in electronic 
communications.1184 The legislation addresses many aspects of e-commerce, in 
particular, the legal recognition of electronic records, writing and signatures; liability 
of network service providers; aspects of electronic contracts; secure electronic records 
and signatures and issues surrounding digital signatures (including duties and 
regulation of certification authorities and subscribers); and e-government issues. 
 
In relation to e-contracts, the legislation addresses the formation and validity of e-
contracts, as well as containing provisions on acknowledgement of receipt and rules 
on the time and place of despatch and receipt.1185  Nevertheless, many important 
questions remain unanswered.  In particular, questions such as whether a despatch or 
receipt rules applies to different types of electronic communications is not addressed 
                                                 
1183  Phang & Seng, “The Singapore Electronic Transactions Act, 1998”, (1999) 7 Int’l J L & Info. 
Tech. 104. 
1184  Section 3. 
1185  Sections 11-15. 
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in the legislation, and issues around the incorporation of terms by means of browse-
wrap and click-wrap agreements remain to be resolved by the common law.1186   
 
In a paper published in 2002 by the Singapore Academy of Law a number of 
questions were identified in this regard, including: 
(1) Should there be legislative clarification on the issue of ascription of 
responsibility for actions of computer agents in the context of formation of 
electronic contracts?  This issue of attribution of origin is dealt with by section 13 of 
the Electronic Transactions Act and it is questionable whether further clarification is 
needed. 
 
(2) Should the substantive law of mistake be modified to give greater allowance 
in electronic contracting for one party to nullify or withdraw from the 
transaction?  
The Paper notes that the desirability of this type of reform depends on empirical 
evidence, if any, as to the relative likelihood of errors being made in such contexts 
compared to normal contexts, as well as considerations of policy as to whether it is 
desirable for the law to be more indulgent with contracts made over electronic media, 
and of possible prejudice to third parties. 
 
(3) Should the legislature clarify the applicability of the postal acceptance rule in 
the contexts of electronic contracting? 
The Paper notes that the arguments are finely balanced as to which rule (despatch or 
receipt) is preferable. However, it opts for a general default rule, based in legislation, 
as not only necessary but also inevitable.  The Paper does not identify which rule 
should be the general default rule but further notes that, exceptions could be 
incorporated in order to achieve a balance between the parties in question.  The 
alternative is to leave the matter to be addressed on a case by case basis ‘by reference 
to the intentions of the parties, by sound business practice and … by a judgment 
where the risks should lie?’ (Brinkibon v Stahag [1983] 2 AC 34). 
 
                                                 
1186  See further Singapore Academy of Law, “The Impact of the Regulatory Framework of E-
Commerce in Singapore”, (2002).   
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(4) Should the legislature modify the existing law on the incorporation of terms 
to deal with specific situations relating to browse-wrap/click-wrap contexts in 
electronic contracting? 
This follows from Question 3.  The Paper asks whether the Legislature might also like 
to consider if a separate regime of rules is required in order to achieve fairness in the 
context of ‘browse-wrap’ as well as ‘click-wrap’ agreements. It is suggested that it 
might retain the existing rules (subject to the clarification proposed above) but add, 
for example, further rules pertaining to incorporation in order to achieve fairness for 
all concerned.  Again, the alternative is to leave such matters to be resolved on a case 
by case basis. It is noted that the US Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act 
(‘UCITA’) uses the concept of ‘opportunity to review’, a concept which, although 
defined extensively in the UCITA, is still not much clearer than the common law 
position. 
 
Further questions relate to alternatives to electronic signatures, protection of 
consumers, international harmonisation, and conflict of laws issues. 
 
7.4  Parol Evidence Rule 
The Evidence Act, Cap 97 contains detailed rules of evidence, including sections 93-
102 in relation to parol evidence.  In a Report of the Law Reform Committee on a 
Review of the Parol Evidence Rule (2006), the Committee considered various 
methods of reform including: 
(i) maintain status quo – no legislative amendments; 
(ii) abolish parol evidence rule by statute; 
(iii) abolish statutory rules and rely on common law; and 
(iv) retain and improve statutory rules. 
Following detailed analysis and a survey of the parol evidence rule in other 
jurisdictions, the Committee favoured the fourth option.  This recommendation 
remains to be acted upon although the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act, Cap 
52A (27 of 2003) has abolished the parol evidence rule in relation to consumers, by 
providing that parol or extrinsic evidence establishing the existence of an express 
warranty is admissible in any action relating to a consumer transaction between a 
consumer and a supplier even though it adds to, varies or contradicts a written 
contract (section 17).   
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7.5  United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods  
Following a Report and recommendation from the Law Reform Committee of the 
Singapore Academy of Law, (1994), and based on strong support from the business 
community, the Sale of Goods (United Nations Convention) Act, Cap 283A, (14 of 
1995) was enacted to incorporate the Vienna Convention into Singapore’s legal 
system.1187 
 
7.6  Conclusions 
Of all the jurisdictions surveyed, Singapore is perhaps most faithful to the UK Sale of 
Goods Act 1979, as amended.  And, as with the UK, reform of personal property 
security interests remains on the back-boiler.  Other calls for reform, i.e. regarding e-
commerce and the parol evidence rule, also remain to be addressed.  However, 
Singapore is notable for its incorporation of the Vienna Convention. 
                                                 
1187 Sun, “Sale of Goods (United Nations Convention) Act 1995”, (1996) 8 SAcLJ 104; Hsu, “Remedies 
available for breach of contract under the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods”, (1996) 8 SAcLJ 113. 
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Chapter 8 
Summary of Reforms and Reform Proposals in Other Jurisdictions    
This Chapter seeks to summarise the different reforms and proposals for reform from 
the six jurisdictions surveyed in Chapters 2-7 and, in so doing, to identify options for 
the reform of Irish sale of goods and supply of services law. First, the general 
approaches to reform followed in other jurisdictions are considered. Secondly, 
specific options for reform of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, as amended by Part II of 
the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980, are examined.  Thirdly, reform of 
aspects of Part IV of the 1980 Act on the supply of services is considered, followed 
by a brief consideration of the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods.      
 
8.1  Approaches to Reform  
1. Nature of Reform.  The study of the reform agenda in the six jurisdictions in 
Chapters 2-7 indicate two main approaches to reform:  
a. Complete review and ‘codification’, including a clear move away from the 
principles and structure of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (e.g. US UCC and 
as attempted in Canada); 
b. Piecemeal approach, amending particular provisions which are in need of 
reform, but maintaining the framework of 1893 Act. 
The question is which of these two approaches is best suited to the Irish legal 
system. A number of points can be made in respect of the first of these approaches 
to reform.     
• In the US, reform of the law of sale in the form of Article 2 of the UCC, 
was part of a wider review and codification process, driven largely by the 
federal nature of the US legal system.  There was, at the time, strong 
momentum driving the process and clear political will to give effect to the 
process. 
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• No other jurisdiction surveyed has evidenced such momentum and 
political will.  Canada came closest in its draft Uniform Sale of Goods Act 
(1981) (see 3.1).  In the UK, while the notion of commercial law 
codification is promoted by some academics1188 and, more recently, 
seemed to have attracted government attention, ultimately  it would appear 
that the proposal for a Commercial Code fell out of favour, not least, 
because of the large amount of Parliamentary time that would be required 
to pass a Commercial Code (see 2.8). 
• It is also worth noting the slow nature and uncertain future of the various 
attempts at codification at a European level. 
The following points can be made in respect of the alternative piecemeal approach to 
reform taken in most countries.   
• Five of the six jurisdictions surveyed clearly subscribe to this approach, in 
practice, including the UK.  The approach of the UK is particularly 
important, in an Irish context, bearing in mind Ireland’s close connection 
to the English legal system and our shared position within the EU. 
• Other smaller jurisdictions, such as Singapore and Hong Kong, have 
followed closely developments in the UK.   
• Subscription to this piecemeal approach to reform, led by the UK, provides 
access to a pool of case law interpreting the legislation, vital in an Irish 
context. 
• Criticism of the reform agenda in the UK has largely been based on its ad 
hoc and patchwork nature (see 2.4), with the principal sales legislation 
being amended, at least, twelve times in the UK.  The Irish approach of 
‘haste more slowly’ avoids this particular criticism.  Any legislation 
seeking to reform the law of sale would be in addition to the 1980 Act, 
only, and could be omnibus in nature, bringing together in one place a 
series of reforms.  
 
                                                 
1188  See e.g. Goode, (1988) 14 Monash LR 135. 
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2. Current and Future Impact of European Law.   Any reform of sale of goods 
and supply of services law must be mindful of developments at European level, as 
regards consumer sales, in particular.  The current uncertain nature of the 
Consumer Rights Directive (COM(2008) 624 final) (especially in terms of the 
proposed shift from minimum to ‘maximum’ harmonisation) places a constraint 
on the work of Sales Law Review Group.  European law impacts not only on the 
substance of the law of sale (see earlier Position Paper on the proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights), 
but also on the architecture of the legislation.  In this latter regard, there are at 
least three possible options for reform which merit further consideration: 
a. Option 1 – one statute with rules of general application and further specific 
provisions addressing consumer sales and commercial sales.  This 
integrated approach has been followed in the UK but has resulted in strong 
criticism that to deal with both commercial and consumer concerns within 
the one statute is no longer sustainable.1189 
b. Option 2 – two separate statutes: one for consumers and another for non-
consumers but seek to maintain commonality in substance between 
statutes as much as possible – e.g. keep framework of implied terms but 
amend as required (to a minimum extent) to conform with Consumer Sales 
Directive, as has been achieved in the UK, to date. 
c. Option 3 – two separate exclusive statutes: one for consumers, based in 
part, on the Consumer Sales Directive, and another for non-consumer sales 
based on a revised Sale of Goods Act. 
3. Remit.  As noted in the Introduction, the remit of this study is broad, and as a 
result, it can be difficult to draw the line between topics which are properly within 
and those which are outside the scope of the study.  Topics such as reform of the 
doctrine of privity of contract and the parol evidence rule have been largely 
excluded from the scope of the study whereas other topics such as security over 
personal property and certain aspects of insolvency law have been included.  The 
question of what topics should come within the scope of sale of goods and supply 
                                                 
1189 See e.g. Bridge [2003] LQR 173. 
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of services legislation is a perennial one, to be addressed on a case by case basis, 
with no clear rules, one way or the other.  
 
4. Limitations of Comparative Legal Research.  As with any comparative legal 
study, there are inherent limitations in such research, and therefore it almost goes 
without saying that, for the purpose of this study, all proposals for reform need to 
be assessed, at a particular time (i.e. 2010 onwards) and in an Irish context.   
 
8.2  Reform of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, as amended by Part II of the Sale of 
Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980. 
 
1. Definition (Section 1).  This provision remains largely unchanged in the 
jurisdictions surveyed (see e.g. minor re-structuring of provision in UK Sale of 
Goods Act 1979).  The major reform of significance which relates to this 
definition occurred in New Zealand in 2003 when the definition of goods was 
extended to include computer software (see 4.1).  The Law Reform Commission 
of New South Wales also recognised the need for legislation as regards the supply 
of computer software but no legislative action has resulted there (see 5.2).  
Despite the arguments made in favour of reform, no other jurisdiction has sought 
to extend the legislation to cover digital content, leaving the matter to the common 
law to resolve.1190  Also relating to the definition of goods, in Canada, in the draft 
Uniform Sale of Goods Act, specific provision sought to clarify issues around the 
sale of minerals and fixtures (s.2.5) (see 3.1). 
 
2. Wider Application.  Aspects of the legislation (principally the statutory implied 
terms and related provisions) have been applied beyond contracts for the sale of 
goods, as defined in section 1, to other similar transactions, in the jurisdictions 
surveyed.  For example, in the UK, provisions similar to those in the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 apply to contracts of hire; hire-purchase, and exchange (see 2.3).  
In Canada, the draft Uniform Sale of Goods Act sought to extend the application 
of the sale legislation.  In particular, the Draft legislation applied to ‘near sales’, as 
a means of encouraging courts to apply the sales legislation by analogy (s.2.2(4)); 
                                                 
1190  See e.g. Toby Construction Products Pty Ltd v Computa Bar (Sales) Pty Ltd [1983] 2 NSWLR 48; 
and St Albans City and District Council v International Computers Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 481. 
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and the price was payable in money or otherwise, so barter came within the scope 
of the legislation (s.2.6) (see 3.1).  In contrast, in Ireland, similar terms apply only 
as regards goods supplied under trading stamp schemes, pursuant to the Trading 
Stamp Act 1980, and goods supplied under consumer hire and consumer hire-
purchase arrangements, pursuant to the Consumer Credit Act 1995.       
 
3. Capacity (Section 2).  Sections 2 notes that capacity to buy and sell is regulated 
by the general law.  In some jurisdictions, where the law on capacity has been 
reformed, consequential amendments have been made to this provision but 
otherwise the provision has been largely untouched.1191 
 
4. Formalities of the Contract (Sections 3 and 4).  Section 3, which restates the 
common law, remains largely untouched.  Section 4, which requires certain 
formalities for contract in excess of ‘ten pounds’ before the contract is 
enforceable, has been repealed in a large number of jurisdictions surveyed (though 
not all). (see e.g. 2.1).   
 
5. Further Provisions on Formation.  It is notable that, other than sections 3 and 4, 
the only other provision on contract formation in the 1893 Act is section 58 on 
auction sales.  Other more modern sale of goods instruments include more 
detailed provisions on contract formation, including the Vienna Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods (1980) (Articles 14-24) and the Canadian draft 
Uniform Sale of Goods Act (1981) (see 3.1).  However, in the jurisdictions 
surveyed no such additions were made to the relevant sale of goods legislation.   
 
Of particular interest is the application of the rules of contract formation in the 
digital environment. Despite an abundance of e-commerce legislation in the 
jurisdictions surveyed, other than recognising the validity of contracts formed 
using electronic means and requiring equality of treatment, no jurisdiction has 
addressed the more detailed questions in this regard, such as when an e-contract is 
formed by e-mail or over the Internet and, issues concerning the incorporation of 
                                                 
1191  See e.g. NZ Minors’ Contracts Act 1969; and UK Mental Capacity Act 2005.  Note Irish Law 
Reform Commission Reports on Minors’ Contracts LCR 15 – 1985, and Vulnerable Adults and the 
Law LRC 83-2006 and any subsequent legislation. 
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terms of contract using browsewrap or clickwrap methods, instead preferring to 
leave such matters to be resolved on a case by case basis (see e.g. 7.3). 
 
6. Subject Matter of Contract (Section 5).  Section 5 addresses the distinction 
between existing and future goods.  However, no jurisdiction surveyed has sought 
to amend this provision and thereby clarify whether future goods can be ‘specific’ 
(see further s.62, 1893 Act).  
 
7. Mistake and Perishing (Section 6 and 7).  Again, this couplet of provisions 
remains untouched in the jurisdictions surveyed, despite many gaps in the 
legislation (e.g. the provisions only apply to ‘specific goods’) and questions about 
its application arising (e.g. what constitutes ‘perishing’ and how does it relates to 
the concept of merchantable quality) since enactment of the legislation.  The 
Canadian draft Uniform Sale of Goods Act sought to reform these provisions by 
collapsing the two concepts of mistake and frustration into one; replacing the 
concept of perishing with one of ‘loss through casualty’; and addressing matters of 
partial loss and theft.  However, the resulting provision has been described as 
‘complex and extremely detailed’.1192  
 
8. The Price (Sections 8-9).  Again these provisions have been untouched in the 
jurisdictions surveyed, although the Canadian draft Uniform Sale of Goods Act 
did make provision for the conclusion of contracts despite an ‘open price’ i.e. the 
price is not settled (see 3.1).   
 
9. Conditions and Warranties – stipulations as to time (Section 10).  Subject to 
some minor re-structuring of this provision in the UK, section 10 has not been 
amended e.g. to incorporate the common law prima facie rule that, in commercial 
contracts, time is of the essence.1193  It has also been questioned why stipulations 
as to the time of payment should be treated differently from stipulations as to the 
time of delivery. 
 
                                                 
1192  Fridman, Sale of Goods in Canada (5th ed., 2004) . 
1193  Hartley v Hymans [1920] KB 475. 
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10. Conditions and Warranties (Section 11).  In conjunction with the interpretation 
section, section 62, which defines a ‘warranty’, section 11 introduces the basic 
distinction between conditions and warranties which permeates the whole Act.  In 
particular, the statutory implied terms in relation to sale of goods contracts are all 
identified as either conditions or warranties.  In contrast, the terms implied in Part 
IV of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 in relation to the supply 
of services are described merely as ‘terms’ and have been interpreted as 
‘innominate’ in nature.1194   
 
The distinction between conditions and warranties in the sales legislation has been 
criticised for allowing parties to terminate a contract and reject goods following 
breach of a condition even though the effect of the breach may be minor.  This has 
led to calls to move away from this distinction and to reclassify the implied terms 
as innominate, allowing a court flexibility to determine, in the circumstances of a 
particular case, what the appropriate remedy is.  This matter was considered by 
the Law Reform Commissions in England and Scotland, in 1983 and 1987 (see 
2.4).  Ultimately, while the implied terms in Scotland where reclassified as ‘terms’ 
(s.15B, Sale of Goods Act 1979), the distinction between conditions and 
warranties was maintained in England.  Instead, a new provision was introduced 
in relation to commercial contracts only, which prohibited rejection and 
termination where the breach of the implied terms was minor (s.15A(1), Sale of 
Goods Act 1979).  (Similar changes were made in relation to section 30 on the 
delivery obligation – see further below).  This more modest reform sought to 
address the potential ‘abusive’ conduct of parties without altering a core feature of 
the legislation, though it is not without its critics.1195   
 
In the other jurisdictions surveyed, the principal sale of goods legislation 
maintains the distinction between conditions and warranties.  Singapore has 
amended its legislation, following the UK example, to limit the right to reject and 
terminate for non-consumers where the breach is minor (see 7.1).  Notably, New 
Zealand, in its consumer sales legislation, the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, 
uses the concept of ‘guarantees’ (a form of innominate term) when addressing 
                                                 
1194  Irish Telephone Rentals v ICS Building Society [1991] ILRM 880. 
1195  E.g. Atiyah’s Sale of Goods (Harlow: Pearson, 11th ed., 2005) p. 97. 
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seller’s obligations in relation to the goods (see 4.1).  Moreover, New South 
Wales has introduced into statute the concept of an innominate term in sale of 
goods contracts (see 5.1). 
 
11. Implied Terms as to Title (Section 12).  Again, in the jurisdictions surveyed, this 
provision remains unchanged, bar minor alterations of a drafting nature.  The main 
proposals for reform in this regard relate to the reversal of the decision in Rowland 
v Divall
1196
 where it has been held that if a purchaser bought goods to which the 
seller had no title (in breach of s.12(1), 1893) then there was a total failure of 
consideration and the purchaser could recover the full purchase price from the 
seller irrespective of any benefit he may have had of the goods in the interim.  
This case was considered on a number of occasions in the UK (1966, 1975, 1983 
and 1987) (see 2.7) but ultimately it was decided that the proposals for reform 
were too complex, and hence no change in the law was recommended.   
 
12. Implied Terms as to Description and Quality (Sections 13-15).  The main focus 
of reform in this regard has been on the implied term of merchantable quality in 
section 14(2) of the 1893 Act.  Before looking at this aspect of the legislation in 
more detail a number of comments can be made more generally and in relation to 
the other implied terms in this collection.  
• Section 13 – A number of academics have noted that the implied term 
as to description adds little, if nothing, to protect the buyer of goods 
over and above the express terms of the contract.  Judicial support can 
also be found for this view.1197  Indeed, in the Canadian draft Uniform 
Sale of Goods Act the implied term as to description was deleted and 
absorbed into the provision dealing with express warranties (s.5.10) 
(see 3.1).  Despite these criticisms, this provision remains unaltered in 
the jurisdictions surveyed. 
• Section 14(1) – which restates the common law rule, caveat emptor, 
has also been criticised, by a variety of sources, as out of date, and 
hence inappropriate and inaccurate in modern times.  This basic 
                                                 
1196  [1923] 2 KB 500 and approved by the Supreme Court in United Dominion Trust (Ireland) Ltd v 
Shannon Caravans Ltd [1976] IR 225.   
1197  See e.g. Harlingdon & leinster v Christopher Hull Fine Arts Ltd [1990] 1 All ER 737.  
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restatement of the common law has been removed from the Hong 
Kong Sale of Goods Ordinance (see 6.1), though it remains in the other 
jurisdictions surveyed.    
• Sections 13, 14(4) and 15 - As part of its review of the statutory 
implied terms, the English and Scottish Law Commissions (1987) 
while recommending various reforms in relation to merchantable 
quality, agreed that the other implied terms as to description, particular 
purpose, and sample were not in need of reform. 
• Section 15 – in the UK and Singapore, in the context of the reform of 
the rules on examination and acceptance in sections 34 and 35 of the 
1979 Act, some repetition between sections 15 and 34 on the right to 
examine was removed from section 15, by the repeal of section 
15(2)(b) on the right to a reasonable opportunity to compare the bulk 
with the sample (see 2.4 and 7.1). 
• Sections 14(2) and (3) – Two main issues arise in this regard: (i) the 
use of the term ‘merchantable quality’; and (ii) the definition or 
meaning of the phrase. 
As regards the former issue, the English and Scottish Law Reform 
Commissions, in their joint 1987 report, recommended a change from 
merchantable quality to ‘acceptable quality’.  However, the Sale and 
Supply of Goods Act 1994 opted for a different phrase: ‘satisfactory 
quality’ (see 2.4).  Singapore followed suit.  The other jurisdictions 
under review still use the phrase ‘merchantable quality’ in their sale of 
goods legislation.  While in New Zealand, the Consumer Guarantees 
Act 1993 implies a guarantee of ‘acceptable quality’; ‘acceptable 
quality’ is also the phrase used in the Saskatchewan Consumer 
Protection Act 1996 (which replaces the Consumer Product Warranties 
Act, 1977 where ‘acceptable quality’ was also utilised) (see 4.1).  The 
question is whether this difference in terminology results in a 
difference in substance.  Case law since the enactment of the Sale and 
Supply of Goods Act 1994 in the UK would suggest not, and the 
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definitions of ‘acceptable quality’ in the New Zealand and Canadian 
legislation are very similar to the modern definitions of merchantable.   
As regards the issue of definition or meaning, the Irish Sale of Goods 
and Supply of Services Act 1980 introduced a definition of 
merchantable quality with specific reference to a number of factors, 
namely reasonable fitness for purpose and durability, taking into 
account description, price and other relevant factors (s.14(3), 1893).  
Other definitions of the quality standard (whether merchantable, 
acceptable or satisfactory; see also DCFR IV A 2:301) identify further 
relevant factors such as: 
• Appearance and finish, 
• Freedom from minor defects; 
• Safety; 
• Express terms; 
• Accessories and instructions; 
• Packaging. 
Lastly, in the UK Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1994, as 
well as changing the quality standard to satisfactory quality, with an 
expanded list of factors, the definition of ‘satisfactory quality’ also 
reversed the decision in Aswan v Lupdine1198 by requiring that goods 
be fit for all their common purposes (and not merely one of their 
common purposes).   
 
13. Passing of Property (Section 16-18) 
The operation of the rules on the passing of property, found in sections 16-18 of 
the 1893 Act, may result in outcomes contrary to parties’ expectations, in 
particular where the goods sold are unascertained or future goods.  As noted in 
earlier Chapters of this study (see 2.6 and 3.3) detriment can result where buyers 
                                                 
1198  [1987] ! All ER 135. 
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(consumer and commercial) have paid for the goods in advance but because the 
goods have not been ascertained (under section 16 because, for example, they 
remain part of a larger bulk) and/or have not been unconditionally appropriated 
(under section 18, Rule 5) no property passes to the buyer.  Therefore, in the case 
of the seller’s insolvency, the buyer is, in practice, left unprotected.  
 
In the UK, the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995 was enacted to protect pre-
paying buyers (both commercial and consumer) of goods in bulk by making them 
tenants-in-common of the bulk (see 2.6).  This legislation, while not 
uncomplicated nor without its critics, has achieved more popular support abroad.  
Following the UK lead, identical amending legislation has been enacted in 
Singapore (see 7.1), New South Wales, Southern Australia and Victoria (see 5.1), 
and, proposed in Hong Kong (see 6.3). 
 
In British Columbia the position of consumer buyers was singled out for special 
treatment and has been enhanced following the enactment of the Consumer 
Protection Statutes Amendment Act SBC 1993 which uses the concept of a lien 
over the seller’s property to protect the pre-paying consumer buyer (see 3.3).  
However, the same effect could have been achieved more simply by giving such 
consumer buyers preferential status (like employees as regards their unpaid 
wages) on insolvency.  This option was not open to the Legislature in British 
Columbia because insolvency law is a federal matter.   
 
14. Reservation of Title (Section 19 etc) 
While the legislation envisages the use of reservation of title devices (s.17 and 
s.19), modern retention of title clauses, which have become popular since the 
1970s are regulated, in detail, by the common law and can operate to undermine 
the statutory scheme of distribution on insolvency (see e.g. 2.8).  Accordingly, the 
courts have sought to draw a line in the sand identifying certain types of clauses 
which are effective, and those which are ineffective for lack of registration.  
Importantly, questions concerning the exact position of this ‘line in the sand’ have 
not been fully resolved in Ireland.   
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It has been argued that legislative provision is needed to bring certainty as regard 
retention of title clauses, including their impact on company charges and the need 
for registration / disclosure (see e.g. 5.2).  A number of jurisdictions have 
addressed the matter of retention of title clauses in the wider context of personal 
property security legislation, led by the USA and Canada (see 3.4).  More 
recently, personal property security legislation has been enacted in New Zealand 
(see 4.2) and Australia (see 5.4).   
 
The matter has been considered on numerous occasions in the UK but to date no 
such legislation has been enacted (see 2.8).  Proposals to introduce personal 
property security legislation in Singapore also remain on the back-boiler (see 7.2). 
 
The Irish Law Reform Commission in its Report on Debt Collect (2) Retention of 
Title
1199 recommended reform in this regard.  In particular, it recommended that 
such clauses should not be enforceable unless evidenced in writing and signed by 
the buyer, and that such clauses would not be deemed to create any form of charge 
over goods unless expressly provided for at the time the contract of sale was 
concluded.  A scheme for the registration of such charges was also recommended.  
However, based on international developments, both where personal property 
security schemes have been put in place and where they have been merely 
considered, the clear preference is to address these issues in the wider context of 
personal property security reform leading to a unitary system where matters of 
substance prevail of that of form. 
 
15. Risk (Section 20) 
Under the 1893 Act risk passes with property, unless agreed otherwise.  It was the 
dominant influence of property within the scheme of the Act (e.g. in relation to 
risk; claims for the price; etc.) which was one of the main criticisms of the 1893 
Act by the drafters of the US UCC.  The Canadian draft Uniform Sale of Goods 
Act 1981 also sought to break the link between property and a number of 
‘unrelated’ areas, including risk. 
 
                                                 
1199  LRC 28-1988. 
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Again, the rules on the passage of risk, due to this link with property, often give 
rise to results which are contrary to the reasonable expectation of the parties.  The 
alternative is to link the passage of risk with delivery.  This is the approach 
proposed in Article 23 of the draft Consumer Rights Directive1200, and in IV.A. 
5:102 of the Draft Common Frame of Reference. 
 
Despite criticism, the rules on the passing of risk in section 20 have, with the 
exception of the amendment introduced in the UK in 2002 which provides that 
where the buyer deals as consumer the goods remain at the seller’s risk until they 
are delivered to the consumer1201, not been amended to date in the jurisdictions 
surveyed.  
 
16. Conflict of Title (Sections 21-26) 
The provisions in sections 21-26 on conflicts of title have been considered suitable 
for law reform on various occasions in a number of jurisdictions.  These reforms 
or proposals for reform can usefully be classed as ‘major’ and ‘minor’.  Starting 
with the more minor reforms, which involve maintaining the basic structure of the 
nemo dat rule followed by a number of exceptions, it is possible to identify a 
number of potential areas of reform.   
 
• Perhaps most significant within this class would be the repeal of the 
market overt exception in section 22 (see e.g. 2.5).   An alternative option 
would be to extend the scope of this rule, as occurred in Hong Kong (see 
6.1), for instance.  Repeal has been favoured in most of the jurisdictions 
surveyed and has also been recommended in Hong Kong.   
 
• As a means of tidying the statute book, some jurisdictions have integrated 
the provisions of the Factors Act, which includes three exceptions to the 
nemo dat rule (section 2 on mercantile agents; and sections 8 and 9 on 
sellers and buyers in possession, overlapping with section 25, of the 1893 
Act)  into the sales legislation. 
                                                 
1200  COM (2008) 614 final. 
1201 Section 20(4) Sale of Goods Act 1979, inserted by Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers 
Regulations 2002 (S.I. 2002/3045), reg. 4(2).  
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• In their 1966 report, the UK Law Reform Committee proposed a number 
of amendments, namely,  
o removal of the distinction between void and voidable contracts in 
section 23;  
o reversal of the decision in Car and Universal Finance Co. Ltd v 
Caldwell
1202 and hence that communication is necessary to avoid a 
contract under section 23; 
o reversal of the dicta in Newtons of Wembley Ltd v Williams1203 and 
that the legislation should be clarified to ensure that a buyer in 
possession can pass good title without the requirement to act as a 
mercantile agent;  
o the reversal of the burden of proof regarding good faith etc. under 
section 23 which, unlike all the other exceptions, rests with the 
original owner.1204   
None of these proposals were implemented in the UK (see 2.7) or 
elsewhere.   
 
A number of more major reforms can be identified, including the following. 
• It has been suggested that it might be possible to apportion loss between 
an innocent owner and an innocent purchaser where there is a conflict of 
title resulting from the conduct of some dishonest middle party who has 
disappeared.1205  However, the UK Law Reform Committee (1966) 
rejected this suggestion of apportionment because they argued it was 
impractical / too complicated to implement, especially where string 
transactions are involved. 
• It has also been proposed (e.g. in the UK, Diamond report (1989); see 2.8) 
that consideration should be given to whether the exceptions to nemo dat 
rules should be reformulated into a single coherent principle.  However, 
no such reformulation has occurred in any of the jurisdictions surveyed 
(cf. US UCC).   
 
                                                 
1202  [1965] 1 QB 525. 
1203  [1965] 1 QB 560. 
1204  Whitehorn Bros v Davison [1911] 1 KB 463. 
1205  Ingram v Little [1961] 1 QB 31 as per Devlin LJ. 
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17. Performance of the Contract (Sections 27-37) 
There have been a number of significant reforms in relation to this section on 
performance of the contract.  Like the amended remedies for breach of the 
statutory implied terms, these new rules seek to bring a flexibility to the 
legislation by allowing partial rejection and by amending the rules on the amount 
to be delivered where the breach is ‘minor’ for commercial sale.  Moreover, 
various amendments have sought to clarify the relationship between examination 
and acceptance.   
 
First, in England and Singapore, section 30 on delivery of the wrong quantity has 
been amended in two main ways.  Section 30(4) of the UK 1979 Act on delivery 
of goods of a mixed description has been repealed (s.30(3) of the 1893 Act).  
Moreover, specific rules have been introduced for commercial buyers to limit their 
ability to reject goods under section 30 where the excess or shortfall is minor (see 
e.g. s.30(2) A-E of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979) (see 2.4).     
 
Secondly, in England and Singapore, a right to partial rejection was introduced, 
including partial rejection within an instalment, subject to the ‘commercial unit’ 
proviso (see e.g. s.35(7) and s.35A, UK Sale of Goods Act 1979) (see 2.4). 
 
Thirdly, in a number of jurisdictions, including the UK, New Zealand, Singapore, 
and Hong Kong, the rules on examination and acceptance have been modified.  
For example, in the UK and Singapore: 
• the right of examination (e.g. s.34, UK Sale of Goods Act 1979) is 
extended such that where goods are delivered and the buyer has not 
previously examined them, he is not deemed to have accepted them (i) 
when he intimates acceptance, or (ii) when he does an act inconsistent with 
the seller’s ownership, until he has had a reasonable opportunity of 
examining them to assess conformity with the contract (new s.35(2), 
1979); 
• moreover, on the issue of acceptance following lapse of a reasonable time, 
the amending legislation makes clear that whether the buyer has had a 
reasonable opportunity of examining the goods is relevant or ‘material’ in 
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determining whether the goods have been accepted or not (e.g. new s.35(4) 
and (5), UK Sale of Goods Act 1979); 
• further, a person is not deemed to have accepted the goods merely because 
(a) he asks for, or agrees to, their repair by or under an arrangement with 
the seller, or (b) the goods are delivered to another under a sub-sale or 
other disposition (e.g. new s.34(6), UK Sale of Goods Act 1979). 
Furthermore, the Canadian draft Uniform Sale of Goods Act (1981) in a section 
on general obligations included details in relation to certain types of contracts 
including international trade contracts such as f.o.b. and c.i.f. contracts, and more 
(see also US UCC).  The usefulness of such detail is open to question now in light 
of the widespread usage of the ICC’s Incoterms.      
 
18. Unpaid Seller’s Remedies (Sections 38-48) 
The provisions in section 38-48 although important when the legislation was 
enacted are rarely relied upon today to protect the unpaid seller.  The prevalence 
of credit sales and developments in transportation make it difficult to utilise these 
protections and instead retention of title clauses have been developed to fill this 
gap in protection.  However, no amendments have been made to sections 38-48 in 
the jurisdictions surveyed. 
 
19. Actions for Breach of Contract – Seller’s Remedies (Sections 49-50) 
Despite criticism about the link between the passing of property and an action for 
the price1206, and the existence of alternative approaches (e.g. US UCC use of 
‘acceptance’ of the goods, under Art 2-709, or the use of ‘delivery’ under  s.9.11 
of the Canadian draft Uniform Sale of Goods Act), there has been no amendment 
to these provisions in the jurisdictions surveyed.  It is also notable that there is no 
statutory provision addressing the matter of late payment (although s.54 refers to 





                                                 
1206  See e.g. Atiyah’s Sale of Goods (Harlow: Pearson, 11th ed., 2005)  p.485.  
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20. Actions for Breach of Contract -  Buyer’s Remedies (Sections 51- 54) 
Again, despite various questions about the operation of sections 51-54 (e.g. the 
lack of statutory provision for late delivery; the appropriateness of a market based 
rule for assessing damages in consumer sales, and indeed in commercial cases) 
there has been no amendment to these provisions in the jurisdictions surveyed. 
 
The Irish Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 introduced a right for 
consumer buyer’s to request cure (s.53(2), 1893 Act).  It is difficult to assess how 
this provision has operated in practice, though the intention was clearly to offer 
consumer buyer’s a wider range of remedies.  The matter of a right to cure has 
been considered on a number of occasions in different jurisdictions.  There are 
many issues to be considered in this regard, including its application in a 
consumer and a commercial context, and, whether it is the seller who has a right 
to cure, or, the buyer who has a right to request cure.  For example, under the 
Vienna Convention, a commercial buyer, in certain circumstances, may request 
cure under Article 46.  Moreover, in Articles 37 and 48 the seller can cure a 
defective performance, at his own expense.  A right to cure also features in the EC 
Consumer Sales Directive 1999/44, in a series of provisions that have raised many 
questions about their operation.  The cure principle is also recognised by a number 
of Canadian jurisdictions in their consumer legislation.  
 
In their joint consultative document in 1983, the English and Scottish Law 
Commissions originally recommended that the seller be given the right to repair or 
replace defective goods. On consultation, the following objections were raised: 
(1) The recommendation was too adverse to consumers because it would 
give a seller reason to argue that the consumer was not entitled to return 
defective goods and get the price back. 
(2) The recommendation left too many questions unanswered and disputes 
about how the cure principle would actually operate would create 
uncertainties. For example, did the seller have to redeliver the ‘cured’ 
goods to the buyer, or did the buyer have to collect them?   
In the end, in their final 1987 Report, the Law Commissions recommended that 
the classification of the implied terms in sections 13-15 of the Sale of Goods Act 
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as ‘conditions’ should be retained for consumer sales so that the consumer would 
continue to enjoy an absolute right to reject defective goods. 
 
The Law Commissions were also not in favour of applying the cure principle to 
commercial sales which usually involve more substantial sums of money than 
consumer sales because firstly, it would be difficult to provide a detailed enough 
code which would cover all eventualities in commercial transactions. Secondly, 
sellers may seek to do all they can to impose cure upon the buyer in some cases, 
and in others, buyers may seek cure for minor but irremediable defects simply to 
have the opportunity to reject goods because the market has changed. Further, a 
cure principle may not be practical where goods were imported with the seller 
many miles away.  Therefore, the Law Commissions recommended that in 
commercial sales the statutory implied terms should also remain as conditions but 
that the Sale of Goods Act should provide that where the breach is so slight that it 
would be unreasonable for the buyer to reject the goods, the breach is not to be 
treated as a breach of condition but may be treated as a breach of warranty (see 
2.4). 
 
A right to cure was also considered in Hong Kong in their 1990 Report on Sale of 
Goods and Supply of Services (see 6.2).  Arguments for and against were 
identified.  Accordingly, the strongest arguments for establishing cure provisions 
for both commercial and consumer transactions were: 
• that it was already common practice; and  
• that their existence would prevent an opportunistic buyer from reneging 
when he no longer wanted to abide by the contract. 
On consultation, there was substantial agreement that cure provisions should be 
established.  
 
Arguments against establishing cure provisions included:  
• if there was no absolute right to reject defective goods and if there was an 
obligation to submit goods for cure, the original state of the goods may be 
rendered undiscoverable by the cure process;  
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• that it was incorrect to assume that when a buyer made a purchase that he 
wanted the goods and would be willing to have defects rectified, quite the 
contrary, when a buyer buys goods, he expects them to be free from defects 
and it would be quite wrong to give a statutory right to the seller to provide 
cure; 
• in addition, there would be arguments about the operation of such cure 
provisions (for example, as to whether the cure had been effective). 
The Commission ultimately rejected the introduction of cure provisions.  As 
regards commercial sales, it stated that it would not be easy to devise cure 
provisions for commercial transactions which would be simple to operate. 
Businessmen generally find solutions through negotiations and the Commission 
was not convinced that having a statutory right to cure would help businessmen in 
the resolution of disputes on quality of goods. As for consumer purchases, the 
Commission stated that the general level of consumer education was relatively 
low in Hong Kong.  The law should therefore stand on the side of the consumer 
who is often in a weaker bargaining position than the seller. The Commission did 
not want to give the seller any grounds for arguing that he has a legal ground to 
resist rejection of defective goods. 
 
21. Supplementary (Sections 55-62) 
There have been no amendments of a significance nature in relation to these final 
provisions of the Act.  
 
8.3  Reform of Part IV of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980. 
Contracts for the supply of services are regulated in four provisions in Part IV of the 
1980 Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act.  There are a number of aspects of 
this regulation which can be considered in terms of its reform.  
 
1.  Definition and Application 
Unlike the Sale of Goods Act 1893 where a contract for the sale of goods is defined 
(s.1, 1893), Part IV of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 includes no 
definition of a ‘contract for services’ as such, although there are some statutory 
exceptions (s.2, 1980).  The exact application of legislation can cause problems of a 
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preliminary nature, as evidenced in Irish Telephone Rentals v ICS Building 
Society.
1207
  .   
 
In the UK, a ‘contract for the supply of a service’ is defined as a contract under which 
a person (‘the supplier’) agrees to carry out a service.  The 1982 Act, and secondary 
legislation thereunder, contains a number of exemptions (see 2.3).  In contrast, a much 
more expansive definition exists in Australia under the Commonwealth Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (see 5.1).  (See also Application and Exclusions under the DCFR 
IV C). 
 
2.  The Quality Standard and other provisions 
The 1980 Act implies four terms into contracts for the supply of services: 
• that the supplier has the necessary skill to render the service; 
• that the supplier will supply the service with due skill, care and diligence; 
• that any materials used will be sound and reasonably fit for the purpose for 
which they are required; 
• that any goods supplied will be of merchantable quality. 
 
A number of points can be made in relation to the statutory implied terms. 
 
First, the English Law Commission in its 1986 report considered and rejected the term 
that the supplier should possess the necessary skill implied in the Irish legislation. 
They thought it unnecessary because the customer would not sustain damage unless 
the supplier failed to exercise reasonable skill. Further, the term was implied at 
common law and since the legislation does not affect any term implied by common 
law, the term would continue to be implied. As statutory implied terms, by their 
nature, codify the common law, the UK criticism can be questioned in this regard.       
 
Secondly, in the UK and other jurisdictions which have been inspired by the UK 
Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, further terms as to the time of performance 
and the consideration are implied (see 2.3).   
 
                                                 
1207 [1991] ILRM 880. 
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Thirdly, the Australian provisions in the Commonwealth Trade Practice Act 1974 (see 
also DCFR IV C 2:106) goes a step further in that there is an implied warranty that 
where the consumer makes known the purpose for which the services are required or 
the result that he wishes to achieve, the services will be reasonably fit for that purpose 
or are such that they might reasonably achieve that result, unless the consumer does 
not rely on the supplier’s skill or judgment, or it is unreasonable for him to do so.  In 
1986, the English Law Commission considered this provision but thought it would be 
inappropriate to add it to the UK 1982 Act because they thought there was as yet no 
clear evidence of a positive need for such an extension of the range of terms implied.    
Such extension was also opposed by the Hong Kong Law Commission (1990) in part 
because of the belief that imposing such a statutory obligation could in fact decrease 
consumer protection because there would be no liability if the supplier could show 
that the consumer did not rely on his skill or judgment (see 5.1). 
 
Lastly, the Draft Common Frame of Reference (IV C) also contains detailed 
provisions in relation to services including a pre-contractual and contractual duty to 
warn; an obligation to co-operate; rules on sub-contracting; a duty to follow directions 
from the client; rules on variation; client’s obligation to notify anticipated non-
conformity; and client’s right to terminate.   
 
3.  Exclusion of Liability 
In Ireland and the UK, for example, liability for breach of the statutory implied terms 
in relation to contracts of services can be excluded or limited, even where the 
recipient is a consumer, provided certain conditions are met.  This can be contrasted 
with the position in relation to sale of goods contracts where consumers are better 
protected.  In contrast, in Hong Kong, the Supply of Services (Implied Terms) 
Ordinance, Cap 457, prohibits the exclusion or restriction of liability for breach of 
these obligations in consumer transactions. (see 6.2). 
 
8.4  United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods [CISG] 
The Irish Law Reform Commission has previously recommended adoption of the UN  
Convention, although no action has been taken as a result of this recommendation.1208  
                                                 
1208  LRC 42 – 1992. 
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Since that time, more states have incorporated the Convention, though the fact that the 
UK has still not incorporated it is significant.   
 
8.5  Consequential Reforms 
Repeal of section 1 of the Bill of Lading Act 1855 and reform along lines of UK 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992. 
In the course of the review of the law of sale in relation to bulk goods, the English and 
Scottish Law Commissions recommended repeal of section 1 of the Bills of Lading 
Act 1855 and further reform of the law.  These proposals were enacted in the Carriage 
of Goods by Sea Act 1992 (see 2.6) and have been adopted elsewhere including Hong 
Kong (see 6.5).  From a purely legal perspective, the case for repeal of section 1 of the 
1855 Act and reform of the law is strong.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
